Genocide and violence are erupting in Algeria in an almost total information blackout. This is certainly not by chance, for the regime has always preferred the clandestine to the transparent. Only the tip of the iceberg, the most insignificant area of decision-making, is visible. To understand the crisis and its possible solution, we must first analyse the political structure - looking beyond the Islamist movement (1) - so that we can identify the main protagonists and examine the relationships between them, and the main issues that divide them.
The power of the state, inherited from the war of liberation (1954-62), takes two forms: the army and the government. This dates back to the dichotomy between the general staff of the National Liberation Army (ALN) and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) (2). The GPRA was set up in 1958 to represent the National Liberation Front (FLN) abroad, mobilise the funds needed to organise the underground movement and support the refugees who had fled to Morocco and Tunisia. But it was the general staff of the ALN that was actually in charge of the revolution. When the war ended, it “dismissed” the GPRA and took over the running of the new state (2). Thirty-six years after independence, the government is still seen as the body that applies the policies decided by the army.
Although the army exercises sovereignty and sees itself as the supreme authority - with the Council of Ministers as merely the executive, responsible for running the administration - it does not form a homogeneous whole. It is made up of several structures which are all formally subordinate to the general staff, but nonetheless have a certain amount of autonomy. They include the national police force, the military security force and the various military districts.
In addition, the officers in charge have (...)
