Why do women join Islamic State?
Despite misconceptions that they're being tricked or coerced, the growing number of women joining Islamic State are doing so for the same political ends as men, writes Sara Mahmood.
Why do women join the so-called Islamic State (IS)? Is it because they've been seduced by promises of kittens and chocolate-hazelnut spread?
This week US Assistant Attorney General John Carlin said terrorist groups like IS were distributing propaganda images online of jihadists posing with kittens and jars of Nutella in a bid to "soften" their image and lure new recruits.
"Kittens sell," Mr Carlin said during his visit to the UK.
Which may be true, but overlooks the true motivations of women joining IS.
A new report by New America, a public policy institute, has revealed that one in seven members of IS from the West are women.
Moreover, it is estimated that at least 600 women from the West have joined IS, and this number is growing steadily.
The majority of women joining IS from the West are believed to be French nationals — intelligence figures estimate there are close to 220 French women currently in Iraq and Syria as part of the group.
The mobilisation of women has also been witnessed in Australia, with authorities claiming at least 40 women have travelled to Iraq and Syria from the onset of the crisis to 2015.
Much has been said about the women of IS, but certain misperceptions regarding their mobilisation and the subsequent roles they perform within IS prevail.
IS has become notorious for its brutal and repressive tactics, alongside its intolerance for deviance. One of the cases that personifies this is the woman who was killed by the Al-Khansaa brigade for "violating public decency norms" while breastfeeding her child in public.
Given these sinister revelations, then, why are women travelling across continents to join IS in unprecedented numbers?
In order to understand and effectively counter the mobilisation of women, it is necessary to narrow in on the preconceived notions regarding their motivations.
Broadly, the women joining IS are portrayed as naive young things who have somehow been tricked into joining IS. It is assumed that women are largely romanticised by jihadists and their false promises of love, and fall into a facade constructed by online recruiters.
However, a number of cases affirm that most women are not coerced or fooled into joining IS. Instead, a significant number of women are seen to make a conscious decision to carry out hijra (migration) for the same political ends as men.
Seeking a 'sense of empowerment'
Like men, these women desire the establishment of the caliphate in "prophetic method", which at its core is a system of governance. Moreover, being part of the group allows them to protest against the global persecution of Muslims.
According to a paper by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, the women joining IS from the West are striving to symbolically fight against the oppression of innocent Muslims in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and beyond by their own countries.
These women are also seeking a sense of empowerment through the unrestrained ability to practice Islam, a right that is often curtailed in their respective countries.
This facet of mobilisation is inextricably linked to growing societal polarisation, augmented by high levels of Islamophobia. These sentiments persist arguably due to the rise of anti-immigration policies and the growing number of hate crimes against women donning the hijab in European societies.
In this way, the Muslim women joining IS, like the men, are seeking a society where they are not discriminated against for their faith — a stark contrast to the alienation and disenfranchisement they are exposed to in the West.
The second misperception relates to the roles women perform after joining IS. Women's contribution is often portrayed as limited and insignificant, or simply bracketed as "jihadi brides".
But the women of IS are much more than just the wives of jihadists; they are assigned a plethora of roles and responsibilities, including recruiting other women, joining the all-female Al-Khansaa policing brigade and other facilitating roles.
The future of IS hinges upon women
A close study of the section From our Sisters in multiple issues of IS's online magazine, Dabiq, reveals that IS regards the role of women as child bearers as indispensible to the long-term survival of its "Islamic State".
Women are exalted for producing the future generation of "lions and lionesses", both men and women. Therefore the existence of IS's caliphate, of its long-term survival, hinges upon women fulfilling this role based on biological determinism.
The women of IS are also expected to indoctrinate their children with the "values" of the caliphate. They're required to ideologise their sons to become "defenders of the ummah" and for their daughters to embody and replicate the roles of their mothers.
The presence of women also contributes to the notion of a stable family, which supplements the husbands or foreign fighters waging jihad, and ensures their retention within the group.
Beyond their roles as mothers and wives, women also play an active role in disseminating IS propaganda on social media to attract more female recruits. And, according to IS's manifesto for women in the Islamic State, women are permitted to engage in jihad to defend the caliphate if the men are unable to do so.
However, this role is simply a temporary transgression, not dictated as permanent whatsoever. The transient nature of women as fighters rests within stereotypical conceptions of women as peaceful beings, and men as the perpetrators of violence.
It is also permissible for women who are doctors and teachers to leave their homes without a male guardian, to ensure the steady provision of public services. In the broader context of social services, women teaching children and providing medical facilities for other women reinforces the survivability of IS.
How can governments prevent women's radicalisation?
Of course, for the women who don't provide these specialised public services, leaving their homes without their male counterparts is impossible.
Even though women and the roles they perform are vital to the present and long-term survival of IS, the suppression and relegation of women to the domestic sphere remains an ardent reality.
This aspect of life under IS needs to be accentuated to inculcate awareness of the freedom the minority Muslim women from the West will be foregoing when joining the group.
Here, stories of women who left Syria as refugees due to the conflict, or who joined and witnessed the violence and restrictive lifestyle of IS, could act as an effective deterrent for mobilisation.
One such initiative by the Metropolitan Police in the UK aimed to promote the stories of three Syrian refugee women, whose pleas to other Muslim women, discouraging migration to Syria, highlighted the risks and dangers of living in a conflict zone as a woman.
Beyond efforts like these, the political dynamics triggering women's mobilisation allow Western governments to understand the underlying factors of the issue.
Rather than focusing on reactive approaches — monitoring trends of women's radicalisation and then trying to prevent them from travelling to Syria — the West needs a more proactive approach.
A proactive approach should be based on integration and community-based policies to prevent feelings of exclusion that make Muslim women more susceptible to the narratives of extremism.
Making sure that Muslim women, despite them being a minority group in the West, feel at home and are not discriminated against will also abate the key rhetoric IS utilises to recruit a growing number of women from these countries.
Sara Mahmood is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. She participated in the International Conference on Women and Jihad organised by the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS) at the University of Western Australia (UWA) in September 2015.
This article contains content that is not available.