Are we explaining consciousness yet?

doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X

Cognition

Volume 79, Issues 1–2, April 2001, Pages 221-237

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X Get rights and content

Abstract

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness.

Section snippets

Clawing our way towards consensus

As the Decade of the Brain (declared by President Bush in 1990) comes to a close, we are beginning to discern how the human brain achieves consciousness. Dehaene and Naccache (in this volume) see convergence coming from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model. There are still many differences of emphasis to negotiate, and, no doubt, some errors of detail to correct, but there is enough common ground to build on. I agree, and will attempt to re-articulate

Competition for clout

The basic idea is that consciousness is more like fame than television; it is not a special ‘medium of representation’ in the brain into which content-bearing events must be transduced in order to become conscious. As Kanwisher (this volume) aptly emphasizes: “the neural correlates of awareness of a given perceptual attribute are found in the very neural structure that perceptually analyzes that attribute”. Instead of switching media or going somewhere in order to become conscious, heretofore

Is there also a Hard Problem?

The most natural reaction in the world to this proposal is frank incredulity: it seems to be leaving out the most important element – the Subject! People are inclined to object: “There may indeed be fierce competition between ‘informations’ for political clout in the brain, but you have left out the First Person, who entertains the winners.” The mistake behind this misbegotten objection is not noticing that the First Person has in fact already been incorporated into the multifarious further

But what about ‘qualia’?

As Dehaene and Naccache note,

[T]he flux of neuronal workspace states associated with a perceptual experience is vastly beyond accurate verbal description or long-term memory storage. Furthermore, although the major organization of this repertoire is shared by all members of the species, its details result from a developmental process of epigenesis and are therefore specific to each individual. Thus the contents of perceptual awareness are complex, dynamic, multi-faceted neural states that

Conclusion

A neuroscientific theory of consciousness must be a theory of the Subject of consciousness, one that analyzes this imagined central Executive into component parts, none of which can itself be a proper Subject. The apparent properties of consciousness that only make sense as features enjoyed by the Subject must thus also be decomposed and distributed, and this inevitably creates a pressure on the imagination of the theorist. No sooner do such properties get functionalistically analyzed into

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Citation Excerpt :
In other words, distilling the minimal NCC from preceding activity risks creating an arbitrary distinction and an oversimplified account conforming to the singular event that represents conscious resolution. As Dennett (2001) says, “(consciousness) is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; (…) consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time.” Revisiting IA1 allows bringing into discussion an alternative conception of consciousness which considers it not the resolved product of unconscious processing, but the very process of resolving incoming information (see Section 4.2 on Process Philosophy).
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Are we explaining consciousness yet?

Abstract

Section snippets

Clawing our way towards consensus

Competition for clout

Is there also a Hard Problem?

But what about ‘qualia’?

Conclusion

Facing up to the problem of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies

The conscious mind

First-person methods in the science of consciousness

Consciousness Bulletin

The astonishing hypothesis: the scientific search for the soul

The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness

Unconscious perception: attention, awareness and control

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition

Quining qualia

Consciousness explained

Real consciousness

Instead of qualia

Consciousness: more like fame than television

The myth of double transduction