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INTRODUCTION
Never since the formation of the state of Bihar way
back in 1912, there has been such a widespread provincial consensus
over issues which affect the interest of the state. The three issues
which have united the broadest spectrum of Bihar society are - first,
the lopsided procurement policy of the central government; second, two
on the location of a Zonal office of Railways in Hajipur; and finally,
on the calamity resulting from the recurrent floods. On all the three
issues, there has been an unprecedented upsurge in the state. The most
positive factor which surfaced during this period was near absence of
political acrimony on the party line in the province. Even the most
virulent political opponents joined hands over those questions in the
interest of the state. These developments are extremely positive and
every effort should be made to consolidate the near elusive provincial
consensus of earlier years. Ironically, nearly two years ago, the state
was allowed to be divided practically un-protested. Even earlier also,
the state was subjected to four successive geographical divisions in
the entire span of the last one century. Except during the time of separation
of Bihar from the Bengal Presidency in the early part of the twentieth
century, there has never been a state-centric movement, cutting across
caste and class divide. Even the movement for a separate state of Bihar
had a limited social base. This resulted into lack of ownership of this
provincial identity by a substantial section and thus the concomitant
regional subnationalism was extremely weak, if not totally absent. The
caste remained the main social anchor and the premier reference of individual
identity. In the process, an intermediate identity of region or sub
nationalism could never surface. Thus an average Bihari has two identities
- the first one related to caste and the second one to nation. So it
was no accident that many important public functionaries and civil servants
from the state loathed to be identified with Bihar and be referred as
‘Bihari’. Instead, they displayed more pro-activism in Bihar bashing
and often acted to ensure all possible fetters for any good thing to
happen in the state, rather than facilitating it.
At the time of independence in 1947, Bihar’s position
in relation to the other states was not very bad. After all, we had
two major investments in this state at that time. Investment by the
Tata’s in steel, an Indian indigenous entrepreneurial effort in Jamshedpur,
in the plateau region of Bihar, was possibly only of its kind in the
entire colonial world in the early part of the twentyeth century. Even
in the plains of Bihar, Dalmias invested substantially in industrial
venture in Dalmianagar before independence. After independence, instead
of consolidating this advantage, Bihar’s development strategy resulted
into its position becoming second last amongst other states by 1961.
And by 1971, we were last in the ladder. Economic condition of Bihar
has further deteriorated after the recent division of the state in 2000.
Even while per capita income (Rs.3859) being lowest and poverty (42.60
percent) being highest in the country, the state never displayed a state
of social stagnation. Ironically, even while Bihar has registered a
dramatic increase in food grain production in last one decade or so,
the state has registered a negative growth in the state income (-1.04).
Bihar has displayed that either in the realm of empowerment or in the
social consciousness, it is not burdened by its low literacy rate (47.53
percent only). Unlike many other states of the Hindi Heartland, which
are contemptuously referred as BIMARU states, the society and the polity
in Bihar have always been vibrant and infact in tremor. It can be said
figuratively that ‘million mutinies’ are taking place in Bihar. These
‘mutinies’ literally ranged from micro to mega struggles. And this phenomenon
has historical antecedent. Apart from the stellar role of Bihar in the
independence struggle, there have been several movements which had strong
impact on the local politics and society. Unfortunately, some of the
mega class movement like that of Kisan Sabha against the intermediaries
(Zamindars) or social stirring by the Triveni Sangh (involving the Koeri,
Kurmi and Yadavas) could not expand their social network or agenda beyond
their immediate goal. However they left a powerful imprint in the political
and social firmament of the state. Their ideological progenies, the
Communist and the Socialist movement, were most powerful in Bihar in
comparison to any other Hindi Heartland states. Thus politics and social
agenda got intertwined, but it could not transcend into a multi class/
caste sub-national agenda of Bihar. In contrast, there have always been
two levels of nationalism in many other parts of India. One is regional
nationalism (also referred as sub nationalism) and other is all India
nationalism. Both these nationalisms are not in contradiction. Infact
during the freedom struggle, both these movements were complimentary.
One could afford to be Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali etc. as well
as a very nationalist Indian. It is no accident that two songs of Rabindranath
Tagore, one meant for Indian nationalism (Jana Gana Mana Adhinayaka
Jayahe) and the other for Bengali subnationalism (Amar Sonar Bangla,
Ami Tomay Bhalobasi), which eventually became the national anthem of
two countries, indicated the concurrent commitment to separate (but
not incompatible) identities. In most of the southern and the western
states in India, the ultimate home of any social movement was subnationalism.
So it was not surprising that the anti-Brahmin movement in those states
got converted into agenda for subnational identity. The subnational
identity was built only after the consolidation of the social movement.
This helped in building bridges with those social sections, who felt
marginalized (mainly the upper castes) earlier, due to the plebian character
of the social movement. This strategic policy leap from ‘anti-Brahminism’
to ‘subnationalism’ triggered economic and industrial development in
those states. So it was no accident that, in Tamilnadu, entrepreneurs
both from the social apex (like Brahmins) as well as from the margin
(like Nadars, the toddy tappers) could build powerful industrial empires
in the state. This phenomenon was repeated in several southern and western
states. The reverberation of economic consolidation of these states
could soon be felt at the national level. The political and economic
centre of gravity shifted to the south and western India. The freight
equalization policy was one of the consequences of their economic and
political hegemony, which infact brought havoc to the mineral rich eastern
states of the county, including the then undivided Bihar. On several
issues, specially related to locating projects, therefore, we had to
bow before their strong subnationalism in some other states.
Even then Bihar didn’t complain. The regional culture
of Bihar ordained that it should subsidise not only Indian nationalism
but also industrialization. If mineral resources were not enough, provide
them with a huge ‘captive market’. After all, even during united Bihar,
there were hardly any intermediary industries which could cater to the
consumer segment. Even during national emergencies either resulting
from war or internal insurgencies, Bihar provided the human phalanx
(Bihar regimental Centre and various other para military and police
organisations) for canon fodder of sacrifice. The deindustrialization
of Gangetic belt, particularly in Bihar, not only facilitated industrial
revolution in Great Britain, but its human resources employed in the
‘war theatres’ also ensured that the ‘Sun should never set’ in the vast
and sprawling empire of its colonial masters.
Even in the realm of culture and confectionery, Bihar
provided captive market. If any budding celebrity wanted to get launched
in the national firmament, destination of Patna’s musical soiree in
the Dussarah festival was a must. It will not be an exaggeration to
state that several national luminaries got themselves launched in the
by-lanes of Patna, before they attained all India fame. This way, Patna
had a track record, almost parallel with Poona. In the realm of fast
moving consumer goods (FMCG), Poona is considered to be the launching
ground. In case of its acceptance there, the consumer goods will get
a national currency. What was Poona for the FMCG, Patna was for the
budding cultural entities. While Poona graduated from consumer market
to mammoth industrial centres, Patna failed to take advantage of its
cultural predominance. Patna had the potential to emerge as an entertainment
production center. The fusion of Marathi renaissance and production
vision brought about unique industrial revolution in Poona. But renaissance
and production vision both eluded this ancient city of Patna. Even in
the case of confectioneries, either chocolate, cakes, chewingum of national
and international brand, Bihar is a captive market. It is really ironic
that food products like Maggi, with least nutritional content are a
raging success in Bihar. It is reported that its sale in Patna is second
highest after Delhi. Inspite of our rich folk/classical culture and
very palatable cuisine, our home grown artists or food are not given
pride of the place. In other cultural regions/states, dance or musical
items like Bharatnatyam or Kuchipudi or Rabindra Sangeet or indigenous
food items like Idli, Dosa, Vada, macher zhole or Rosogulla has a preeminent
position. On the contrary, in Bihar, the native songs like purbi, chaita,
holi, bidesia, ghato, birha, kajari, irni/ birni, pachra, ropnigeet,
katnigeet, sohar, jhumar, jatsari, aalah, nirgun, samdaun or dance forms
like jat jatin, launda nach, bamar nach, jharni, jhijhia, natua nach,
bidapad nach, sohrai nach, gond nach songs or our cuisine/snacks like
litti/chokha, dhuska, pitha, thekua khaza, belgrami, tilkut, khurma,
anarasa, papri, lai never got a pride of place in Bihar. Bihar is possibly
one of the few states which have a rich subaltern culture. In the realm
of dance there are several of them. One can be kept spellbound by their
performance, like, dhobi nach, jhumarnach, manjhi, gondnach, jitiyanach,
more morni, dom-domin, bhuiababa, rah baba, kathghorwa nach. Subaltern
tradition with ethnic identity is not only alive in the action packed
dances but can be found in the melodious songs as well with folk aesthetic
grammar. No cultural or religious function is complete in certain social
groups without the melody of shivnarayani, harpauri, birha, lorikayan.
Even in the realm of theatre (Reshma-Chuharmal, Bihula-Bisahari, Bahura-Gorin,
Raja Salhesh, Sama Chakeva, Dom Kach) and musical instruments (More
Baza, Dhol Tasha, Pach Bazna, Daphla Bansuri) subaltern culture has
rich tradition. If our folk tradition could have been packaged by adding
certain cultural value for national-international audience, then Bihar’s
subnational identity at the grass-root could have got different meaning.
It will not be out of place to state that in the last three decades,
‘Chatth’ festival in Bihar has emerged as a subnational festival of
the state. If ‘Chatth’ could be the cultural convergence point for the
broadest possible caste and class coalition, there is no reason why
it cannot transcend into other areas also. In Bengal, Rabindranath Tagore,
Madhusudan Dutta, Jamini Roy, Girish Chandra Ghosh etc. resurrected
the folk culture in the realm of songs, music, poetry, art and theatre
and gave a new identity to Bengali subnationalism. Dravidian anti-Brahmin
movement appropriated the folk tradition and thrust modern identity
to the regional movement in the entire South and similar phenomenon
is also visible in Western India.
Now it is for India to ponder, whether even after
the onset of a new century, can it still turn deaf ear to Bihar? Can
India flourish without consolidating the economic foundation of Bihar?
Bihar has given enough to the world and the country, now it is their
turn to turn towards this benighted state. Some time we see a bizarre
scene of the so called successful states, when, even on the question
of providing a modicum of support to Bihar, they create a raucous. Sometime
back, utterances of Chandra Babu Naidu about increased resource devolution
to Bihar on the basis of Eleventh Finance Commission award was not in
good taste. Bihar would never like to grow by weakening India but it
would nevertheless like to have a ‘place under the Sun’
Recently when Jaylalitha, the Chief Minister of Tamilnadu,
insinuated to the Prime Minister for not being invited in the swearing
in ceremony of the President of India which tantamount to insult to
Tamil subnationalism, the view was fully supported by her most die hard
opponent, the former Chief Minister Karunanidhi. Such unanimity of opinion
on the questions that effect their subnational pride, among political
parties working at political cross purpose, consolidated the regional
identity and national hegemony. The prolonged dispute over Cauvery water,
between Tamilnadu and Karnataka, again indicates the strength of the
subnational foundation in both the states.
It is hoped that now the political insularity of Bihar’s
identity will be banished. Bihar, by virtue of its continued preoccupation
with national politics, has aborted its agenda for the state. Bihar
has always been used as an experimental laboratory for testing various
political strategies, which is to be replicated later at the national
level. Mahatma Gandhi, before launching his political agenda into the
national firmament, fine tuned his political strategies in the fields
of Champaran. The main bastion of J.P, the modern incarnate of Gandhi,
for the ‘Total Revolution’ was Bihar. Incidentally, both these Bihar-based
movements (Gandhiji’s Champaran satyagraha and J.P’s ‘Total Revolution’)
brought about paradigm shift in politics in India. After the Champaran
Satyagrah, Gandhi had converted the then Congress Party into a mass
organization, just as after the ‘Total Revolution’, J.P brought out
BJP (then Jan Sangh) in the political mainstream of the nation. Both
these events were scripted in the political soils of Bihar, which in
turn changed the course of history of India. These brief historical
moments were essentially recounted to indicate the intensity and receptivity
of Bihar society to different ideas, ideals and ideologies. Bihar always
felt that the burden of carrying Indian nationalism rested on its shoulder.
In the process, the regional agenda of Bihar got relegated into the
background.
Bihar has witnessed historic changes in the recent
period. The emergence of new social forces in Bihar because of electoral
empowerment is practically unprecedented. Nowhere in the country could
this segment be imagined to be at the political helm of power. Earlier,
Mungerilal Commission and later Mandal Commission democratized the society
and gave social identity to those marginalized section. Now the need
for the hour is that Bihar should transcend from consolidating ‘social
identity’ to ‘regional identity’. One could build social coalition with
all categories on regional questions. For an effective regional coalition,
multi-caste and multi-class cohesion is a necessary precondition. South
and Western India have shown the way of social and regional engineering.
The critical question is - are we going to subsume the social and regional
identity aspirations with the developmental agenda? We are sure that
the regional political consensus, being currently witnessed in the state,
can be used as a catalytic agent for triggering its development. New
era should be ushered in the state where, instead of engaging in politics
of development, every political effort should be geared for development
alone. In an underdeveloped country, ‘state’ still plays a pivotal role,
instead of ‘market’, in deciding the developmental contour. This will
be true atleast for sometime in India. For galvanizing the state, politics
is the best conduit. In that case, the regional consensus will give
muscle to the politics in bringing about substantive development. In
what follows, to understand things in a historical perspective, we will
examine briefly the factors for non-development of sub-nationalism in
Bihar. This has been discussed in the light of developments that have
occurred in the gradual evolution of nationalism and sub-nationalism
in the global as well as national context.
Nationalism, as a political phenomenon, is a product
of modern Europe. It is believed that the earliest nation states of
England, Spain, Portugal and Holland emerged during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries 1. The nation originated in the process of the elimination
of feudalism and the development of capitalism. Subsequently, other
nations emerged in central and eastern Europe. France developed as a
full-fledged nation only after the revolution of the entrepreneur class
of 1789, which swept away the multiple local loyalties 2. The emergence
of nations all over Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century
was brought about with the initiative of the entrepreneurs with an eye
to secure the domestic market within the limits of national boundaries.
The entrepreneur class unfurled the flag of nationalism because, ‘The
market is the first school in which (it) learns its nationalism’ 3.
The above explanation for the development of nationalism in Europe finds
a similar echo in India as well. Niharanjan Roy 4, Partha Chatterjee
5 and Irfan Habib 6, fundamentally subscribed to the above theoretical
format that the nation was built in Western Europe in the era of capitalism.
But Barun De7, disagrees with this formulation, and argues that national
consciousness or national movements existed even prior to the era of
capitalism. To be a nation it is not enough to have a common cultural
heritage. It is necessary, according to John Stuart Mill writing in
1861, for people to have the desire to be under some government which
should be a government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively.
So the concept of nation is intrinsically linked with the popular consciousness
for a separate sovereign entity. The emerging entrepreneur class often
leads this movement. The ideological manifestation of the movement is
‘nationalism’. ‘These are the characteristics that distinguish a nation
of the modern era from its earlier counterparts’ 8 .
Nationalism, as an ideological superstructure, helps
in facilitating capitalist development. Hence, the specific identification
of a nation by its proponent is dependent entirely upon the nature and
the strength of the class, which leads the national movement. This movement,
however, is further dependent on its expected source of support, its
opponents and the specific historical context within which the struggle
has to be carried out. There is hardly any doubt that in the pre-imperialist
phase, nationalities were cultural groups, while the nation constituted
a political economic unity that evolved under the hegemony of the entrepreneur
class.
The European experience of development of nationalism
should, however, not be mechanically applied to the colonial or Third
World countries, where nationalism was the outcome of a different historical
process. In these countries, this modern variant of nationalism emerged
as a result of its interaction with imperialism. Unlike the European
experience, nationalism here was a reaction to the colonial presence.
That is why the concept took shape within the inevitable framework of
an alien rule. Secondly, the issue of sub-nationalism in the European
context would be generally irrelevant now since, although at one time
the countries of Europe were almost like the various regions in India,
they later got much more sharply defined and could eventually shape
themselves into individual nations with nationalistic characteristics.
To understand the process as it developed in India,
it is necessary to first determine the relationship between nationalism
and sub-nationalism. Once we accept the paradoxical truth of India being
a symbol of ‘unity in diversity’, we are bound to acknowledge the fact
that India is a polyethnic and multilingual country. Nevertheless, in
the course of many centuries, India was able to evolve a fundamental
unity within its geographical ambit. The Mauryas were the first to impose
it. So did the Guptas after an interlude of six hundred years. Subsequently,
the Mughal empire succeeded in creating a unified sub-continental complexion
over the fragmented personality of India. All these impositions from
above were essentially political in nature. Despite this, our history
is replete with examples of centrifugal forces, expressed in the efforts
to assert regional identities, which present a challenge to the central
authority. In an illuminating article, Sudhir Chandra wrote ‘that development
in Assamese, Oriya and Gujrati literature during the 19th century would
suggest that regional consciousness was beginning to emerge contemporaneously
with national consciousness’ 9. Thus sub-nationalism is a historical
reality and cannot be sacrificed at the alter of omnivorous nationalism
for the sake of political expediency. Such caution is necessary to forestall
the development of nationalism and sub-nationalism along an antagonistic
path. With the advent of British rule in India, the relation between
the periphery and the center radically changed. For the first time,
the entire sub-continent came under single administrative machinery,
an experience previously unknown to the Indian people. But in the process
the British themselves became the unconscious progenitors of Indian
nationalism. This in turn proved to be the nemesis of British Imperialism
in India.
In Third World countries, and specially in India,
the specific feature of our nationalism has been, in the words of Amalendu
Guha : “ever since its beginning in the 19th century… nationalism has
been developing at two levels - one at all-India, on the basis of pan-Indian
cultural homogenities and an anti-imperialism shared in common; and
another regional (Bengali, Marathi, Assamese, etc.) on the basis of
regional cultural homogeneity. From the very outset, the two nationalisms
are found intertwined and dovetailed. Traditionally an average Indian
identified himself with both the nationalisms except in some peripheral
areas (e.g, Nagaland and Mizoram), left untouched by railways and both
the national movements” 10.
On the question of the transmitters of national consciousness
Paul Brass writes, ‘certain classes and elites have historically been
considered the special carriers of national consciousness - the urban
entrepreneur class in Europe, westernized elites in the early stages
of nationalism in the colonial countries’ 11 Brass further notes : “whether
or not a nationalist movement originates within a group, its success
or failure and the form it takes depend(s) up on the character of the
elites who have economic and political influence in the society, or
whether they are willing to take lead, or how capable they are of mobilising
broader segments(s) of the community” 12. In India also, the emergence
of nationalism at the all India and regional level was a middle class
phenomenon. At the top of the society were the foreign capitalists and
their allies, the big landlords; and at the bottom the primary producers
- the toiling peasants, artisans, and workers. Indian industrialists,
traders, petty landlords, the petty entrepreneur class and the educated
class held the middle positions. The middle class wants to project its
own interests as the interests of a large group so that (the) latter
could be politically mobilised in the struggle for power. This is how
Indian nationalism as well as… regional nationalism originated. The
former aimed at consolidating the all India market and reserving it
for Indian middle classes to the exclusion of the foreign domination.
The latter was and is interested in developing the regional market as
an exclusive preserve of the regional middle class or classes 13.
The intensity of nationalism and sub-nationalism would,
however, depend on the arrangement of forces on either side, their co-operation
and conflict and their abilities to mobilise the latent forces in society.
This would of course operate within the constraints of the cultural
and socio-economic set-up under the colonial framework.
In Europe, during the initial phase of nationalism,
the middle class became the main representative of the new ideas of
nationality and capitalism that led to the demise of feudalism. But
here in India ‘ colonialism did not destroy but relied upon the different
pre-capitalist relations of production to facilitate its process of
exploitation 14. That is why, in the realm of politics, the middle classes
were not able to intervene in the course of history as polarised entities;
much of their articulations were mediated through communitarian structures
of caste, religion or language... Nation formation in India thus implied
the forging of institutionalized links between segmental groups and
the Congress Party. This was achieved by the efforts of Gandhi as a
great manipulator of symbols. He effectively used them to evoke the
idea of nationhood among desperate sections of the people overstepping
their actual class of interest 15.
Tracing the course of the evolution of the ‘middle
class’, Brass writes ‘in various regions of the country, however, certain
segments of the old elites and new elites arose to develop an all India
sense of nationality to challenge the British rule -- the ‘Bhadraloks’
in Bengal, Chitpavons in Maharashtra, Tamil Brahmins in Madras, Urban
Hindu caste(s) in Punjab, Local rural land controllers in North India’
16.
The British rule created a new class of westernised
elites, first in the three presidency cities of Calcutta, Bombay and
Madras. Particularly because of the early ‘economic and administrative
penetration of imperialism’, Bengal ‘witnessed the efflorescence of
cultural nationalism, known as the Bengal Renaissance 17. Unlike Bombay
18, here the cleavage between ‘imperial interest’ and nationalist aspiration
stood out more sharply due to bitter social relations between the exceptionally
large and powerful European Community and the highly politicized and
economically frustrated, educated Bengalis’19. In Bengal, particularly
in Calcutta this new class came to be known as the ‘Bhadraloks’. But
as a result of colonial rule, administrative and economic changes transformed
the old Bengal from the status of a relatively closed society, where
social and political relationships were determined by caste and customs,
to a relatively open and competitive society, where social relationships
were shaped by class 20. This newly rich Bengali stratum rose from the
various castes- Brahmin, Kayastha, Suvarnabanik, Tili Basak and Kaivarta
- who prospered in commercial association with the East India Company.
There was then an ‘aristocracy of wealth’ but not of caste. In fact,
education also created a new breed of elites. ‘English education was
indeed the great ‘Enterprises’ of Calcutta, in which Bengalis of all
sorts could participate without those racial barriers, which debarred
their entry in business and industry’ 21 [emphasis added]. But still
caste did not vanish; it tenaciously persisted mainly in the spheres
of marriage, social prestige and inheritance. 22
In Bombay, the phenomenon developed in a different
way. Two new classes emerged, namely the Sethias and the westernised
elites. The Sethias were merchants of western India, who belonged to
two linguistic groups - Gujaratis and Marathis- and were composed of
heterogeneous sections like Parsis, Kapols, Banias, Bhatias, Bhausalies,
Bohras, Khojas and Memons. They collaborated with the British in their
commercial and administrative pursuits but persistently refused to forge
an ‘intellectual partnership’ with the foreigners and thereby resisted
all attempts to turn themselves into ‘cultivated Indian gentlemen’ 23.
Regarding the Bombay elites, Dobbin noted that : “Part of the reason
for this was that British educational policy in western India was bedeviled
by internal contradictions. Successive educators oscillated between
the desire to create a class of ‘Indian gentlemen’ who would be the
regenerators of their country and the need to provide [the] Raj with
competent clerks and lower civil servants. Among the Marathi speaking
population of the city were Chitpavan Brahmin[s], Saraswat Brahmin[s]
and Pathare Prabhus, members of those castes which had administered
the Peshwas’ empire in the eighteenth century. These caste[s], with
their tradition of learning and Government service were ready to enter
Government schools and colleges as soon as they were established, in
the hope of gaining knowledge and employment in Government administrative
or educational departments. The Government despite its hope, that education
would be the preserve of the ‘wealthier classes’, was forced to admit
that in traditional society the ‘upper class’ and the ‘educated classes
were different entities. The intelligentsia of Bombay city in the early
part of the nineteenth century comprised those who of necessity earned
their living in Government service, and who were dependent on the Government
for education and livelihood” 24.
By 1870, lawyers emerged as the leaders of the intelligentsia.
In order to organise political activities, the intelligentsia induced
the Sethias to form the Bombay Association in 1852. But differences
soon developed between the Sethias and the intelligentsia on the issue
of ‘investigating the inadequacies’ of the British rule. The Sethias
offered resistance to such attempts since the Bombay Association was
principally concerned with mercantile interests. Consequently the intelligentsia
in 1869, organized an alternative platform to ‘voice its own interests’.
This was the Bombay branch of the London-based East India Association
of Dadabhai Naroji. It indicated the beginning of much deeper implications
for the growth of nationalism in India. Dobbin further notes: ‘Dadabhai
gave [the] intelligentsia a promise of political salvation. As an all-India
class, he urged them not to be confined by limits of [the] Bombay problem,
but to regard the entire country as their political platform’ 25.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
OF SUBNATIONALISM IN INDIAN CONTEXT
It is almost a truism to assert that industrial revolution in various
countries has a direct correspondence with the growth of nationalism and
capitalism. A similar concept of sub-nationalism possibly can go quite
far in explaining the sluggish industrial growth in a state like Bihar.
Bihar came into existence in 1912 and nine decades are sufficient to gestate
one’s sub-national identity and its very important component, economic
nationalism. Bihar’s failure to do so is all the more glaring against
the background of the success achieved by Assam26 and Orissa27 during
this period in forging their sub national identity. Both these states
were part of Bengal Presidency along with Bihar. Admittedly, these two
states have not made any significant breakthrough in converting their
backward economies to advanced one. Nevertheless the sub-national awareness
is a necessary precondition for even rudimentary economic development.
The Indian sub continental syndrome is testimony to the fact that the
states that have progressed had sufficient sub-national consciousness.
The question, therefore, arises - does Bihar possess some inherent ethnic
deficiency by which reckoning one can explain this failure? This entire
problem which is a complex historical phenomenon needs much deeper scientific
probing. In the present study, we start this probe by first describing
the emergence of sub-nationalism in the Indian context.
Without hazarding a precise formulation of the yet
largely unexplained concept of sub-nationalism, as already been discussed
earlier, it is proposed to use the term essentially for any movement
which seeks to make the regional market as an exclusive preserve of
the local entrepreneur. Such movements may imply notable cultural dimensions,
but it would be mainly for the capitalist and industrial transformation
of the economy. Indeed sub-nationalism would be very necessary condition
for such a transformation. Thus the all India consciousness of nationalism
initially emerged as a sub-national phenomenon in some parts of the
country, which subsequently merged into a single stream and spread throughout
the sub-continent. Sub-nationalism, therefore, remained complementary
to nationalism particularly in the initial phase. That is why, the existence
of sub-national phenomena in the Bombay and Bengal Presidencies helped
in their economic and industrial development. These two states were
the most industrialised and, in many respects, the most advanced though
there were qualitative differences in the nature of their economic and
industrial contours. In Bombay, the non-entrepreneur class first ignited
the spark of sub-national consciousness but later on the entrepreneur
class flourished in it and did not confine themselves only to Bombay
but stoked the fire of nationalism on an all India scale and became
the main propellant of the national movement. Bengal, however, lagged
behind upto the 1920s inspite of developed sub-nationalism. This happened
because of other historical factors, such as deeper penetration of British
capital in the eastern region of India and the rise of western Indian
capital on the national scene.
Along with this liberal brand of nationalism deriving
sustenance from the modern ideas of the West, another brand of nationalism,
essentially a revivalist trend based on Hinduism, also emerged. ‘The
first of these leaders’, wrote Dr. B.B. Mishra, ‘was Swami Dayanand
Saraswati (1824-83), whose aim was to restore Indian culture to its
pristine dignity by seeking ‘India for Indians’ 28. Though he belonged
to the Bombay Presidency, it was Punjab that became the rallying point
of his revivalist movement under the banner of Arya Samaj. With complete
disregard for other components like Islam and Christianity, this brand
of nationalism denied the composite character of Indian culture29. In
most of the Hindi speaking areas, the impact of the Arya Samaj was noticeable,
but the phenomenon of sub-nationalism did not emerge as a formidable
factor 30.
The Britishers bequeathed the uneven nature of regional
development to us. In the post-independence period of economic reconstruction,
the interregional disparities, instead of being reversed, have been
further accentuated 31. The capitalist growth in India has throughout
shown a strong tendency towards self-perpetuating unevenness both region-wise
and community wise. The overall tendency of a divisive capitalism is
more towards differentiation and separate crystallisation than towards
assimilation, as was the case with growing capitalism in western Europe32.
The centralisation of capital has resulted in centralised
political authoritarianism. ‘The state intervention in the deployment
of financial resources, through the instrument of the state sector,
reveals that the dominant feature of this intervention is the support
given to the growth of private industrial capital’ 33. The reports of
various committees, (Chowdhary and Nigam 1961, Mahalanobis Committee
Report 1964, Hazari 1966, Monopolies Commission Report 34, Dutt Committee
Report 35) on the different aspects of industrial concentration reveal
that the state policy has been pursued in ‘the interest of the indigenous
industrial entrepreneur class. Within the entrepreneur class, furthermore,
it has especially pursued the interest [s] of the big entrepreneur class
rather than the rest of the entrepreneur class’ 36. This has resulted
in serious imbalances in regional growth. A study of the Industrial
Licensing Policy of 1970 revealed that ‘it has failed to achieve...
better regional balance of industrial development... More precisely,
it failed to intervene in the market process of decision making on location.
The basic defect was the total absence of an operational strategy regarding
regional development’37. Whereas the Licensing Policy has led to industrial
concentration and monopoly, it has also left the ‘regional balance of
medium industries... to the mercy of market forces’ 38. This will act
as a stumbling block for the development of a regional entrepreneur
class. It was rightly predicted that if the tendencies of agglomeration
are not severely dealt with, it would lead to the accentuation of further
regional disparities in industrial development, the result of which
might be quite damaging both from the political as well as the economic
points of view’39.
The conflicts due to these regional imbalances are
increasing, though such conflicts were also experienced occasionally
before 1947 - e.g., separation of Bihar from Bengal 40. Prior to 1947,
the contradiction due to local disparities was more or less subdued
by the omnivorous nationalism. With the departure of the Britishers,
the situation changed considerably. Post-independent India saw many
struggles against regional disparities under the slogan of reorganisation
of states. The state reorganisation based on linguistic and cultural
variations, that affected a large portion of India, came about as a
result of the bitter struggle launched by the regional entrepreneur
class and the richer kulak strata and backed by a popular mass movement
in these areas 41. The reaction of the dominant entrepreneur class towards
regional imbalances and reorganisation was pragmatic but hesitant and
based upon the intensity of upsurge in support of the cause. For, the
numerous linguistic, ethnic, and territorially-culturally unified groups
are lumped together, were subordinated to other units, or manipulated
into state formation which would result in intensified tension among
groups and also recurrent demand for state formation by these discontented
units 42.
Despite their mutual differences, both the regional
and the dominant all-India entrepreneur class generally tried to resolve
their conflicts earlier within the ambit of the Congress party. Though
the regional entrepreneur class used all the opposition parties, like
the communists or socialists or sometimes formed short lived organisations
like the KMPP to press for their interests, they did not snap their
connections with the Congress. ‘The ruling party has for a long time
been a coalition of regional forces’ 43. In fact even after these bitter
struggles for regional or sub-regional identities which led to the formation
of states based on linguistic criteria and various constitutional and
political crises (T. Prakashan / Andhra Pradesh; Pattom Thanu Pillai/Kerala,
etc.) the regional entrepreneur class did not go the whole hog against
the Congress. In fact, the Congress was voted to power, even where the
regional movements had taken a militant form. Meghnad Desai commented
in 1975 that the ‘vigorous temporary clashes of interests between regional
and national capital do not exclude an underlying harmony between [the]
two’ 44.
But a decade later, we notice a significant aggravation
of the conflict - harmony giving way to disharmony. Some regional parties
like the DMK, AIDMK, Telgu Desam came into power after dislodging the
Congress. Even some national parties like the CPI (M), Janata Party
etc. came to power with more regional than national overtones. This
phenomenon cannot be understood unless we study the genesis and consolidation
of the regional entrepreneur class, particularly after independence.
Besides, it is necessary to study the whole gamut of the complicated
relationship between the regional and the dominant entrepreneur class
to understand the emerging configuration of the Indian state and the
class contradictions within it.
The regional economic differentiation that emerged
in India was largely due to the extent and penetration of British capital
and political authority 45. Over and above, the land tenure system introduced
in different parts of the country, permanent settlement in eastern India,
Rywatwari in south and west India and Mahalwari in north west India
also affected the economic structure. ‘The variations in land tenure
led to different systems of surplus creation and absorption and the
size of the surplus differed’ 46. Social movements also played an important
role in the economic transformation. Thus the triad of land tenurial
system, extent of penetration of British capital and the nature of the
social movements, essentially determined the evolution and pattern of
the economic profile of a region. The favourable combination of the
above trinity could be witnessed mainly in the Rywatwari area.
The growth of capitalist farmers was more rapid in
Rywatwari and Mahalwari areas, because a portion of the surplus produced
by the rich peasants could be retained by them due to the absence of
intermediaries like Zamindars 47. The capital generated by agriculture
was to some extent also invested in industry, facilitating the emergence
of the regional entrepreneur class.
In the Rywatwari area of Maharastra, Gujrat, Madras
and Andhra Pradesh, some entrepreneurs from a peasant background entered
industry. Unlike eastern India, here the level of penetration of British
capital was lower making investment in industry much easier. Amelioration
of the plight of the peasantry, was an integral part of the anti-Brahmin
movement that swept the Rywatwari areas. The social origin of the rich
peasantry in western Maharastra, the pioneers of the sugar co-operative
industry, can be traced to the social reform movement led by the Satyashodhak
Samaj under the leadership of Jyotirao Phule, a Mali by caste, in the
closing decades of the nineteenth century. This movement, which enjoyed
considerable popular support during its period, was led by an alliance
of economically better off non-Brahmin caste [s], educated non-Brahmans
and elements from the trading community. The Satyashodhak Samaj focussed
its attack on Brahmin domination over and above the economic, social
and political life of rural and urban Maharastra 48. This non-Brahman
rich peasantry could secure for itself ‘social and political recognition
in keeping with their rising economic status, as an outcome of a mass
based social reform movement and also following the introduction of
electoral power politics’ 49.
After taking the Congress under its wing by the 1920s
and with the advent of Gandhi, the big entrepreneur class (often referred
to as the west Indian entrepreneur class) started exercising their hegemony
through the medium of regional elites who subsequently became the spokesmen
of the entire nation. At the same time, these spokesmen were meticulously
careful to buttress the interests of the dominant entrepreneur class
who reciprocated by patronising the regional elite.
Tamil Subnationalism
The challenge to this domination manifested itself
in different ways in some regions of India. The social movement heralded
in the Madras Presidency, was one such manifestation. Its orientation
and direction was considerably dependent on the economic structure of
the given area. The challenge to the domination of west Indian capital
was not necessarily frontal. It was subsumed in the anti-Brahmin movement.
In the Madras Presidency, the Justice party was the spearhead of the
anti-Brahmin movement. Here ‘large sections of the local capitalist
class had been integrated with the power structure of the Justice Party’
50. The anti -Brahmin connotation of the movement was not only ‘iconoclastic’,
but was also an attempt to dislodge the primacy of the Brahmins and
to protect the growing economic and financial aspirations of the regional
entrepreneur class. In Madras, where industry was still dominated by
British capital (with the exception of Coimbatore, which was the largest
center of the textile industry in the province), the opposition to the
Congress from large Indian trading and money lending interest[s] was
demonstrated by the failure of the Congress Party to secure any of the
reserved seats. In the Nattukottai Nagarather Association constituency,
the Congress candidate was defeated by Muttiah Chettiar, a merchant
prince and a banker, the head of the Nattukottai Chettiar Community,
which dominated the financial scene in South India and had huge interests
abroad 51.
But to fight the more popular appeal of the Congress,
the non-Brahmin movement had to extend its base from upper ‘non-Brahmin
castes such as Vellalas, Naidus, Nayars, Mudaliars’ 52, to the lower
section of the backward classes. This gave way to the formation of the
DK under Ramaswamy Naicker and subsequently the DMK in 1949 under C.N.
Annadurai 53.
In a parallel development, ‘the non-Brahman[s] also
took part in a greater measure in the Indian National Congress movement
and [the] new structure[s] of power that were created by the introduction
of [the] democratic process’ 54. Kamraj Nadar was one of its outstanding
leaders, who was soon to eclipse Rajaji from the state politics. The
Nadars, toddy tappers by caste, developed into a strong ‘commercial
elite’. Even within the Congress, Kamraj became the rallying point for
articulating the interests of the regional entrepreneur class, as opposed
to Rajaji - a close ally of Gandhi and Vallabhabhai Patel - who not
only symbolised Brahminism but also the dominant entrepreneur class
at the all India plane. His close connection with west regional capital
was revealed, when in a crucial cabinet meeting of the Madras Congress
Ministry in 1938, on the issue of giving a cement company lease to a
local businessman, he along with Dr. Subborayan preferred C.P. Company
(a part of the Associated Cement Companies Combine). To enlist the majority
support in his cabinet he ‘read a letter from Vallabhabhai mentioning
amongst other things that the lease may be given to C.P Cement Co. as
the company has the necessary capital’ 55. This was not an isolated
case. The High Command of the Congress ‘increasingly tended to intervene
on behalf of capitalist interests with various provincial governments.
Thus in July 1938, Patel, in a circular addressed to all the Congress
Chief Ministers, urged them to ensure all government business with genuine
‘Swadeshi Companies’ 56. This ‘Swadeshi’ often in practice meant west
regional private capital. So this cleavage between regional and national
entrepreneur class has historical roots. The final climax of this political
break came in 1967, when first the DMK came to power and subsequently
its offshoot the AIDMK.
Marathi Subnationalism
Even within the former Bombay State the cleavage was
witnessed before independence between dominant financial and business/industrial
interests of Gujrat and Bombay and the emerging agro-industrial entrepreneur
class of the Marathi-speaking region. Gandhi and Vallabhabhai Patel
who were Gujratis ‘represented certain economic and regional interests
in the politics of western India. Within Bombay State in particular,
Patel’s political following was strongest in Gujrat and Bombay city
among the business classes. It was less secured in Marathi speaking
area[s] 57. Opposition to the ‘nationalist Gujrati wing of the Congress’
was mediated in Maharastra through the anti-Brahmin Movement. This led
to demands by the non-Brahmans for a ‘more effective voice in the Congress.’
In the post independence period, the Marathi and the
non-Marathi divide assumed menacing proportions over the question of
the formation of a separate state of Maharashtra. ‘The industrial, trading
and financial interests in Bombay which were overwhelmingly non-Marathi,
were totally opposed to the formation of a separate state of Maharashtra,
with Bombay as its capital. The Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee led
by S. K. Patil’ 58, representing the big business, ‘was absolutely opposed
to any such move’.
The formation of Maharastra, and the advent of Y.
B. Chavan represented, the ‘shift of power from the urban, upper caste[s]
(mostly Brahman)… to the rising rural middle castes. This process was
considerably helped by the dominant position of the Maratha caste cluster
(almost 40%) in Maharashtra society’ 59. The economic reasons for the
shift in the power structure are due to enactment of tenancy and land
reform laws. The creation of centres of economic power in the form of
credit and other co-operatives and co-operative sugar factories, and
the spread of education in rural areas accelerated this change over,
some of the latter factors being themselves the product of the shift
of power structure 60. The big entrepreneur class could solve the sub-national
question and the growing assertion of the agri-industrial entrepreneur
class in Maharastra, however belated it may be. Political offspring
of Y.B. Chavan is Sharad Pawar. He is a mediator of regional and national
aspirations. Coalition of his party with Congress in Maharashtra is
testimony to this reality.
Kanarees Subnationalism
The non-Brahman movement in Mysore differs from its
counterpart in Madras. It did not ‘assume the form of a pro-Dravidian
and anti-Aryan image’ 61. In fact, regional consciousness in Mysore
was marked by strong economic nationalism. ‘Mostly economically informed
persons felt that Mysore was being plundered by “aliens” and that it
had become indispensable to develop the entrepreneurial talent of Mysoreans
62. It was strongly felt that ‘capital goods left the country, but the
English took the profits, the Madrassis took the jobs and the Marwaris
took charge over the increasing trade’. And to reverse this, Dewan Visvesvaraya
the Prime-Minister of the Mysore Princely State, launched a programme
for the ‘total transformation of economic structure’. The regional entrepreneur
class started developing significantly in Mysore long before independence,
because it was the only state which was characterised by ‘far reaching
industrialisation programmes and efforts at achieving economic self
reliance, which are quite unique in India at the time’. Even today the
strength of the regional entrepreneur class in Karnataka, is very well
reflected by the fact that there are about forty-five units of chamber
of commerce directly affiliated to the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry). Several parliamentary and assembly elections
demonstrated the strength and adherance of the regional entrepreneur
class of Karnataka, to identify with the two levels of nationalism.
Hegde inherited the mantle of Deoraj Urs, who was the first to evoke
regional identities. Urs advocated regional economic development. He
was instrumental in ‘decentralised planning and allocated a proportion
of plan funds for district level projects’ 63. Advocacy for ‘Karnataka
for Kannadigas’… and by adopting the cause of Kannada, Hegde had strengthened
his image as a regional leader… main linkman with the wider political
world and as a champion of Karnataka’s interest’ 64. The subnationalism
is still very pronounced and its intensity is revealed over the Cauvery
water issues.
Telgu Subnationalism
Andhra Pradesh was carved out of the former Hyderabad
state of Nizam and the Madras Presidency. Here, under the liberal patronage
of the Nizam a number of factories like textile, paper and engineering,
were started. A number of petty industries such as ‘tobacco, mica, mines,
foundry, rice and oil mills were also located in the Andhra region65.
In the pre-independence period ‘the growing middle class intellectuals,
the growing Hindu business and industrial interests took up cudgel’
against the oppressive rule of the Nizam. Subsequently they formed the
backbone of the movement for linguistic reorganisation. But the success
of the green revolution in the late sixties and profits from tobacco
cultivation, strengthened the agri-capitalist of Andhra Pradesh. The
surplus generated in agriculture flows in two directions ‘agro-based
industry and trade and film production, distribution and exhibition’
66. The most important though not exclusive class/caste group to take
advantage of this situation were the Kammas, who had earlier been the
important support base for the communist movement in the state. Over
time they have also grown substantially rich, and have multiplied their
riches since the Green Revolution. They are now flourishing in different
types of industry, like tobacco, film and other small scale sectors.
Their political aspirations and Telegu pride were highlighted by a newspaper
called ‘Eenadu’, owned by Ramaji Rao, a ‘typical successful new rich
youngish man who got some of his organisational skills from the AISF
twenty or more years ago. A modern entrepreneur who made his capital
accumulation through money lending, euphemistically called Margardasi
Chit fund’ 67. It subsequently became the rallying point of the regional
entrepreneur class of Andhra Pradesh. The rise of NTR and the Telugu
Desam was a long overdue political manifestation of this class. There
are about sixty five units of chamber of commerce affiliated to FICCI,
reflecting the strength of the regional entrepreneur class. Chandra
Babu Naidu, the present Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh is an aggressive
version of subnationalism. He has been able to corner substantial dividend
for the state from the central government.
Punjabi Subnationalism
Among all the regional problems of the non-Zamindari
areas, the Punjab problem is the most complicated. The introduction
of advanced technology accompanying the ‘Green Revolution’ had generated
large surpluses in the agrarian economy. Those who have benefited the
most from this capitalist transformation in agriculture are the Jat
Sikhs.
The agrarian boom of the earlier years, has now reached
a ‘plateau’ 68. Many of the capitalist farmers have invested their surplus
in ‘transport, trade and industry’ 69. In their effort to open new areas
of investment, they came in direct conflict with the already entrenched
urban based financial, business and industrial interests, which are
largely in the hands of the Hindu community. Their interests are increasingly
coming into conflict with traders and the big entrepreneur class
because of increased costs of agricultural inputs.
The political aspect of this conflict between the capitalist farmer
and the big entrepreneur class is provided by the Akali party 70. In
the absence of any effort to pre-empt the social frustration of the
articulate section of the rural rich, due to the various factors mentioned
above, they have taken recourse to ‘a regressive ideology that seek[s]
to give voice to the sense of injustice by a militant assertion of the
Sikh religion’ 71. Thus regional assertion in Punjab, instead of unfolding
as a secular sub-nationalism has instead transformed into religious
bigotry, in the name of Sikh nationalism. When most of the states were
reorganised on a linguistic basis the Akali demand for a Punjabi Suba
was brushed aside, and Punjab was made a bilingual state. ‘This was
done under the pressure of Punjabi Hindus who opposed Punjabi Suba and
disowned their mother tongue in the Census of 1951 72. The leading light
of this movement Lala Jagat Narain, editor of the Punjab Kesari, was
murdered by a Sikh fanatic. The Hindus by disowning the Punjabi language
‘made it the language of the Sikhs and communalised the issue of the
language. This was later used by the Sikh communalists to equate Punjabi
culture to Sikh culture’ 73. It appears that extreme subnationalism
has diminished in recent periods. The smooth transition of government
in the recently held assembly election from Akali Dal to Congress indicated
that direction.
Regional Entrepreneurship
in Post-Independence Era
By 1970, as the economic situation in India deteriorated, there was greater
demand at the regional level for economic concessions from the centre.
Nehru’s vision of a centralised master plan for the economic development
of India was questioned as it was felt that such a plan was not feasible
in view of regional awareness and aspirations 74. The ‘Linguistic chauvinism
was not peculiar to Tamilnadu’, Kerala was also fighting for the ‘share
of industrialisation. Andhra demonstrated with great passion for the location
of [a] steel plant. Mysore has been keen to expand [its] industrial base.
In fact this pattern is repeated all over India’. As early as January,
1970, M.V. Arunacchalam had prognosticated the ‘emergence of regional
parties and regional consciousness not only within the present linguistic
conformations but class within the subregions thereof’. Apart from the
aspirations of the regional entrepreneur class, the urge for industrialisation
also stems from a desire to provide greater employment opportunities.
But industrialisation is likely to succeed only when the local entrepreneur
class is given concessions and encouragement is given to ‘local initiative
through decentralisation, in the present circumstances, it is more likely
to succeed than the centralised licensing policy administered from Udyog
Bhawan’ earlier 75.
The mechanism of licensing, has only been used by
the chosen few to corner the licenses and divert them to the chosen
region. They are also operating in the small scale sector, normally
the domain of the regional entrepreneur class. In a study conducted
by the Corporate Studies Group at the IIPA, New Delhi, it has been found
that a number of companies, though registered under the MRTP Act, continue
to lay claim to their being part of the small scale sector’ 76. And
in the absence of any legislation to protect the small scale sector
a situation may arise when ‘large scale companies could resort to taking
over existing small scale units’. This will further accentuate the cleavages
between the big and the regional entrepreneur class.
Interestingly, the regional entrepreneur class was
no longer content with expressing their rift with the big entrepreneur
class at the political plane alone. They were fighting for their interests
within the premier forum of the big entrepreneur class, the FICCI 77.
The simmering discontent within their rank, once flared up over the
innocuous question of the choice of a Vice- President from the South.
The Times of India of 28 April 1985, in a prominent headline in the
front page - ‘Southern Businessmen ask FICCI to clarify’ - reported
that the ‘consultative committee comprising secretaries of the Hindustan
Chamber of Commerce, Andhra Chamber of Commerce, Southern Chamber of
Commerce, met here informally to … ask the parent body to,’ clarify
the choice of a Vice-President from the South. This was prompted by
reports in a section of the press that the selection of the Vice-President
of FICCI for the next year had been aborted as no suitable person of
‘stature and financial clout was available’ from the south . Since then
the Times of India often reported the impending break up of the FICCI
and the ‘captain of industry and trade’ trying to avert it.
At the same time, the regional entrepreneur class
by its very nature, could not afford to continue an antagonistic contradiction
with the dominant entrepreneur class for too long. Likewise, the dominant
entrepreneur class in the initial phase had played a subsidiary role
to colonial industrial capital, and for this reason they showed an unwillingness
to cross swords with imperialism in our struggle for independence. But
with the development and consolidation of their position, even under
alien domination, the Indian entrepreneur class started asserting themselves
vis-à-vis imperialism and utilised the Congress and the national movement
to wrest state power. The post -independence period witnessed the growth
of capitalism under the aegis of both the regional and the dominant
entrepreneur class, though the lions share went to the later.
But the regional entrepreneur class who originally
played second fiddle to the dominant entrepreneur class, mustered economic
viability and political strength, and were able to mobilise the masses
of their region against the centre to further their own interests. This
led to the emergence of a few regional centres of power against the
dominant group. The regional entrepreneur class is utilising the centre-state
contradiction, as the national entrepreneur class had once done against
imperialism. But in the case of imperialism, the national entrepreneur
class, despite their vacillations and compromises followed an antagonistic
path leading to the retreat of alien power. Hence the contradiction
was antagonistic in character. But in the case of the regional and national
entrepreneur class, the contradiction is non-antagonistic.
Since the dominant national entrepreneur class wields
state power and since the working class is not politically and organisationally
strong enough to intervene decisively, the result of this conflict will
depend, for the time being, on the path to be followed by the dominant
entrepreneur class, by taking the entire nation into confidence and
keeping the whole issue at the level of reconciliation. In case of failure,
fissiparous forces backed by imperialism will successfully further the
fragmentation of the nation. Today, nationalism in India cannot sustain
itself without the simultaneous flowering of sub-national interests.
PROBLEMS OF SUB-NATIONALISM
IN BIHAR During the national movement, specially during the
Gandhian era, Bihar was in the forefront. But the spell of nationalistic
spirit did not give rise to industrial entrepreneurship. At the same
time, anti-feudal movement of the period led by Kisan Sabhas intensified
agro-entrepreneurship. This phenomenon has peculiar interrelationship
with the caste factor of Bihar with corresponding political implications
as pointed above. The question arises why Bihar could not evolve regional
industrial entrepreneurship despite great nationalistic spirit. In relation
to the concept of Protestant ethics, it is often posed : is it not a
little artificial to suggest that the capitalist enterprise has to wait
till some religious or other spirit has produced capitalist spirit.
On the other hand, question can also be put : can the whole edifice
of industrial entrepreneurship develop without the corresponding growth
of material forces. Hence the problems in relation to Bihar are (1)
why nationalism couldn’t give rise to entrepreneurship, and (2) why
material forces for capitalistic enterprise could not develop here.
Post-independence India has witnessed systematic attempt
at planned economic development in the country as a whole. Inspite of
high potentialities for industrial development and large scale public
sector investment in industries, Bihar was at the bottom of industrial
development in the country. United Bihar possessed 30 per cent of the
value of minerals produced in India and yet Bihar remained one of the
most ruralised regions of the country. It was believed that whatever
industrial development occurred in India before independence occurred
as a result of the integration of the Indian economy with the world
capitalist system through trade and capital investment. But on the contrary
the major spurt in Indian industrial development took place precisely
during those periods when India’s colonial economic link with the world
capitalist economy were temporarily weakened or disrupted.78 Even this
limited industrial growth failed to take place in Bihar; on the other
hand strengthening of these links led to backwardness and stagnation.
The regional matrix of growth in India calls for a
separate analysis. The Eastern region had to face the main brunt of
British capital and exploitation.79 Much as Bihar shares the fate of
Eastern India generally, there are notable differences in the levels
of industrialization in the Eastern sector itself. The economic backwardness
of Bihar is not an isolated phenomenon. The underdevelopment of Bihar
is the manifestation of a common, historically conditioned and structurally
determined, development process that can be understood only with reference
to the nature, structure and evaluation of the present national and
international order. As we know, of all places Bengal Presidency (constituting
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) before independence, was the original pasture
of British colonialism in India. The resources of the eastern India
not only provided the fodder for the imperial war machine to conquer
the rest of India but it also bridged the deficits of the presidencies
of Bombay and Madras in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.80 This
area witnessed systematic extermination of artisan and traders.
Against this background, we now discuss what had indeed
prevented the emergence of regional entrepreneurial class in Bihar,
which was earlier part of the Bengal Presidency. The answer to this
query in terms of a poor material base of the local economy is undoubtedly
appealing. But we must also remember that there are parts of India,
where material base has been equally poor and yet have seen the emergence
of fairly buoyant regional entrepreneurs. This leads us to an enquiry
into the possible link between regional identity and regional entrepreneurship
which have been seen to emerge almost simultaneously in many parts of
India. This phenomenon has been witnessed in the colonial period, as
well as after independence.
As discussed above, the artisans and traders who could
have been the main social base for provincial entrepreneurs faced widespread
extermination during the early stages of colonial rule in the eastern
region of India. The South and Western India felt the brunt of colonial
rule at a very late stage, so the artisans and traders of this region
survived the colonial depredations. Secondly, Bihar being in the ‘Permanent
Settlement’ area, the land tenurial system here was more iniquitous
than in Ryotwari and Mahalwari areas. Surplus generation and retention
in the hands of the tenants of that surplus was least, as compared to
the other tenurial systems. Thirdly, public investment during the British
period created condition for strengthening the material base of the
respective economy. Investment in canal and roads brought about dramatic
changes in agricultural production and industrial development. Punjab,
Western U.P., Coastal Region are testimony to the fact. In Bihar, Sone
Canal area which is the most developed agricultural track held this
preeminent position even during the British period. Infact, Green Revolution
was introduced in 1960’s where there were captive water resources. It
can be said with some amount of authority that no new area has developed
in India, which was not developed in the pre-independence period. Since
1947, regional accumulation was dependent on devolution of resources
by the Central government to the states. On that count Bihar’s record
was very dismal. On the question of devolution of resources, either
planned or non-planned, Bihar was always disadvantaged. The recent division
of the State was the final blow, which has financially crippled the
State. To top this, there has not been any compensation from the Central
government. In the realm of debt, Bihar is on the verge of financial
trap. Out of our Rs. 18,000 crore annual budget, we are not in a position
to raise tax revenue of more than Rs. 3,000 crore. On the other hand,
we have to pay Rs. 5,000 crore in the form of interest for our debt.
Non-Economic Constraints
As noted earlier,
nationalism first emerged as regional or sub-national phenomenon particularly
in non-Hindi linguistic areas like Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, etc.
But in the Hindi Heartland, the regional phenomenon unfolded differently.
Let us very briefly discuss about the problems of language and nationalities
of this region.
Language
The term ‘Hindi’ is applied to two groups of dialects,
viz. Western and Eastern. Western Hindi has four main dialects-Bundeli
of Bundelkhand, Braj Bhasha of Mathura, Kanauji of Central Doab and
Vernacular Hindusthani of Delhi and upper Doab. Eastern Hindi has three
dialects namely Awadhi of Oudh, Begheli of Beghlkhand and Chattisgarhi
of Chattisgarh. Eastern Hindi has Bihari to its east and Marathi to
the south, both being outer languages. Along with the above dialects,
Hindi literature also includes the literatures of the parts of Rajasthan
in the west and Bihari in the east which, strictly, are not Hindi at
all.81 Thus the question arises, like other linguistic people of India,
do the Hindi speaking people constitute a sub-nationality ?
The question of Hindustani sub-nationality was raised
as far back as 1922. Hindustani denotes the language of Hindustan and
during the Muslim period, Hindustan was considered to be the north Indian
geographical tract lying between the Punjab and Bengal, obviously this
includes Bihar also. The failure to develop Hindustani sub-nationalism
in contrast to Bengali and Punjabi, Maharashtrian etc. was adduced to
the lack of political consciousness.82 This is because while the regional
elites were emerging in other areas, ‘Hindustan’ being the last citadel
of moribund medieval feudalism, was cordoned off from the influence
of modern ideas. Being the main area of the upsurge of 1857, it invited
the bloodiest reprisal and retribution and subsequently the deliberate
negligence and indifference from the side of colonial rulers. As a result,
strong feudal features survived here and in the entire Hindustani speaking
area and thus leading to certain amount of isolation from as well as
resistance to modernism.
Politically, Bihar was tagged to Bengal even during
the pre-British days leading to her economic backwardness. On the other
hand, culturally and linguistically being a part of the Hindi Heartland,
she too smarted under relative conservatism. While the social reform
of various streams swept the three presidencies in spite of solid phalanx
of orthodox opposition, the movement of Arya Samaj that found some following
among the backward castes acted more as a vehicle of conservatism than
regeneration. In Bihar, the unit of social movement was caste, not village
or region.83 Evidences of multi-castes reform movement are practically
absent.
Against the background of the Bihar’s economic backwardness,
she developed a fragmented personality having a number of territorial
entities with definite dialects like Bhojpuri, Magahi and Maithili,
superimposed over a formidable hierarchy of caste system. Linguistically
those dialects could be put into a common group known as ‘Bihari languages’.
One can contest this classification but they are definitely distinct
from Hindi and more related to Bengali, Assameese and Oriya, as all
these dialects were derived from common root known as Ardha Magadhi
Apabhransa. ‘Like Bengali or Oriya, no common ‘Bihari language has ever
emerged.84
Movement for Separation
of Bihar
The movement for separation of Bihar from Bengal was
the first effort to assert her own regional identity in terms of sub-nationalism.
At the regional level, participation for separate Bihar ‘facilitated
through the aggregation of primordial loyalities like religious group,
caste association and the regional identities’ 85. The westernised Bihari
elites were carriers of this movement. Three major factors, namely Bihari
intelligentsia, Bengali settlers and British imperialism interacted
and determined the character of the regional and economic consciousness
of Bihar.
Let us first discuss the factor of indigenous elites
‘The historians have tried to characterize this class as an elite group
and have sought to emphasise the determining role of the attitude and
social behaviour of this group to the exclusion of more basic structural
feature of the economy’.86. The movement for separate Bihar was spearheaded
by the professional and the educated elites and not by the Bihari entrepreneurs.
This is because of preponderance of feudalism in Bihar. The social bases
of these elites were limited. The movement in Bihar mainly revolved
round the discrimination against Biharis in the matter of education
and jobs. The movement had no wider ramification. Being essentially
movement for separation of Bihar, it could not build bridges with the
boycott movement of Bengal (1905). Non-participation in ‘Swadeshi’ movement
seriously effected the intellectual outlook of the movement in the sphere
of developing independent economic agenda. Ironically, during the ‘Swadeshi’
movement, when more than three hundred units were functioning in Orissa,
in contrast only three committees were functioning in Bihar. Even these
committees were mainly functional in Bhagalpur. As they were mainly
manned by Bengali settlers, they were contemptuously referred as ‘Babu
Tamasha’.
The class limitation of the movement for separation
of Bihar is reflected by the absence of any political thought based
on economic nationalism. Without contesting the justification of the
demand for reservation of jobs for the local people, they could not
transcend the movement beyond it. The British imperialism further distorted
economic and social development of Bihar. While Industrial Revolution
was sweeping in England, Gangetic belt in India, specially in Bihar
was experiencing systematic process of deindustrialization which was
staggering.87
Now let us take up the second factor, namely, the
Bengali settlers. Despite the political linkage of Bihar with Bengal,
linguistically and culturally she was more connected with Hindi Heartland.
This lack of cultural affinity restrained the Bengali settlers to identify
with local population. In addition, the former developed supercilious
attitude of cultural superiority as a result of their dominance as subordinate
partner in the administrative professional set-up in the colonial rule.
Except some noteworthy but limited contributions, they could not emerge
as the main conveyor belt for the dispersal of the radical ideas that
emerged in Bengal earlier along with the social and political awakening.
This is rather natural because these people were part of the colonial
administration; ‘a middle class’ of Bengal could not play the historical
role in initiating cultural renaissance in backward area. 88
One of the weaknesses of Bengali renaissance was its
geographical limitations, with no significant spill over to Bihar. Some
reformist movement like Brahma Samaj, though implanted in Bihar, could
not develop root in the soil. It is a dismal failure of the so called
Bengali renaissance to establish powerful link with Bihar and thereby
breaking its conservative insularity. This lack of activities on the
part of Bengal with transregional perspective particularly in the backward
peripheries, also determined the character of the superstructural complexion
of Bihar. Secondly, because of its elitist character, Bengal remained
more or less indifferent to the general problems of Bihar. For example,
Bengal successfully fought against the monstrous oppression of indigo
planters in the 19th century; but she did not extend this movement to
Bihar. Infact, Bihar had to wait nearly half a century for Gandhi to
organise crusade against the indigo planters. In this movement, Bihar
was caught in the whirlwind of nationalism of Gandhian era without sufficiently
developing sub-nationalism. So, Bihar developed nationalism in which
regional identity was stuck up in the quagmire of caste and to a certain
extent in the sub-regional entities like Maithili, Jharkhand, Bhojpuri
etc.
The third factor, as mentioned earlier, is the colonial
rule. The boycott movement of Bengal induced the imperialist rulers
to take steps so that no militant movement similar to Bengal, might
develop in Bihar. The British Government was facing organized resistance
in Bengal. With the partition of Bengal, ‘Swadeshi’ movement was organised
successfully there. The middle class Bengali youth were organizing ‘revolutionary
activities’. The situation compelled the British Government to show
their support to the voices of protest raised in Bihar against the employment
of Bengalis.
Subsequently, Bihar became the most important bastion
of national movement during the Gandhian era. This shift towards all
India political linkage of Bihar is extremely significant. First, it
denotes the most significant reality of Indian politics in the emergence
of the western India on the national movement. The geographical connotation
actually indicates the increasing domination of industrial capitalist
from western India over other parts of India including Bihar and also
in the Indian National Congress along with the group of different regional
elites, who earlier assumed its leadership. The Congress party became
‘loose confederation of interests’ which ‘could integrate in the colonial
period the multiple levels of nationalism in India’89. The earlier reluctance
of the Sethias in Bombay to be drawn to even in the initial stage of
anti-British political trend, faded away to a certain extent. Their
contradictions with imperialism made them realize the importance of
the platform of Indian National Congress which could be transformed
into a powerful instrument to foster their class interest. On the other
hand, the middle class elites needed the support of a powerful financial
class to sustain the tempo of the national movement.
Role of West Indian
Industrial Capital
In a nutshell, it indicates a qualitative change in
the political complexion of India. The capitalist started exercising
hegemony through a faithful coterie of elites of all India dimension.
Besides the two pronged attacks of this alliance (against imperialism
and socialism) this hegemony has wider implications at the level of
sub-nationalism too. The sub-national aspirations were brushed aside
by the high pressure sweep of omnivorous nationalism. Bihar was no exception
to it. By keeping sub-nationalism at the low key, the capitalists of
western Indian origins spread to the eastern region under the banner
of nationalism, “Since the capacity of the indigenous capitalist group
… to compete internationally with more advanced industrial interests
is negligible, they tend to maximize their exploitation of local people
in an effort to accumulate large profits. They also use political influence
on a national level more intensely to hoodwink the local people. They
are permanently under the necessity to keep up nationalistic hysteria
to induce people to make necessary sacrifice to fill the former’s coffer’.90
The financially and ritualistically weak trading community
of Bihar could not checkmate the onslaught of west regional capital
on the economic spectrum of Bihar. As early as 1965, Industrial Planning
and Licensing Policy Committee headed by R. H. Hazari reported that
the bulk of the Marwari, Parsee and Punjabi investment have been in
Bihar apart from few other states like Maharashtra, W. Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and TamilNadu. The different trading castes in
Bihar, although quantitatively quite substantial, could not articulate
beyond the caste matrix. At no stage in the regional level movement
of Bihar, the elites sought partnership of the local commercial community,
like the elites of Bombay who forged relationship with the Shethias,
in the national movement.
This is the reflection of the weak position of the
indigenous entrepreneur, which is yet to be born in the real sense.
The present Bihari entrepreneur is in the nascent stage and has not
yet reached a stage where they can give effective leadership to the
business community.
With the handicap of lack of sub-nationalism and its
concomitant economic entrepreneurship, the class, which took over the
reigns of Bihar after independence, did not have a synthetic vision
for the agricultural or industrial growth of the state. The narrow vision
of economic development within which they operated could not transcend
beyond Zamindari abolition (giving up the system of intermediaries)
and some prestigious large projects in public sector. Land reform measures
were not taken up seriously. Domination of western Indian capital in
India to the detrimental of eastern India was institutionalized through
the freight equalization policy of the national government. Natural
advantage that Bihar enjoyed in the realm of mineral resources was forestalled,
the large private investment which started with the Tata’s in the early
part of the 20th century did not substantially increase, after independence.
Economic development involves structural transformation and requires
composite long-term vision. In the context of India and specially in
relation to Bihar, it means transition from feudalism to capitalism.
But unfortunately the class, which was guiding the destiny of Bihar
in the first four decade since independence, was hostile to the above
strategy because of their entrenched feudal legacy.
After the division of the state in 2000, whatever
accumulation had taken place in plateau region of Bihar is now a part
of a new state. Bihar has to start afresh. The social vision of the
ruling leadership and the developmental strategy should find some common
ground. We cannot make our subnationalism substantive, untill and unless
we give economic muscle to it. Can Bihar still be resurrected after
its crippling division?
Bihar was disadvantaged earlier, when state-centric
growth model predominated. Central Government could not alter the spatial
underdevelopment in the country. Now in the wake of market-centric growth
model, we will be on the verge of disaster if we don’t alter our strategy.
In this model also, state which had initial advantage of accumulation
will again rule the roost. An Economic Times Survey of October 14, 2002
indicates that the investment destination, whether domestic or international,
is still Maharastra, Tamilnadu or Gujrat. This is not due to better
infrastructure only. These states have outperformed their counterparts
comprehensively in the post-reform years - the productivity, both of
capital and labour, was higher in these states than elsewhere in India.
Surprisingly, on those counts, Bihar’s position is not very dismal with
respect to either capital or labour productivity. Infact, the labour
productivity is higher than in West Bengal and Orissa. Even then Bihar
is not the destination of investment in the Eastern Region. In this
regard, we feel that we lack subnational killer instinct. These facts
of low capital-output ratio and higher labour productivity of Bihar
should be made known to the world of not only scholars but of business
and media as well.
Full commitment of Bihari sub-nationalism will be
needed for the economic revival of Bihar. In the market economy, the
even playing field is absent. And this is specially true for the underdeveloped
states. Further, with globalisation the subnational concern cannot be
limited to regional market only. The entrepreneurs elsewhere could accumulate
and develop with protected market. That gave teeth to their subnational
concerns. Half a century of post-independence India saw their consolidation
and growth. Tamil, Telegu, Marathi, Kanaree, Punjabee etc. are powerful
subnational entity. Left to themselves, they are economically much better
off than many of the developing countries in the third world. With market
economy and globalisation, regional economy cannot hope to survive on
the basis of regional market alone. In fact, there is need for counter
movement. Regional and subnational formation will have to think in terms
of reverse globalisation. Not only packaging but the quality of our
product should be such that it succeeds in conquering national and global
market. This agenda will be difficult, nevertheless, it is achievable.
For this, we need to harness not only the regional capital but also
‘knowledge’. We can leapfrog into development on ‘knowledge’ based strategy.
Creation of a ‘literate’ society would be the precondition towards this
end. In this context, one should immediately note that acquiring of
literacy is the first precondition for entrance to the world of knowledge.
It is only through knowledge that an individual or a society can acquire
rationality and move towards development, social and economic. So the
struggle for development of Bihar should be fought on two fronts - at
one hand, there should be social mobilisation cutting across caste,
class and political lines to forge a sense of sub-nationality; and on
the other, a movement towards mass literacy and creation of a knowledge
society.
Bihar has already created a niche in the ‘knowledge’
world. Not only we are supplying maximum agricultural labourers, we
are also supplying maximum numbers in the pool of IAS officials. Our
success in IIT and IIM are also phenomenal. It is a pleasant irony that
the subaltern section of Bihar’s society is also not lacking on this
score. The artisan community, from the remote area of Patepur Toli of
Manpur Block in Gaya district are contributing in substantial number
in the IIT’s. Apart from ‘knowledge’ based strategy, we need to strengthen
the foundation of our economy by land reform, consolidation of holding,
internal institutional reform etc. In this backdrop we have to perform
several times better, to even come to the national level. For this mandate,
there should be complete provincial consensus, cohesion and commitment.
In the 21st century, we cannot afford to be less alert. We have to convert
our disadvantage into advantage. Not only Bihar but Bihar made goods
should attain a brand image, so that it gets national or international
currency. And this agenda cannot be attained in the absence of concerted
subnational cohesion. Let political acrimony take a back seat. In the
interest of Bihar, Let the Biharies rally back without hesitation. The
social justice movement is already substantially consolidated; it is
time now that it transcends in the realm of subnationalism. This no
doubt will mean broadest possible caste-class alliance.
Let Bihari subnationalism write a new script. It will
be mediated with an eye for national and global market. This is only
possible by forging a new identity in an atmosphere of a resurgent Bihar
wherein we can give befitting reply to all the existing cliches about
Bihar’s identity, which generally conceptualizes corruption and misrule
as being synonymous to the state. The consistent denigration has resulted
in the formation of a paradigm which provides fodder to the intelligentsia
at the national level to relish in not only Bihar bashing but also try
to understand misrule and corruption in other states of the country
through concepts and categories which are embedded in this Bihar-centric
view. The most recent example of this trend was disturbingly brought
forth on one of the most premier news channel of the country while showing
the interview of the Chief Minister of a neighbouring state. The interviewer,
himself one of the leading journalist of the country, was persistent,
while haranguing this Chief Minister, to accept that developments in
governance and polity of the concerned state has become ‘Biharised’
which he seemed to sanguinely believe was a substitute word for growing
corruption and misrule.
But we need not get agitated over this and try to
carry out a dialogue with these intellectuals to contest such portrayals.
Such conflicts might in the end prove to be carrying out our dialogue
with the deaf. Here we need to take some leafs from the way the Sikhs,
who were the butt of all jokes till recently, backed by the strong element
of economic development in Punjab, have forsaken several of their past
images to reconstitute their identity as an enterprising community.
While the jokes still go round but the conviction about the foolish
traits of a Sikh personality which are so intrinsic to these jokes is
missing or is atleast on the wane. Perhaps, the creation of a new Bihar
for which we have assembled here today would provide us with the required
ammunition to silence our critiques without using words and by merely
flaunting the performance of our state and a reconstituted identity
of Bihari based on such performances.
Dr.
Shaibal Gupta*
Comments....
However, I am a bit wary of the hypothesis that the only respite for Bihar is substantiation of sub-nationalism. This conjuncture, if I may call it so, is based on the assumption that the cause of development of rest of the India is sub-nationalism. And, India has developed. Here I beg to differ. Maybe you are right from within India view but if you view it from the International perspective then India has hardly had any significant development. Even if we leave the western countries and Japan alone and compare it to China and the South East Asia, the overall development of India is pathetic. You go to Beijing, Shanghai or even Manilla and none of the Indian cities compare. Nonetheless I agree that in development terms, Bihar is simply the pit of the pits.
On an arbitrary developmental scale of 100, if India is at 10 then Bihar is at 6. The difference of 4 is hardly visible from the point of view of the developed economies. Hence, it does not justify a strategy as pervasive as sub-nationalism. India as a whole is going to go nowhere with sub-nationalism. It will have to eventually shed it. Globalisation, Internet and the Free Trade zones will simply ignore or even by-pass the sub-nationalities.
A solution has to be based on a bigger picture. Parochialism and inward-looking solutions have never been successful in longer terms.
However, there is an opportunity. With the official British Indian documents being released to the public, we are in a better position to understand the current structural issues of the Indian society. This is where the solution lies. The struggle will be in identifying the real structural problems; the obvious and superficial ones are far too many, overwhelming and distracting. Bihar shows the tip of the iceberg. But the best part is that it is visible. If and when the problems of Bihar are tackled, India will again walk with the elephants.
As on optimist, I hope, that this will happen, maybe not in my life time. But the foundation has been laid. Once the Panchayat Raj takes over from the British Raj, things will move. The ideal world would be when the IAS/IPS bureaucracy is dismantled and the Panchayats are free to sponsor their own wealth generating projects. That is when India will get its real independence and it won’t matter whether you are a Bihari or not.
Anant Sahay anants@iprimus.com.au |
