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Fodor and [[Zenon Pylyshyn]] use the notion of [[cognitive architecture]] in their defense. Cognitive architecture is the set of basic functions of an organism with representational input and output. They argue that it is a law of nature that cognitive capacities are productive, systematic and inferentially coherent—they have the ability to produce and understand sentences of a certain structure if they can understand one sentence of that structure.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism/ |title=Connectionism |author=James Garson |date=2010-07-27}}</ref> A cognitive model must have a cognitive architecture that explains these laws and properties in some way that is compatible with the scientific method. Fodor and Pylyshyn say that cognitive architecture can only explain the property of systematicity by appealing to a system of representations and that connectionism either employs a cognitive architecture of representations or else does not. If it does, then connectionism uses LOT. If it does not then it is empirically false.<ref name="murataydede"/>
Connectionists have responded to Fodor and Pylyshyn by denying that connectionism uses LOT, by denying that cognition is essentially a function that uses representational input and output or denying that systematicity is a law of nature that rests on representation.{{Citation needed|date=October 2011}} Some connectionists have developed implementational connectionist models that can generalize in a symbolic fashion by incorporating variables.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chang|first=Franklin|date=2002|title=Symbolically speaking: a connectionist model of sentence production|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2605_3|journal=Cognitive Science|language=en|volume=26|issue=5|pages=609–651|doi=10.1207/s15516709cog2605_3|issn=1551-6709}}</ref>
== Empirical testing ==
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