¹ Sartori, Giovanni, “Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems,” American Political Science Review, 63 (06, 1969), 398 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² The best review of the many meanings of ideology is provided by Naess, Arne and Associates, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1956), especially, pp. 141–176 Google Scholar. An appreciation for the range of meanings, however, can be gained from the much shorter list collected by Lane, Robert E., “The Meanings of Ideology,” in Power, Participation and Ideology, ed. Larson, Calvin J. and Wasburn, Philo C. (New York: David McKay, 1969), pp. 321–323 Google Scholar.

³ Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (Cleveland: Meridian, 1963), p. 96 Google Scholar.

⁴ This difficulty is recognized clearly by Giovanni Sartori (pp. 398–400). Although I disagree with Sartori's concept of ideology, his work is important because it raises, in a self-conscious and systematic way, the problem of distinguishing ideology from other mental and cultural phenomena.

I have analyzed Sartori's approach in an article titled, “Sartori's Concept of Ideology: A Dissent and An Alternative,” in Public Opinion and Political Attitudes: A Reader, ed. Wilcox, Allen R. (New York: Wiley, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

⁵ An excellent account of Bacon's contribution to the theory of ideology is provided by Barth, Hans, Wahrheit und Ideologie, 2nd ed., enlarged (Zurich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1961), pp. 32–60 Google Scholar.

⁶ The most prominent of the Idéologues is generally considered to be Antoine Destutt de Tracy whose basic work on ideology was his Elements d' Ideologie (1801–1815). An excerpt from the Elements d' Ideologie in English translation, together with some comments on the work of the Idéologues, is contained in Cox, Richard H., ed., “The Original Concept of Ideology,” in Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969), pp. 10–27 Google Scholar. On the Idéologues see also Acton, H. B., “The Philosophy of Language in Revolutionary France,” in Studies in Philosophy, ed. Findlay, J. N. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 143–167 Google Scholar; Barth, pp. 13–31; Lichtheim, George, “The Concept of Ideology,” History and Theory, 4 (1965), 164–170 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or, Stein, Jay W., “Beginnings of ‘Ideology,’” South Atlantic Quarterly, 55 (04, 1956), 163–170 Google Scholar.

After the Revolution of 1789, when France was still a democratic republic, the Idéologues, most of them members of the National Institute, sought to develop doctrines that would be a solvent for the à priori philosophical and theological speculations which had bolstered the old regime. The method the Idéologues developed to meet this double exigency was the “science of ideas” which they called “ideology,” and through it, they aspired to provide a firm ground for reason by “reducing” all ideas to their genesis in sensation. Using this technique, the transcendent notions of religion and philosophy were subjected to criticism with the aim of hindering the perpetuation of false abstract principles which, they believed, impeded “not only the understanding of men amongst themselves, but also the building of the state and society.” (Barth, pp. 16–17. Translation by Ilse M. Mullins.)

Their iconoclastic views naturally brought the Idéologues into conflict with Napoleon Bonaparte after his rise to the position of Emperor. He set out to discredit the science of ideas, which, it seemed, undermined political authority and promoted the dissolution of the body politic. Through his powers as head of state, Napoleon reorganized the Institute, abolishing the Second Class of Moral and Political Sciences, until then a sanctuary for the Idéologues, and he turned the terms “ideology” and “ideologue” into pejoratives, indicating that the Idéologues were visionary dreamers who had no understanding of practical political affairs.

⁷ Of course, Marx's concept of ideology was influenced by antecedent developments in German philosophy, especially as found in the works of Hegel and Feuerbach. See, for example: Barth, pp. 61–96; Gregor, A. James, A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 3–37 Google Scholar; Lichtheim, pp. 174–177; or Plamenatz, John, Ideology (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 32–45 Google Scholar.

⁸ In relating Marx's concept of ideology, it is tempting to stop with his portrayal of ideology as a separation or “inversion” of thought and being, where ideas become reified and lose their relevance to one's existential sociological condition. The cure for these mental chimeras, therefore, would be “positive science.” See Marx, and Engels, , The German Ideology, ed. Pascal, R. (New York: International, 1947), pp. 13–15 Google Scholar.

This, however, would be an incomplete account of ideology as Marx conceived it. That is because, for Marx, a true understanding of one's existential situation in a particular epoch necessitates not only “positive science,” but requires, in addition, the capacity to understand the significance of that situation as measured from the perspective of “history as a whole.” In the words of George Lichtheim: “To Marx, as to any Hegelian, the actual world of empirical perception was only an imperfect realization—at times indeed a caricature—of the real or rational world, in which man's essential nature (his rationality) will have overcome the reified existence he leads while the surrounding object-world is not perceived as the product of his own creativity. The attainment of this liberated state is the work of history, whose dialectic is not disclosed by empirical perception, but by critical (philosophical) reflection on the totality of the process” (p. 194).

⁹ Compare, for example, Marx and Engels, pp. 13–15, with Marx, , “Excerpt from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ,” in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings in Politics and Philosophy, ed. Feuer, Lewis S. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 44 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Marx, , “Excerpt from A Contribution …,” p. 44 Google Scholar. In Marx's view, myth and Utopia, as types of distorted theoretical thinking, are also forms of ideology. On myth, see Marx, , “Excerpts from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte ,” in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings …, ed. Feuer, , especially pp. 320–323 Google Scholar. See also Harold Rosenberg's excellent analysis of the Brumaire in his “The Resurrected Romans,” The Kenyon Review, 10 (Autumn, 1948), 602–620 Google Scholar. On Utopia, see Marx, and Engels, , “Manifesto of the Communist Party” and Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings …, ed. Feuer, , pp. 37-39, 68–111 Google Scholar, respectively.

¹¹ Ideology and Utopia, trans. Wirth, Louis and Shils, Edward (New York: Harvest, 1936), p. 59 Google Scholar.

¹² Mannheim, p. 57.

¹³ Mannheim, pp. 125, 277.

¹⁴ Mannheim, pp. 192–193.

¹⁵ Mannheim argues that “wish-images” are not Utopian until they pass over into “actual conduct” (p. 193).

¹⁶ For a discussion of this difficulty in Mannheim's thought, See Wagner, Helmut R., “Mannheim's Historicism,” Social Research, 19 (Spring, 1952), 320–321 Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Each Age is a Dream: A Study in Ideologies (New York: Bouregy and Carl, 1954). Compare pp. 6, 7, 14, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Garstin, p. 27.

¹⁹ Garstin, pp. 10–47.

²⁰ The Domain of Ideologies: A Study of the Origin, Development and Structure of Ideologies (Glasgow: William MacLellan, 1947)Google Scholar.

²¹ Walsby, p. 142 (author's emphasis).

²² See Aron, Raymond, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962)Google Scholar; Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: The Free Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Vintage, 1956)Google Scholar; Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960)Google Scholar; Shils, Edward, “Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual,” Sewanee Review, 66 (Summer, 1958), 450–480 Google Scholar, and Shils, , “Letter From Milan: The End of Ideology?” Encounter, No. 26 (1955), 52–58 Google Scholar.

Much of the literature of this movement and its critics is found in Waxman, Chaim I., ed. The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968)Google Scholar.

²³ Delany, William, “The Role of Ideology: A Summation,” in The End of Ideology Debate, p. 295 Google Scholar.

²⁴ See, for example, Aron, pp. 265–294; Bell, pp. 400–401; Camus, pp. 110–132; and Shils, , “Ideology and Civility …,” pp. 457–466 Google Scholar.

²⁵ Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 116 Google Scholar (author's emphasis). For an analysis of political symbols similar to that presented in Power and Society, see also, Lasswell, , “The Language of Power,” in Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics by Lasswell, , Leites, Nathan and Associates (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949), pp. 3–19 Google Scholar.

²⁶ Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 117, quoting A. V. Dicey. Lasswell and Kaplan note the similarity between their “‘myth’” and, among others, “Marx's ‘ideology,’” and “Mannheim's ‘ideology’ and ‘Utopia’” (p. 117).

²⁷ Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 123 (author's emphasis). In a footnote on this page, it is suggested that the term “utopia” is retained because of its “familiarity in technical contexts,” but that the term “countermyth” might be “less misleading” (author's emphasis).

In this section Lasswell and Kaplan also conceptualize other aspects of the political myth, each of which has a distinct political function. These are: the “political doctrine” which “formulates basic expectations and demands;” the “miranda” which consists “of basic symbols of sentiment and identification;” and, the “political formula” which “is the part of the political myth describing and prescribing in detail the social structure” (pp. 117–123; 125; 126–133, author's emphasis).

I shall concentrate on the relationships between political myth, ideology and Utopia, because they relate more directly to the general theme of this paper. Some of the remarks that follow, however, would apply, ceteris paribus, to the logical relationships between political myth, doctrine, miranda and formula, as well.

²⁸ Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 123.

²⁹ Marx, and Engels, , “Manifesto …,” p. 38 Google Scholar.

³⁰ Marx and Engels' well-known reference to communist society in The German Ideology, hardly counts as an example of detailed Utopian planning: “[I]n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (p. 22).

The most “Utopian” aspect of Marxism is perhaps the expectation that in communist society something resembling Utopian planning would be possible because, there, production is carried out “by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.” Marx, Karl, Capital, Vol. I (Moscow: Progress, 1965), p. 80 Google Scholar.

³¹ This argument is similar to one made by Robert Merton against the practice of assuming that every structure has a function. Whether this is so can only be decided on the basis of empirical inquiry. See, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd ed., rev. and enlarged (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 32–36 Google ScholarPubMed.

³² “Myth, Politics and Political Science,” Western Political Quarterly, 22 (03, 1969), 150 Google Scholar.

³³ McDonald, p. 149 and, especially, “Politics and Myth,” in Hutchison, John A. and McDonald, Lee C., Myth, Religion and Politics (The Methodist Church: Division of Higher Education, General Board of Education, 1965), pp. 26–27 Google Scholar.

³⁴ “The Dynamic Elements of Culture,” Ethics, 65 (07, 1955), 235–249 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although Halpern is concerned with the socially dynamic functions of ideology and myth, he first establishes criteria for these phenomena, the functions of which are studied. He is attempting, in fact, to correct a deficiency in Talcott Parsons's theory of action which, while it studies the functions of cultural phenomena vis à vis the social system, “says very little about the systematic character of culture itself,” or about how cultural forms guide actors in the social system (p. 236).

³⁵ “Ideology and Myth,” Accent, 7 (Summer, 1947), 195–205, especially 198–200Google Scholar.

³⁶ “Ideology as a Cultural System” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. Apter, David E. (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 47–76 Google Scholar.

³⁷ Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), especially pp. 83–93 and pp. 94–105 Google Scholar.

My view is that the question of an ideology's functions for a political system may be extremely important to the scientific understanding of political phenomena, and it is always, therefore, a matter with which students of ideology might be legitimately concerned. Two caveats, however, are in order. First, as I indicated in the previous section, questions about functions are empirically useful only after the identification of both what is functioning, and the system in relation to which there is a function. Second, the search for functions, with its emphasis on systemic patterns, should not obscure the fact that the patterns are abstractions from the concrete activities of individual actors who have feelings, motives, and purposes which ate expressed and structured by the symbolic forms utilized by the actors. Friedrich is not susceptible to criticism regarding this second factor, although, regarding the first, he has a propensity to define ideology in terms of its functions.

The analysis of ideology in this paper, while relevant to problems of system-maintenance, is more directly concerned with how individuals and groups of individuals utilize symbol constructs to comprehend reality and direct their activities. For statements regarding the importance of not neglecting this relationship between individuals and culture in social explanation, see: Geertz, pp. 52–65; and, Halpern, pp. 235–236.

³⁸ Some find the beginnings of ideology in earlier millennial Christian movements. See, for example, Lasky, Melvin J., “The Metaphysics of Doomsday,” Encounter, 32 (01, 1969), 36–47 Google Scholar; or, Walzer, Michael, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. A more compact version of Walzer's view may be found in his article, “Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology,” History and Theory, 3 (1963), 59–90 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

To Michael Oakeshott, the watershed of ideological politics appears to be the American, not the French, Revolution. See his “Rationalism in Politics,” in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, by Oakeshott, (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 28 Google Scholar.

³⁹ Barnard, Frederick M. and Porter, Jene M., Discontent and Political Development: A Discussion of Some Contemporary Methodological and Substantive Problems (mimeographed), paper delivered to the Canadian Political Science Association meeting, Calgary (06 5, 1968), p. 12 Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Although there are enormous differences in their theoretical content and conclusions, most variants of liberalism, socialism and fascism view politics as working in accord with historical developments toward more preferable social arrangements. As an ideology, conservatism also considers the relationship between historical developments and political action, but it argues that given the nature of history and the limits of politics, men should avoid any but the most circumscribed political and social innovations. A basic difference between ideological conservatism and a traditional view, incidentally, is that, in the former, historical change is a practical and intellectual problem, whereas, in the latter, no such problem arises.

⁴¹ “Introduction,” in The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, by Lerner, Daniel (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 3 Google Scholar.

⁴² Frye, Northrop, “New Directions From Old,” in Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Murray, Henry A. (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 116 Google Scholar. Frye uses these phrases to describe the subject matter of the poet, but as he recognizes, the description applies equally well to the content of myth.

Recognizing the intimate relationship between poetry and myth, McDonald stresses the public nature of the latter: “Myths are poetry, but a special kind of poetry—the poetry men live by” (“Myth, Politics and Political Science,” p. 141).

⁴³ Quoted by Knox, John, Myth and Truth (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1964), p. 56 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Halpern, p. 238.

⁴⁵ On the myth of the founding, see Friedrich, p. 96 and pp. 393–396.

⁴⁶ Regarding the mythical renewal of the past in the present, Thomas Mann says: “[L]ife in the myth, life, so to speak, in quotation, is a kind of celebration, in that it is a making present of the past, it becomes a religious act, the performance by a celebrant of a prescribed procedure; it becomes a feast. For a feast is an anniversary, a renewal of the past in the present. Every Christmas the world-saving Babe is born again on earth, to suffer, to die, and to arise. The feast is the abrogation of time, an event, a solemn narrative being played out conformably to an immemorial pattern; the events in it take place not for the first time, but ceremonially according to the prototype.” See “Freud and the Future,” in Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Murray, , p. 374 Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ See Malinowski, Bronislaw, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1954), pp. 100–101 Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Myth has a religious quality of high seriousness; it is believed to be true and it deals with the intense, even tragic, character of real human experience. See Langer, Susanne K., Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art (New York: Mentor, 1951), pp. 151–153 Google Scholar.

Ideology is also characterized by serious intent; it is oriented to the problems of human beings living in society, and it is concerned with whether and how the human social condition may be improved. Utopia, on the other hand, is frankly imaginary and lacks the drama or tension of myth and ideology.

⁴⁹ Dahrendorf, Ralf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,” The American Journal of Sociology, 64 (09, 1958), 115 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Dahrendorf, p. 117.

⁵¹ Frye, Northrop, “Varieties of Literary Utopias,” Daedalus, (Spring, 1965), p. 329 Google Scholar. See also, Judith Shklar “The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia,” in this same issue. Utopia, she says, “is an expression of the craftman's desire for perfection and permanence. That is why utopia … is of necessity a changeless harmonious whole, in which a shared recognition of truth unites all the citizens. Truth is single and only error is multiple. In utopia there cannot, by definition, be any room for eccentricity” (p. 371).

⁵² Shklar, p. 372.

⁵³ See More, Thomas, Utopia, trans. Ogden, H. V. S. (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 18 and 24 Google Scholar. In his closing sentence More admits “that there are many things in the Utopian Commonwealth that I wish rather than expect to see followed among our citizens.”

In The Republic, see especially Book VI. For the argument that, according to The Republic, it is impossible to bring the good city into being, see the discussion by Strauss, Leo, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 118–138 Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Strauss, p. 138.

⁵⁵ Shklar, p. 371.

⁵⁶ Shklar, pp. 374–378.

⁵⁷ “Utopia For Practical Purposes,” Daedalus (Spring, 1965), p. 438 Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ I use the term “symbol” in the broad and untechnical sense that “[a]ll linguistic expression is symbolic representation.” (Friedrich, p. 100).

⁵⁹ Burke, pp. 199–200 (author's emphasis). Burke suggests that ideology, with its philosophical vocabulary, is a way of translating mythic truths into the forms of discursive thought (p. 201). See also, Halpern, pp. 240–241.

⁶⁰ Halpern, p. 240.

⁶¹ Hence ideology, unlike myth, can be identified as the mental product of a specified political or cultural elite.

⁶² Although in the pages to follow the components of ideology, as cultural phenomena, are analyzed separately, one should keep in mind that at the level of individual psychology these components appear to be subtly interconnected and interdependent. This is shown by Merelman, Richard M. in his article, “The development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization,” American Political Science Review, 63 (09, 1969), 750–767 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. Apter, , pp. 206–261 Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Converse, p. 207.

⁶⁵ Converse, p. 229.

⁶⁶ Converse, p. 246.

⁶⁷ Converse, p. 214.

⁶⁸ Converse, p. 227.

⁶⁹ Converse, p. 232.

⁷⁰ The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 85 Google ScholarPubMed.

⁷¹ Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁷² Downs, p. 7.

⁷³ “The Revolt Against Ideology,” in Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, ed. Cox, , p. 154 Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Aiken, p. 153.

⁷⁵ Bell, pp. 400–401.

⁷⁶ Sartori, pp. 403–405.

⁷⁷ For expressions of the “emotivist” position in ethics see Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1946)Google Scholar, and Stevenson, Charles L., Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944)Google Scholar. For the systematic use of this approach in the analysis of ideology, see Bergmann, Gustav, “Ideology,” Ethics, 61 (04, 1951), 205–218 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁸ See Bergmann, pp. 206, 211.

⁷⁹ See, for example, Melden, A. I., “Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 35 (10, 1962), 45–60 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), especially pp. 134–158 Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ My notion of evaluation is consistent with the more explicit but cumbersome definition of values proposed by Clyde Kluckhohn: “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.” See “Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action,” in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward A. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 395 Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Taylor, Charles, The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 5–6 Google Scholar.

⁸² Emmet, Dorothy, Function, Purpose and Powers: Some Concepts in the Study of Individuals and Societies (London: Macmillan, 1958), p. 113 Google Scholar.

⁸³ See High, Dallas M., Language, Persons and Belief: Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses of Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 211–212 Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ This definition is, to varying degrees, in accord with the usage of some other contemporary writers on ideology in several academic disciplines. See: Aiken; Brzezinski, Zbigniew B., Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962)Google Scholar; Converse; Friedrich; Geertz; Merelman; LaPalombara, Joseph, “Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, 60 (03, 1966), 5–16 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walzer, “Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology.”

The observation of another writer on ideology would seem to indicate that the factors included in my definition have a wider acceptance: “Agreement on the meaning of the term [ideology] is far from universal, but a tendency can be discerned among contemporary writers to regard ideologies as systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the inter-connections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity, and furnish guides for action.” McClosky, Herbert, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” American Political Science Review, 58 (06, 1964), 362 (author's emphasis)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.