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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorWeder, Beatrice
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T19:30:11Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder. 2002. Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? American Economic Review 92(4): 1126-1137.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553011
dc.description.abstractCritics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is "no."en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1257/00028280260344669en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleDo Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?en_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T19:30:11Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/00028280260344669*
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


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