Against all odds: U.S. policy and the 1963 Central America Summit Conference

Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 2003 by Leonard, Thomas M

INTRODUCTION

An estimated 250,000 Costa Ricans lined the route from La Sabana Airport to the National Theater in city center on March 18, 1963 to welcome U.S. President John F. Kennedy to San Jose, host of the Central Summit conference between he and his isthmian counterparts. Often the crowd overwhelmed police and security forces along the route to surround the president's limousine, and in the process, prevented other vehicles in the motorcade from moving forward. So intense were the mobs of people, Senator William J. Fulbright (D.,Ark.) abandoned his vehicle, and walked the last four miles of the route. While this was Kennedy's third trip to Latin America since becoming president, the Central American public was ecstatic over its first ever summit conference to include a U.S. president. Across the isthmus, front page newspaper stories extolled the virtues of the United States, expressed admiration for Kennedy, and anticipated lofty results from the conference. Each prominently displayed photographs of their nation's president with Kennedy. For the United States, Kennedy's visit to Central America was "one more manifestation of his intense interest in Latin America and his determination to make the Alliance for Progress succeed."1

On December 30, 1961 U.S. President John F. Kennedy received a proposal from Honduran President Ramon Villeda Morales for a conference between Kennedy and the five Central American heads of state. Villeda Morales offered Tegucigalpa to serve as the host city. At the time, the U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa downplayed the suggestion because it concluded it that Costa Rican President Mario Enchandi would not receive the necessary legislative approval to travel out of the country. Earlier, Enchandi led the congressional opposition that prevented then President Jose Figueres from going abroad, and now the National Liberation Party was expected to return the favor. The matter rested for eighteen months until Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes suggested a similar meeting to "reinvigorate the Central American Common Market for Central America's development" and for the Alliance for Progress to provide special "treatment" for the project. Ydigoras' suggestion found a more receptive audience than that of Villeda Morales. New Costa Rican President Francisco Orlich informed the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Raymond Telles, that he would "meet with President Kennedy and any or all of the Central American Presidents...in any of the Central American capitals." Subsequently, he offered San Jose as the meeting site. Not to be out maneuvered, Ydigoras proposed Guatemala City. Kennedy wrote back that while he could not attend such a meeting in 1962, he asked for "suggestions as to time and place for future meetings" and that the Central Americans reach a "consensus" in selecting a "mutually agreeable site."2

The State Department wrestled with which Central American capital Kennedy should go to without offending the other republics. Because of the Somoza's image, Managua was "the least acceptable," and Guatemalan President Ydigoras was considered "a bit unstable" to serve as host. San Salvador was too small to accommodate the entourage that accompany each president, especially Kennedy, and "certainly not Tegucigalpa [where]...there were no facilities." That left San Jose. Although its facilities were considered "inadequate" at least it "would be done with good will on the part of everybody." Indeed San Jose lacked sufficient space for Kennedy's group. "Everybody doubled up," U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Charles Burrows subsequently recalled. Ambassador Raymond Telles and his family moved in with friends so that Kennedy could use the official residence.

In early December 1962 Guatemalan President Ydigoras visited his colleagues in the other Central American capitals, where he gained their support for the summit agenda to include only region-wide issues. Ydigoras' proposal included a charge to the Agency for International Development's (USAID) Regional Organization for Central America and Panama office (ROCAP) to immediately design a region-wide economic development program; the regionalization of the Alliance for Progress social programs; the establishment of a Central American Securities Exchange to facilitate regional investment; and that the Central Americans receive "more equitable" compensation for their primary products in the global market place. The Ydigoras plan also called upon each republic to formulate their own development programs that would be jointly presented to international lending agencies.3

Subsequently, the Central American Foreign Ministers agreed that San Jose host the meeting, and that Panama be included. When Kennedy suggested the meeting be held in March or April, the Central Americans offered mid-March as more appropriate thanks to the torrential "rainy season" that commenced in April. With place and time set, the Central Americans seized the initiative and the planning process commenced. After being selected coordinator by his colleagues Costa Rican Foreign Minister Daniel Obudar orchestrated a mid-January 1963 meeting of the Central American Foreign Ministers to set the summit's political agenda that would focus upon the Cuban threat to the region. Obudar also set January 21, 1963 as the date and San Salvador the site for the Economic Ministers to define the summit's economic agenda that would focus upon Central America's economic integration and its relationship to the Alliance for Progress. According to the Central American plan, following these meetings, Obudar would come to Washington to finalize the summit agenda.4