Egyptian Crisis (2011–2014): Difference between revisions

It is still debatable whether the toppling of Mubarak's regime was good for Egypt or not. What is clear, however, is that it has led to a beginning of a new chapter in the country's history, one that is marked by revolutionary restructuring of its political and social order (Sowners and Toensing 1-320). The Muslim Brotherhood's participation in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was instrumental, as it led to the resurgence of Islamism in Egyptian politics, and by extension, the Egyptian experience. It is worth mentioning that this outcome was all too predictable, because the Muslim Brotherhood had already been gaining a lot of influence not only as an organization but also as an ideological movement, even before the toppling of Mubarak's regime. In Guirguis' (187-226) paper, he also described how the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of Mubarak's regime's collapse in order to further its goal of installing a new government based on the Sharia law. On the positive side, the post-Mubarak Egypt has led to positive developments, including but may not be limited to the rise of political parties—enabling the creation of further checks and balances against authoritarianism, trade and economic liberalization, and the establishment of independent social groups and unions, all of which lead to a more robust and dynamic democratic society (Joya 367-386). The market-friendly policies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leaders made it very popular among the people of Egypt. The organization has long been known for their policies that support the development of free markets, and the liberalization of Egypt's rather obsolete trade and economic policies. The only problem that remains in Egypt's post-Mubarak era is who (or rather what organization) should be given the authority to control the government and lead its people towards prosperity and freedom. In Selim's (177-199) paper, he argued that there are currently three camps that are vying for that position, in what he refers to as the Triangle of Counter-Revolution. These three camps are represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the United States. Selim (177-199) suggested that these three camps are currently engaged in a counter-revolutionary conflict against each other in Egypt, a development that prevents the nation from moving on from the Egyptian Revolution.

 

{{Main|Egyptian presidential election, 2014}}

General [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]] who led the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état|military coup]] against President [[Mohamed Morsi]] emerged as a popular figure by his supporters in Egypt,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://poy.time.com/2013/12/06/how-egypts-gen-al-sisi-won-times-person-of-the-year-poll/|agency=TIME|title=How Egypt's Gen. al-Sisi Won TIME's Person of the Year Poll|date=6 December 2013|accessdate=4 June 2014}}</ref> and he eventually declared his candidacy for president in the [[Egyptian presidential election, 2014|2014 elections]]. According to results from the Egyptian elections authority, he won 96.9% of the vote, however these results were denounced by observers as being a sham election similar to numbers reported for [[Hosni Mubarak]] in periodic elections and referendums during his reign as president.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140127-what-is-there-in-common-between-gen-musharraf-and-gen-al-sisi/|title=What is there in common between Gen. Musharraf and Gen. Al Sisi?|date=27 January 2014|website=Middle East Monitor}}</ref> Nonetheless, el-Sisi's election was widely recognized internationally.