Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij
Mobilisation Resistance Force

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has appointed the new deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces as well as the new commander of the Basij Organization, Mehr reported 02 July 2019. In a decree on Tuesday, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani as the new deputy chief of the Armed Forces, replacing Major-General Ataollah Salehi. Soleimani was appointed to the job upon a proposal by IRGC Chief Major General Hossein Salami, the Leader said. Under Iran’s law, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. The top commanders of the Armed Forces are directly appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei.

Changing the leadership of the Basij Movement over the course of just three years has been unprecedented during the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 02 July 2019, appointed Gholamreza Soleimani as head of the Basij Mostazafin organization, which followed the appointment of former President Gholam Hossein Ghayebourvar in December of 1395.

This is while Mohammad Reza Naghati, Mohammad Reza Naghati, Mohammad Reza Naghati, Mohammad Reza Naghati, who has been in office for more than 7 years (October 2002 to December 1995), Hossein Taeb for more than a year (July 87 to October 88), Mohammad Hejazi less than 10 years Until September 1386) and Alireza Afshar (8 March to March 1976) were at the head of the Basij Organization. Prior to Mr. Afshar, Mohammad Ali Rahmani was in charge of the Basij, who has been responsible for this since the previous leader.

Of course, during the course of the leadership of Khamenei, in a short period of the Basij Organization, there was no independent head of the Basij Organization, and it was under the command of the commander of the IRGC, which naturally is not to be considered in the above-mentioned: specifically from September 2007 (after the appointment of Mohammad Ali Ja'fari to the command of the Sepah) until July 2008 The commander of the Corps was also the head of the Basij Resistance Force, and Hossein Taeb was his deputy and "successor to the Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Resistance Force". But this was a temporary period, and from July 2008, Mr. Taeb became the "commander of the Basij Resistance Force" Contrary to a common vision, the replacement of the Basij commanders does not necessarily take place along with the change of commanders of the entire IRGC: for example, Gholam Hossein Gheibparvar, the former head of Basij, was appointed in December of 1395 two and a half years prior to the change of commander of the IRGC (Mohammad Ali Ja'fari).

The Pasdaran was given the mandate of organizing a large people's militia, the Basij, in 1980. Islamic Revolution Guards (Vezarat-e Sepah Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Islamic) is in charge of the paramilitary national Mobilization of the Oppressed (Baseej-e Mostazafan) Organisation. It is from Basij ranks that volunteers were drawn to launch "human wave" attacks against the Iraqis, particularly around Basra.

The Basij, a paramilitary force formed soon after the 1979 revolution, is one of the Iranian regime’s primary enforcers of internal security. The Basij, which came under the formal authority of the IRGC in 2007, has branches in every province and city in Iran. Its activities include indoctrinating schoolchildren and providing combat training to children as young as 12-years-old.

Shortly after the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran’s Islamic Republic, gave a speech to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and emphasized that the country needed a 20 million-strong army to be able to defend itself against its enemies, particularly the United States. Iranian sources consider that date the official establishment of the Basij (the name means mobilization). However, the related law was only passed in June 1980. It states that the purpose of the Basij is ‘to train and organize all volunteers for encountering any threat and invasion against the accomplishments of the Islamic revolution from inside and outside.’ The law also places the Basij organization under the control of the supreme leader; however, in practice, it has always been supervised by the IRGC.

When Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980, the ayatollahs faced a challenge in defending the country. They had weakened the country’s military by executing or imprisoning many high-ranking military officers, allegedly for being loyal to the previous regime or being involved in suppressing the revolutionaries. Under such circumstances, the Basij started to recruit millions of volunteers for the war. Without the contribution of the so-called Basijis, Iran most probably would have lost the war to Saddam’s army.

When the war was over, the IRGC started to use the Basij for staging propaganda events in support of the regime. For instance, when the supreme leader calls for a rally in support of the system or against Western countries, the Basijis are the first on the scene and encourage or even force others to attend. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), who attempted some political reforms, Basijis became thugs attacking reformist politicians, journalists, students, or anyone critical of the conservative establishment.

The height of their notoriety was the protests against the reelection of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president in 2009, when they were armed by the IRGC to suppress protesters. In addition to beating up supporters of the so-called Green Movement and handing them over to security forces, they were also responsible for killing dozens. […] The Basij also does significant recruitment in schools. The recruits are separated into categories, ‘Omidan’ (Hopes, in elementary schools); ‘Pouyandegan’ (Seekers, in middle schools) and ‘Pishgaman’ (Standard Bearers, in high schools).

The title of the "Mashhad-e-Shafin Organization", also used during Ayatollah Khomeini's time, was changed to the Basij Resistance Force in 1989 and at the same time as Alireza Afshar's appointment. However, in 2009, following the appointment of Mohammad Reza Naghdi, he again became the "Basij Mostazafin Organization". Such a change had a distinctly intermediate level: until October 13, the mobilization was one of the "forces" of the Revolutionary Guards, along with ground forces, naval and air forces (which was called the air space in the same month of October 2009) and the Qods Force. But since then, it has been one of the "Revolutionary Guards" organizations - along with the intelligence agency, the Information Protection and Protection Corps.

The difference between the forces and organizations of the IRGC is that the main task of the "forces" of the military, and the main task of the organizations is mainly civilians - for example, intelligence, security or information. In the same vein, after the formation of the Masjedzafin Basij Organization in 2009, its main task was to define the "soft war" and the Basij militia units joined the Revolutionary Guard's Ground Forces. The task that is already relevant and in practice places this organization in a political-security position.

It seems that the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran - for whatever reason - has been determined to change the administrative structure of the IRGC and its subsidiaries with an acceleration and scope beyond its usual traditions. The change that has shown is that, in addition to the military, in the intelligence fields (IRGC) and political-security (Basij), it is more recognizable and more or less reminiscent of the structural changes of the IRGC in 2009.

Among other malign activities, the IRGC’s Basij militia recruits, trains, and deploys child soldiers to fight in IRGC-fueled conflicts across the region. This Iran-based network is known as Bonyad Taavon Basij, which is translated as Basij Cooperative Foundation, and is comprised of at least 20 corporations and financial institutions. The Bonyad Taavon Basij employs shell companies and other measures to mask Basij ownership and control over a variety of multibillion-dollar business interests in Iran’s automotive, mining, metals, and banking industries, many of which have significant international dealings across the Middle East and with Europe.

The Bonyad Taavon Basij network is an example of how the IRGC and Iranian military forces have expanded their economic involvement in major industries, and infiltrated seemingly legitimate businesses to fund terrorism and other malign activities. This vast network provides financial infrastructure to the Basij’s efforts to recruit, train, and indoctrinate child soldiers who are coerced into combat under the IRGC’s direction.

The precise size of the Basij is an open question. Basij membership comprises mainly boys, old men, and those who recently finished their military service. Article 151 of the Constitution says the government is obligated to provide military-training facilities for everyone in the country, in accordance with the precepts of Islam under which all individuals should have the ability to take up arms in defense of their country

Iranian officials frequently cite a figure of 20 million, but this appears to be an exaggeration based on revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's November 1979 decree creating the Basij. Khomeini said at the time that "a country with 20 million youths must have 20 million riflemen or a military with 20 million soldiers; such a country will never be destroyed." In a 1985 Iranian News Agency report, Hojjatoleslam Rahmani, head of the Basij forces of the Pasdaran, was quoted as stating that there were close to 3 million volunteers in the paramilitary force receiving training in some 11,000 centers.

General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the commander of the IRGC, predicted that in the Third Five-Year Development Plan (2000-04) the number of Basijis will expand to 15 million (9 million men, 6 million women) to better counter potential domestic and foreign threats. While apparently falling short of the goal outlined in the plan, Basij commander Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi estimated the number of Basij personnel at 10.3 million in March 2004 and 11 million in March 2005. Basij commander General Mohammad Hejazi said on 14 September 2005 that the Basij has more than 11 million members across the country.

Other estimates place the force at 400,000. There are about 90,000 active-duty Basij members who are full-time uniformed personnel; they are joined by up to 300,000 reservists. The Basij can mobilize up to 1 million men. This includes members of the University Basij, Student Basij, and the former tribal levies incorporated into the Basij (aka Tribal Basij). Middle-school-aged members of the Student Basij are called Seekers (Puyandegan), and high-school members are called the Vanguard (Pishgaman).

The Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij - the Mobilisation Resistance Force - was the strong right arm of Ayatollah Khomeini. Its volunteers were martyred in their tens of thousands in the Iran-Iraq war, and were given the role of moral police at home. The supreme leader's equally conservative successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been careful not to let any of Iran's overlapping security forces fall under the control of his elected rival.

Ashura Brigades were reportedly created in 1993 after anti-government riots erupted in various Iranian cities. In 1998 they consisted of 17,000 Islamic militia men and women, and were composed of elements of the Revolutionary Guards and the Baseej volunteer militia.

A January 2018 article of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) (author: Saeid Golkar) refers to the Basij as the “largest civil militia organization in the world, with around five million members spread among twenty-four branches and divided into four main rankings: regular, active, cadre, and special. It is noted that the Basij form “a cluster network consisting of Basij bases, districts, and regions”: “Although the bases are the lowest organizational level, their high visibility (50,000 locations throughout Iran) makes them the Basij’s true grassroots backbone. Each Basij resistance district controls ten to fifteen bases and is home to local security and military forces. These districts are in turn controlled by IRGC regional branches. Depending on size, some cities have more than one IRGC region (e.g., Tehran).” (WINEP, 5 January 2018)

A January 2018 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explains that the Basij force has “evolved steadily since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and large elements are now local paramilitary security forces tied to the IRGC”. The same source comments on estimates regarding the strength of the Basij force: “Iranian official estimates sometime put their total part-time and full-time strength at more than 20 million, and other estimates indicate a core strength of 90,000, and up to 600,000 with some kind of mobilization potential. These numbers are soft to say the least, and being a regular solider or conscript, or policeman, has never meant that any given case is a strong supporter of any regime.” (CSIS, 11 January 2018, p. 4)

A May 2018 report of the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) puts the strength of the Basij force at 100,000: “Security forces number about 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces, with another 100,000 Basij (volunteer militia under IRGC control) permanently deployed. Hundreds of thousands of additional Basij could be mobilized in the event or an all-out war.” (CRS, 23 May 2018, p. 18)

The Basij, or Baseej paramilitary volunteer forces, come under the control of the Revolutionary Guards. They have been active in monitoring the activities of citizens, enforcing the hijab and arresting women for violating the dress code, and seizing 'indecent' material and satellite dish antennae. In May 1999 the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated in public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting, quickly criticised any potential change as amounting to "surrender" to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea. The "Special Basijis" are not permitted to participate in political parties or groups, although other members of the Basij can belong to political associations if they are not on a Basij mission and do not use the name or resources of the Basij for the association. Basijis can participate in specialist or trade associations.

Hezbollahi "partisans of God" consist of religious zealots who consider themselves as preservers of the Revolution. They have been active in harassing government critics and intellectuals, have firebombed bookstores and disrupted meetings. They are said to gather at the invitation of the state-affiliated media and generally act without meaningful police restraint or fear of persecution.

President Mohammad Khatami told the cabinet on 22 November 2000 that "the Basij is a progressive force which seeks to play a better role in maintaining religious faith among its allies, and acquiring greater knowledge and skills." The deputy commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Brigadier-General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, made comments in a similar vein at the annual Basij Supreme Association for Political Studies and Analysis gathering. He told the audience that the Basij pursued military activities in the first decade after the revolution because the main threat facing Iran at the time was a military one. Now, Zolqadr explained, the Basij will become "involved anywhere if the country's security, goals, or national interests are threatened." A statement issued by the Basij Center at the Science and Technology University on 23 November 2000 explained how this will be accomplished : "The Basij Resistance Force is equipped with the most modern and up-to-date weapons and is undergoing the most advanced training. It is making such achievements that if the enemy finds out it will tremble and have a heart attack." The Basij demonstrated what it would do in case that faile during 23 November 2000 civil defense exercises, when armed Basijis took up positions in the streets and along strategic locations.

The Basij Resistance Force appeared to be undergoing something of a revival under the administration of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. This could be connected with the organization's alleged role in securing votes for Ahmadinejad during the presidential campaign and on election day. Ahmadinejad appointed Hojatoleslam Heidar Moslehi, the supreme leader's representative to the Basij, as an adviser in mid-August 2005. But the revival -- along with changes in the paramilitary organization's senior leadership -- could also be connected with preparations for possible civil unrest. In late September 2005, the Basij staged a series of urban defense exercises across the country. General Mirahmadi, the first deputy commander of the Basij, announced in Tehran that the creation of 2,000 Ashura battalions within the Basij will enhance Iran's defensive capabilities. Ashura units have riot-control responsibilities. In addition to its involvement in violent crackdowns and serious human rights abuses in Iran, the Basij recruits and trains fighters for the IRGC-QF, including Iranian children, who then deploy to Syria to support the brutal Assad regime. Since at least early 2015, the Basij has recruited and provided combat training to fighters before placing them on a waiting list for deployment to Syria.

In addition to Iranian nationals, the Basij also recruits Afghan immigrants to Iran, including children as young as 14-years-old, to join the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia made up of Afghan fighters under the control of the IRGC-QF in Syria. Some of these Afghan recruits, reportedly coerced to fight on the side of the Assad regime in Syria, choose instead to flee to Europe. The Basij also recruit Pakistani nationals to join the Zainabiyoun Brigade, a militia comprised of Pakistani nationals under the control of the IRGC-QF in Syria.

In addition to committing acts of violence at home and abroad and supporting the IRGC-QF’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, the Basij, through its economic arm, Bonyad Taavon Basij, has increased its involvement in Iran’s major industries such as the metals and minerals, automotive, and banking sectors. In addition to providing social welfare services, including housing and financial support, to Basij members, Bonyad Taavon Basij manages Basij members’ economic activities by funding small companies. However, as its role in domestic oppression and support for the IRGC-QF’s external meddling has increased, Bonyad Taavon Basij has expanded its reach into Iran’s economy by establishing several investment firms through its financial and investment offshoot Mehr Eqtesad Bank.