The Strait of Tiran and Tiran Island
lies to the east of Tiran, southeast of the shallow strait between Tiran and Saudi Arabia.
International documents inconsistently refer to both the "Straits of Tiran" and the "Strait of Tiran". There are several passages formed by the islands between Egypt
and Saudi Arabia
. The westernmost strait, between Egypt and the island of Tiran, overlooked by the Egyptian city Sharm el-Sheikh
is the "Strait of Tiran", 5 or 6 km (3 or 4 mi) wide. It has two passages deep enough to be navigable by large ships. The Enterprise passage, 290 metres (950 ft) deep, is adjacent to the Egyptian side, while the 73-metre (240 ft) deep Grafton passage, surrounded by shallows, is to the east, nearer to the island of Tiran
. To the east of Tiran, between it and Saudi Arabia, the other strait has reefs and shallows with a single channel 16 metres (52 ft) deep.
Closure in 1967
In May 1967, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
repeated declarations that Israel had made in 1957, saying that closure of the Straits of Tiran would be an act of war.
Egypt then blockaded the straits on May 22, 1967, and oil tankers that were due to pass through the straits were required to submit documents ensuring their cargo was not destined for an Israeli port.
At that time, Israel viewed the Straits of Tiran as a vital interest as it is where Israel received vital imports, mainly oil from Iran, and a blockade threatened Israel's ability to develop the Negev
In May 1967, Major General Indar Jit Rikhye
was the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) in the Sinai peninsula when Egypt deployed its own troops in that territory and demanded that Rikhye withdraw all of his troops. Rikhye did withdraw, including from the port at Sharm el Sheikh
adjacent to the straits. The subsequent closure of the Tiran Straits by Egypt was closely linked to the preceding UNEF withdrawal, because having the peacekeepers (rather than the Egyptian military) at Sharm el Sheik was important for keeping that waterway open.
Later in life, General Rikhye sought to downplay the importance that Israel attached to keeping that waterway open, saying that Israel's accusation in 1967 of a blockade was "questionable" given that an Israeli-flagged ship had not passed through the straits in two years, and that "The U.A.R. [Egyptian] navy had searched a couple of ships after the establishment of the blockade and thereafter relaxed its implementation".
Egypt had initially requested UNEF withdrawal from locations other than Sharm el-Sheik,
but UN Secretary-General U Thant
demanded an all-or-nothing withdrawal.
If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent, maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.
A project to build a 15-kilometre (9.3 mi) bridge across the straits, linking Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is under consideration by the Egyptian government (see Saudi–Egypt Causeway
- ^ Carl F. Salans (December 1968). "Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran: Troubled Waters". Proceedings. United States Naval Institute. 94 (56).
- ^ Robert Priewasser, Tiran Island and Straits of Tiran. Unexplained Sovereignty over an Island in the Context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Saarbrücken: Akademikerverlag, 2013)
- ^ Oren, Michael B. (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-515174-7.
- ^ Shlaim, Avi; Louis, William Roger (13 February 2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge University Press. p. 224. ISBN 978-1-107-00236-4. 90% of Israeli oil was imported through the Straits of Tiran
- ^ Neff, David. Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East, p. 88 (Simon & Schuster, 1984): "In separate messages to the leading maritime powers, Eshkol warned: 'Israel would stop short of nothing to cancel the blockade. It is essential that President Nasser should not have any illusions.'"
- ^ "Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 1 March 1957" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs): "Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits."
- ^ Shlaim & Louis (2012), p. 27
- ^ "Daily brief to the U.S president on 27 May 1967" (PDF). 27 May 1967. diverted as was a sister ship yesterday
- ^ Bregman, Ahron (2013). Israel's Wars: A History since 1947. Taylor & Franci. p. 7. ISBN 978-1-135-68787-8.
- ^ Avi Shlaim; William Roger Louis (13 February 2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge University Press. p. 63. ISBN 978-1-107-00236-4. the occupation [by Egypt] of Sharm-al-Sheikh would force the closure of the Tiran Straits
- ^ Rikhye, Indar Jit (1980). The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. London: Rutledge. ISBN 0-7146-3136-1.
- ^ Quigley, John (December 2012). The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense, Kindle Location 485. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
- ^ Segev, 2007, op. cit., p. 274.
- ^ Ben Gad, Yitschak. Politics, Lies, and Videotape: 3,000 Questions and Answers on the Mideast Crisis, p. 182 (SP Books, 1991).
- ^ "LBJ Pledges U.S. to Peace Effort", Eugene Register-Guard (Jun 19, 1967). See also Johnson, Lyndon. "Address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators" (June 19, 1967).
- ^ Najla Moussa (2 March 2006). "Bridge connecting Egypt, Saudi Arabia considered". Daily News Egypt. Retrieved 11 April 2016.
Last edited on 6 April 2021, at 12:38
Content is available under CC BY-SA 3.0
unless otherwise noted.