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===Biological realism===
Connectionist work in general does not need to be biologically realistic and therefore suffers from a lack of neuroscientific plausibility.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.encephalos.gr/48-1-01e.htm|title=Encephalos Journal|website=www.encephalos.gr|access-date=2018-02-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/?id=s-OCCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT18&lpg=PT18&dq=%22accurate%22#v=onepage&q=%22accurate%22&f=false|title=Neural Geographies: Feminism and the Microstructure of Cognition|last=Wilson|first=Elizabeth A.|date=2016-02-04|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9781317958765|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e953/59bc80e624a963a3d8c943e3b2898a397ef7.pdf|title=Organismically-inspired robotics: homeostatic adaptation and teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop|last=|first=|date=|website=|access-date=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zorzi|first=Marco|last2=Testolin|first2=Alberto|last3=Stoianov|first3=Ivilin P.|date=2013-08-20|title=Modeling language and cognition with deep unsupervised learning: a tutorial overview|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|volume=4|pages=515|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00515|issn=1664-1078|pmc=3747356|pmid=23970869}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=comparativephilosophy|title=ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY|last=|first=|date=|website=|access-date=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/?id=uV9TZzOITMwC&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17&dq=%22biological%20plausibility%22#v=onepage&q=%22biological%20plausibility%22&f=false|title=Neural Network Perspectives on Cognition and Adaptive Robotics|last=Browne|first=A.|date=1997-01-01|publisher=CRC Press|isbn=9780750304559|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7pPv0STSos8C&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=%22biological+realism%22#v=onepage&q=%22biological%20realism%22&f=false|title=Connectionism in Perspective|last=Pfeifer|first=R.|last2=Schreter|first2=Z.|last3=Fogelman-Soulié|first3=F.|last4=Steels|first4=L.|date=1989-08-23|publisher=Elsevier|isbn=9780444598769|location=|pages=|language=en}}</ref> However, the structure of neural networks is derived from that of biological [[​Neuron|neurons​neuron​]]​s​, and this parallel in low-level structure is often argued to be an advantage of connectionism in modeling cognitive structures compared with other approaches.<ref name=":2" /> One area where connectionist models are thought to be biologically implausible is with respect to error-propagation networks that are needed to support learning ,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Crick|first=Francis|date=​January 1989-01|title=The recent excitement about neural networks|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=337|issue=6203|pages=129–132|doi=10.1038/337129a0|pmid=2911347|issn=1476-4687|bibcode=1989Natur.337..129C}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Rumelhart|first=David E.|last2=Hinton|first2=Geoffrey E.|last3=Williams|first3=Ronald J.|date=October 1986​-10​|title=Learning representations by back-propagating errors|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=323|issue=6088|pages=533–536|doi=10.1038/323533a0|issn=1476-4687|bibcode=1986Natur.323..533R}}</ref>​, but error propagation can explain some of the biologically-generated electrical activity seen at the scalp in [[Eventevent-related potential​|event-related potentials]]s such as the [[N400 (neuroscience)|N400]] and [[P600 (neuroscience)|P600]] ,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fitz|first=Hartmut|last2=Chang|first2=Franklin|date=2019-06-01|title=Language ERPs reflect learning through prediction error propagation|journal=Cognitive Psychology|volume=111|pages=15–52|doi=10.1016/j.cogpsych.2019.03.002|issn=0010-0285|hdl=21.11116/0000-0003-474F-6}}</ref>​, and this provides some biological support for one of the key assumptions of connectionist learning procedures.
 
===Learning===
The weights in a neural network are adjusted according to some [[learning rule]] or algorithm, such as [[Hebbian theory|Hebbian learning]]. Thus, connectionists have created many sophisticated learning procedures for neural networks. Learning always involves modifying the connection weights. In general, these involve mathematical formulas to determine the change in weights when given sets of data consisting of activation vectors for some subset of the neural units. Several studies have been focused on designing teaching-learning methods based on connectionism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Novo|first=María-Luisa|last2=Alsina|first2=Ángel|last3=Marbán|first3=José-María|last4=Berciano|first4=Ainhoa|date=2017|title=Connective Intelligence for Childhood Mathematics Education|journal=Comunicar|language=es|volume=25|issue=52|pages=29–39|doi=10.3916/c52-2017-03|issn=1134-3478}}</ref>
 
By formalizing learning in such a way, connectionists have many tools. A very common strategy in connectionist learning methods is to incorporate [[gradient descent]] over an error surface in a space defined by the weight matrix. All gradient descent learning in connectionist models involves changing each weight by the [[partial derivative]] of the error surface with respect to the weight. [[Backpropagation]] (BP), first made popular in the 1980s, is probably the most commonly known connectionist gradient descent algorithm today .<ref name=":4" />.
 
==History==
* Computationalists often posit [[domain specificity|domain specific]] symbolic sub-systems designed to support learning in specific areas of cognition (e.g., language, intentionality, number), whereas connectionists posit one or a small set of very general learning-mechanisms.
 
Despite these differences, some theorists have proposed that the connectionist architecture is simply the manner in which organic brains happen to implement the symbol-manipulation system. This is logically possible, as it is well known that connectionist models can implement symbol-manipulation systems of the kind used in computationalist models,<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Chang|first=Franklin|date=2002|title=Symbolically speaking: a connectionist model of sentence production|journal=Cognitive Science|language=en|volume=26|issue=5|pages=609–651|doi=10.1207/s15516709cog2605_3|issn=1551-6709}}</ref>​, as indeed they must be able if they are to explain the human ability to perform symbol-manipulation tasks. Several cognitive models combining both symbol-manipulative and connectionist architectures have been proposed, notably among them [[Paul Smolensky]]'s Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture (ICS).<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Smolensky|first=Paul|date=1990|title=Tensor Product Variable Binding and the Representation of Symbolic Structures in Connectionist Systems|url=http://www.lscp.net/persons/dupoux/teaching/AT1_2012/papers/Smolensky_1990_TensorProductVariableBinding.AI.pdf|journal=Artificial Intelligence|volume=46|issue=1–2|pages=159–216|via=|doi=10.1016/0004-3702(90)90007-M}}</ref> But the debate rests on whether this symbol manipulation forms the foundation of cognition in general, so this is not a potential vindication of computationalism. Nonetheless, computational descriptions may be helpful high-level descriptions of cognition of logic, for example.
 
The debate was largely centred on logical arguments about whether connectionist networks could produce the syntactic structure observed in this sort of reasoning. This was later achieved although using fast-variable binding abilities outside of those standardly assumed in connectionist models.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Shastri|first=Lokendra|last2=Ajjanagadde|first2=Venkat|date=​September 1993/09|title=From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables and dynamic bindings using temporal synchrony|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|language=en|volume=16|issue=3|pages=417–451|doi=10.1017/S0140525X00030910|issn=1469-1825}}</ref>​. {{As of | 2016}}, progress in neurophysiology and general advances in the understanding of neural networks have led to the successful modelling of a great many of these early problems, and the debate about fundamental cognition has, thus, largely been decided among neuroscientists in favour of connectionism.{{citation needed|date=March 2012}} However, these fairly recent developments have yet to reach consensus acceptance among those working in other fields, such as psychology or philosophy of mind.
 
Part of the appeal of computational descriptions is that they are relatively easy to interpret, and thus may be seen as contributing to our understanding of particular mental processes, whereas connectionist models are in general more opaque, to the extent that they may be describable only in very general terms (such as specifying the learning algorithm, the number of units, etc.), or in unhelpfully low-level terms. In this sense connectionist models may instantiate, and thereby provide evidence for, a broad theory of cognition (i.e., connectionism), without representing a helpful theory of the particular process that is being modelled. In this sense the debate might be considered as to some extent reflecting a mere difference in the level of analysis in which particular theories are framed. Some researchers suggest that the analysis gap is the consequence of connectionist mechanisms giving rise to [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]] that may be describable in computational terms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ellis|first=Nick C.|date=1998|title=Emergentism, Connectionism and Language Learning|url=http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ncellis/NickEllis/Publications_files/Emergentism.pdf|journal=Language Learning|volume=48:4|pages=631–664|via=}}</ref>
Keith D
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