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Salafi jihadism
Salafi jihadism or jihadist-Salafism is a transnational, hybrid religious-political ideology based on Sunni Islamism seeking a Global caliphate, advocacy for "physical" jihadism and Salafi concepts of returning to (what adherents believe to be) true Islam.[1][2] The ideological foundation of the movement was laid out by a series of prison-writings of the Egyptian Islamist theoretician Sayyid Qutb during the 1960s.[3]
The terms "Salafist jihadist" and "jihadist-Salafism" were coined by scholar Gilles Kepel in 2002[4][5][6][7] to describe "a hybrid Islamistideology" developed by international Islamist volunteers in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad who had become isolated from their national and social class origins.[4] The concept was described by Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be [simplified to] jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage." (emphasis supplied)[7] Qutbism has been used as a close relative,[8][9] or variety of Salafi jihadism
Practitioners are referred to as "Salafi jihadis" or "Salafi jihadists". They are sometimes described as a variety of Salafi,[10] and sometimes as separate from "good Salafis"[6] whose movement eschews any political and organisational allegiances as potentially divisive for the Muslim community and a distraction from the study of religion.[11] (Salafi Scholars such as Albani, Ibn Uthaymeen, Ibn Baz, Saleh Al Fawzaan and Muqbil ibn Hadi have condemned rebellion against the rulers as "the most corrupt of innovations" and forbid Muslims "to take it upon himself to execute a ruling" which is under the jurisdiction of the rulers.)​[12]​[13]​[14]​[15]​[16]​[Note 1] According to Salafist jihadists, they are not dividing the Muslim community because in their view, the rulers and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actually apostates.
In the 1990s, extremist jihadists of the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in the attacks on police, government officials and tourists in Egypt, and Armed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal group in the Algerian Civil War.[4] The most infamous jihadist-Salafist attack is the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda.[19] While Salafism had next-to-no presence in Europe in the 1980s, Salafist jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001."[6] While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000 (at least in the United States),[20][21] others see the movement as growing, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the breakdown of state control in Libya and Syria.[22]
History and definition
(Data from A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, Seth G. Jones, 2014, Figure 3.1)
Gilles Kepel writes that the Salafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".[4][6] However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violent jihadists created "a volatile mixture".[6] "When you're in the state of such alienation you become easy prey to the jihadi guys who will feed you more savory propaganda than the old propaganda of the Salafists who tell you to pray, fast and who are not taking action".[6]
According to Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."[23]
Salafi jihadists distinguished themselves from salafis they term "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believed – the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema [ulama al-balat]". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Muslim Brotherhood, who were believed by Salafi jihadists to be excessively moderate and lacking in literal interpretation of holy texts.[23]
In the words of Madawi al Rasheed, Salafi-Jihadism is
"a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity”[24]
According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions." Thus contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity, rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadisn which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, al-Jaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreign imperialist and colonial penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World , they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite it's critique), and advocate a neo-liberal free-market rationale , in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.[25]
Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh), but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.[26]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:[27]
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of
According to Michael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'."[29]
Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation'".[30]
Antecedents of Salafism jihadism notably includes Egyptian Islamist author Sayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings", in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Jihadist organizations around the world, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS.[31][32][33][34] Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb was one of Osama bin Laden’s teachers at university. Sayyid Qutb has been described as ‘Al-Qaeda’s Philosopher’. Ayman al Zawahiri, the Egyptian who was second in command and co-founder of Al-Qaeda, calls Qutb, "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".[35][36]
In his writings, both before and after joining the Muslim Brotherhood Qutb argued that the Muslim world had reached a crisis point and that the Islamic world has been replaced by pagan ignorance of Jahiliyyah, (which directly translates to "ignorance", a term used by Muslims to describe the "dark" ages before Muhammed's foundation of Islam). When Qutb went abroad for a two-year scholarship to the United States, it's said he came back with extremist radical beliefs. He used what's been often described by scholars as his "genuine literary excellence" to spread these views of western criticism to form the main intellectual doctrine for the Muslim Brotherhood, which later be adopted by most terrorist organizations worldwide.[37][38]
Qutbism doctrine of Islam interpretation emphasizes how the secular, infidel Muslim leaders and populations have fallen to imitating the western way of life, and that before any prosperity would occur, the Muslim world must revert to the Caliphate-age Shari'ah Law instead of "Man-made laws". He issued ideological & religious debates stating that the violent means are justifiable under Islamic Law for an end as great as returning the Islamic State "days of glory", and these means are often leading a victorious violent holy war (Jihad) against the west.[39]
A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book "The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning to Egypt from the United States. In it he complained of Western materialism, individual freedoms, economic system, racism, brutal boxing matches, "poor" haircuts,[40] superficiality in conversations and friendships,[41] restrictions on divorce, enthusiasm for sports, lack of artistic feeling,[41] "animal-like" mixing of the sexes (which "went on even in churches"),[42] and strong support for the new Israeli state.[43]
He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential book "The America that I Have Seen":
the American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs – and she shows all this and does not hide it."[40]
On 29 August 1966, Sayyid Qutb was executed by hanging by Egyptian president's Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regime for his alleged role in the president's assassination plot.[44][45][46][47] This would later paint him as an Islamic Martyr among supporters & Islamist circles, particularly as the trial was alleged to be a show Trial.[48] Qutb wrote his major Fundamental Islamist books (a commentary of the Qur'an Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), and a manifesto of political Islam called Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), whilst incarcerated and allegedly tortured. This, alongside his allegedly extrajudicial execution, elevated the value of these two major writings, giving his radical, violent Islamist doctrine in his writings a stronger influence over future Terrorist organizations.[49][50]

The group Takfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.[6]
In Afghanistan, the Taliban were of the Deobandi, not Salafi, school of Islam but "cross-fertilized" with bin Laden and other Salafist jihadis.[4]
Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation finds in his research that Salafi-jihadist numbers and activity have increased from 2007 to 2013. According to his research:
Leaders, groups and activities
Leaders and development
"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known as Abu Hamza al-Masri.[51] Osama bin Laden was its most well-known leader. The dissident Saudi preachers Salman al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali, were held in high esteem by this school.
Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri praising Sayyid Qutb, stated that Qutb's call formed the ideological foundation for the contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movement.[52]
Murad al-Shishani of The Jamestown Foundation states there have been three generations of Salafi-jihadists: those waging jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq. As of the mid-2000s, Arab fighters in Iraq were "the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement".[53] These fighters were usually not Iraqis, but volunteers who had come to Iraq from other countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. Unlike in earlier Salafi jihadi actions, Egyptians "are no longer the chief ethnic group".[53] According to Bruce Livesey Salafist jihadists are currently a "burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among EU countries" from September 2001 to the beginning of 2005".[6]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on Salafi dominance, similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."[26]
Groups
Salafist jihadist groups include Al Qaeda,[10] the now defunct Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA),[23] and the Egyptian group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.
In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being theArmee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity".[54] It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all (adult male sane) Muslims,[54] and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called a "wholesale massacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners,[54] and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took a campaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war,[55] the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces.[56] Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[57]
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Group) another Salafist-jihadi movement[58] fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for a November 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists were hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999,[59] although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime Syria.[58]
Flag of al-Qaeda
Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda.[60] Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled the Soviet military to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988.[61][62] Members were to making a pledge (bayat) to follow one's superiors.[63] Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", i.e. the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that killed over 200 people;[64] and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the Mujahidin Shura Council and the Ansar al Sunna Group.[26] There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups in Azerbaijan.[65]
The group leading the Islamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations,​[66]​BRN-Koordinasi​, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.[67][68]
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, the Islamist group Hamas, for failing to enforce Sharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding his Ibn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself), were killed and over 130 were wounded.[69]
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against King Abdullah II of Jordan,[70] and the kidnapping and killing of Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.[71][72]
In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the Caucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept of tawhid (purist monotheism), and fiercely reject any practice of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagating Al Wala' Wal Bara' and declaring takfir against any Muslim who (they believe) is a mushrik (polytheist) and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed by Muhammad and his companions (Sahaba).[73]
Flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
In Syria and Iraq both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS[74] have been described as Salafist-jihadist. Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime.[75] Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.[74]
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group[76] that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,[77]
List of groups
According to Seth G. Jones at the Rand Corporation, as of 2014, there were around 50 Salafist-jihadist groups in existence or recently in existence ("present" in the list indicates a group's continued existence as of 2014). (Jones defines Salafi-jihadist groups as those groups which emphasize the importance of returning to a “pure” form of Islam, the form of Islam which was practiced by the Salaf, the pious ancestors; and those groups which believe that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty)).[1]
Salafist-jihadist groups as of 2014[60]
Name of GroupBase of OperationsYears
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
(Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions)
Saudi Arabia2009–present
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
(Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions)
Lebanon2009–present
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)Philippines1991–present
Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)Yemen1994–present
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI)Somalia, Ethiopia1994–2002
Al-Qaeda (core)Pakistan1988–present
Al-Qaeda in Aceh
(a.k.a. Tanzim al Qa’ida Indonesia
for Serambi Makkah)
Indonesia2009–2011
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia)Saudi Arabia2002–2008
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen)Yemen2008–present
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat, GSPC)
Algeria1998–present
Al Takfir wal al-HijrahEgypt (Sinai Peninsula)2011–present
Al-Mulathamun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)Mali, Libya, Algeria2012–2013
Al-Murabitun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)Mali, Libya, Algeria2013–2017
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-
Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC)
Somalia, Eritrea2006–2009
Ansar al-IslamIraq2001–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Egypt)Egypt2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)Libya2012–2017
Ansar al-Sharia (Mali)Mali2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisia2011–present
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis
(a.k.a. Ansar Jerusalem)
Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)2012–present
AnsaruNigeria2012–present
Osbat al-Ansar (AAA)Lebanon1985–present
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF, a.k.a. BIFM)
Philippines2010–present
Boko HaramNigeria2003–present
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
(Basayev faction)
Russia (Chechnya)1994–2007
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM,
a.k.a. Turkestan Islamic Party)
China (Xinjang)1989–present
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)Egypt1978–2001
Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-IslamiyyaSyria2012–present
Harakat al-Shabaab al-MujahideenSomalia2002–present
Harakat al-Shuada’a al Islamiyah
(a.k.a. Islamic Martyr's Movement, IMM)
Libya1996–2007
Harakat Ansar al-DinMali2011–2017
Hizbul al IslamSomalia2009–2010
Imarat Kavkaz (IK, or Caucasus Emirate)Russia (Chechnya)2007–present
Indian MujahedeenIndia2005–present
Islamic Jihad Union
(a.k.a. Islamic Jihad Group)
Uzbekistan2002–present
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan1997–present
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)Iraq, Syria2004–present
Jabhat al-NusrahSyria2011–present
Jaish ul-AdlIran2013–present
Jaish al-Islam
(a.k.a. Tawhid and Jihad Brigades)
Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)2005–present
Jaish al-Ummah (JaU)Gaza Strip2007–present
Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-MaqdisEgypt (Sinai Peninsula)2011–present
Jamaat Ansarullah (JA)Tajikistan2010–present
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)Indonesia2008–present
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore
1993–present
JondullahPakistan2003–present
Jund al-ShamLebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip,
Qatar, Afghanistan
1999–2008
Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM)Philippines2013–present
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, a.k.a. Mansoorian)Pakistan (Kashmir)1990–present
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)Libya1990–present
Liwa al-IslamSyria2011–present
Liwa al-TawhidSyria2012–present
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)Morocco, Western Europe1998–present
Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO)
Mali2011–2013
Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN)Egypt2011–present
Mujahideen Shura CouncilGaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)2011–present
Salafia Jihadia (As-Sirat al Moustaquim)Morocco1995–present
Suqour al-Sham BrigadeSyria2011–2015
Tawhid wal JihadIraq1999–2004
Tunisian Combat Group (TCG)Tunisia, Western Europe2000–2011
Ruling strategy
In several places and times, jihadis have taken control of an area and they have ruled it as an Islamic state, such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form of sharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire of Osama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.[78]
In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes.[79] One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:
You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones ... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.[79]
However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war",[79] and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model (according to New York Times correspondent Robert Worth), may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.[79]
ISIS, is believed to have used a manifesto which is titled "The Management of Savagery" as its model. The manifesto emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery", i.e. lawlessness, in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness (particularly terrorism) to continue to try to govern its territory, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in its place.[80] The author of "The Management of Savagery", did not place a lot of emphasis on winning the sympathy of local Muslims, instead, he placed a lot of emphasis on the use of extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening [others] and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them."[80] (Social-media posts from ISIS territory "suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions occur every few weeks", according to journalist Graeme Wood.[81])
Condemnations by Muslims and challenges
Thousands of Muslim leaders and scholars and dozens of Islamic councils have denounced Salafi jihadism. Some scholars, policy institutes, and political scientists have noted a growing concern that Salafism and Wahhabism can be a gateway to terrorism and violent extremism.​[82]​[83]​[84]​[85]​[86]​[87]​[88]​[89]​[90]​[91]​[92] Notable challenges in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track,[93][94][95] Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world,[96] resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap,"[97] weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.[98]
References
Notes
^ "Defining Salafism and Its Importance:- Foundational to understanding the threat is knowing the meaning behind key terms associated with the global Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Salafism is often conflated or misinterpreted in texts and publications. Literally, the word Salafis means “pious forefathers,” which is most often understood to mean “the first three generations of Muslims.” The foundation for this statement can be found in Sahih al-Bukhari’s compilation, which quotes the Prophet Muhammad as saying, “The best of my community [i.e. Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them and then whose who follow them.” Proximity to the Prophet Muhammad in the temporal sense matters in that the saying and actions of the early companions of Muhammad carry greater relevance and authority. Of course, the hadiths (a written collection of traditions based on the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), and principally the compilations of al-Bukhari and Muslim are held in highest regard.[6] And how these hadiths were understood by the early community of Muslims and acted upon matters greatly. This is essential to understand because Muslims, including Salafis, do not derive their religious beliefs and practices exclusively from the Quran, but also from the hadith, making its contents just as important for Islamic theology and law. The hadiths are also the locus from which Salafi-Jihadists derive many of the violent scriptural references which they use as justification for their methodology and behavior. [17][18]
Citations
  1. ^ a b Jones, Seth G. (2014). A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (PDF). Rand Corporation. p. 2. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 April 2015. Retrieved 28 May 2015.
  2. ^ Moghadam, Assaf (2008). The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of ... JHU Press. pp. 37–8. ISBN 9781421401447. Archived from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 28 May 2015.
  3. ^ Livesey, Bruce (25 January 2005). "The Salafist Movement". PBS. Archived from the original on 28 June 2011.
  4. ^ a b c d e "Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002)
  5. ^ Deneoux, Guilain (June 2002). "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam". Middle East Policy. pp. 69–71."
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h "The Salafist movement by Bruce Livesey". PBS Frontline. 2005. Archived from the original on 28 June 2011. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  7. ^ a b Kramer, Martin (Spring 2003). "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?". Middle East Quarterly. X (2): 65–77. Archived from the original on 2015-01-01. Retrieved 2015-01-01. French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism – an historical reference to the precursor of these movements – will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage.
  8. ^ Manne, Robert (2017). The Mind of the Islamic State. NY: Prometheist Books. pp. 17–22. Retrieved 9 March 2021.
  9. ^ Shultz, Richard (2008). Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement. Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies. Retrieved 9 March 2021.
  10. ^ a b El-Baghdadi, Iyad. "Salafis, Jihadis, Takfiris: Demystifying Militant Islamism in Syria". 15 January 2013. Retrieved 10 March 2013.[permanent dead link]
  11. ^ "Indonesia: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix". International Crisis Group. Archived from the original on 7 February 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
  12. ^ Nasiruddin Al Albani, Muhammad (27 August 2014). "You Can't Take the Law into Your Own Hands". Albaani Site. Archived from the original on 23 August 2017.
  13. ^ "The Speech of Shaykh Muqbil about revolutions and uprisings". Dawatus Salafiyyah Leicester UK. As for uprisings and revolutions against the rulers who are in the Islamic lands, then this is not the way of rectification. And the way of rectification is teaching the Muslims the Book of their Lord and the Sunnah of their Prophet and teaching them the biography of the Prophet (صلى اللهُ عليه وسَلَّم) and the biography of his companions and how they had patience with the poverty, not having (enough) clothes, leaving their homelands and the infectious diseases which befell them in al-Madeenah after they emigrated. Therefore, it is imperative that we nurture the people in being close (to the way) of the companions, and I do not think that we are able to do that (in its entirety) but at least (it should be) close to the way of the companions.
  14. ^ Al-Fawzan, Saalih (May 2004). "Is Rebelling Against a Ruler an Issue of Ijtihād?" (PDF). AbdurRahman.org. It is impermissible to oppose and rebel against the leader of Muslim affairs. Rather, it is an obligation to obey him and forbidden to oppose him due to what that entails of bloodshed, disunity, and the ruining and alienation of a nation. And you all witness now those lands in which people revolted against their leaders. You see the results such as fighting and killing, bloodshed, and the loss of safety and security when some of these leaderships are not Muslim governments. But when people rebel against their leaders, the same thing occurs – that which occurred in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other place.What if the ruler is Muslim? It is not allowed to oppose him due to what that will result in of bloodshed, the loss of security, the opportunity for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslims, and dissension and division among Muslims. line feed character in |quote= at position 611 (help)
  15. ^ Abdul Wahid, Abu Khadeeja (19 December 2013). "The Tyranny Of The Rulers, A Reason For Rebellion?". "The noble scholar Shaikh al-Albānī (rahimahullaah, died 1420H) was asked, “Is that which is known nowadays as a military coup against the ruler mentioned in the Religion or is it an innovation?” So the Shaikh answered:“There is no basis for these acts in Islām. And it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj (methodology) with respect to the daʿwah (Islamic call) and creating the right atmosphere for it. Rather it is an innovation introduced by the innovators which has affected some Muslims. This is what I have stated and explained in my notes to al-Aqeedah at-Tahāwiyyah" The great scholar Ibn Bāz (died 1420AH) was asked, “Is it from the methodology of the Salaf [to]criticize the rulers from the pulpits? And what is the methodology of the Salaf in advising the rulers?” So he answered:“It is not from the methodology of the Salaf to criticize the rulers from the pulpits, because that would incite chaos, and it would involve not listening and obeying in that which is good. And this would mean becoming engrossed in that which harms and does not benefit. However, the way of advising that the Salaf followed was to write to the ruler, or to convey the advice to the Scholars who would then convey it to him, until he has been directed towards good. So opposing the evil can be done without mentioning the doer. So adultery, intoxicants and interest can be opposed without mentioning the one who is involved in them. And it is enough of an opposition to sins that they be warned against without mentioning that so and so is involved in them, whether it is the ruler, or other than the ruler." Shaikh Sālih al-Fawzān was asked:“Respected Shaikh, yourself and your brothers who are scholars in this country are Salafīs – and all praise is due to Allāh – and your method in advising the rulers is that of the Sharīʿah and as the Prophet has explained, yet there are those who find fault with you due to your neglect in openly rejecting the various oppositions [to the Sharīʿah] that have occurred. And yet others make excuses for you by saying that you are under the control and pressure of the state. So do you have any words of direction or clarification to these people?” So Shaikh al-Fawzān answered with clear and unambiguous words:“There is no doubt that the rulers, just like people besides them, are not infallible. Advising them is an obligation. However, attacking them in the gatherings and upon the pulpits is considered to be the forbidden form of backbiting. And this evil is greater than that which occurred from the ruler since it is backbiting and because of what results from backbiting such as the sowing of the seeds of discord, causing disunity and affecting the progression of daʿwah (the call to Islām). Hence what is obligatory is to make sure advice reaches the rulers by sound and trustworthy avenues, not by publicizing and causing commotion. And as for reviling the Scholars of this country, that they do not give advice [to the rulers], or that they are being controlled in their affairs, this is a method by which separation between the Scholars, the youth and the society is desired, until it becomes possible for the mischief-maker to sow the seeds of his evil. This is because when evil suspicions are harbored about the Scholars, trust is no longer placed in them and then the chance is available for the biased partisans to spread their poison. And I believe that this thought is actually a schemed plot that has come into this country, and those who are behind it are foreign to this country. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to be cautious of it.”line feed character in |quote= at position 579 (help)
  16. ^ Iyaad, Abu (16 May 2019). "http://www.kharijites.com/kj/articles/bnhijuiwl-shaykh-ibn-uthaymin-revolting-against-the-rulers-is-the-most-corrupt-vile-innovation.cfm"​. Kharijites.com. Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said: And rebelling against the ruler, there is no doubt it is from the most corrupt of innovations, the most vile of them and the most evil of them. The ummah was not torn to pieces except due to rebelling against its rulers. External link in |title= (help)
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Further reading
External links
Robert Manne, Sayyid Qutb: Father of Salafi Jihadism. ABC Religion and Ethics
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