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A possible result of a country remaining trapped in stage 2 is its government may reach a state of "demographic fatigue," writes Kaufman. In this condition, the government will lack financial resources to stabilize its population's growth and becomes unable to deal effectively with threats from natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, landslides, drought, and disease. According to Kaufman, many countries suffering from "demographic fatigue" will slip back into stage 1, resulting in both high fertility and high mortality rates. "If they do," he states, "these countries may soon reach [[zero population growth]], but at a terrible price." He gives the example of [[Zimbabwe]], where 26 percent of the adult population has [[AIDS]] and the average person has a life expectancy of only 40 years.<ref name=Kaufman/>
'LOW FERTILITY TRAP - Another 'Demographic Trap'
The "The Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis" as put forward by Lutz, Skirbekk & Testa,
[http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/RP-07-001.pdf The Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis: Forces that May Lead to Further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe], points to another possible "opposing" trap (to the 'Demographic Trap' referred to above). This 'low-fertility trap' hypothesis questions the ability of a nation or region to extract itself from human reproduction rates below 1.5 TFR (Total Fertility Rate) per woman per lifetime. Europe is their prime example, and countries on that continent or in that region, such as Germany, Spain, Greece, and Italy, among others. In their hypothesis, they suggest the possibility that nations and regions where birth rates have dropped below replacement levels (2.11 is considered about exact replacement for advanced economies with low mortality rates), may result in a situation where the costs for those in child-bearing years of sustaining retirees, themselves, and the rising generation may be too onerous, if not impossible, for them to have either the ability or disposition to self-reproduce sufficiently to get the families, nations or region back to even at least exact replacement levels.
A few economists, like Clarence L. Barber, have posited that declining human population growth may have been a major factor, if not the major cause, of the Great Depression of the 1930's. In the US, in 1926, demand for housing, for example, began to decline, as fewer households were formed. In early 1929, demand for housing in the US dropped precipitously. The stock market crash in October of that year, as well as the Great Depression that ensued, may have been a final result of a lowering in population growth. And, of course, once the economy declines, this further lowers population growth, as people are dealing with lost jobs and an uncertain financial future.
Other examples in the world today of nations caught in this 'low fertility trap' may include Japan and South Korea. And, as fertility rates go down in even developing economies, until the whole world, on average, is projected to decline overall to a TFR around 1.85 by 2050, according to a report published by the UN Population Division in 2002, more and more countries may drop into this 'other demographic trap'. Some have even questioned if any sustained fertility rate below replacement may not put nations in such a 'low fertility trap'.
==Notes==
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