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Rent seeking: Some conceptual problems and implications

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Conclusion

Rent-seeking waste is a matter of opinion depending on one's view of the appropriate role of the state, which must ultimately be determined on the basis of ethics rather than economic theory. If emphasis is placed on the freedom of individual choice, there are genuine opportunities for improvements in the political system and strong reasons to reduce the current level of redistributive activity. Rent-seeking activities by organized groups are important in the growth of the bargaining society or transfer society with its stifling effect on the competitive market process and concomitant shrinking of liberty of choice. Moreover, while there can be little doubt that there has been a pronounced increase in the number of groups organized for redistributive purposes, group activities generally pose little reason for concern in the absence of government assistance. Thus, limiting the role of the state is essential in minimizing the effects of rentseeking activity.30 There is mounting evidence that a revision of the constitutional contract will be necessary to reduce the role of the state. Regardless of the approach taken in reducing the scope of government, however, a necessary first step is increased awareness of the economic and ethical implications of redistributive activities by individuals and groups.

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Authors
  1. E. C. Pasour Jr.
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This article was presented as a paper at a New York University-Liberty Fund Research seminar in Austrian economics, August 7–11, 1983. The author wishes to thank members of the seminar and Terry Anderson, Marc Johnson, Dwight Lee, Jim Leiby, Rolf Mueller, and Ray Palmquist for helpful comments and suggestions.

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Pasour, E.C. Rent seeking: Some conceptual problems and implications. Rev Austrian Econ 1, 123–143 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01539337

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