Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the mind. I develop an account of implementation, linked to an appropriate class of automata, such that the requirement that a system implement a given automaton places a very strong constraint on the system. This clears the way for computation to play a central role in the analysis of mind.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Block, N.: 1981, ‘Psychologism and Behaviorism’, Philosophical Review 90, 5–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J.: 1994a, ‘On Implementing a Computation’, Mind and Machines 4.

  • Chalmers, D. J.: 1994b, ‘A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition’, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Technical Report 94-03, Washington University.

  • Hopcroft, J. E., and Ullman, J. D.: 1979, Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages, and Computation, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1973, ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy 70, 556–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maudlin, T.: 1989, ‘Computation and Consciousness’, Journal of Philosophy 86, 407–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H.: 1988, Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. R.: 1980, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. R.: 1990, ‘Is the Brain a Digital Computer?’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64, 21–37.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Washington University, 63130, St Louis, Missouri

    David J. Chalmers

Authors
  1. David J. Chalmers
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Chalmers, D.J. Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?. Synthese 108, 309–333 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413692

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413692

Keywords

Search

Navigation