By More Than Providence
Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783
Columbia University Press
By More Than Providence
Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783
Columbia University Press
Soon after the American Revolution, certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities.
Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.
Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.
Michael Green's magisterial study is a timely and insightful reminder of the deep and long-standing ties between East Asia and the United States, and the complex interplay between our economic and security interests, and our values, a dynamic which has shaped US policy for two and a half centuries. It is an indispensable point of reference for students and policy makers seeking to understand a critical region where history casts a long shadow, notwithstanding the extraordinary changes of recent years. James Steinberg, Syracuse University and former deputy secretary of state
With impeccable research and lucid prose, Michael Green provides a first-rate account of the deep historical roots of American grand strategy toward Asia. It is essential for understanding American policy toward a crucial region. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University, and author of Is the American Century Over?
Already a renowned Japan expert, Green combines his regional knowledge with a capacious strategic mind and historical sensibility. This is one of the most impressive books I have ever read. It is consistently original, providing on every page fresh insights immersed in a compelling narrative arc, and it is destined to be a lodestar among scholarship on history, strategy, and statecraft. William Inboden, Chair, Clements Center for National Security, The University of Texas, Austin
Important and comprehensive study of America's relations with the region. Gordon G. Chang, New York Times Book Review
Green set about filling [a] gap in the literature and he has succeeded triumphantly. His book is likely to become the standard work on the subject. Gideon Rachman, Financial Times
With rich historical records and insightful analysis, this is a fascinating, most useful reference for students and scholars of US-Asia relations and American foreign policy. Choice
[An] essential guide to understanding U.S. policy in Asia. Foreign Affairs
Rich and ambitious history of US strategic thinking toward Asia Los Angeles Review of Books
By More Than Providence provides the greatest value in illustrating how the draw of the Asia-Pacific has been an enduring influence in the United States for nearly two-and-a-half centuries. Matthew T. Brundage, Journal of American-East Asian Relations
Green brings scholarly and policymaking credentials to this tour d’horizon. Imperial & Global Forum
A brilliant and highly readable history of America's evolving grand strategy toward Asia and the Pacific since 1783. Asian Review of Books
By More than Providence is a gold mine of richly documented historical detail, informed by international relations theory, and enlivened by the hands-on policymaker’s nose for bureaucratic turf battles, clashing personalities, and Washington intrigue. . . . The Asia-Pacific has long loomed large in American strategic thinking and today its centrality is unparalleled. By More than Providence provides a sweep, power, and coherence that anchors that centrality historically. T.J. Pempel, Journal of East Asian Studies
In examining U.S. grand strategy toward the Asia Pacific, he has produced a grand synthesis. Journal of American History
Note on Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Terms
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I. The Rise of the United States
1. "A Theatre for the Exercise of the Most Ambitious Intellect": Seeds of Strategy, 1784–1860
2. "How Sublime the Pacific Part Assigned to Us": Precursors to Expansion, 1861–1898
3. "I Wish to See the United States the Dominant Power on the Shores of the Pacific": Grand Strategy in the Era of Theodore Roosevelt
II. The Rise of Japan
4. "Leave the Door Open, Rehabilitate China, and Satisfy Japan": Defining the Open Door, 1909–1927
5. "Between Non-resistance and Coercion": The Open Door Closes, 1928–1941
6. "We Have Got to Dominate the Pacific": Grand Strategy and the War Against Japan
III. The Rise of the Soviets
7. "The Overall Effect Is to Enlarge Our Strategic Frontier": Defining Containment in the Pacific, 1945–1960
8. "Anyone Who Isn't Confused Really Doesn't Understand the Situation": Asia Strategy and Escalation in Vietnam, 1961–1968
9. "An Even Balance": Nixon and Kissinger's Redefinition of Containment in Asia, 1969–1975
10. "The President Cannot Make Any Weak Moves": Jimmy Carter and the Return of the China Card, 1977–1980
11. "To Contain and Over Time Reverse": Ronald Reagan, 1980–1989
IV. The Rise of China
12. "The Key to Our Security and Our Prosperity Lies in the Vitality of Those Relationships": George H. W. Bush and the Unipolar Moment, 1989–1992
13. "Engage and Balance": Bill Clinton and the Unexpected Return of Great-Power Politics
14. "A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom": Strategic Surprise and the Asia Policy of George W. Bush
15. "The Pivot": Barack Obama and the Struggle to Rebalance Asia
Conclusion: The Historical Case for Asia Strategy
Notes
Index
Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I. The Rise of the United States
1. "A Theatre for the Exercise of the Most Ambitious Intellect": Seeds of Strategy, 1784–1860
2. "How Sublime the Pacific Part Assigned to Us": Precursors to Expansion, 1861–1898
3. "I Wish to See the United States the Dominant Power on the Shores of the Pacific": Grand Strategy in the Era of Theodore Roosevelt
II. The Rise of Japan
4. "Leave the Door Open, Rehabilitate China, and Satisfy Japan": Defining the Open Door, 1909–1927
5. "Between Non-resistance and Coercion": The Open Door Closes, 1928–1941
6. "We Have Got to Dominate the Pacific": Grand Strategy and the War Against Japan
III. The Rise of the Soviets
7. "The Overall Effect Is to Enlarge Our Strategic Frontier": Defining Containment in the Pacific, 1945–1960
8. "Anyone Who Isn't Confused Really Doesn't Understand the Situation": Asia Strategy and Escalation in Vietnam, 1961–1968
9. "An Even Balance": Nixon and Kissinger's Redefinition of Containment in Asia, 1969–1975
10. "The President Cannot Make Any Weak Moves": Jimmy Carter and the Return of the China Card, 1977–1980
11. "To Contain and Over Time Reverse": Ronald Reagan, 1980–1989
IV. The Rise of China
12. "The Key to Our Security and Our Prosperity Lies in the Vitality of Those Relationships": George H. W. Bush and the Unipolar Moment, 1989–1992
13. "Engage and Balance": Bill Clinton and the Unexpected Return of Great-Power Politics
14. "A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom": Strategic Surprise and the Asia Policy of George W. Bush
15. "The Pivot": Barack Obama and the Struggle to Rebalance Asia
Conclusion: The Historical Case for Asia Strategy
Notes
Index
Illustrations
Runner-up, 2018 Arthur Ross Book Award, Council on Foreign Relations