Myths, illusions and peace

WHEN Barack Obama speaks to the Muslim world in Cairo on June 4th, his audience will want to know, above all, what he proposes to do about Palestine. Bill Clinton tried intense mediation, but it led to the explosion of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000. George Bush ignored the conflict and then called on Palestinians to dump their leader, Yasser Arafat, only to see a Hamas electoral victory in 2006 and some appalling violence in Gaza.

Mr Obama could do worse, before he goes, than read the thoughts of Dennis Ross, a veteran American mediator with considerable experience of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and David Makovsky, a colleague from a think-tank in Washington, DC. In their new book, the authors caution American leaders against believing they can either let the problem fix itself or impose peace. Instead they advocate diplomatic engagement “without illusions”: diplomacy may not achieve peace, but it might prevent the conflict from worsening.

So much blood has been shed in the years since the 1993 Oslo accords that, the authors insist, “the most formidable obstacle is the disbelief that exists on both sides”. For Israelis, territorial concessions have provoked more terrorism; for Palestinians, coming to terms with Zionism has led to more stifling occupation and the expansion of Jewish settlements. Grand declarations will count for nothing without tangible signs of change, big and small, on the ground. In short, America “cannot afford to raise expectations again”.

The authors seek to debunk several misconceptions, particularly the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central problem of the Middle East, and is damaging America's relations with the rest of the region. This notion of “linkage”, they say, is the “mother of all myths”. It allows Arab leaders to blame everyone but themselves. In practice, they usually pay only lip service to the Palestinian cause, and inter-Arab rivalry trumps other considerations. Such arguments have some truth, but are overdone. The authors themselves recognise that the conflict is stoking Islamic radicalism and anti-Americanism—that is why they want America to pursue peace.

The most interesting section of the book deals with the dilemma over whom America should talk to. The authors oppose dialogue with armed militant groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah, despite their strength, electoral success and proven ability to act as spoilers. And yet the authors think it is right for America to talk to Iran, a major sponsor of Hamas and Hizbullah, without preconditions. (Mr Ross is now Hillary Clinton's adviser on Iran.)

Why the difference? Because, the authors say, Iran is a state whose calculations can be influenced by America. Hamas and Hizbullah, by contrast, are violent ideological groups willing to provoke wars; talking to them only undermines moderates. That said, they argue, talks with Iran should not be open-ended and must be accompanied by economic and political pressure, perhaps applied by Europe, Russia and Saudi Arabia. America could extend its nuclear umbrella to Iran's neighbours.

This combination, the authors say, is more likely to convince Iran to give up the quest for nuclear weapons. And if diplomacy fails, then the effort at talks could help “set the stage for the use of force if agreement proves not to be possible”.