Overseas and under siege

Chinese money is helping to drive infrastructure investment in many developing countries, but in its wake has also come a big rise in Chinese immigrants and overseas workers that has proved less popular. As the number of attacks on Chinese citizens and property increases, domestic pressure may grow on China's government to respond assertively, undermining its doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

The last few months have seen another outbreak of anti-Chinese rioting in countries that casual observers might have been surprised to find even had a Chinese minority. In Algeria this August, clashes broke out between Chinese and locals in the capital, Algiers, leaving several people injured and a number of Chinese shops looted. Chinese shops around the capital were closed for the period following the violence, and there were calls from some Algerian traders for the expulsion of all Chinese immigrants from the country. Across the world in Papua New Guinea even more serious violence was witnessed after anti-Chinese rioting, reportedly involving thousands of people, broke out in May. At least one person was killed and Chinese-owned businesses were pillaged in several cities (including the capital, Port Moresby) and towns throughout the country.

Two outbreaks of violence could be deemed tragic but coincidental. However, the last few years have seen many similar bouts of rioting that have specifically targeted expatriate Chinese communities. The most serious occurred in the Solomon Islands in 2006, when the Chinatown in the capital, Honiara, suffered extensive damage amid riots that drove out much of the country's ethnic Chinese population. These followed an election in which many politicians were accused of having received bribes from Chinese businessmen as China and Taiwan vied for the Islands' diplomatic recognition. The same year saw outbreaks of unrest in the nearby island country of Tonga that also targeted Chinese firms and premises—the unrest erupted as pro-democracy groups accused the government of failing to advance democratic reforms, but rapidly took on anti-immigrant overtones.

Africa saw similar riots in 2006 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, following the election defeat of the opposition's presidential candidate, Michael Sata, who had run a campaign that strongly focused on the negative effects of rising Chinese involvement in the local economy. Zambia has since seen a steady rumbling of anti-China sentiment, mostly in the copper belt where Chinese investment is concentrated—a Chinese copper mine manager was hospitalised in March 2008 after a protest by workers over conditions. Unrest also broke out in 2007 in Lesotho, when local small-scale retailers, angered by a campaign to relocate them to a designated market place away from the city centre, went on a rampage targeting Chinese-owned businesses.

Rising resentment

Chinese communities abroad have long lived under the threat of persecution. The long-established ethnic-Chinese minorities in South-east Asia have been on the receiving end of some of the worst pogroms, with tens of thousands dying in Indonesia and Malaysian riots in the last century (the most recent violence in Indonesia, in 1998, may have left as many as 1,500 dead). In the decades since 1978, when China began its economic reforms, the number of Chinese who have moved abroad has increased rapidly and their destinations have become more varied. In the last few years China's increasingly open-handed approach to funding overseas infrastructure has heightened this flow of emigration. Developing nations across the world have been keen to accept Chinese financing for their roads, ports and telecommunications networks, but this money usually comes with requirements that foreign governments allow Chinese companies to do the work—and most often with a large number of Chinese labourers.

As a result of these trends, Chinese communities across the developing world have expanded explosively. Official data from governments in these countries are wildly contradictory on the exact numbers, but in Algeria, for example, press reports at the time of the recent riots suggested there were between 25,000 and 35,000 Chinese in the country, many working on petrochemical projects associated with Chinese investments. Coupled with this boom in the number of Chinese living abroad has come the impact of country's export juggernaut. Surging Chinese exports, especially to the developed world, have crushed local manufacturing industries in many parts of the developing world, particularly in the textiles trade. Small-scale Chinese retailers have also tended to crowd out local vendors, exploiting their ties to the source of the products now dominating foreign markets. The result can often be rising resentment against expatriate Chinese communities.

Adding to this can be other issues, such as labour incidents and land claims. The recent violence in Papua New Guinea followed an incident in which a Chinese worker driving a tractor at the Ramu nickel mine (which is being developed by a Chinese state enterprise, the China Metallurgical Construction Group) injured a local man. Land owners have also attacked Chinese employees at the mine. The violence in Zambia violence has also been linked to labour conditions in Chinese-owned mines, notably the Chambishi copper mine.

An easy target

For those who wish to target them, Chinese expatriates and their businesses are easily identifiable, marked by Chinese-language signs and often clustering in Chinatowns—it is notable that almost all anti-Chinese rioting has taken place in city centres, rather than near the infrastructure projects where many Chinese workers are employed. In Chinese areas there is sometimes a sharp cultural divide from the local environment. In Islamic countries there are frequent complaints about the open consumption of alcohol and immodest dress of Chinese businessmen and workers. In some places, such as Afghanistan, Chinese residents have even been linked with prostitution rackets.

While these factors may explain some of the underlying resentment levelled against Chinese communities overseas, it is probably no coincidence that in the majority of cases to date anti-Chinese rioting has been preceded by domestic political instability in the host country. In places like Tonga, the Solomon Islands and Zambia public anger against the government was already high, and the outbreak of violence against Chinese businesses was partly a result of opposition movements seeking to strengthen their positions.

Unusual quiescence

So far the Chinese government has had a curiously muted response to these incidents, confined to organising evacuations and relief. This is surprising given its tendency to react very strongly when it feels its national interest is threatened on issues such as trade or minority regions like Tibet. However, it is in part a reflection of the lessons of history. The Chinese government's strong response to the Indonesian pogroms against that country's ethnic Chinese in the 1960s and 1970s only served to stoke the Indonesian government's mistrust, leading to further persecution.

Despite this, pressures for a more activist position are growing. Within China, there is little distinction between nationality and ethnicity; even when ethnic Chinese hold a foreign passport both the government and the wider public tend to view them as citizens of China. More and more, the domestic media is bringing examples of the abuse of Chinese citizens abroad to public attention, increasing the pressure on the government to act.

For the time being, the Chinese government's main priority will be national strategic interests—be they mining operations (as in Zambia), the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan (a factor in the violence in the Solomon Islands) or the success of multi-billion dollar investments led by its state-owned enterprises (as in Algeria). However, as more Chinese businesses expand overseas and more Chinese live and work abroad, the government will have to put more emphasis on defending the welfare of its nationals. This will introduce yet another complicating factor into Chinese diplomacy.