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MOLTKE
  

supervision, and remarkable for its combination of accuracy with reticence. On the 24th of December 1868 Moltke’s wife died at Berlin. Her remains were buried in a small chapel erected by Moltke as a mausoleum in the park at Creisau.

In 1870 suddenly came the war with France. The probability of such a war had occupied Moltke’s attention almost continuously since 1857, and a series of memoirs is preserved in which from time to time he worked out and recorded his ideas as to the best arrangement of the Prussian or German forces for the opening of the campaign. The arrangements for the transport of the army by railway were annually revised in order to suit the changes in his plans brought about by political conditions and by the growth of the army, as well as by the improvement of the Prussian system of railways. The great successes of 1866 had strengthened Moltke’s position, so that when on the 15th of July 1870 the order for the mobilization of the Prussian and south German forces was issued, his plans were adopted without dispute and five days later he was appointed “Chief of the general staff of the army at the headquarters of his Majesty the King” for the duration of the war. This gave Moltke the right to issue in the king’s name, though of course not without his approval, orders which were equivalent to royal commands. Moltke’s plan was to assemble the whole army to the south of Mainz, this being the one district in which an army could best secure the defence of the whole frontier. If the French should disregard the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and advance on the line from Paris to Cologne or any other point on the Lower Rhine, the German army would be able to strike at their flank, while the Rhine itself, with the fortresses of Coblenz, Cologne and Wesel, would be a serious obstacle in their front. If the French should attempt to invade south Germany, an advance of the Germans up either bank of the Rhine would threaten their communications. Moltke expected that the French would be compelled by the direction of their railways to collect the greater part of their army near Metz, and a smaller portion near Strassburg. The German forces were grouped into three armies: the first of 60,000 men, under Steinmetz, on the Moselle below Treves; the second of 131,000 men, under Prince Frederick Charles, round Homburg, with a reserve of 60,000 men behind it; the third under the crown prince of 130,000 men, at Landau. Three army corps amounting to 100,000 men were not reckoned upon in the first instance, as it was desirable to keep a considerable force in north-eastern Germany, in case Austria should make common cause with France. If, as seemed probable, the French should take the initiative before the German armies were ready, and for that purpose should advance from Metz in the direction of Mainz, Moltke would merely put back a few miles nearer to Mainz the points of debarcation from the railway of the troops of the second army. This measure was actually adopted, though the anticipated French invasion did not take place. Moltke’s plan of operations was that the three armies while advancing should make a right wheel, so that the first army on the right would reach the bank of the Moselle opposite Metz, while the second and third armies should push forward, the third army to defeat the French force near Strassburg, and the second to strike the Moselle near Pont-à-Mousson. If the French army should be found during this advance in front of the second army, it would be attacked in front by the second army and in flank by the first or the third or both. If it should be found on or north of the line from Saarburg to Luneville, it could still be attacked from two sides by the second and third armies in co-operation. The intention of the great right wheel was to attack the principal French army in such a direction as to drive it north and cut its communications with Paris. The fortress of Metz was to be observed, and the main German forces, after defeating the chief French army, to march upon Paris. This plan was carried out in its broad outlines. The battle of Wörth was brought on prematurely, and therefore led, not to the capture of MacMahon’s army, which was intended, but only to its total defeat and hasty retreat as far as Châlons. The battle of Spicheren was not intended by Moltke, who wished to keep Bazaine’s army on the Saar till he could attack it with the second army in front and the first army on its left flank, while the third army was closing towards its rear. But these unintended or unexpected victories did not disconcert Moltke, who carried out his intended advance to Pont-à-Mousson, there crossed the Moselle with the first and second armies, then faced north and wheeled round, so that the effect of the battle of Gra.velotte was to drive Bazaine into the fortress of Metz and cut him off from Paris. Nothing shows Moltke’s insight and strength of purpose in a clearer light than his determination to attack on the 18th of August, when many strategists would have thought that, the strategical victory having been gained, a tactical victory was unnecessary. He has been blamed for the last local attack at Gravelotte, in which there was a fruitless heavy loss; but it is now known that this attack was ordered by the king, and Moltke blamed himself for not having used his influence to prevent it. During the night following the battle Moltke made his next decision. He left one army to invest Bazaine and Metz, and set out with the two others to march towards Paris, the more southerly one leading, so that when MacMahon’s army should be found the main blow might be delivered from the south and MacMahon driven to the north. On the 25th of August it was found that MacMahon was moving north-east for the relief of Bazaine. The moment Moltke was satisfied of the accuracy of his information, he ordered the German columns to turn their faces north instead of west. MacMahon’s right wing was attacked at Beaumont while attempting to cross the Meuse, his advance necessarily abandoned, and his army with difficulty collected at Sedan. Here the two German armies were so brought up as completely to surround the French army, which on the 1st of September was attacked and compelled to raise the white flag. After the capitulation of Sedan, Moltke resumed the advance on Paris, which was surrounded and invested. From this time his strategy is remarkable for its judicious economy of force, for he was wise enough never to attempt more than was practicable with the means at his disposal. The surrender of Metz and of Paris was a question of time, and the problem was, while maintaining the investment, to be able to ward off the attacks of the new French armies levied for the purpose of raising the siege of Paris. Metz surrendered on the 27th of October, and on the 28th of January 1871 an armistice was concluded at Paris by which the garrison became virtually prisoners and the war was ended.

On the 29th of October 1870 Moltke was created graf (count or earl), and on the 16th of June 1871, field marshal. After the war he superintended the preparation of its history, which was published between 1874 and 1881 by the great general staff. In 1888 he resigned his post as chief of the staff. In 1867 Moltke was elected to the North German Diet, and in 1871 to the Reichstag. His speeches, dealing mostly with military questions, were regarded as models of conciseness and relevancy. He died suddenly on the 24th of April 1891, and after a magnificent funeral ceremony at Berlin his remains were laid beside those of his wife in the chapel which he had erected as her tomb at Creisau.

As a strategist Moltke cannot be estimated by comparison with Frederick or Napoleon, because he had not the authority either of a king or of a commander-in-chief. While it is doubtful whether he can be convicted of any strategical errors, it seems beyond doubt that he never had to face a situation which placed any strain on his powers, for in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 his decisions seemed to be made without the slightest effort, and he was never at a loss.

He had a tall spare figure, and in his latter years his tanned features had received a set expression which was at once hard and grand. He was habitually taciturn and reserved, though a most accomplished linguist, so that it was said of him that he was “silent in seven languages.” The stern school of his early life had given him a rare self-control, so that no indiscreet or unkind expression is known to have ever fallen from him. Long before his name was on the lips of the public he was known