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Part of the appeal of computational descriptions is that they are relatively easy to interpret, and thus may be seen as contributing to our understanding of particular mental processes, whereas connectionist models are in general more opaque, to the extent that they may be describable only in very general terms (such as specifying the learning algorithm, the number of units, etc.), or in unhelpfully low-level terms. In this sense connectionist models may instantiate, and thereby provide evidence for, a broad theory of cognition (i.e., connectionism), without representing a helpful theory of the particular process that is being modelled. In this sense the debate might be considered as to some extent reflecting a mere difference in the level of analysis in which particular theories are framed.
The recent{{when?|date=February 2016}} popularity of [[Cognitive Model#Dynamical systems|dynamical systems]] in [[philosophy of mind]] have added a new perspective on the debate; some authors{{which?|date=February 2016}} now argue that any split between connectionism and computationalism is more conclusively characterized as a split between computationalism and [[Cognitive Model#Dynamical systems|dynamical systems]].
==Notes==
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