This article needs to be updated. (January 2019) |
In May 2014, the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched the "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism" (Chinese: 严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) in the far west province of Xinjiang. It is an aspect of the Xinjiang conflict, the ongoing struggle by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government to manage the ethnically diverse and tumultuous province.[1] According to critics, the CCP and the Chinese government have used the global "war on terrorism" of the 2000s to frame separatist and ethnic unrest as acts of Islamist terrorism to legitimize its counter-insurgency policies in Xinjiang.[2] Chinese officials have maintained that the campaign is essential for national security purposes.
| Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism | |
|---|---|
| Native name | 严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动 |
| Location | Xinjiang Province, China |
| Date | Beginning 2014 23rd May 2014 – Present |
| Target | Ethnic Uyghurs, "separatists", violent extremists |
Attack type | Political repression, mass arrests, incarcerations and extrajudicial detention/surveillance, |
| Victims | 14,000 (Initial arrests) 1 million + (Forced detention) |
| Perpetrators | Chinese Communist Party, Ministry of Public Security |
| Motive | Stability maintenance, maintenance of Chinese Communist Party control over Xinjiang region, suppression of ethnic minority independence |
| Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 嚴厲打擊暴力恐怖活動專項行動 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动 | ||||||
| Literal meaning | Special action to crack down on violent terrorist activities | ||||||
| |||||||
Different "Strike Hard" campaigns had been mounted by regional authorities in the 1990s.[3]
Background edit
In April 2010, after the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, Zhang Chunxian replaced the former CCP chief Wang Lequan, who had been behind religious policies in Xinjiang for 14 years.[4] Zhang Chunxian continued Wang's policy and even strengthened them. In 2011, Zhang proposed "modern culture leads the development in Xinjiang" as his policy statement. In 2012, he first mentioned the phrase "de-extremification" (Chinese: 去极端化) campaigns. Under General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping, the Chinese government began scaling up its military presence in the region and introducing more stringent restrictions on Uyghur civil liberties.
Campaign edit
In response to growing tensions between Han Chinese and the Uyghur population of Xinjiang itself, the recruitment of Uyghurs to fight in the Syrian Civil War, and several terrorist attacks orchestrated by Uyghur separatists, in early 2014, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang launched the renewed "strike hard" campaign around New Year. It included measures targeting mobile phones, computers, and religious materials belonging to Uyghurs.[5] The government simultaneously announced a "people's war on terror" and local government introduced new restrictions that included the banning of long beards and the wearing of veils in public places.[6] Scholars have stated that the most pervasive of the repressive measures in Xinjiang may be the government's use of digital mass surveillance systems. Authorities collect the DNA, iris scans, and voice samples of the Uyghur population, regularly scan the contents of their digital devices, use digitally coded ID cards to track their movements, and train CCTV cameras on their homes, streets, and marketplaces.[7][8]
Criticism edit
China has received criticism for its mass detention of members of the Muslim Uyghur community from some countries as well as human rights observers. James A Millward, a scholar who has researched Xinjiang for three decades, declared that the "state repression in Xinjiang has never been as severe as it has become since early 2017".[9] The US State Department has said it is deeply concerned over China's "worsening crackdown" on minority Muslims in Xinjiang and the Trump administration has reportedly considered sanctions against senior Chinese officials and companies linked to allegations of human rights abuses.[10] Canadian officials have also raised concern in Beijing and at the United Nations about the internment camps: "We are gravely concerned about the lack of transparency and due process in the cases of the many thousands of Uyghurs detained in so-called 're-education camps', which continues to call into question China's commitment to the rule of law and which violate its international human rights obligations."[11]
Chinese government response edit
Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated in May 2014 that "practice has proved that our party's ruling strategy in Xinjiang is correct and must be maintained in the long run".[12]
In November 2018, a UN panel condemned China's "deteriorating" human rights record in Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese government replied saying that such international condemnation was "politically motivated". Vice foreign minister Le Yucheng responded, "We will not accept the politically driven accusations from a few countries that are fraught with biases, with total disregard for facts. No country shall dictate the definition of democracy and human rights."[13] China has defended the strike-hard campaign as lawful, asserting that the country is a victim of terrorism, and that Uyghur men are motivated by global jihadi ideology rather than driven by grievances at home. The Chinese government denies the internment camps are for the purposes of re-education.[13]
See also edit
References edit
- ^ Bovingdon, Gardner (2004). Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.). Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (PDF). Policy Studies. East-West Center Washington. p. 1. hdl:10125/349. ISBN 1-932728-21-X. ISSN 1547-1330. Retrieved 16 Apr 2021.
- ^ Trédaniel, Marie; Lee, Pak K. (2017-09-18). "Explaining the Chinese framing of the "terrorist" violence in Xinjiang: insights from securitization theory" (PDF). Nationalities Papers. 46 (1): 177–195. doi:10.1080/00905992.2017.1351427. ISSN 0090-5992. S2CID 157729459. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2019-04-27. Retrieved 2019-08-18.
- ^ Chestnut Greitens, Sheena; Lee, Myunghee; Yazici, Emir (2020). "Counterterrorism and preventive repression: China's changing strategy in Xinjiang" (PDF). International Security. pp. 9–47.
- ^ Wines, Michael (11 July 2009). "Wang Lequan Is China's Strongman in Controlling Uighurs". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2019-07-06. Retrieved 2018-12-02.
- ^ "China Steps Up 'Strike Hard' Campaign in Xinjiang". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 2018-12-03. Retrieved 2018-12-02.
- ^ Roberts, Sean R. (2018-03-22). "The biopolitics of China's "war on terror" and the exclusion of the Uyghurs". Critical Asian Studies. 50 (2): 232–258. doi:10.1080/14672715.2018.1454111. ISSN 1467-2715. S2CID 149053452.
- ^ Greer, Tanner. "48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 2018-12-05. Retrieved 2018-12-02.
- ^ "Top China official urges 'reform through education' for Xinjiang prisoners". Reuters. Archived from the original on 2018-12-05. Retrieved 2023-01-30.
- ^ Millward, James A. (3 February 2018). "What It's Like to Live in a Surveillance State". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2018-12-06. Retrieved 2018-12-02.
- ^ Kuo, Lily (September 11, 2018). "US considers sanctions on China over treatment of Uighurs". The Guardian. Archived from the original on December 8, 2018. Retrieved December 4, 2018.
- ^ Vanderklippe, Nathan (September 27, 2018). "Trudeau, Freeland face criticism for failing to condemn China over Uyghur detentions". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on October 15, 2018. Retrieved December 4, 2018.
- ^ Wong, Edward (30 May 2014). "China Moves to Calm Restive Xinjiang Region". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 11 May 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2019.
- ^ a b Kuo, Lily (2018-11-06). "China says UN criticism of human rights record is 'politically driven'". the Guardian. Archived from the original on 2019-01-05. Retrieved 2018-12-02.