Abstract
We document the increase in marital turnover and survey economic models of the marriage market. Couples match based on attributes but sorting is constrained by costs of search. Divorce is caused by new information on match quality, and remarriage requires further search. Although most men and women marry, they are single more often than before and more children live in one-parent household. The impact on children depends on child-support transfers. Such transfers may rise with the aggregate divorce (remarriage) rates.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Weiss, Y. (2008). Marriage and Divorce. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2626-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2626-1
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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