U.S. Department of the Army No Gun Ri Review Report

Executive summary

Introduction

Following the release of the Associated Press story concerning the matter on September 29, 1999, the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) initiated independent, but cooperative, reviews of the incident at No Gun Ri. This story brought to the forefront the earlier efforts of Korean citizens to secure an official inquiry into their claims surrounding certain events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, including the firing upon Korean refugees at the double railroad overpass and an air strike on the railroad track.

Over the last year, the U.S. Review Team has conducted an exhaustive factual review by examining over a million documents from the National Archives, conducting interviews with approximately 200 American witnesses, and analyzing the interview transcripts and oral statements of approximately 75 Korean witnesses. The U.S. Review Team also closely examined press reports, aerial imagery, and other forensic examination results. This U.S. Report reflects the U.S. Review Team's factual findings based upon all the evidence available on the incident.

Unfortunately, the passage of 50 years greatly reduces the possibility that we will ever know all of the facts surrounding this particular event. A large number of factors, including but not limited to trauma, age, and the media, influenced the recollection of Korean and U.S. witnesses. By comparing and contrasting all of these available information sources, the U.S. Review Team has developed a clearer picture of the events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in July 1950. The findings of the U.S. Review Team have been organized into several key issues, which describe the Team's conclusions regarding what occurred at No Gun Ri based upon all the information available half a century later.

I. Background - The Korean account

The Korean villagers stated that on July 25, 1950, U.S. soldiers evacuated approximately 500 to 600 villagers from their homes in Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri. The villagers said the U.S. soldiers escorted them towards the south. Later that evening, the American soldiers led the villagers near a riverbank at Ha Ga Ri and ordered them to stay there that night. During the night, the villagers witnessed a long parade of U.S. troops and vehicles moving towards Pusan.

On the morning of July 26, 1950, the villagers continued south along the Seoul-Pusan road. According to their statements, when the villagers reached the vicinity of No Gun Ri, U.S. soldiers stopped them at a roadblock and ordered the group onto the railroad tracks, where the soldiers searched them and their personal belongings.

The Koreans state that, although the soldiers found no prohibited items (such as weapons or other military contraband), the soldiers ordered an air attack upon the villagers via radio communications with U.S. aircraft. Shortly afterwards, planes flew over and dropped bombs and fired machine guns, killing approximately 100 villagers on the railroad tracks. Those villagers who survived sought protection in a small culvert underneath the railroad tracks. The U.S. soldiers drove the villagers out of the culvert and into the larger double tunnels nearby (this report subsequently refers to these tunnels as the "double railroad overpass"). The Koreans state that the U.S. soldiers then fired into both ends of the tunnels over a period of four days (July 26-29, 1950), resulting in approximately 300 additional deaths.

II. Department of Defense review directives

On September 30, 1999, the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Army to lead a review to determine "the full scope of the facts surrounding these [No Gun Ri] press reports." On October 25, 1999, the Secretary of the Army directed The Inspector General to conduct a thorough review of the allegations, pursue every reasonable lead to determine the facts, and then prepare and submit a report of the findings with regard to the allegations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense established a Steering Group chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to oversee the conduct of the review. In addition, the Secretary of Defense invited eight distinguished Americans, who are not affiliated with the Department of Defense, to advise on the conduct of the review based upon their expertise in academia, journalism, the Korean War, and U.S.-ROK relations.

III. Department of the Army Inspector General review effort

The Inspector General developed a four-phase concept plan: Preparation; Research and Interviews; Review and Analysis; and Production of the Final Report. The Inspector General then formed the No Gun Ri Review Team (U.S. Review Team) into a Research Team and an Interview Team. The research effort, led by an Army historian, began in October 1999. The Research Team consisted of Department of the Army military and civilian members augmented by a United States Air Force research team, an imagery analyst, a Korean linguist, and professional research assistants from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The researchers examined over one million pages of text from the National Archives and other repositories and approximately 45,000 containers of United States Air Force reconnaissance film.

The interview process started on December 29, 1999, after the Interview Team located former soldiers assigned to the major combat units that passed through the Yongdong-Hwanggan area in mid- to late July 1950. The Interview Team and Air Force researchers culled through over 7,375 names to locate and interview approximately 200 U.S. veterans. While every effort was made to make this a comprehensive sample, the U.S. Review Team had no power to compel a witness to grant an interview and no authority to issue subpoenas or to grant immunity. In fact, eleven veterans contacted by the U.S. Review Team declined to be interviewed. The U.S. Review Team did review, however, the published accounts of some witnesses who declined to be interviewed by the Team.

IV. U.S. and ROK cooperation

The Department of the Army and the Department of Defense worked in close cooperation with the representatives of the government of the Republic of Korea who were conducting a parallel review of the allegations. Members from the U.S. Review Team, the Republic of Korea Investigation Team (ROK Review Team), and government officials from both countries met on approximately a dozen occasions in both the United States and Korea, to include the Secretary of the Army's meetings with President Kim Dae-Jung and Minister of National Defense Cho Song-Tae in January 2000. The U.S. Review Team provided the ROK Review Team with copies of all relevant documents and other information discovered in the course of the review in support of the ROK's parallel investigation. On two occasions, the U.S. Review Team supported working visits by a ROK Review Team researcher to the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. The U.S. Review Team provided full access to, and funded the reproduction costs of, any materials already gathered by the U.S. researchers. No information was withheld.

V. Organization of the U.S. report

The U.S. Review Team conducted this review and prepared this report fully aware of the political, military, and emotional significance of the allegations. This report is not intended as a point-by-point response to the media and Korean accounts. The report presents an independent assessment of the facts derived directly from an exhaustive review of primary and secondary sources, the statements of U.S. veterans and Koreans, ballistic and pathology forensics, and imagery analysis. The report consists of an Executive Summary, five chapters, and five appendices. Chapter 1 (Introduction) outlines the purpose, background, and overall organization and conduct of the review. Chapter 2 (Background and History) describes the ground events unfolding on the Korean Peninsula in July 1950. Chapter 3 (Combat Operations - July 1950) examines the state of U.S. intelligence and U.S. ground forces in July 1950 and provides a day-by-day account of the tactical operations of the 1st Cavalry Division in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950. This chapter also includes research on U.S. and allied air operations in the Yongdong- Hwanggan area for the same time period. Several photographs from 1950 are inserted between Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 (Analysis of Interview Data) provides the analysis of interviews of American and Korean witnesses. The review of witness statements identifies areas of consensus between statements and outlines possible sequences of events. Finally, Chapter 5 (Key Issue Analysis and Findings) synthesizes the analysis of documentary research and witness interviews into a thorough, fact- based set of findings.

The appendices supplement the material in the main body of the report. Appendix A (Research Methodology) documents in detail the methodology used in the research of the historical records. Appendix B (Forensic Evidence) provides an analysis of the forensic evidence associated with the No Gun Ri site. This appendix discusses the sources of Korean casualty estimates, analysis of the ballistic evidence collected by Korean authorities, and an analysis of the USAF reconnaissance film taken over the No Gun Ri area on August 6, 1950. Appendix C (Imagery Analysis) contains the analysis of the August 6, 1950, USAF reconnaissance photograph performed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). This appendix includes the NIMA response to the ROK Investigation Team's questions concerning this analysis. Appendix D (Joint Cooperation) discusses the actions taken to ensure a cooperative and coordinated effort between the ROK and U.S. Review Teams, including joint meetings and the exchange of documents and other information. Appendix E (Supporting Documents) contains explanatory charts and maps.

VI. Findings

Given the challenge of ascertaining facts a half century after their occurrence, the U.S. Review Team made findings when possible, identified possibilities, and noted when the evidence was not sufficient to identify a possibility or reach a finding about what may have occurred at No Gun Ri in July 1950 based upon an analysis of available information. A summary of its factual findings has been organized into several key issues. These issues were identified and developed in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Group, U.S. Outside Experts, and counterparts from the Republic of Korea.

A. Key Issue 1: Condition of U.S. forces in July 1950

Background. U.S. soldiers were young, under-trained, under-equipped, and unprepared for the fight they would wage against the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The soldiers of the Army of Occupation in Japan functioned primarily as a constabulary in a conquered land and not as combat-ready warfighters. Their lack of combat preparedness was a direct result of deficiencies in training, equipment, structure, personnel strength, and leadership. Proper training areas were not available to conduct more than small-unit training. Classes for critical specialties such as maintenance and communications were also inadequate. Most of their equipment, including ammunition, was of World War II vintage, and had been poorly stored and maintained. The three infantry regiments in the 1st Cavalry Division had only two of the three battalions normally assigned. Likewise, each regiment lacked its authorized tank company, and the division artillery battalions contained only two of the normal three firing batteries. In response to a requirement to bring the 24th Infantry Division up to strength prior to that division's departure for Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division transferred nearly 800 men, most of them from the top four senior non- commissioned officer grades, to the 24th. This loss of non-commissioned officers with whom the soldiers had trained weakened the cohesion of the division and significantly reduced the number of leaders with combat experience at the small-unit level.

Finding. Based on the documentary evidence, as well as the statements by U.S. veterans, the U.S. Review Team concluded that most American units and soldiers were not adequately prepared for the combat conditions that they confronted in Korea in June and July 1950. No experience or training equipped them to deal with an aggressive enemy that employed both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics or with a large refugee population, which the enemy was known to have infiltrated. Shortages of experienced Non-commissioned officers, along with inadequate equipment and doctrine, made it difficult for individuals or units to adapt to these conditions.

B. Key Issue 2: U.S. and ROK refugee control policies

Background. The U.S. troops were completely unprepared for the stark reality of dealing with the numerous, uncontrolled refugees who clogged the roads and complicated the battlefield to an unexpected degree. Early on in the war, U.S. forces encountered the NKPA practice of infiltrating soldiers dressed as civilians among large refugee concentrations. Once behind American lines, these infiltrated soldiers would then conduct guerilla-style combat operations against American rear-area units and activities.

In late July 1950, the ROK government and the Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters issued refugee control policies to protect the U.S. and ROK forces from NKPA infiltration and attacks from the rear. Additionally, these policies were aimed at reducing the adverse impact of large refugee concentrations on main supply routes, which stymied the U.S. and UN troops' ability to rush ammunition forward and evacuate casualties to the rear. These U.S. and ROK refugee policies depended heavily upon the constant presence of, and coordination with, the ROK National Police to handle the uncontrolled refugee population. Despite comments attributed to Major General Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander, that he would not employ the Korean National Police in his division's area of operations, his refugee policy directive of July 23, 1950, made the National Police responsible for handling refugees. The movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was restricted to specific hours and for specific purposes by a limited number of people, and the National Police were responsible for enforcing the policy. On July 26, 1950, the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK), in coordination with the ROK government, established and disseminated a plan to control refugee movement which: - precluded movement of refugees across battle lines at all times, prohibited evacuation of villages without general officer approval, and established a National Police responsibility, - prescribed procedures for Korean National Police to clear desired areas and routes, - strictly precluded Korean civilian movement during the hours of darkness, and - established requirements for disseminating the policy.

The Eighth Army's policy was intended to deny the NKPA their widely used infiltration tactic while also safeguarding civilians by prohibiting refugees from crossing battle lines (battle lines are the areas where there is contact with the enemy or contact is about to occur). The policy did not state that refugees could not cross friendly lines and contains instructions for the handling of refugees in friendly areas (friendly lines are the forward troop positions not in contact with the enemy). The policy emphasized the Korean government's responsibility for the control and screening of refugees to provide for their welfare. Nothing in this policy was intended to put refugees at risk. Most veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment interviewed by the U.S. Review Team were enlisted men during the Korean War and did not receive copies of policies from higher headquarters. In general, most U.S. veterans remembered warnings that there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. The veterans who remembered more specific details about refugee control remembered specific actions to be taken; for example, keep refugees off the roads, do not let refugees pass, or search refugees and let them pass.

Finding. From its study of the refugee control policies in effect during the last week of July 1950, the U.S. Review Team found that the Eighth U.S. Army published, in coordination with the ROK government, refugee control policies that reflected two predominant concerns: (1) protecting U.S. and ROK troops from the danger of NKPA soldiers infiltrating U.S. - ROK lines; and (2) precluding uncontrolled refugee movements from impeding flows of supplies and troops. The published 1st Cavalry Division refugee control policy dated July 23, 1950, reflected the same two concerns. The task of keeping innocent civilians out of harm's way was left entirely to ROK authorities. By implication, these policies also protected refugees by attempting to ensure they were not in harm's way.

C. Key Issue 3: Tactical situation July 22-29, 1950

Background. The 1st Cavalry Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division northwest of Yongdong on July 22, 1950. The 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived in Pohangdong, Korea, on July 22, 1950, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, moved forward to the Yongdong area. With friendly forces outnumbered by the NKPA, the Eighth Army developed a strategy to withdraw behind the last defensible terrain feature, the Naktong River. As events developed, the 1st Cavalry Division withdrew from Yongdong through a series of delaying actions in accordance with the Eighth Army strategy and to avoid a threatened envelopment. On the evening of July 25, 1950, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was supporting the 5th Cavalry Regiment in positions east of Yongdong. Sometime during the night of July 25, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the sector to the 7th Cavalry Regiment's north.

Finding. The U.S. Review Team found that, in the early morning hours of July 26, 1950, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, without specific orders but believing they were being enveloped, conducted a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal from a position east of Yongdong to the vicinity of No Gun Ri. They spent the remaining hours of July 26 until late into that night recovering abandoned personnel and equipment from the area where the air strike and machine-gun firing on Korean refugees is alleged to have occurred. On July 26, 1950, at 9:30 at night, 119 men were still unaccounted for. It will probably never be possible to reconstruct the activities of the scattered soldiers of the 2nd Battalion. The U.S. Review Team determined that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the afternoon of July 26, 1950. They relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and established their position east of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment.

The U.S. Review Team found that there was repeated contact reported between the 7th Cavalry and enemy forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 27 and July 28. The records indicate by this time that the 7th Cavalry had been told that there were no friendly forces to the west and south of No Gun Ri (i.e. back toward Yongdong). The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reported an enemy column on the railroad tracks on July 27, which they fired upon. On July 29, the battalion withdrew as the NKPA advanced. The U.S. Review Team concluded that based on the available evidence, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was under attack, as they believed, between July 27 and July 29, 1950, when in position near No Gun Ri.

D. Key Issue 4: Assembly and movement of villagers

Background. The U.S. and ROK policy in July 1950 stated generally that Korean civilians should not evacuate their villages. The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri, but this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of any U.S. action. Some witnesses stated that the Americans told them that they were being moved for their safety. Some U.S. veterans remember escorting refugees from villages, but these veterans cannot remember the villages' names or the dates the evacuations occurred. Therefore, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village. While the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that the villagers were moved, there was no sound military reason for soldiers to travel approximately three miles off their designated movement route to the village of Im Gae Ri during a hasty withdrawal for the purpose of encouraging an additional 400 refugees onto the already crowded roads and further aggravating the congested conditions. It is also unlikely that the soldiers would have performed this evacuation given the widespread knowledge and fear of North Korean infiltrators believed to be present in refugee concentrations.

Some 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans recalled displacing South Koreans from unknown villages on unknown dates. The U.S. Review Team found that the 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in the vicinity of Im Gae Ri on July 25 based upon official records of the Regiment's positions. Some veterans of the 5th Cavalry Regiment indicated that they evacuated or escorted Korean civilians from unknown villages in late July and early August 1950. A patrol from the 5th Cavalry Regiment may have told the villagers who had assembled at Im Gae Ri to leave. Finding. The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri, but the U.S. Review Team concluded that this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of U.S. action. Based on some of the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village, but the soldiers who did so were not from the 7th Cavalry Regiment. E. Key Issue 5: Air Strikes in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri Background. Korean witnesses describe an air strike / strafing around noon on July 26, 1950 on the railroad tracks. The Korean witnesses describe the effects of machine gun fire and explosions. The U.S. Review Team could not locate any records to substantiate the occurrence of an air strike / strafing incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri around noon on July 26, 1950. While there are mission reports for July 26, 1950, that could not be located, the missions can be accounted for through other reports. The only documented USAF air strike in the immediate vicinity of the Hwanggan area occurred southwest of No Gun Ri on July 27. This air strike was a friendly fire incident in which a F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 in the morning. The strafing destroyed two U.S. trucks but claimed no lives. The friendly strike on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, caused the 7th Cavalry Regimental Commander to request immediately that he be assigned a Tactical Air Control Party in order to control aircraft in his area and thereby preclude further friendly-fire incidents. Only a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) with a jeep-mounted AN/VRC-1 radio could talk to the Air Force elements, including the strike aircraft. There was only one TACP operating in support of the 1st Cavalry Division during this period of time. This TACP was not located in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period of July 26 to July 29, 1950. Ordinary soldiers could not communicate on their radios with aircraft. Although it was possible for the Army to request an air strike from the Air Force, the process was cumbersome and took considerable time because the request had to be processed through Army and Air Force channels. No U.S. Air Force veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants. The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 or 27. However, on July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy troops and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.

The Defense Intelligence Agency found 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron photographs of the No Gun Ri area dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. The Air Force Team showed these photographs to four retired photo interpreters of national reputation, all of whom agree that the photographs show no signs of bombing or strafing on the railroad tracks. A NIMA photo interpreter maintains that some patterns near the tracks approximately 350 yards from the double railroad overpass show "an imagery signature of probable strafing" but no bomb damage. The location of the probable strafing is in the same relative location identified by the Korean witnesses as that location where they were strafed.

Finding. An exhaustive search of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy records and interviews with U.S. pilots did not identify an air strike in the No Gun Ri area on July 26, 1950. The number of Korean witness statements describing the strafing and the photograph interpretation by NIMA does not permit the U.S. Review Team to exclude the possibility that U.S. or allied aircraft might have hit civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during an air strike / strafing on July 26, 1950. On July 27, 1950, an air strike did in fact occur on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's position near No Gun Ri that both the Air Force and Army recorded in official documents. On July 28, there was also an air strike on NKPA forces near 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Assuming Korean civilians were near the positions of these strikes, they could have been injured.

The U.S. Review Team concluded that strafing may have occurred near No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 and could have injured or killed Korean civilians but that any such air strikes were not deliberate attacks on Korean civilians. The U. S. Review Team concluded that any air strikes / strafing occurring on July 26 took place under the same conditions as the air strikes / strafing on July 27, specifically an accidental air strike / strafing caused by the misidentification of targets and not a pre-planned strike. An accidental air strike / strafing could have happened due to several factors: target misidentification, lack of reliable communications, absence of a Tactical Air Control Party in the 7th Regiment, and the fluid nature of the battlefield. It was not a pre- planned strike on civilian refugees.

F. Key Issue 6: Ground fire in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

Background. Some U.S. and Korean witness statements indicate that U.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period July 26-29, 1950, as discussed below. According to the Korean description of the events on July 26, 1950, refugees were strafed or bombed on the railroad tracks. Some fled the area or hid in ditches and others went into the double railroad overpass tunnel where they were fired upon from different locations for a period of up to four days, with the heaviest fire occurring on July 26 (which was the first day they report spending in the double railroad overpass). In interviews, some U.S. veterans stated they saw or heard firing of various types including machine-gun, mortar, artillery, and rifle fire, near unidentified individuals in civilian clothing outside the tunnels / bridges in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Only a few veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated they fired toward civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Two veterans fired over the heads of or into the ground in front to keep the civilians pinned down or to prevent them from moving. Several other veterans stated they either received hostile fire from, or saw hostile fire coming from, the civilian positions in the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. They also stated that they returned fire, or observed fire being returned, on the civilian positions as a response to the hostile fire they received or observed. Some veterans also remember intermittent NKPA and U.S. artillery and mortar fires. Official records indicate that the NKPA attacked the 7th Cavalry on July 27 and 28, and the 7th Cavalry employed every means at its disposal to defend itself, including the use of small-arms fire, mortars, and artillery.

Finding. Although the U.S. Review Team cannot determine what happened near No Gun Ri with certainty, it is clear, based upon all available evidence, that an unknown number of Korean civilians were killed or injured by the effects of small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950. These Korean deaths and injuries occurred at different locations in the vicinity of No Gun Ri and were not concentrated exclusively at the double railroad overpass.

Some U.S. veterans describe fire that lasted for a few to 60 minutes. Some Korean witnesses describe fire day and night on the tunnel for as long as four days. Because Korean estimates of the length of time they spent in the tunnel are so inconsistent, the U.S. Review Team drew no conclusion about the amount of time they spent in the tunnel. The firing was a result of hostile fire seen or received from civilian positions or fire directed over their heads or near them to control their movement. The deaths and injuries of civilians, wherever they occurred, were an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing.

G. Key Issue 7: Issuance of orders to fire on refugees

Background. To determine if soldiers or pilots were issued orders to attack and fire on refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, the Review Team reviewed documents and conducted interviews with Army and Air Force veterans. Based upon the available evidence, which included the statements of veterans, documents, and the absence of documents, the U.S. Review Team concluded that U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to fire on refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 25 and 29, 1950. Pilots were not ordered to attack and kill civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Air strikes in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 were either the result of a misidentification of a target or an accident as discussed above. No USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone

participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants. In interviews, pilots stated that they sought out targets such as tanks, trucks, moving troops, and groups of men in uniform. Pilots fired when they were told a target was hostile and fired back when fired upon. The U.S. Review Team found two documents that refer to an unknown Army request to the Air Force and the Navy to strafe civilian or refugee columns. The first reference is in a memorandum by COL T.C. Rogers, Fifth Air Force ADVON (Korea), dated 25 July 1950. The second reference is a Naval Activity Summary for the same date from the Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge. The U.S. Review Team could not find any originating request from the Army that prompted these two references. The Rogers' memorandum actually recommends that civilians not be attacked unless they are definitely known to be North Korean soldiers or have committed hostile acts. The Navy document stated that the first pass over personnel would be a non-firing run to identify if civilians were present. If the target was determined to be hostile, a firing run would follow. Soldiers were not ordered to attack and kill civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The veterans interviewed said that deadly force was not authorized against civilian refugees who posed no threat to the unit, and they were not given orders to shoot and kill civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers who were in the vicinity of No Gun Ri were given an order to stop civilians and not to let them pass their position. Some soldiers did believe if civilian refugees did not stop, they could use deadly force to prevent them from passing.

Several other veterans stated they observed firing at the civilians in response to perceived hostile fire from the positions near the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. Based on veterans' interviews, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers believed that they could take action in self-defense against civilians; that is, if they were fired upon or if they saw actions that indicated hostile intent. Some veterans said they observed firing in the direction of the double railroad overpass in response to fire from that location. Return fire in this case would have been an action in self-defense, and no orders were required. Two veterans fired over the heads of civilians, or into the ground in front to keep the civilians pinned down or prevent them from moving. The U.S. soldiers were repeatedly warned that North Korean soldiers wore civilian clothing over their uniforms in order to infiltrate U.S. positions. The U.S. soldiers were also told that North Korean soldiers would hide within refugee columns.

In interviews with the U.S. Review Team, several veterans stated that they assumed there was an order to fire on civilians because artillery and mortar fires were used that may have hit civilians. These veterans had no information to support their assertions. When interviewed, the veterans said they did not know who gave the order, they did not hear the order, they did not know when the order was given, and they personally did not receive the order. Former officers of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, that the U.S. Review Team interviewed remain adamant that the battalion commander issued no order to fire on refugees at any time.

There are references that appear to authorize firing on Korean civilians in Army records. The first reference was an abbreviated message that appeared in an 8th Cavalry Regiment message log dated 10:00 AM on July 24, 1950, that stated: "No refugees to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." The U.S. Review Team found no similar entry in the records of the 1st Cavalry Division, its other two regiments (the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments), or in the records of units subordinate to the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The U.S. Review Team found no evidence that the 8th Cavalry message was transmitted to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments or any other subordinate element of the division. In interviews, U.S. veterans in the vicinity of No Gun Ri do not recall instructions to fire on civilian refugees. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the unit in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26. By July 26, 1950, the last elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment were withdrawing from the vicinity of No Gun Ri to the division rear near Hwanggan.

The refugee control policy set by the 1st Cavalry Division Commander in his order of July 23, 1950, titled "Control of Refugee Movement" makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. It stated: "Municipal authorities, local police and the National Police will enforce this directive." The U.S. Review Team concluded that the 8th Cavalry Regiment log entry did not constitute a 1st Cavalry Division order to fire upon Korean civilians at No Gun Ri.

The second reference was a 25th Infantry Division Commander's memorandum to commanders issued on July 27, 1950. On July 25, 1950, the 25th ID Activities Report stated: "Refugees and Korean Civilians were ordered out of the combat zone in order to eliminate possible serious traffic problems and to aid in blocking the infiltration of North Korean Forces through the lines. These instructions were passed to the civilians through the Korean Police." The July 27, 1950, memo to Commanders reads: "Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly." The area "between the blue lines" was in front of the 25th Infantry Division's main line of defense, an area about to be occupied by the enemy. Two things are clear: actions had been taken in conjunction with the Korean National Police to clear the civilians out of the danger area, and those actions were intended to ensure that noncombatants would not find themselves in harm's way when the advancing NKPA subsequently made contact along the Division's front. After the area was cleared, anyone caught in civilian clothes and suspected of being an enemy agent was to be turned over to the Counter-Intelligence Corps immediately and not to the Korean Police. There is nothing to suggest any summary measures were considered against refugees or people dressed like refugees. The 25th Infantry Division was not located in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950.

Finding. Based upon the available evidence, and despite some conflicting statements and misunderstandings, the U.S. Review Team concluded that U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot and kill Korean civilians during the last week of July 1950 in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. A veteran stated that soldiers could have misunderstood the order not to let refugees pass or to stop refugees. Some veterans did believe that if a civilian would not stop, they could use deadly force to prevent civilians from passing. Some veterans stated that there was an order to shoot civilians at No Gun Ri but had no information to support their assertions. These soldiers did not know who gave the order, did not hear the order, did not know when the order was given, and personally did not receive the order. As a result, the U.S. Review Team concluded that these veterans assumed that an order was given because artillery and mortars were fired. The U.S. Review Team also considered media statements quoting veterans who claimed that an order to shoot Korean civilians was given at No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team was unable to confirm these reports because the witnesses either were not at No Gun Ri at the time or refused to speak to the U.S. Army. Although the U.S. Review Team found four references (entry in the 8th Cavalry Regiment Message Log, 25th Infantry Division Commander's order, Colonel Rogers' memorandum, and an extract from the U.S. Navy's Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge Activity Summary) discussing actions against civilians, it did not find evidence of an order given to soldiers by a U.S. commander, orally or in writing, to kill Korean civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950.

H. Key Issue 8: Number of Korean deaths and injuries

Background. After taking the statements of U.S. veterans and securing the professional evaluation of the August 6, 1950, aerial reconnaissance photograph by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the U.S. Review Team asked the ROK Review Team to provide information on the number of casualties. The U.S. Review Team's research revealed no official records of refugee deaths or injuries in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 26 and July 29, 1950. The initial Associated Press articles reported hundreds of people killed. Korean witness estimates range between 60 -100 dead in the double tunnel and 50 - 150 dead or injured from strafing / bombing. Several U.S. veterans describe a lower number of dead or injured civilians. The soldiers did not check the areas where civilians came under fire to determine whether there were dead bodies, and some estimates appear to be guesswork or to be based on recollections not related to No Gun Ri. At three different meetings, ROK officials reported an unverified number of 248 casualties, which they stated was provided to them by the Yongdong County Office. But the ROK Review Team acknowledges that the estimated figure of 248 is not considered factual and will have to be substantiated by an additional investigation at some future date by the ROK government.

Finding. Based on the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team is unable to determine the number of Korean civilians who were killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. During their investigation, the ROK Review Team reported that the Korean survivors' organization claimed an unverified number of 248 South Korean civilians killed, injured, or missing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 25 and 29, 1950. This report was recorded by the Yongdong County Office. The ROK Steering Group, at a ROK-U.S. Steering Group meeting on December 6-7, 2000, in Seoul, ROK, reiterated the claim of 248 casualties. The actual number of Korean casualties cannot be derived from the U.S. veteran statements and Korean witness statements. The U.S. Team believes that number to be lower than the Korean claim. An aerial reconnaissance photograph of the No Gun Ri area taken on August 6, 1950, shows no indication of human remains or mass graves in the vicinity of the No Gun Ri double railroad overpass. Korean burial customs, farming in the area, lack of reliable information, wartime disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time preclude an accurate determination of the numbers involved.

Conclusion

During late July 1950, Korean civilians were caught between withdrawing U.S. forces and attacking enemy forces. As a result of U.S. actions during the Korean War in the last week of July 1950, Korean civilians were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team did not find that the Korean deaths and injuries occurred exactly as described in the Korean account. To appraise these events, it is necessary to recall the circumstances of the period. U.S. forces on occupation duty in Japan, mostly without training for, or experience in, combat were suddenly ordered to join ROK forces in defending against a determined assault by well-armed and well- trained NKPA forces employing both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics. The U.S. troops had to give up position after position. In the week beginning July 25, 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division, withdrawing from Yongdong toward the Naktong River, passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Earlier, roads and trails in South Korea had been choked with civilians fleeing south. Disguised NKPA soldiers had mingled with these refugees. U.S. and ROK commanders had published a policy designed to limit the threat from NKPA infiltrators, to protect U.S. forces from attacks from the rear, and to prevent civilians from interfering with the flow of supplies and troops. The ROK National Police were supposed to control and strictly limit the movements of innocent refugees.

In these circumstances, especially given the fact that many of the U.S. soldiers lacked combat-experienced officers and Non-commissioned officers, some soldiers may have fired out of fear in response to a perceived enemy threat without considering the possibility that they might be firing on Korean civilians. Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S. veterans' statements reviewed by the U.S. Review Team support a hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians. What befell civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950 was a tragic and deeply regrettable accompaniment to a war forced upon unprepared U.S. and ROK forces.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Many have called the Korean War1 the "Forgotten War". Neither history nor its many veterans and victims has forgotten this terrible conflict. Fifty years ago, more than 20 nations united in the defense of the South Korean peoples' independence against the aggression of expansionist communist North Korean forces. Today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a thriving and prosperous democracy with a large and well-developed economy, while around the world the communist ideology has been discredited and largely abandoned. As always, freedom is not free. Our South Korean and other United Nations allies suffered grievous losses. Included in this testament of sacrifice are the more than 36,000 Americans2 who gave their lives as a demonstration of America's commitment to the security and future of the South Korean people. During his visit to No Gun Ri in January 2000, the Secretary of the Army listened to the Koreans' stories first hand, which, he said, "allowed us to witness their concerns and to express our regret for their sufferings." The manner in which this inquiry pursued the facts, no matter where they led, and in full cooperation with the Republic of Korea government, will only help to strengthen the close relations between the two countries.

I. The Associated Press (AP) special report

(See footnote 3.) On September 29, 1999, the Associated Press reported that American soldiers "machine-gunned hundreds of helpless civilians" under a railroad bridge in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, ROK, in July 1950, in the early days of the Korean War.3 Significantly, the AP stated that "six veterans of the 1st Cavalry Division said they fired on the refugee throng in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, and six others said they witnessed the shootings." According to the AP, the United States (U.S.) veterans agreed on the time, place, and the preponderance of women, children, and old men among the victims. In their original report, the Associated Press interviewed Mr. Edward Daily, who was identified as a veteran of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Mr. Daily's military service is discussed in Chapter 4. However, U.S. military records indicate that Mr. Daily was a member of 27th Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, and not a member of H Company, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in July 1950. Mr. Daily's u nit was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950. The AP report acknowledged that none of the U.S. veterans gave a complete and detailed account of what happened in the vicinity of No Gun Ri nearly 50 years after the fact. The report also noted discrepancies in the statements of the veterans concerning whether the refugees beneath the bridge initiated the firing and whether they later found a few disguised North Korean soldiers among the dead. In another part of the article, however, the AP stated that U.S. soldiers "corroborated the core of the Koreans' account: that American troops kept the refugees pinned under the bridge in late July 1950, and killed almost all of them." In a related article published on December 29, 1999, the Associated Press reported that "American jets attacked groups of Koreans in civilian clothes on suspicion they harbored enemy infiltrators."

II. The Koreans' account

(See footnote 4.) The Korean account, derived from their September 10, 1997, petition to President Clinton, stated that on July 25, 1950, U.S. soldiers evacuated approximately 500-600 villagers from their homes in Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkae-ri, Imkyeh-ri, and Im Ga Ri) (see 1 in Figure) and Joo Gok Ri (sometimes spelled Jugok-Ri) (see 2 in Figure).4 The villagers said U.S. soldiers escorted them towards the south. That evening the American soldiers then led all of the villagers into a nearby dry streambed and ordered them to stay there that night (see 3 in Figure). During the night the villagers witnessed a long parade of U.S. troops and vehicles moving towards Pusan. At dawn on July 26, the villagers found that the U.S. soldiers had left the area. The villagers continued south on their own, following the Seoul-Pusan road. According to their statements, when the villagers reached No Gun Ri, they were stopped by U.S. soldiers at a roadblock and ordered onto the railroad tracks, where their bodies and personal belongings were searched (see 4 in Figure). The Koreans state that, although no prohibited items (e.g. weapons or other military contraband) were found, the Koreans alleged that the soldiers ordered an air strike / strafing upon the villagers via radio communication (see 5 in Figure). Shortly afterwards, planes flew over and dropped bombs and fired machine guns, killing approximately 100 villagers on the railroad tracks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Those that survived sought protection in a small culvert underneath the railroad tracks. Then the U.S. soldiers drove the villagers out of the culvert and into the larger tunnels nearby. The Koreans state that the U.S. soldiers then fired into both ends of the tunnels over a period of days (July 26-29, 1950), resulting in approximately 300 additional deaths (see 6 in Figure).

(Figure=Schematic of attack area)

III. Purpose of the review

On September 30, 1999, the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Army to lead a review to "determine the full scope of the facts surrounding ¦these¨ press reports." The Secretary of Defense memorandum is at Enclosure 1 (Enclosures are found at the end of this chapter). In a memorandum dated October 15, 1999, the Secretary of Defense further clarified his earlier instructions. The process would include "review of the documentation, conduct of interviews, any additional research necessary to provide a full and comprehensive review of the facts, and preparation of a report" for subsequent presentation to the public. The Secretary of Defense memorandum is at Enclosure 2. On October 25, 1999, the Secretary of the Army directed The Inspector General to conduct a thorough review that pursues every reasonable lead to determine the facts and to provide a report. The Inspector General then formed the No Gun Ri Review Team (U.S. Review Team). This report reflects the facts uncovered by that review. From these facts, the report subsequently develops, analyzes, assesses, and portrays the conditions and circumstances leading up to, and culminating in, the events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950. The U.S. Review followed a four-phased concept plan that served as a road map for the review. The Secretary of the Army Memorandum is at Enclosure 3 and the Concept Plan is at Enclosure 4.

IV. Scope of the review

The primary focus of the Review was to determine and report the facts regarding the actions of U.S. ground and air forces in and around the Yongdong-Hwanggan area of Korea during the final week of July 1950.5 The preceding efforts to discover these facts were incomplete and inadequate. The U.S. Army had on two previous occasions addressed the allegations of a U.S. killing of Korean civilians in the No Gun Ri area in late July 1950. One, referenced by the AP, was an October 6, 1997, U.S. Army Claims Office response to a Korean government agency. The reply, stating that there is not "any evidence to show that the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly occurred," was based on faulty research and was incorrect.6 The other, conducted by the U. S. Army Center of Military History, was severely limited in scope and did not fully address the concerns raised by the Koreans.7 Neither of these earlier efforts were properly planned and conducted. In 1994, the ROK government ha d also conducted a review regarding these same allegations. The resulting report was short and inconclusive.8 The AP report provided some limited general, historical context regarding the condition of the U.S. Army at the time of the alleged incident. However, their interviews with veterans and textual research focused primarily on the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Similarly, the Koreans uniformly attributed their allegations to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment.

In order to meet the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army mandate of thoroughness, the U.S. Review Team cast a wide net in its effort to determine and report what actually happened in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. This effort required a comprehensive understanding of the events, to include their military and historical context, that occurred on the Korean peninsula both prior to and through the first months of the Korean War. Therefore, the review included a methodical examination of the historical records of the U.S. forces that operated in the Korean theater from the company / troop level all the way up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Review Team researched the tactical air operations of the U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy, and the allied Air Forces. The U.S. Review Team interviewed hundreds of U.S. Korean War veterans that were assigned to ground and air units operating in the area of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team obtained some materials of Korean origin from the U.S. Archives that included information on the ROK Army (ROKA), the (South) Korean National Police (KNP), and captured North Korean People's Army (NKPA) materials. The U.S. Review Team also examined the archived records of organizations within the Department of Defense, documents of agencies outside the Department of Defense such as the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency, and contemporaneous accounts reported in major U.S. newspapers and periodicals.

V. Organization and general conduct of the review

The Office of the Secretary of Defense established a Steering Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), to coordinate the review (the Under Secretary later became the Deputy Secretary and continued to serve as Chairman of the Steering Group). The Secretary of Defense also invited eight Outside Experts not affiliated with the Department of Defense to advise on the conduct of the review. These Outside Experts represent a wide spectrum of experience and relevant expertise, coming from backgrounds in academia, journalism, foreign and military affairs, the Korean War, and ROK-U.S. relations. A number of these distinguished citizens are also highly decorated Korean War veterans. The membership of the U.S. Review Organization is at Enclosure 5.

The Inspector General organized the U.S. Review Team into two separate teams, Research and Interview. Team Organization is at Enclosure 6. The Research Team consisted of Department of the Army military and civilian members, augmented by a USAF research team, an imagery analyst, professional researchers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and a Korean linguist. An Army historian led this effort. The researchers' focus was a review of records at the National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland. Records were also reviewed at the National Personnel Records Center and several Federal Records Centers, including the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, the MacArthur Library, the Harry S. Truman Library, and the Military History Institute (see Appendix A for details). The researchers examined over one million documents and approximately 45,000 containers of USAF reconnaissance film.

The Interview Team's focus was to locate former soldiers assigned to the major combat units that passed through the Yongdong-Hwanggan area in mid-to-late July 1950 (see Chapter 4 for details). This effort involved a potential pool of three U.S. divisions and several higher-level units as well. The Interview Team compiled a list of potential interviewees from a wide variety of data sources, including the use of a HQDA Internet site and toll-free number. Additionally, the Interview Team received numerous additional names of possible contacts from many of the interviewees, adding to the pool of possible sources. The interview process started on December 29, 1999. Early in the process, the Interview Team received training in interview techniques. This training consisted of interview techniques from experienced interviewers and a psychiatrist who discussed conducting interviews with traumatized witnesses. The Air Force researchers reviewed the Fifth Air Force officer roster and other records that lis t the names of pilots and staff officers. The Air Force attached a trained interviewer to the U.S. Review Team to contact and interview as many of these men as possible. While every effort was made to make this a comprehensive sample, the U.S. Review Team had no power to compel a witness to grant an interview and no authority to issue subpoenas. In fact, eleven veterans contacted by the U.S. Review Team declined to be interviewed. However, the U.S. Review Team did review the published accounts of witnesses who declined to be interviewed by the Team (see Chapter 4).

VI. U.S. and ROK cooperation

The Army and the Department of Defense worked in close cooperation with the government of the ROK (see Appendix E for details). There were a number of bi-lateral information exchanges and country visits. Selected members of the U.S. Review Team visited the ROK on five occasions, including one visit with Secretary of the Army and the U.S. Outside Experts in January 2000. On three of the five visits, members of the U.S. Review Team held meetings with members of the survivor groups. Additionally, survivors met with Department of Defense officials in the United States in November of 1999. During the January 2000 visit, the Secretary of the Army met with several high- level ROK government officials, including President Kim and Minister of National Defense Cho, and heard the personal accounts of six No Gun Ri survivors. The ROK Investigation Team (ROK Review Team) visited the Inspector General Review Team six times, including a visit in May 2000 with the ROK Outside Experts.

The U.S. Review Team provided the ROK Review Team with copies of all relevant documents and other information discovered in the course of the Review in support of its parallel investigation. On two occasions, the U.S. Review Team supported working visits by a ROK Review Team researcher to the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. The U.S. Review Team provided full access to, and funded reproduction costs of, any research materials that had already been gathered by the U.S. researchers. No information was withheld.

A list of key events and milestones in the conduct of the Review is at Enclosure 7.

VII. Organization of the report

The report consists of an Executive Summary, five chapters, and five appendices. The Executive Summary contains the background, methodology, and key issues and findings found in detail elsewhere in the report. Chapter 1 (Introduction) outlines the purpose of, and the background behind, the conduct of the review and provides a general description of the contents of the report. Chapter 2 (Background and History) describes the ground events unfolding on the Korean peninsula in July 1950. This contextual tapestry, while broad in scope, provides important historical context. This picture is critical to a full understanding of the events leading up to what occurred in late July 1950 in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (several period photographs are inserted between Chapters 2 and 3). Chapter 3 (Combat Operations in July 1950) brings the events into sharper focus. This chapter derives from the U.S. Review Team's extensive archival research.

Chapter 3 opens with an examination of the state of U.S. intelligence and U.S. ground forces in July 1950. There follows a day-by-day account of the tactical operations of the 1st Cavalry Division in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during that last week of July 1950. This chapter includes research on U.S. and allied air operations in the Yongdong-Hwanggan area for the same time period. Chapter 4 (Analysis of Interview Data) discusses the analysis of both American and Korean witnesses' interview data. The review of witness statements identifies areas of consensus between statements and outlines possible sequences of events. Finally, Chapter 5 (Key Issue Analysis and Findings) synthesizes the analysis of documentary research and witness interviews (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) into a fact-based analysis.

The appendices supplement the material in the main body of the report. Appendix A (Research Methodology) documents in detail the methodology used in the research of the historical records. Appendix B (Forensic Evidence) provides the analysis of the forensic evidence collected at the No Gun Ri site. This appendix contains a forensic pathology analysis of the USAF reconnaissance photograph taken of the No Gun Ri area on August 6, 1950. This appendix also includes the assessments of the Korean analysis of the ballistic evidence conducted by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Appendix C (Imagery Analysis) contains the analysis of the August 6, 1950, USAF reconnaissance photograph performed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). This appendix includes the NIMA response to the ROK Investigation Team's questions concerning this analysis. Appendix D (Joint Cooperation) discusses the actions taken to ensure a cooperative and coordinated effort between the ROK and U.S. Review Teams, including joint meetings and the exchange of documents and other information. Appendix E (Supporting Documents) contains a U.S. Air Force mission summary diagram and the tactical maps.

In this report, the terms "civilians" and "refugees" are used. For the purpose of this report, refugee is defined as a person who is fleeing to a place of safety; implied within that definition is that a refugee is an innocent person. During the Korean War, NKPA soldiers infiltrated refugee columns, and collaborators or persons assisting the NKPA were also in refugee parties. The NKPA collaborators and soldiers dressed in civilian clothing so that they could pass as refugees traveling through U.S. forces' lines. Therefore, the term civilian is used if it could not be determined that the civilians being described were "refugees" as defined above. If the sentence or paragraph is a quotation, a reference to a witness statement, or a document that used the word refugee, the word refugee is used.

The U.S. Review Team conducted this review fully aware of the political, military, and emotional significance of the allegations. This report describes events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun RI in July 1950, and places them in their historical context. The report is not a point-by-point refutation of the media and Korean accounts. Earlier efforts notwithstanding, this review and report started from a clean slate. It presents an independent assessment of the facts derived directly from the exhaustive review of primary textual sources, the testimony of U.S. veterans, the statements of Korean witnesses, ballistic analysis, and forensic and imagery analysis of overhead reconnaissance photographs.

VIII. Key issues

The U.S. Review Team, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Group, U.S. Outside Experts, and our counterparts from the Republic of Korea, identified the following key issues during the review. The report provided a response to each issue.

Condition of U.S. forces in July 1950

U.S. and ROK Refugee Control Policies

Tactical Situation July 22-29, 1950

Assembly and Movement of Villagers

Air Strikes in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri

Ground Fire in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri

Issuance of Orders to Fire on Refugees

Number of Korean Deaths and Injuries

These key issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Key Issue Analysis and Findings.

Enclosure 1 (Memo from Cohen to Caldeira)

Enclosure 2 (Memo from Cohen to Caldeira)

Enclosure 3 (Memo from Caldeira to Army inspector general)

Enclosure 4

Concept Plan

1. Phase I ­ Preparation.

a. Task organize the Inspections Division into two teams: a Research Team to conduct historical research and collect documentary data and an Interview Team to identify, interview, and obtain statements from witnesses. Supplement teams with other experts as required.

b. Meet with ROK counterparts to coordinate the effort.

c. Determine resources required for both personnel and funding.

d. Coordinate with agencies to review classified and unclassified records from all appropriate military and civilian archival repositories, to include veterans organizations, prior claims, and media accounts.

e. Conduct necessary training about Korean history and culture.

f. Develop a reference library and database to capture information pertaining to personnel and events for cross-referencing and analysis.

g. Establish a website and toll-free number.

2. Phase II ­ Research and Interviews.

a. Collect personnel rosters, unit operational logs and maps, and other relevant documents from all appropriate military and civilian archival repositories. Build upon existing research by Center of Military History and the Associated Press.

b. Identify, locate, and contact witnesses. Conduct initial telephonic interviews to assess the relevance of the information. Conduct face-to-face interviews with witnesses following this initial screening as appropriate.

c. Follow leads to other persons / sources identified as the result of public outreach efforts and during the course of research / interviews.

3. Phase III ­ Review and Analysis.

a. Provide a comprehensive laydown of the operational and tactical situations and the detailed disposition and composition of units in and around No Gun Ri in July 1950.

b. Provide In Progress Reviews (IPR) as required to the OSD Steering Group and the invited Outside Experts.

c. Draft a fair and objective analysis of the historical facts.

d. Exchange information with Republic of Korea (ROK) counterparts.

4. Phase IV ­ Produce Final Report. Produce a written report for public release that reflects a complete and comprehensive account, as best as can be determined, of what occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

Enclosure 5

U.S. Review Organization

Office of the Secretary of Defense No Gun Ri Review Steering Group

Honorable Rudy de Leon, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Office of the Secretary of Defense No Gun Ri Review Steering Group - former USD (P&R)

Honorable Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) / Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Honorable James M. Bodner, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas A. Dworkin, Acting Department of Defense General Counsel

Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Honorable Patrick T. Henry (Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower & Reserve Affairs)

Honorable Charles Blanchard, Army General Counsel

U.S. Outside Experts

Ambassador Donald Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and Chairman of the Board of the Korea Society

Honorable Paul ("Pete") McCloskey, Jr., former member of Congress from California and Korean War veteran (United States Marine Corps)

Honorable Michael O'Callaghan, former governor of the State of Nevada and Korean War veteran (United States Army)

Robert W. Riscassi, General, United States Army, Retired, former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, former Commander in Chief, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

B.E. Trainor, Lieutenant General, United States Marine Corps, Retired, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council of Foreign Relations, Associate, Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School and Korean War veteran

Young Oak Kim, Colonel, United States Army, Retired, served as a junior officer with the Japanese-American 442nd Regimental Combat Team during World War II and commanded the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, during the Korean War.

Dr. Ernest R. May, Charles Warren Professor of American History, Kennedy School, Harvard University

Mr. Don Oberdorfer, Nitze School of Advanced and International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Army veteran with service in the Republic of Korea

Enclosure 6

Inspector General Review Team Organization

The Inspector General

Review Team Chief

Research Team Chief

Interview Team Chief

Assistant Team Chief

Assistant Team Chief

Operations Officer

Operations Officer

Review Team Historian

Information Officer

Researcher / Information Officer

Database Officer in Charge

Researcher / Admin Officer

Resource Planner

Researcher / Resource Officer

Database NCO

Team Non-commissioned Officer

Legal Advisor

Additional Research Experts from USACE, USAF Interviewer St. Louis District, Technical Services Branch

USAF Historians and Research Experts

U.S. Army Korean Language Translator

INSCOM Imagery Analyst

Other DOD and Non-DOD agency support as required

Other contract support as required (e.g., conference interpreters, translation services, topographic engineering).

Enclosure 7

Key Events

Sep 29, 99: Associated Press releases initial article on alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

Sep 30, 99: Secretary of Defense tasks Secretary of the Army to lead a review for Department of Defense to determine the full scope of the facts surrounding press reports of civilian deaths near No Gun Ri

Oct 15, 99: Secretary of Defense directs the establishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Committee and the consultations with Outside Experts

Oct 25, 99: Secretary of the Army directs The Inspector General to conduct a full and comprehensive review of the facts concerning the No Gun Ri Bridge incident; Designates the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) (ASA (M&RA)) to oversee effort as the senior Army representative to the Steering Group

Oct 27, 99: United States Corps of Engineers' Ordnance & Technical Services Branch begins research at National Personnel Records Center (St. Louis)

Oct 29, 99: U.S. Review Team visits ROK: bilateral discussions; site visit; and meets the survivors

Nov 2, 99: Steering Group meeting; Luncheon with Steering Group and Outside Experts

Nov 3, 99: Began research at National Archives

Nov 8, 99: Secretary of Army In Process Review

Nov 12, 99: Survivors visit U.S. and meet with Department of Defense officials

Nov 16, 99: Brief to Senate Armed Services Committee

Nov 19, 99: Brief to House Veterans Affairs Committee & House Armed Services Committee

Nov 22, 99: The Inspector General brief to Veterans Organizations

Nov 23, 99: The Inspector General brief to U.S. / ROK Security Consultative Meeting

Dec 10, 99: The Inspector General brief to U.S. Outside Experts

Dec 14, 99: 2nd U.S. Review Team visit to ROK: bilateral discussions

Jan 10-14, 00: Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Group, Outside Experts visit ROK: meet with survivors

Feb 3, 00: Department of Defense brief to House and Senate Armed Services Committees

Feb 23, 00: ROK / U.S. Bilateral Coordination Group Meeting

Feb 28, 00: The Inspector General brief to Veterans Organizations

Feb 28, 00: Began Category I interviews

Mar 21, 00: The Inspector General brief to U.S. Outside Experts

Apr 16-20, 00: U.S. Review Team trip to ROK: bilateral discussions, information exchange, site visit, meet with survivors

May 2-3, 00: ROK / U.S. Outside Experts' Bilateral Meetings, Washington, D.C.

Jun 30, 00: Completed Textual Research

Jul 31- Aug 4, 00 ROK-U.S. Working Group meeting in ROK

Sep 27-29, 00 ROK and U.S. Review Team meeting in Washington, D.C.

Oct 17, 00 U.S. Outside Experts briefing in Washington, D.C.

Nov 3 and 6, 00 ROK-U.S. Review Team Working Group meeting in Washington, D.C.

Nov 6, 00 Bilateral Coordinating Group meeting in Washington, D.C.

Nov 28, 00 U.S. Outside Experts meet with Steering Group

Dec 6 and 7, 00 Steering Group Meeting in ROK

Endnotes

1 In keeping with more common usage, the term "Korean War" will be used throughout this report instead of the term "Korean Conflict."

2 Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1999 page 79.

3 Sang-Hun Choe, Charles Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, "Bridge at No Gun Ri," Associated Press Special Report September 29, 1999.

4 Won Ki Hong, letter ("Petition") to President Clinton, October 27, 1999.

5 Histories, archival records, and media reports record other incidents in which civilians were killed during the Korean Conflict. Witnesses in this review also referenced incidents that did not occur in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team was directed to review the events that allegedly occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. In spite of this fact that the focus of this review is the No Gun Ri incident, the Review Team noted other incidents revealed during the review process.

6 United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea, letter to Chongju District Compensation Committee, October 6, 1997.

7 United States Army Center of Military History, Memo February 17, 1999 "Allegations Concerning Deaths of Innocent Villagers During the Korean War."

8 ROK National Defense Military Research Institute (War History Department), dated 13 July 1994, subject: Nogun-ri Accident Review (Report).

Chapter 2 - Background and history

The background information required to explore in detail the early events of the Korean War in July 1950 includes an examination of the readiness of the U.S. Army in 1950; the refugee policy the U.S. forces developed in response to the unexpectedly complex battlefield that the Army faced; the U.S. Army's battlefield experiences in the first weeks of the conflict; and the enemy, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), with whom the U.S. Army clashed in those early days. The U.S. Army rushed into the midst of a rapidly developing North Korean invasion of South Korea with little notice, a new and hitherto unknown enemy, and a complex battlefield rife with civilian refugees who, unlike refugees commonly encountered in World War II, posed a potentially severe threat to the soldiers. Each of these dynamic factors affected the U.S. Army's perform- ance and fundamental behavior in the opening weeks of the Korean War.

I. Post-World War II Korea

Syngman Rhee became the ROK's first elected president on August 15, 1948, and less than one month later, Kim IL Sung proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea throughout North Korea. A series of uprisings proved that the Rhee government was not as popular as it professed. The Soviets soon withdrew their troops from the North, and the American military followed suit in the South in June 1949. The U.S. Army left behind a small force for the training of the South Korean Army called the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).1 With the Americans gone, the North Korean Communist regime now felt that 1949 could become the year of victory and reunification. Kim ordered a major guerrilla offensive in 1949, but the guerrillas were too widely scattered, lacked communications, failed to rally a significant proportion of the rural population, and faced a ROK military designed for counterinsurgency operations. Rhee's victory did not come cheaply, though. Some 100,000 Koreans lost their lives in this insurgency and counterinsurgency, the first Korean civil war.2 Cross-border raids and probes continued throughout 1949. The South often initiated these raids and usually suffered the worst for their efforts. Tensions on the peninsula continued to grow.

II. U.S. combat readiness in 1950

In 1950, the United States Army's combat readiness did not match the abilities of the NKPA, who regularly bested in combat the U.S. Army troops that deployed from Japan to defend the Republic of Korea in July 1950. Staff officers dispatched from the United States to Korea to observe the Eighth Army's operations reported significant training, personnel, equipment, and leadership deficiencies.3 The Army's difficulties in Korea resulted from a significant imbalance between the resources provided to the Army and the numerous occupation, research, and training

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assistance missions it was assigned. These missions showed that the President and much of Congress were convinced that America had to remain significantly engaged with the rest of the world if the U.S. was to avoid what many believed were mistakes made after World War I that, in turn, led to World War II.4 Expectations about future wars also affected the resources provided to the Army.

Between 1946 and 1950, one scenario dominated both civilian and military thinking about America's next war: World War III with the Soviet Union. The President and many in Congress hoped that the Strategic Air Command, armed with atomic bombs, would deter the Soviet Union from even starting such a war. Resultantly, the President and Congress tended to favor the Air Force over the other services when allocating funds and expressed little interest in the readiness of the Army for immediate combat.5

III. The Eighth Army's readiness in occupied Japan

The Department of the Army's Inspector General in March 1949 found that occupation duties, inadequate funding, and high levels of personnel turnover had had such deleterious effects upon Eighth Army's readiness that the "depletion of combat units in Japan is so widespread as to make the conception of a four division military force an illusion."6 The next month, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in- Chief, Far East Command (FEC), directed that Eighth Army's four divisions begin a progressive training schedule designed to make them combat-effective units. Company- level training was to be completed by December 1949, battalion level by May 1950, regimental level by July 1950, and division level by December 1950. Also in June 1949, Eighth Army established a new method of evaluating and reporting unit readiness.7 Eighth Army forecasted three obstacles to effective unit training. The most im- portant was the steady flow of officers and enlisted men trained in their specialty to replace personnel returning to the United States after completing their tour in Japan. Another problem was a shortage of equipment such as mortars, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, howitzers, and recoilless rifles. Finally, there was a shortage of adequate training areas located near the units; some units had to travel up to 200 miles to find sufficient maneuver training space.8 Eighth Army's unit readiness evaluation, computed at the end of September 1949, revealed significant progress. Under Eighth Army's scores, the 1st Cavalry Division remained the highest ranked of the four divisions. The 25th Infantry Division followed next with the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions in third and fourth place respectively.9 Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of Eighth Army, rated his command at 55.2% overall effectiveness and wrote that the "substantial progress made by the units of Eighth Army in their efforts to obtain Combat Effectiveness is considered gratifying."10 Insufficient maneuver and range areas, however, continued to affect training seriously, most noticeably in the 1st Cavalry Division.11 This division had only one area available to conduct combat firing exercises.12

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IV. Changes in the Army's force structure

The Army's one-third cut in the authorized strength of divisions would certainly affect combat effectiveness. This strength reduction forced the four Eighth Army divisions in Japan not to fill certain units. Within each division, each of the three infantry regiments (except the 24th Infantry Regiment) lost one of its three battalions, and both the tank company and the counter-fire platoon were cut. Also cut from the divisions was one of the three firing batteries in each of the four field artillery battalions. The antiaircraft artillery battalion lost two of its three firing batteries, and the divisional tank battalion was reduced to one company.13

These cuts to the divisions' structure had other implications besides the loss of manpower. Army tactical doctrine was based on the rule of three. In both the offense and the defense, the standard tactic involved committing two subordinate units and keeping the third as a reserve, something a regimental commander could no longer do with only two battalions. Additionally, without his tank company, the regimental commander lost his most effective tank-killing system. The loss of one-third of the division's field artillery batteries also significantly weakened the division's firepower.14 Likewise, no doctrine existed to guide commanders in how to conduct operations with their newly reduced structure.

V. The Eighth Army's readiness challenges in early 1950

Eighth Army in June 1950 not only lacked many of the units required by American doctrine but its equipment and supplies, save for food and medicines, were mainly of World War II vintage. Therefore, much unit equipment by 1950 was worn and required extensive maintenance. Almost all on-hand ammunition had been produced during World War II and much of it had been improperly stored since the end of the war, resulting in a significantly higher dud rate than normal.15 In addition, units in Japan did not receive the 3.5-inch anti-tank rocket launcher to replace the less effective 2.36-inch version used in World War II. The standard tank for the U.S. Army was the M46 Patton, but limited production meant that some armor units had either the obsolescent M4E8 Sherman or the limited standard M26 Pershing.16 Given the budget and force structure limits placed upon it, the Army had no choice but to man its overseas garrisons by individual rotation, which resulted in an average annual personnel turnover rate of approximately 40%.17 By June 1950, the active-duty enlisted force sat at 98.8% for the Regular Army, but enlistments lagged behind requirements. The Army was also short of junior officers. These shortfalls left the Army in June 1950 approximately 37,000 soldiers short of its authorized active-duty strength.18 Problems of personnel quality as well as quantity also existed. Specialized advanced individual training did not exist for most new soldiers in the combat arms between 1946 and 1950. After a branch-immaterial basic training, they joined their units; the Army then expected the units to provide the required advanced training. Furthermore,

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a number of battalion, regimental, and division commanders had spent most of their careers in staff and administrative positions and commanded units more because of seniority than because of demonstrated leadership proficiency.19 The Army of June 1950 had focused on combat readiness for little more than a year, not enough time to overcome all the effects of demobilization and occupation duty. Furthermore, the war in 1950 became the war that neither the Army nor the nation had expected to fight. The fact that the United States suffered heavy casualties and serious reverses on the battlefield during July 1950 comes as no surprise.

VI. The North Korean invasion of June 25, 1950

The NKPA surged across the 38th parallel in pouring rain during the early morning hours of June 25, 1950. One-half of the ROK Army was on leave that Sunday morning, a fact that contradicts theories that a northern response to a southern probe ignited the war. South Korea had been caught flat-footed and began to fall back, but the South Korean Army did not disintegrate. Once he became convinced that the attack marked something other than a cross-border thrust, President Truman and his administration acted swiftly and decisively. Less than 24 hours after the invasion, the President convened his closest advisors and ordered immediate American air and naval support for the ROK. The blatant nature of this invasion galvanized the President, Congress, and the nation. If anything, the United Nations responded off the mark to the North Korean invasion. On the day of the war's outbreak (Eastern Standard Time), the UN Security Council simply condemned the attack as "a breach of the peace" and demanded that the DPRK's forces withdraw from the ROK "forthwith." The Korean War was a United Nations' war prosecuted under the auspices of the unified (or combined) United Nations Command (UNC) headed, until April 1951, by General Douglas MacArthur. Ultimately, 22 member states of the UN contributed to the UNC cause with no less than 16 actually supplying combat troops and several UN nations supplying air and naval forces.20 All of this support proved inadequate in the first weeks of the war. ROK forces disastrously lost Seoul on June 29, and General MacArthur, after a reconnaissance of the area, concluded that only American ground troops could save the situation. The result was to commit the first U.S. soldiers to see action against enemy ground troops since World War II: Task Force Smith. However, Task Force Smith would encounter not only a strong NKPA, but also a growing refugee problem that developed in the combat area of operations. This problem soon demanded the Allies' immediate attention and the introduction of policies designed to cope with this unexpected battlefield conundrum.

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VII. The refugee situation in July 1950

The refugee crisis, the mass of humanity flowing away from the combat zones, enhanced the NKPA's ability to exploit the U.S. and UN forces' diminished capacity to distinguish friend from foe. The refugee situation was the NKPA's first true combat multiplier in the early stages of the war. Infiltrating NKPA soldiers, routinely dressed as civilians, created an air of confusion and concern for the U.S. and UN forces. A variety of methods and directives were employed to control not only the refugee situation but also the potential tactical threat these refugees posed to the UN forces. Following the North Korean cross-border assault on June 25, the civilian popula tion quickly left their homes to escape the fighting. Refugees clogged roadways en masse, carrying personal items both by hand and pushcart to flee the combat zones. This enormous human exodus created significant problems for the UN forces. The G-1 (Personnel) Summary of the 24th Infantry Division War Diary for July 23-August 25,1950, states that: "One of the greatest problems encountered was control of refugees...The extent of this problem is difficult to describe; often a refugee concentration would contain 30-40,000 people plus cattle, horses, carts, etc."21 UN forces could not move supplies, equipment, or personnel effectively when fleeing refugees obstructed the roads. Not only did refugees clog the major road networks, but the refugees also became a mechanism for North Korean infiltration. The U.S. forces recognized that they had to control the movement of refugees.

VIII. The first refugee policies

One of the first policy documents to discuss controlling refugee movement was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23,1950. Movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only; no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways; no fields could be worked; no schools, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort; and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive. The National Police would collect all refu gees from the countryside and highway and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel, including an attached Korean CIC Team, would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening.22 On July, 24,1950, when refugees appeared in the Division Command Post area,1st Cavalry Division personnel loaded refugees on trains headed for Kumchon. Upon arrival, the CIC interrogated the refugees and detained the suspicious ones. The remaining refugees were told to continue south. The 1st Cavalry Division dropped leaflets on small villages in the area, telling the people to move north because the U.S. forces would treat them as the enemy if refugees occupied the combat area.23

On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Par ticipants from the Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police,

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United Nations, and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement.24 As a result of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950:

Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be assigned three Na tional Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National Police will immediately clear the area. Food, wa ter, and comfort items for these refugees will be provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.

Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups in battle ar eas or rear areas, after the hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive.

Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this information. National Police will further disseminate this infor mation to all Korean civilians by means of radio, messenger, and the press.25

On July 27, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker's Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions CIC teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees:

To ensure compliance with South Korean Government regulations governing the flow of refugee travel and to assist in proper exploitation by this Division, CIC teams will:

a. Maintain daily contact and coordinate with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies charged by the Korean Government with operation and control of refugee movements.

b. Maintain surveillance and inspection of police and South Korean Army refugee check points determining and reporting on sufficiency and efficiency of manning personnel.

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c. Insure [sic] the normal flow of arrestees from police to South Korean Army control. Refugees of intelligence value must be made available for G-2 ex ploitation before local disposal.

d. Screen, check and interrogate detainees indicated by preliminary po lice and South Korean Army interrogations to be of counter intelligence value.

e. Conduct spot checks to insure [sic] that all prisoners and detainees of counter intelligence value are made available to CIC interrogators by the police and / or South Korean Army.

f. High level NK agents as discovered, will be made available to Army G-2 for further interrogation and CINCFE disposition.

g. Check and report on curfew regulations and enforcement.26

The refugee problem was clearly widespread and not restricted to any one division's area of operations. For example, during the last week of July, the 25th Infantry Division, located north of the 1st Cavalry Division, was being strongly pressed by NKPA forces. The 25th Infantry Division Activities Report for July 27, 1950, in a paragraph on civil affairs and military government, reiterates the refugee policy:

A message was sent to the Commanding Officers of all front line units concern ing refugees and Korean civilians within the combat zone. In addition to the in formation and previous instructions in regards to this problem, the Commanding Officers were again told of the seriousness of this condition and that all levels would take drastic action to prevent movement of all Korean personnel into and within the combat zone. Civilians moving within the combat zone would be con sidered as enemy.27

Leaflets provided one method of conveying the theater policy on refugee move ment to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulates that the leaflets would read as follows:

Effective immediately, civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines.

The aggressor has been taking advantage of such movement to smuggle sol diers through, disguised as civilians.

Civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated when the UN Commanding Officers consider it advisable. Any such evacuation will be under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police. When such an evacuation has been approved, you will be told which roads to follow and where to go. You will move only by daylight. No one will move at night.

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These orders will be rigidly enforced by the National Police in order to protect the security of the armies of the Republic and of the United Nations.

If you are not told to evacuate by the authorities, be calm and remain in your homes. Confusion helps only the Communist aggressors.28

IX. Initial confusion and the soldier's view of the refugee problem

The average soldier arriving in Korea knew little about the country's people, culture, or beliefs. Rumors about North Korean tactics and problems with refugees undoubtedly fueled the soldiers' imaginations long before their first contact with the enemy and the populace. Likewise, many U.S. officers arrived in Korea lacking insight into the country and the situation at hand. Harold J. Noble, the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, wrote in his book Embassy at War that newly arriving American officers displayed an "astonishing amount of contempt for the ROK Army." Noble claimed Major General Hobart Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commander, newly arrived in Korea, told a press conference that "he did not intend to take the ROK Army into consideration at all in making his estimates and dispositions and that his solution for the Communist's infiltration tactics was to force every Korean out of the division's area of responsibility, on the theory that once they were removed, any Korean caught in the area would be an enemy agent." Noble also said Gay's "order included the Korean National police, whom he sent back to Taegu." Whatever General Gay might have said when he first arrived in Korea, there is no evidence that he put any of these ideas into practice. His official policy on handling refugees dated July 23, 1950 (described earlier) made the National Police the responsible authority for handling refugees.29 The 8th Cavalry Regiment War Diary contains an entry for 10:00 AM on July 24 that reads as follows: "No refugees to cross the front lines. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."30 The source of the message was a telephone call to the 8th Cavalry Regimental headquarters from an 8th Cavalry Regiment officer (staff officer, not a commander) working in the 1st Cavalry Division operations section as a liaison officer to the division headquarters from his regiment. A search of documents did not reveal a similar entry in the records of the other regiments (the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments) in the division. As outlined above, the Eighth Army issued its own expanded refugee policy on July 26, 1950. The entry in the regimental diary was not an order but more likely the liaison officer's misinterpretation of the Eighth Army's soon to be published guidance which stated, "No, repeat, no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time, movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately." This policy also announced the assignment of three National Police officers to each division to act as liaison officers to assist in carrying out the new policy. Within 48 hours of the misleading regimental diary entry, on July 26th, the 1st Cavalry Division received the detailed Eighth Army refugee control policy, which clarified and superceded the 8th Cavalry Regiment's liaison officer's initial misinterpretation. There is no evidence that this misinterpretation was ever passed down from the Division Headquarters to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments,

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the subordinate battalions of the 8th Cavalry or any other units assigned to the division. The reality of the situation on the ground was daunting for the soldiers charged with implementing the 1st Cavalry Division's refugee policy. Perhaps the most descriptive account of the refugee problem appears in a monograph entitled "Civilian Control in South Korea" written by Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Powhida, who was assigned to the 1st Cavalry and Division G-3 (Operations) section during the early days of the war. This monograph was incorporated into Training Bulletin No. 3, Lessons Learned in Korea, published by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), November 28, 1950. The following excerpt captures the nature of the refugee problem that the division faced:

On or about the 21st [July 1950,] the 1st Cavalry Division moved over through Yomgchu through Teague up to Yong Dong. All along this route fleeing refugees interfered with our move. In some instances refugees were hit and killed by our vehicles. It seemed as though the countryside was alive and on the move in all directions. Communists in Allied territory were giving false information to villagers to start them on their way along the narrow rocky roads causing the retarding of all Allied movement of vehicles.

Combat Phase

Once the Division was in the lines and readying for their first battle civilians came pouring through the battle positions. At this time, this officer was assigned as liaison with two of our regiments with headquarters in Yong Dong. Arriving at this town I immediately contacted the police chief -- the only city official remaining in town. I asked him how many police he had. He informed me [that he had] ninety. I told him to divide them and disperse them in the areas of our battalions in the line. He promised to do so. He was instructed to get his police to move the refugees down trails, off highways, onto a rail bed and direct them to Kumchon where we would arrange for their screening and evacuation. Later the police chief was to meet me in a village on our left flank for control of refugees there. This plan was temporary and it was about fifty percent effective.

The masses of refugees straining through and pouring down the highways into our positions caused grave concern to everyone in the Division. It was obviously a civil affairs problem but our Division staff was not augmented by a civil affairs section.

Due to my World War II training and experiences I sat down and drew up a plan for controlling civilian circulation. After a study by my section chief, the G-2 and Chief of Staff, the plan was approved and in addition to my other duties I was given the responsibility of refugee control. All steps outlined were immediately put into effect. The machinery outlined screened some 50,000 refugees in about a week.31

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The introduction to this same monograph serves as an excellent summary of refugee control issues during the early days of the war:

Under present conditions of war in South Korea, especially in the combat zone, the civilian control is a paramount problem to the fighting forces. The problem stems from the following facts:

1. Allied withdrawal instead of moving forward.

2. Weak village and city governments (lack [of] people's confidence).

3. Weak police force (corrupt) and weak in enforcing the law.

4. An illiterate populace.

5. Communist elements creating confusion in Allied area of occupation.

6. Distrust of government officials.

7. Infiltration of North Korean agents and troops in civilian garb through Allied lines disguised as refugees.

8. The inability of the Allies to tell the difference between a South Korean and a North Korean.

9. The make-up of the Oriental mind is such that it is difficult to determine whether the populace in [the] Allied zone of operation is with them or against them.

10. No trained personnel in civil affairs or military government [is] with [the] fighting forces.

11. Due to the piecemeal commitment, the 24th Division did not have time nor personnel to cope with the problem of controlling the civilians. This was also true of the 25th Division.32

This refugee problem profoundly affected the U.S. Army's behavior in the early weeks of the Korean War. In fact, the first few weeks of the Korean War exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed earlier in this chapter. But one factor that truly caught the U.S. troops by surprise early in the war was the stark reality of dealing with refugees who clogged and complicated the battlefield to a hitherto unknown, and unexpected, degree.

X. The first weeks of the war

Task Force (TF) Smith (1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Division) was rushed from Japan to the rice paddies and exhausting hills of Korea. Although TF Smith's men fought well (they were in very good physical condition), they could only delay, not stop, the NKPA onslaught.33 The UNC fought a series of delaying actions, losing each one but buying time for the arrival of more troops and equipment from the U.S. and its UN allies. The worst defeat at this stage of the war occurred at Taejon, where the NKPA's 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions mauled the shaky U.S. 24th Infantry Division and the 19th and 34th Infantry Regiments. The 24th's commanding general, Major General William Dean, promised General Walker that his division would hold the North Koreans for two days at Taejon,

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giving Walker desperately needed time to bring the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division on line. Cohesion fell apart in the planned retreat from Taejon. Troops straggled and be came lost in the hills and paddy fields. But Walker now had his extra day when each day counted. Taejon saw the last deployment of significant numbers of NKPA armor and was probably the last time the Korean People's Army Air Force supported ground combat. The battles at Osan, Pyongtaek, the Kum River, Kongju, and Taejon were all obvious U.S. defeats but had their redeeming consequences: they bought time. Meanwhile, UNC air power took an increasing toll of NKPA equipment and personnel. Within a matter of days, the UNC achieved control of the air over both North and South Korea, and the command's sea power patrolled the entire peninsula's coasts. The North Koreans pushed the UNC ground troops out of one defensive position after another. The NKPA employed stereotypical tactics that seemed to work most of the time: the NKPA's troops would fix a UNC position in front and then attack along the flanks, cutting off all retreat routes. The NKPA also employed the unnerving tactic of deploying some of its troops in civilian garb to fight as infiltrators and guerrillas behind the porous UNC lines. Others were South Koreans press-ganged into the NKPA with out the niceties of a uniform.34

The ROK forces and the U.S. Army continued their retreat. Few Americans would have taken comfort in the knowledge that the NKPA was, considering its excellent heavy equipment and its iron discipline, perhaps the best army in the world at the time. The NKPA boasted a motorized, armor-tipped, fast-moving force with modest air cover and mobile heavy artillery.35 The war progressed almost entirely in favor of the NKPA. The 24th Infantry Divi sion lost a significant amount of equipment, particularly in the battle for Taejon. The thrifty North Koreans picked up and used this abandoned equipment. These steady withdrawals and defeats dispirited the U.S. troops. Many argued that the troops were exhausted and often suffering from dysentery contracted from water in the rice paddies. The summer of 1950 also proved one of the hottest in generations. But the NKPA troops operated in continuous combat from the beginning of the invasion in the same heat and with minimal air protection and artillery support. The Army did not settle for excuses but instead dispatched a team of high ranking officers from Headquarters Army Ground Forces to South Korea soon after the Taejon defeat to discover what went wrong and why. The Team's report proved damn ing: Like all green troops, they magnified the strength of the enemy, and tended to become panicky and stampede when small hostile groups got in their rear...Infantry troops were specifically deficient in...aggressiveness in counter-attack, steadiness under fire, [and] confidence in their own weap ons...Lack of leadership in regimental and subordinate echelons was often

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evident, in both field and company grades, and among the non commissioned officers. The report also stated that the troops had been committed piecemeal into com bat after inadequate training. In addition, officers proved to be the least prepared for combat.36 The only bright spot at the time is the fact that Eighth Army developed such an unvarnished account of its own shortcomings without excuses or special pleadings.

The NKPA hardly paused after its victory at Taejon. The North Koreans' excel lent 6th Division moved rapidly down the western coastal road net, and UNC intelligence basically lost or misidentified them. The battered and weary 24th U.S. Division, with no time to replace its devastating losses in men and materiel, received orders on July 24 to block the NKPA force in the Chinju area. The following day, the division's 19th Infantry Regiment took the Hadong road junction 35 miles southwest of Chinju and departed the following morning. On July 27, the newly arrived and completely untested motorized 3rd Battalion of the 29th Infantry (which had no time to calibrate rifles, test-fire, or clean the cosmoline from their weapons) was ambushed at the Hadong Pass and suffered the heaviest casualties in any single engagement of any U.S. Army unit of the Korean War. The same day, when the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, moved north from Chinju toward Anui to replace the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, the NKPA's 4th Division badly shot up B and C companies of the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. In all, on that day of "aggressive defense", the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29th Infantry suffered 618 casualties. When American forces overran the area in late September, the soldiers discovered the bodies of some 313 American troops.37 These descriptions of a U.S. Army on the run in the early days of the Korean War effectively illustrate the Army's initial combat experiences in the Korean War. In a matter of days, the NKPA bloodied the soldiers' noses in several critical battles. This pattern of events continued until early August, when the Army finally showed signs of standing firm in the face of the NKPA's extremely effective battlefield tactics.

XI. The North Korean People's Army in 1950

The U.S. Army faced an opponent, the NKPA, who used a mix of tactics familiar and unfamiliar to American soldiers. The NKPA, like the U.S. Army, practiced conventional combined-arms warfare, tactics that combined infantry, artillery, and tanks. Unlike the U.S. Army, the NKPA also relied heavily on infiltration tactics, the practice of slipping groups of soldiers through enemy lines to gather intelligence, to attack artillery positions and supply points, and to block roads. The NKPA routinely sought to increase the effectiveness of both their combined-arms attacks and their infiltration efforts through the extensive exploitation of civilians on the battlefield. These efforts, by forcing civilians to move into enemy positions ahead of conventional attacks and by using civilian refugees as cover for infiltration, often proved very effective during July 1950 and created serious tactical problems for American units. The success and effectiveness of the NKPA to this point was a direct result of their development; their effective leadership; and the time-tested, Soviet-style tactics they employed on the battlefield.

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Officially activated in February 1948, the NKPA grew rapidly during the next 29 months; by June 1950 the NKPA boasted a fighting strength of approximately 116,400, with 10 infantry divisions and a tank brigade as its major combat elements. North Korea also had a paramilitary Border Constabulary of approximately 18,600 men; this force could conduct limited combat operations and serve as the cadre to form additional NKPA divisions.38 Normally a new army expanded this quickly would face severe problems in creat ing and sustaining tactical skill among the tens of thousands of men conscripted beginning in the summer of 1948. During July 1950, however, many NKPA units demonstrated high levels of tactical skill on the battlefield. A major reason for the success of the NKPA was that approximately one-third of its strength comprised ethnic Koreans who had served with the Chinese Communist forces during the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Communists allowed these men to return to North Korea, where they were immediately incorporated into the NKPA; eleven of the 21 infantry regiments that invaded South Korea mainly comprised these veterans. Additionally, these veterans filled many of the key leadership positions in other units of the NKPA.39 These veterans, along with the thousands of conscripts, benefited from the Soviet Union's extensive assistance to the NKPA. The Soviets provided the NKPA with the weapons, equipment, and supplies needed to create a modern combined-arms force. While the heavy weapons, the tanks and artillery, supplied to North Korea far exceeded what the U.S. supplied to South Korea, they were generally older designs superseded by more modern equipment in the Soviet Army. For example, the NKPA re ceived the T34 / 85 tank instead of the IS-III tank. Several thousand Soviet advisors assisted in the creation and training of units, and a special team of officers helped the NKPA in 1950 plan the invasion of South Korea. The result of this Soviet assistance was an NKPA whose organization and tactical doctrine closely matched the World War II Soviet Army. The NKPA infantry divisions resembled Soviet rifle divisions of three in fantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and supporting units. The battalions of the NKPA's tank brigade were attached to infantry divisions to help break through enemy defenses. Following Soviet doctrine, the standard NKPA tactic in the attack was a double envelopment; while infantry supported by tanks and artillery penetrated the enemy's defenses frontally, other infantry units would move around the distracted enemy's flanks. Caught in this double envelopment, the enemy would either be destroyed or forced to withdraw with heavy losses in men and equipment. However, the NKPA lacked the large numbers of non-divisional artillery and tank units that in the Soviet Army provided significant combat power for breaking through and deeply penetrating enemy defenses.40

XII. North Korean Infiltration Tactics

Also in accordance with Soviet doctrine, the NKPA supported its combined-arms attacks with extensive infiltration efforts. Reconnaissance units infiltrated to gather intelligence about enemy positions, particularly the locations of the enemy's flanks to assist

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in envelopment attacks and the enemy's artillery positions so that NKPA artillery could suppress them with counter-battery fire. Other infiltrated units would assist envelopment attacks by hitting enemy defensive positions from the rear, destroying enemy artillery positions and supply points, and establishing road blocks that would prevent the enemy from either reinforcing its defensive line or withdrawing from that line. Infiltrated NKPA units would also attempt to contact any South Korean guerrilla forces or civilian sympathizers in the area for assistance in gathering intelligence and attacking enemy units.41 While the U.S. Army gave extensive thought to the problems of defending against combined-arms attacks, the Army paid little attention to infiltration tactics. The Army itself did not employ infiltration tactics in the offense, and its defensive doctrine barely addressed the issue and then only in the context of conducting counter-guerilla operations. In 1947, the Army established the "Aggressor" program to provide a distinctive opponent for American units during training. Like today's "Opposing Forces," the program created a fictitious enemy, the "Aggressor," complete with its own uniform and tactics. "Aggressor" tactics stressed the double envelopment as "fundamental for units from platoon to army group levels" but only mentioned infiltration as an aside in discussing the use of the submachine-gun company.42 In 1950, American units, under-strength, attempting to defend wide frontages, and without training or doctrine on infiltration tactics, quickly found the NKPA's infiltration abilities to be a formidable threat. Many U.S. veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated they had been warned about infiltrators. On July 17, Eighth Army is sued "Combat Lesson Number One," which warned that the NKPA would infiltrate troops behind American lines as individuals or in small groups. These troops would then move to an assembly area from where they would stage attacks on American positions. Depending on the depth of the infiltration and the time used to conduct the maneuver, the NKPA could build a force of "100 to 1,000 men or even more." "Combat

Lesson Number One," drawing on American doctrine for defense of wide frontages, advised Eighth Army's units to locate the infiltrators' assembly areas "promptly by aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations." Then "reserve echelons supporting front line units, particularly artillery or armored vehicles, must be promptly dispatched to the area in order to liquidate the assembled forces."43

Unfortunately for the Eighth Army, it had almost nothing in the way of "reserve echelons" in July 1950. All but one of its infantry regiments had only two of the normal three battalions; American doctrine called for the third battalion to serve as a reserve that infantry regiments could use for just this type of contingency. Eighth Army also fell short of artillery and armored vehicles. It had none of the non-divisional artillery battalions normally assigned to a field army. Its armored capability, which should have been six companies of medium tanks and a reconnaissance company of light tanks in each infantry division, instead comprised just one company of light tanks and an armored reconnaissance company in each division. These weaknesses, together with the wide frontages they attempted to hold, made American units in July 1950 particularly vulnerable to NKPA infiltration. Impressed by the effectiveness of NKPA infiltration efforts, the

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U.S. Army later in the year organized Ranger companies to provide American infantry divisions with a unit able to conduct infiltration missions.44

XIII. The NKPA's exploitation of civilians

The NKPA's exploitation of civilians on the battlefield greatly enhanced both the NKPA's combined-arms envelopment attacks and infiltration efforts. Two major forms of this exploitation existed. The first consisted of NKPA soldiers disguising themselves in traditional Korean peasant clothing to infiltrate through enemy lines. The second form consisted of NKPA soldiers forcing civilians, usually refugees attempting to flee the battlefield, to assist them either by providing cover for infiltration efforts or by moving in front of NKPA units attacking enemy positions. The U.S. Army had rarely faced such tactics during World War II and then usually in an environment where the civilians were of a different nationality from the enemy. Thus Eighth Army was not prepared psychologically for the NKPA's exploitation of Korean civilians; likewise, the army was unprepared to field the specialized military police, counter-intelligence, and civil affairs units required to counter this type of exploitation at the start of the war. During July 1950, a number of reports surfaced of NKPA soldiers disguised in traditional Korean peasant clothing attempting to infiltrate American positions either on their own or among refugee columns. Examples include:

• 24th Infantry Division Prisoner of War (PW) Interrogation, time of capture

July 7, 1950 -- "20 men are sent from each division dressed as civilian to get information on the number of men, type of weapons of the enemy before attacking."45

• A message from Headquarters Eighth United States Army (EUSA) dated July 11,

1950 -- "Reports from Korean sources state North Korean soldiers are changing into civilian clothes and coming through lines in American sector with rifles concealed under clothing. Refugees moving from front and flank must be searched to apprehend any such personnel."46

• Message No. 1 from 24th Infantry Division G-2, 122200 July 1950 -- "reports

confirmed by reliable sources indicate that North Korean troops in small groups enter homes along line of advance, reappear in civilian clothing concealing small arms and infiltrate to our flanks and rear for the purpose of harassing our troops."47

• 24th Infantry Division Counter Intelligence Corps team, July 12, 1950 -- "A

2LT in NKPA was interrogated and said he and another soldier were issued civilian clothing to wear on patrol. These were the clothing they had on at time of cap ture."48

• 25th Infantry Division memo to G-3, notes on liaison trip to U.S. Army Forces

In Korea and 24th Infantry Division, July 12-14, 1950 -- "Guerilla activity - Pot shots at single vehicles are not uncommon. En[emy] soldiers are infiltrating in civ clothes."49

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• Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) Periodic Intelligence Report No. 6,

182400 July 50 -- "...in the west sector N.K. troops entered our lines posing as peasant refugees carrying unassembled firearms and uniforms in bundles."50

• 25th Infantry Division G-3 Activities Report of July 19,1950 -- "The units

were advised to be alert for enemy disguised as peasants with weapons and uniforms in bundle. These soldiers were infiltrating behind our lines."51

• Message from Commanding General, EUSAK, dated 191435K July 1950 -- "One

report in west sector NK troops entered our lines posing as peasant refugees carrying unassembled firearms and uniforms in bundles."52

• EUSAK Periodic Intelligence Report No. 8, 202400 July 50 -- "Enemy reportedly

moved toward our lines along the tops of mountain ridges disguised as farmers whose dress is predominantly white. Women and children accompanied these groups. When the enemy reached a point adjacent to and behind friendly lines, they were equipped with arms. Upon a given signal, fire was directed from ridges upon the U.S. flanks and rear forcing the friendly forces to retire. Further to the rear the withdrawing forces were cleverly ambushed."53

• Prisoner of War interrogation by 24th ID G-2 Language Section, July 20, 1950

-- "...He and another PW like him was attached to a guerrilla unit of about twenty men. All of these soldiers were dressed in civilian clothing and their rank were not known..."54

• 25th Infantry Division Annex A (INTELLIGENCE) to Operation Order No. 8,

220030 July 1950 -- "CG 8 ROK Div has advised that persons in white clothing seen frequently on the tops of the hills adjacent to MSR's and other routes are not friendly. He advised immediate remedial action be taken to prevent this observation of friendly movement and disposition."55

• 25th Infantry Division Periodic Report #10, 221800K to 231800K July 1950 --

"Again, white clad farmers appeared with rifles after contact was made with the enemy. Extreme caution should be used in allowing native civilian personnel to remain in close proximity to troops when on approach march or in contact (24 RCT)."56

• 25th Infantry Division Periodic Report #11, 231800K to 241800K July 1950 --

"Use is made of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support, the white-clad farmers appearing on the high ground again today in the 27th RCT zone."57

• The EUSAK War Diary for July 23, 1950, which provides material from the

interrogation of four American officers of the 24th Infantry Division -- "All agree this is a problem of major proportions. They strongly suspect North Koreans soldiers of

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coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear."58

• 25th Infantry Division War Diary dated July 24, 1950 -- "Continued use was

made by the enemy of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support. The white clad soldiers continued to appear. Native personnel in the combat zone must be considered hostile until proven friendly."59

• A message from Recon Troop (south) to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 281815

(TOR) July 1950 -- "We have pulled back to our original positions. The pass on the way to the 27 RCT is a regular mousetrap. Everyone should be cautioned about going thru towns and leaving these civilians behind them. LT Friant is in there now and I know he has the enemy behind him. That is what happened to Wozniack today also."60

• A message from S-2, 35th RCT to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 July 1950

-- "Soldiers from 1/35 which has just returned from 27 RCT mentioned that two women had been caught in their area -- one woman carrying a bag of hand gre nades, the other carrying a radio of the SCR 300 type."61

• The 24th Reconnaissance Company War Diary, July 23 - August 25, 1950 -- "At

one point where a platoon of this company was forced to withdraw due to enemy envelopment, small arms fire was received from the rear from Koreans dressed in civilian clothing."62

• The 25th Infantry Division Historical Report for July 8-31, 1950 states that:

"'People in white' -- or 'PIW's' as they were called [ -- ] were constantly infiltrating into and through our lines. To counter this threat, the Division commander was forced early in the engagement, to order that strong measures be taken by all commanders to stop this infiltration, since in many instances, the PIW's changed clothes, or still in white, turned on our forces, and attacked them in the rear and flanks. Such was the peculiar nature of the Korean war."63

• The G-1 summary of the 24th Infantry Division War Diary, July 23 - August 25,

1950 -- "One of the greatest problems encountered was control of refugees. ...Several armed guerillas were detected, apprehended, and forwarded to EUSAK with incriminating evidence. The extent of this problem is difficult to describe; often a refugee concentration would contain 30-40,000 people plus cattle, horses, cars, etc."64

There were also isolated reports of the NKPA forcing Korean civilians in advance of NKPA troops and into American positions. In the 27th Infantry Regiment's sector, about 200 refugees (women, children, and old men) walked into a battle position from the direction of the enemy. As the refugees were "creating some confusion as they were being rounded up and processed," a NKPA unit launched a frontal attack, its

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"leading elements mingled with the stragglers of the refugee group." When questioned, the refugees said that NKPA troops had directed them toward the American position.65

XIV. Lessons learned about the enemy

In mid-August 1950, Eighth Army published "Combat Information Bulletin Number One," distilling the experience of American forces after approximately six weeks of combat operations in Korea. Infiltration was "a problem of major proportion. North Korean soldiers are coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear." The bulletin warned that the "fact that the enemy will occupy all terrain features that we do not physically occupy, with what appear to be civilians or refugees, has caused commanders to forcibly deny if necessary, any refugees within their sectors. They must be sent back toward the enemy lines." Infiltrating NKPA troops had proved capable of over-running American companies and even battalions; American units, the bulletin warned, had to ensure "strong local security and perimeter defense in depth in every case regardless of the size unit and its location to the front line."66

To help prepare American soldiers going to Korea, the Department of the Army in August 1950 issued a pamphlet entitled Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea). The pamphlet included the following information about the enemy:

Charlie Company learned about guerrillas, the hard way. One day a group of Korean 'civilians' strolled into a quiet defense position occupied by a company outpost. One of the Koreans who spoke English offered to sell the soldiers a chicken. He reached under his cloak, but instead of a chicken produced a gun. In the fight that ensued, the Americans lost several men. The guerrilla problem is complicated by the fact that North Koreans and South Koreans look alike and talk alike. At the risk of offending their South Korean friends, Charlie Company learned to be cautious of all Koreans whose identity and loyalty were not definitely known.67

Some outside observers drew similar conclusions. An article by correspondent John Osborne in the August 21, 1950, issue of LIFE entitled "Report From The Orient: Guns Are Not Enough," provided the American public some insights about the problems that NKPA tactics, especially their exploitation of civilians, posed for American troops. In this article, Mr. Osborne portrayed vividly the situation in Korea and stressed the need for American leaders to recognize the union of politics and military operations in war rather than trying to segregate the two. He argued that because of the tactics used by the North Koreans, the war against the Communists in Asia could not be won by military means alone: To attempt to win it so, as we are now doing in Korea, is not only to court final failure but also to force upon our men in the field acts and attitudes of the utmost savagery. This means not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field but savagery in detail -- the blotting out of villages where the enemy may be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans in the anonymous white

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clothing of the Korean countryside, or who may be screening an enemy march upon our positions, or who may be carrying broken-down rifles or ammunition clips or walkie-talkie parts in their packs and under their trousers or skirts.68

While the full scope of NKPA infiltration and civilian exploitation remains difficult to determine it was clearly extensive. The U.S. Army in Korea clearly recognized the seriousness of this threat. The strongly worded directive issued by the 25th Infantry Division's commander further illustrates how serious this infiltration threat was taken. A memorandum dated July 27, 1950, addressed to the "Commanding Officers, all Regi mental Combat Teams and Staff Sections, this Headquarters" stated: "Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly."69 This area was not in the rear, but in front of U.S. positions: a distinct area within which the South Korean police had evacuated all South Korean civilians. The 25th Infantry Divi sion War Diary for July 27, 1950, recorded that General Kean ordered commanders at all levels to take drastic action to prevent the movement of any Korean civilians into their areas within the combat zone. U.S. soldiers were to consider all persons in civilian clothes moving within the combat zone as enemy.70 The combat zone was the area directly to the division's front where contact with the enemy was imminent or fighting was going on and not simply a forward position. Only by denying the NKPA the ability to infiltrate during combat operations could U.S. positions be protected. It should also be noted that the area described above in the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations was miles away from No Gun Ri. (See Plates 2 thru 11, Appendix E, for the location of units in the No Gun Ri area.) This policy in combat areas was no secret, for example on July 27 the Associated Press reported that: "All Korean civilians have been ordered out of the fighting zone southeast of Taejon. In an area once cleared of civilians, anyone in civilian clothing may be shot."71 (See Plates 2 thru 11 Appendix E.)

The situation is best summed up in the 1st Cavalry Division War Diary entry for July 24, 1950: "The control of refugees presented a difficult problem. No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all."72

XV. Conclusion

The U.S. Army developed a good understanding of the NKPA's tactics soon after entering combat in Korea. However, personnel shortages, pre-war cuts to the force structure, and little experience in earlier wars with an enemy willing to exploit civilians on the battlefield handicapped the Eighth Army's efforts in July 1950 to use American doctrine effectively when dealing with such tactics as practiced by a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated enemy. Determining with certainty how this knowledge of North Korean

37

tactics may have influenced 1st Cavalry Division soldiers' actions, and the actions of all U.S. soldiers, in the early days of combat is impossible. However, the soldiers were wary, and even prudently apprehensive, of the Korean civilian populace. To behave otherwise would have exposed soldiers to grave risks.

The first few weeks of the Korean War severely exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed in this chapter. These shortcomings, which were the result of peacetime readiness issues, training shortfalls, complex refugee problems, and ignorance of the NKPA's tactics, painted a bleak and daunting picture for the U.S. Army's continued prosecution of the war. This myriad of problems and challenges, both on and off the battlefield, represented the conditions that would define all units fighting in Korea in the first few weeks of the conflict. An appreciation and understanding of these factors help to clarify, and explain, the circumstances faced by the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea, one of the first U.S. units to clash with the NKPA in July 1950.

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Endnotes

1 Quoted in RG 332, USAFIK, Box 28, "Historical Journal of Korea" folder. A former Deputy Governor of Chulnam wrote to an American official that: Things are getting worse in [South] Korea by leaps and bounds. Some of the Americans are well-intentioned enough, but how can they govern a people when they don't understand the language, and don't know what is going on under their very noses?", quoted in E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: 1951), 235. (Meade was a Korean MG official in the early days of the occupation.)

2 Quoted in John R. Merrill, "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950", Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware (1982), 65.

3 Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Box 558, Chief of Staff Decimal File 1950, Record Group 319, "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces on Section II, Conclusions, and Section III, Recommendations, of Report of First Office, Chief of Army Field Forces' Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 August 1950," enclosure to Letter, 28 August 1950, General Mark W. Clark to General J. Lawton Collins, File 350.07 Far East (28 Aug 50), Box 128, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File 1949- 1950, RG 319, NARA.

4 William W. Epley, America's First Cold War Army, 1945-1950 (Arlington, Virginia: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1993).

5 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950 (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996); Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea (Westport, Con necticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); Kolodziej, op. cit. For an outline of how the Army expected World War III to be fought, see the March 1949 testimony of General Omar N. Bradley in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, "National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1950, Part 4: Department of the Army" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 568-570.

6 Memo, 23 March 1949, The Inspector General to Chief of Staff, Subject: "Annual General Inspection, Fiscal Year 1949, Eighth United States Army," File 333 GEN, Box 698, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, RG 338, NARA. For a case study of these deleterious effects, see William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 1996), 42-60.

7 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 55; Headquarters Eighth Army, Office of the Commanding General, Memorandum 23 June 1949, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Reports," File 322 GEN, Box 697, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, RG 338, NARA.

8 "Combat Effectiveness Report," 21 July 1949.

9 Headquarters Eighth Army, Office of the Commanding General, Memorandum to Commander-in-Chief Far East, 20 October 1949, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 322 (SU), Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 697, RG 338, NARA; Informal Check Slip, 20 October 1949, G-3 to G-1, G-4, DC/S, and CG, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 322 (SU), Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 697, RG 338, NARA.

10 Ibid.

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11 See Appendix E for the Organizational Chart of the 1st Cavalry Division - 7th Cavalry Regiment was a subordinate unit of 1st Cavalry Division.

12 Memo, 7 October 1949, Commanding General I Corps to Commanding General Eighth Army, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 353, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 700, RG 338, NARA.

13 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 54.

14 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 53-54; Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), 7-11; Field Manual 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and Technique (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948), 53-54; Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), 146-149; Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 2-7.

15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 45-46, 58-59; James A. Huston, Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses for Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 25-36.

16 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 45-46; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces."

17 "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces."

18 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 43-45, 85-86; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces;" Office of the Adjutant General, "STM-30: Strength of the Army," 1 June 1950; Enclosure 2 to Memo, 18 May 1950, Colonel J.K. Wilson, Jr. to Secretary, General Staff, Subject: "Background Material for Gen Collins' Speech to the National War College."

19 "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces;" Unknown, "Some Infantry Lessons From Korea," no date (but most likely late 1952), copy in File Geog V Korea 321 Infantry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.; Department of the Army Circular No. 1, 1 January 1948, "Career Guidance Plan for Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel;" Army Regulation 605-8, 17 August 1948, "Appointment of Lieutenants, Regular Army, From Officers on Extended Active Duty;" Technical Manual 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948). The background of regimental commanders and many battalion commanders is discussed in Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), passim. While flawed, an interesting case study of leadership in command positions is Faris R. Kirkland, "Soldiers and Marines at Chosin Reservoir: Criteria for Assignment to Combat Command," Armed Forces and Society, 22 (Winter 1995/96), 257-274.

20 Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War (6 vols.) (Seoul: 1975); W. Fox, History of the Korean War: Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations (Tokyo: Far East Command, N.D.); Grey, J., The Commonwealth Armies: An Alliance Study (Manchester: 1989).

21 G-1 Summary of 24th Infantry Division (ID) War Diary, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50. In Records of the Adjutant General's (AG) Office, AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3481, RG 407, NARA.

22 Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.

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23 Informal Check Slip and related documents, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) HQs, 26 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, 8th Army Adjutant General Section 1944-1956, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 729, RG 338, NARA.

24 Ibid.

25 Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.

26 Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.

27 Activities Report, 25th ID G-1, 27 Jul 50. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Infantry Divisions, 25th ID, 1950, Box 806, RG 338, NARA.

28 Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950. In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950, Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA.

29 Noble, Harold Joyce, Embassy at War, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975, pp. 152-153.

30 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

31 Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTC J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1951-1952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA.

32 Ibid.

33 Roy E. Appleman, North to the Naktong, South to the Yalu (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 58-76.

34 Appelman, 365-6.

35 This assessment is based on what the NKPA was able to accomplish in spite of overwhelming UNC air and naval control and substantial artillery superiority and in the face of an almost two-to-one numerical inferiority during the Pusan Perimeter fighting, Appleman, Chapt. 15; James F. Schnabel, Policy and Diirection - The First Year. United States Army in the Korean War. U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1972). See E. H. Atkins, and R. Sessums, North Korean Logistics and Methods of Accommplishment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, for U.S. Army, 1951); W. Bradbury, "Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in the Korean War", in S. Myers and A. Blderman, eds., The Manipulation of Human Behavior (Chicago: 1968). On the other hand, there was something brittle about the morale and discipline of the KPA, as demonstrated in its flight northward after the Inchon landings with far greater celerity than the UNC retreat at the beginning of the war.

36 Report of the First OCAFF (Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces) Observer Team to the Far East Command", 16 August 1950, Entry 55, Box 171, RG 387, NARA.

37 Appleman, 215-221. Among the dead was MG Chae Byong Duk, former ROK Army Chief of Staff, who was accompanying the 3rd Bn.

38 Roy E. Appleman. North to the Naktong, South to the Ya!u (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 7-11.

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39 Ibid, 9-10; Richard A. Mobley, "North Korea: How Did It Prepare for the 1950 Attack?" Army History, no.49 (Spring 2000), 4, 7-8.

40 John A English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, revised edition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994),89; Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, "Enemy Tactics," 26 December 1951, 56 -60, in File "Enemy Tactics," U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files, Box 73, RG 338, NARA; Appendix E, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Chief of Staff Classified Decimal File 1950, Box 558, RG 319, NARA; Mobley, 3, 5-6.

41 English and Gudmundsson, On Infantry, 90; "Enemy Tactics," 21-23, 41-44, 112-117; Appendix E, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command."

42 Change 1, 1 July 1948, to Field Manual 30-102: Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces (Washington: War Department, 1947), 131-134G; the quotation is from page 132. For American doctrine, see Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), and Field Manual 7-40: Infantry Regiment (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950).

43 Serial Number 28, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 Journal, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 54, Cavalry Divisions 1960-1967, RG 338, NARA. Doctrine for defense of wide frontages is in Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), 140-142.

44 The U.S. Army's World War II Ranger units had been inactivated after that war. On the Korean War Ranger program see David W. Hogan, Rangers or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 105-142.

45 Prisoner of War Interrogation Report, 24th Infantry Division, 7 Jut 50. In Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

46 Message, Eighth United States Army. 11 July 50. In Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944- 56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 724, RG 338, NARA.

47 Message, 24th Infantry Division G-2, 122200 JuISO. In Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division G-2 Journal, Box 3474, RG 407, NARA.

48 Report, Counter Intelligence Command (CIC) Team, 12 JuI 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

49 Memorandum, 25th Infantry Division, Notes on Liaison trip to United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) and 24th Infantry Division, 12-14 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-3 Journals, Box 680, RG 338, NARA.

50 Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950. Box 714. RG 338, NARA.

51 Activities Report, 25th Infantry Division G-3, 19 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949- 1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

52 Message, CG EUSAK, 191435K Jul 50. In Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56 Security- Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

53 Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

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54 Prisoner of War Interrogation, 24th Infantry Division G-2 Language Section, 20 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

55 Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order No.8. 25th Infantry Division, 220030 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-3 Journals. Box 682, RG 338, NARA.

56 Periodic Report #10, 25th Infantry Division, 221800K to 231800K July 1950. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50. Entry 429. Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

57 Periodic Report #11, 25th Infantry Division, 231800K to 241800K July 1950. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

58 War Diary, Headquarters EUSAK, 23 July 1950, sub: Interrogation Report, North Korean Methods of Operation. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, Entry 429, Box 1084, RG 407, NARA.

59 War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

60 Messages to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 28 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division Periodic Intelligence Reeports 1950, Box 667, RG 338, NARA

61 Message from S-2, 35 Regimental Combat Team to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-2 Journals, Box 634, RG 338, NARA.

62 War Diary, 24th Reconnaissance Company, 23 Jul- 25 Aug 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Book I-IV, Box 3481, RG 407, NARA.

63 Narrative Historical Report, 25th Infantry Division, 8-31 Jut 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

64 G-1 Summary of 24th Infantry Division (10) War Diary, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50. !n Records of the Adjutant General's (AG) Office, AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3481, Record Group (RG) 407, NARA.

65 EUSAK Periodic Intelligence Report No. 20, 012400 August 1950, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

66 Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, Office of the Commanding General, "Combat Information Bulletin No.1," Down loaded from the U.S. Army Military History Institute website, http://carlisleewww.army.milfcgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=62. While this document was issued without a date, other sources make it clear that it was issued sometime in mid-August 1950. A number of items in the bulletin are taken from earlier periodic intelligence reports issued by Eighth Army. A draft version, dated 25 July 1950, is included in "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command." Lieutenant Colonel Warren S. Everett, a General Staff officer who visited Korea in August, reported that just prior to his departure from Korea on August 24, Eighth Army published the bulletin. "Report on Visit of Lt Colonel Everett (representative of G-3, D/A) to RECOM and USARPAC, 19-30 Aug 1950." In File 333 Pacific, Box 94, G3 Top Secret Decimal File 1950, RG 319, NARA .

67 Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-105, Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea), August 1950. In Army Intelligence Decimal Files 1950, Entry 2A, Box 572, RG 319, NARA.

68 John Osborne, "Report From The Orient: Guns Are Not Enough," LIFE, Vol. 29, No.8, August 21, 1950.

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69 Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949- 1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

70 War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

71 News Bulletin, 25th Infantry Division Troop Information & Education (TI&E) Section, 27 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division, G-4 Journals, Box 766, RG 338, NARA.

72 War Diary, 1st Cavalry Division. 24 Jul 50. In Box 42, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files, Entry 34407, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

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(This online version did not include photographs, pp. 45-71 in the official government print version.)

Chapter 3 - Combat operations in July 1950

The combat operations conducted in July 1950 marked a very fluid, and often confusing, period of the Korean War. The previous chapter described how the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) moved rapidly against South Korea nearly unchecked. Intelligence on the enemy proved an early challenge to the U.S. Army units rushed overseas to stem the North Korean tide. In fact, intelligence gathering on the Korean peninsula received scant attention prior to the NKPA's assault because the U.S. spent the immediate post-World War II years focusing on a potential war with their new Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. But several intelligence successes, and hasty delaying actions by the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, caused the North Korean Army to pay dearly for the ground they gained.

This period in July 1950 requires some particular focus with regard to the alleged incident near No Gun Ri. To explain effectively the events of this particular period of July 25 to July 29, one must understand the intelligence available to the U.S. and Allied forces during that time; the flow of battlefield events, to include the 1st Cavalry Division's relief of the 24th Infantry Division, the battle for Yongdong, the U.S. withdrawal to the Naktong River; and the Air Force, Navy, and UN air operations that supported these battlefield activities. A discussion of these topics and how they fit together paints a clearer picture of the events and the intelligence and aviation factors that affected those events. But the first, most crucial challenge the U.S. Army faced at that time was determining how the North Koreans fought, where they were disposed on the battlefield, and what they planned to do next.

I. U.S. Army intelligence in July 1950

United States Army doctrine in 1950 defined military intelligence as "evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, including terrain and weather, together with the conclusions drawn there from." That same doctrine defined combat intelligence as "military intelligence produced in the field, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the military intelligence sections of all tactical headquarters."1 The primary purpose of combat intelligence was "to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions".2 The intelligence officer, using "all available information," was expected to: "(1) Determine the enemy capabilities or the lines of action open to the enemy that would have a bearing on the accomplishment of the commander's mission. (2) Determine the conditions under which any particular capability may be carried out; for example, the time, place and strength of an attack. (3) Draw conclusions in certain cases as to the relative probability of adoption of lines of action open to the enemy."3 Commanders, however, were warned that they "must be certain

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that they base their action, dispositions and plans upon estimates of the enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of the enemy's intentions" (Emphasis in original).4

II. Institutional intelligence weaknesses

In July 1950, military intelligence in the U.S. Army suffered from a number of weaknesses. The Army did not have a military intelligence branch filled by officers whose primary specialty was intelligence. Instead, officers from various branches were detailed to serve in intelligence positions. Some fields of intelligence, such as counterintelligence and signals intelligence, possessed a core of officers and men with World War II experience in these areas, and the need for such specialties in peacetime kept training programs in these fields open after the end of World War II. Combat intelligence, however, generated no such demand; the Military Intelligence Training Center, which during World War II trained combat intelligence specialists, closed soon after the war ended. During the interwar period, training in this field for those assigned to intelligence positions at echelons from army to battalion consisted of a hodgepodge of intelligence classes at various Army schools, unit training programs, self-study, and on-the-job experience. Combat intelligence effectiveness also suffered from the inadequate training of infantrymen and infantry units in patrolling skills.5

Other deficiencies in the military's intelligence capability resulted from Army-wide problems. The austere post-war budgets produced little money for new equipment, so units deployed to Korea in 1950 fought mostly with weapons, vehicles, equipment, and material produced during World War II; many of these items were either worn out or damaged by improper storage. Unable to man fully all units according to authorized personnel strength levels, the Army, by July 1950, had eliminated entire units or some units' subordinate elements. Eighth Army's two corps-level headquarters, a vital link between the division and army echelons, were deactivated in early 1950. Given the powerful artillery force the North Koreans possessed in July 1950, two serious deficiencies in intelligence gathering were that the infantry regiments lacked their counter-fire platoon, used to locate enemy artillery and mortars, and that Eighth Army did not have the artillery acquisition battalions normally assigned to a field army. No mobile tactical communications interception units existed in Japan, and none were available in the United States ready enough to deploy overseas without several months of preparation.6

III. The American understanding of the enemy from July 22 to July 30, 1950

American military planning after World War II focused on only one contingency -- war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, American intelligence collection efforts between 1945 and 1950 focused on the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, on China after the Communists won the civil war there in 1949. In

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the Far East Command, intelligence efforts focused on monitoring these two nations and supporting the American occupation of Japan. Given these priorities, the American military boasted few Korean linguists in 1950, and much of the military's information on North Korea came from intelligence collected by South Korean civilian and military intelligence agencies. Additionally, North Korea's intensive counter-intelligence efforts often frustrated what little attention American intelligence gave to North Korea before June 25, 1950.7 Between the start of the war and the 1st Cavalry Division's move from Japan to Korea, the division's intelligence staff "gathered and disseminated available information on Korea, made plans, held briefings, secured necessary equipment, addes [sic] personnel and arranged for distribution of maps throughout the command." On July 10, the division published an intelligence standing operating procedure to provide guidance on conducting intelligence operations. The procedure only briefly mentioned civilians, directing that "all natives in operational areas will, in the event of any doubt, be considered as hostile until definitely proven friendly." The procedure did not mention how units should handle civilians attempting to move through American positions. On July 22, the intelligence staff provided guidance on this issue, directing that civilians "infiltrating through our lines will be arrested and turned over to CIC [the Counter-Intelligence Corps]."8

During the voyage from Japan to Korea, the division intelligence staff, reinforced with a team from the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, continued preparing for combat, although the staff received "very meager" information on the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) from the Eighth Army staff.9 In the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the regimental operations officer or the regimental intelligence officer briefed each company "on the situation and [gave] pointers on combat, what to expect, how to react, and the like."10 In July 1950, the intelligence staffs at Eighth Army and the 1st Cavalry Division employed a variety of source materials in their efforts to view the battlefield and understand the NKPA. Much of the material used by intelligence staffs came from subordinate units: information on engagements with NKPA units; reports of shelling by NKPA artillery and mortars; reports from ground patrols; and reports from aerial observers using L-5 and L-17 liaison aircraft. Battalion and regimental intelligence sections at times provided their analysis of the situation along with the material they forwarded to higher echelons. Other sources used by army and division intelligence staffs included post-mission pilot debriefings provided by Fifth Air Force; aerial photo reconnaissance; American advisors serving with Republic of Korea (ROK) units; Korean National Police units; South Korean officials; South Korean civilians, usually refugees crossing American lines; interrogations of captured NKPA personnel; and examinations of captured NKPA weapons and material. In August and September 1950, during the battles on the Pusan perimeter, interception and analysis of NKPA radio

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traffic played an important role, but this capability was not available during the withdrawal to the perimeter in July 1950.11

IV. The periodic intelligence report

Intelligence from higher echelons, both regularly scheduled reports and spot reports, could do much to shape an organization's understanding of the enemy and the wider battlefield. While higher echelons sent subordinate units spot intelligence reports as required by the tactical situation, most of the intelligence flow from Eighth Army to the divisions, and from divisions to their regiments, came in the form of a "Periodic Intelligence Report" (PIR). Eighth Army's daily PIR covered the period from midnight to midnight. The PIR outlined the enemy situation at the end of the period (often by using an enclosed overlay or map); briefly discussed enemy operations during the period and then reviewed operations in more detail by component elements (infantry, artillery, armor, and so on); reported any new enemy tactics, weapons, and material encountered; provided estimates of enemy losses, combat efficiency, morale, and supply status; and forecasted the next day's weather. The last paragraph of the PIR discussed the enemy's possible courses of actions and the intelligence staff's estimate of the enemy's probable courses of action. Occasionally, the PIR included an annex that provided detailed information on subjects such as the enemy order of battle or enemy tactics and equipment. The PIRs prepared by division intelligence staffs and sent to regiments followed the same format; however, divisions used a 24-hour reporting cycle of 6:00 PM to 6:00 PM.12

V. The accuracy of the Eighth Army's intelligence

Overall, despite the weaknesses in the Army's intelligence capability, Eighth Army and the 1st Cavalry Division during this period had sufficiently accurate combat intelligence. Neither Eighth Army nor the 1st Cavalry Division suffered serious reverses because the NKPA caught them by surprise.

As the 24th Infantry Division delayed the NKPA between July 5 and July 19, Eighth Army collected enough enemy information to provide the 1st Cavalry Division with an accurate outline of the tactics they could expect the NKPA to use. During the remainder of the month, Eighth Army provided its divisions with more detailed information on the NKPA, culminating with the publication of "Combat Information Bulletin Number One."

Eighth Army tended to overestimate the strength the NKPA would commit to the Taejon-Kumchon axis. The Eighth Army missed, until late July, the 4th Division's turn to the south after the capture of Taejon to join the 6th Division in the effort to envelop Eighth Army's left flank. By July 26, the Eighth Army had identified the three NKPA divisions that opposed the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions, although the Eighth Army probably overestimated the combat effectiveness of these units (During July, Eighth Army significantly

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underestimated the number of casualties its units, the Fifth Air Force, and the ROK Army inflicted on the NKPA.). This tendency further manifested itself in the fact that most American units, when making initial enemy contact, magnified the size and strength of the enemy forces because they lacked the combat experience required to make accurate judgments.13

Probably the most important achievement of Eighth Army's intelligence staff during this period was its warning on July 23 that one course of action open to the NKPA included a deep envelopment of the Eighth Army's left flank in southwestern Korea, an area covered at this time by only a few hundred South Korean troops and local police. This warning led to increased aerial reconnaissance of southwestern Korea that detected the NKPA's deep envelopment, although Eighth Army's intelligence staff erroneously identified the unit conducting the maneuver as the 4th Division (in truth the 6th Division). Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army's commander, could then move the 24th Infantry Division, recently relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at Yongdong, into position to delay the NKPA's advance and to prevent the North Koreans from enveloping Eighth Army's flank.14 The focus then shifted to the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. unit that would undergo a baptism of fire during that last critical week of July 1950.

VI. 1st Cavalry Division in 1950

The 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry) was organized, like the other divisions stationed in Japan in 1950, according to a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) published in 1948.15 As discussed in Chapter 2, the authorized peacetime manning levels for this period meant that the three infantry regiments comprised only two of the three battalions normally assigned. Likewise, each regiment lacked its authorized tank company. These missing units did not represent the only personnel and organizational shortfall in this peacetime structure; the division artillery battalions were reduced to two firing batteries. In addition, the division's equipment was largely of World War II vintage. These limitations had little impact on a force tasked only with occupation duty. The early days of the Korean War, however, clearly laid bare the inadequacies of this structure for combat. Historians generally accept the fact that the soldiers of the Army of Occupation functioned merely as a constabulary, ill-trained and ill-equipped to fight a modern war against a well-trained and well-equipped adversary. While critical limitations in the training and equipment of the 1st Cavalry Division existed, the officers and men were not incompetent or unprofessional in any way.

After reviewing a portion of the pre-publication manuscript of the first volume of the Army's official history of the Korean War, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu by Roy Appleman, General Douglas MacArthur took strong exception to the frequent references to the poor state of the troops under his command in Japan. In a letter to the Chief of Military History concerning the manuscript, he

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underscored the fact that soldiers in Japan met the same standards the Army demanded of soldiers stationed anywhere else in the world. If the standards proved inadequate, that fault rested with the Army. MacArthur wrote:

The criticism, by implication, seems to apply solely to occupation troops. This is incorrect. The same weaknesses existed in all American troops. The divisions that came later to Korea from the United States were no better or worse than those from Japan. The policies, which caused these deficiencies, were formulated in Washington, not in the Occupation.16

The 1st Cavalry Division's critical personnel shortages proved just as serious as the shortages in organization. To bring the 24th Infantry Division up to strength prior to that division's departure from Japan for Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division transferred to the 24th Division nearly 800 men, most of them senior non-commissioned officers.17 The Army made every effort to correct these shortfalls through promotion and reorganization, but no organization can effectively perform its mission with so many non-commissioned officers missing.

VII. Training and equipment in the 1st Cavalry Division

To assume that no training, or inappropriate training, occurred in Japan is also misleading. The 1st Cavalry Division was relieved of its occupation duties in 1950 specifically to conduct comprehensive unit training. The division initiated a training cycle designed to progress from the individual soldier to the regimental level. The deployment alert left the 1st Cavalry Division unable to finish its training plan. In the case of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, this program had focused on squad-, platoon-, and company-level training and had not progressed to the battalion and regimental level.18

The material condition of the 1st Cavalry Division also affected its fighting ability. Several shortages existed in all units in Korea; the 1st Cavalry was no exception. General Walker, the Eighth Army Commander, issued these instructions to the Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, General Gay:

You will take over from what is left of the 24th Division northwest of Yongdong, protect Yongdong, but remember that there are no friendly troops behind you. You must keep your back door open. You can live without food, but you cannot exist long without ammunition and unless the Yongdong -- Taegu Road is kept open, you will soon be without ammunition.19

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The 1st Cavalry Division quickly recognized the reality of these instructions. The division also experienced shortages in ammunition and other supplies. These shortages influenced the pace of the withdrawal. The threat of infiltration and flanking attacks remained until the division reached the Naktong River, but the need to secure the supply route from Taegu was equally important in the decision to move rapidly from Hwanggan to Kumchon. The effectiveness of antitank weapons is another common explanation of why U.S. Army performance failed to meet expectations. The standard issue antitank weapon for infantry units was the 2.36-inch rocket launcher, commonly referred to as the bazooka. This weapon proved to be totally ineffective against NKPA T-34 tanks, causing considerable fear among U.S. soldiers. Under development when the war broke out, but not yet in the hands of the troops, was the much-improved 3.5-inch rocket launcher. Supplies of these weapons were airlifted into Korea and issued to the 24th Infantry Division by July 11, 1950, which was too late to assist Task Force Smith. But the new rocket launchers proved a welcome addition to the infantryman's arsenal.20 After relieving the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division received some of the 24th Division's 3.5s with ammunition.21 Although in short supply in the first weeks of the war, the 1st Cavalry Division's organic antitank weapons proved capable of successfully engaging and destroying the NKPA T-34 tanks. Nearly as important as ammunition, water became a critical problem. Leaders frequently reminded soldiers to use water only from authorized water points. A chronic shortage of trucks with water trailers and of water purification tablets issued with C rations forced thirsty soldiers to drink from streams and rice paddies. Dysentery became commonplace and affected the strength and well being of the individual soldier, often leading to evacuation from the combat area.22 All of these manning and supply problems do not explain adequately what may appear as poor performance on the battlefield. Pure hubris led to the belief that the Army could not lose a battle to the NKPA, but portraying these men as incapable is equally inaccurate. This understanding is critical when evaluating the discipline and the performance of the 1st Cavalry Division. Mistakes occurred, particularly as elements of the division engaged in combat for the first time (for example the disorganized withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment on the night of July 25-26, 1950); however, no systemic breakdown in discipline or performance occurred. Prudent tactics called for the necessary trading of space for time until the Allies could establish the Naktong defenses and until the first counterattack, the Inchon landings, could create favorable conditions for the breakout and pursuit of the NKPA.

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VIII. The 1st Cavalry Division lands in Korea

The 1st Cavalry Division was alerted for possible deployment to Korea on July 1, 1950. The outbreak of the war and the departure of the 24th Infantry Division clearly signaled that the division had to be prepared. The division staff requested missing personnel and equipment immediately. Unfortunately, little in the way of replacements or equipment was on hand.23 The division traveled by sea to Korea in two lifts. The 5th and 8th Cavalry comprised the first lift, and the 7th Cavalry arrived in the second lift. The 5th and 8th Cavalry arrived in Korea on July 18 and moved forward to the Yongdong area the following day. The battle for Taejon already raged, and the North Koreans began surrounding the 24th Division. The 24th desperately needed replacements and a chance to reorganize. The 34th Infantry Regiment, caught in Taejon by the 3rd NKPA Division, was incapable of offensive action. The 1st Cavalry Division now faced this same enemy division in Yongdong. The 1st Cavalry Division's intelligence staff landed at Pohang on July 18 and moved to Kumchon, where the division command post was established. As elements of the 24th Infantry Division awaited the NKPA's attack against Taejon, Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 19 reported that increased pressure in the Taejon area and "the probable shift of elements of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions to the West and South West" indicated that the enemy's main effort would indeed be along the Choch'iwon-Taejon axis. The PIR also passed along information obtained from interrogating captured NKPA soldiers. Enemy tactics included "a frontal attack with flanking movement supported by artillery. The unit attacking frontally is widely dispersed and keeps up heavy fire, while strong flanking elements constitute the main effort." Enemy soldiers said they had been told that Japanese troops were fighting on behalf of the South Korean government and that "Americans will retreat in combat."24 On July 20, the 1st Cavalry Division received a copy of Eighth Army's "Combat Lesson Number One." The lesson outlined the infiltration tactics used by the NKPA, noting that individuals or small groups "work themselves behind our lines under cover and then assemble at a predesignated point." From that point, the now reassembled NKPA unit would "attack against the rear or flanks of our troops." The lesson warned that the location of the assembly points in the American rear areas used by infiltrators "must be determined promptly by aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations." Then "reserve echelons supporting front line units, particularly artillery or armored vehicles, must be promptly dispatched to [the] area in order to liquidate the assembled forces."25

As noted earlier, the 1st Cavalry Division lacked sufficient personnel and their full complement of units to form the reserve echelons capable of dealing with infiltrators assembling in their rear areas.

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IX. Facing the enemy

The last elements of the 24th Infantry Division passed rearward through Yongdong on July 22 to become, temporarily, the Eighth Army reserve. By the end of July 21, the 1st Cavalry Division, along with the 25th Infantry Division and elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, faced elements of several NKPA divisions determined to win at all costs. Immediately after the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked in Korea, the Eighth Army directed the division to move forward to the Yongdong-Kumchon area. The 1st Cavalry Division quickly deployed both the 5th and 8th Cavalry to defend Yongdong.26 Yongdong is about 10 miles across rugged, hilly countryside from No Gun Ri (See maps 3 -11 Appendix E for day-to-day positions). As the 1st Cavalry Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division around Yongdong, Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 21 described the enemy's combat efficiency as unchanged and morale among enemy troops as "excellent." The PIR reported that the enemy's "continued attack in the TAEJON area by elements of two or three divisions" and "increased enemy pressure along the left front of the ROK I Corp [sic]" indicated that the NKPA's main effort was along the Taejon-Kumchon axis -- in the 1st Cavalry Division's new sector.27 The 1st Cavalry Division's Operation Order 9-50, dated 7:00 AM July 22, identified the NKPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions as opposing the division, each with an estimated strength of 8,775 soldiers. Elements of the NKPA 4th Division were reported to be in reserve behind the other two divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division's intelligence staff warned that the most likely course of action for these enemy units was to "continue to advance on our positions in the vicinity southeast of TAEJON with primary effort being to envelop our flanks and thus cut off our units one at a time. Envelopment will be attempted on both flanks with major effort coming from the southeast." The order directed that civilians "infiltrating through our lines will be arrested and turned over to CIC [Counter-Intelligence Corps]."28 The 5th Cavalry Regiment became the first unit committed to combat. The 5th's mission was to relieve the 21st Infantry and the other remaining elements of the 24th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Yongdong.29 This plan changed when the regiment could not advance from its assembly areas due to the congested roads. A combination of retreating U.S. and ROK troops, along with the ever-present refugees, made forward progress so slow that the 5th could not relieve the 21st Infantry in time. The 8th Cavalry moved forward to relieve the 21st and to prevent the occupation of Yongdong from the northwest and southwest.30

The Eighth Army knew that the loss of Taejon and the withdrawal from the Kum River meant that the next defensive barrier was the Naktong River. With friendly forces still outnumbered by the NKPA, a series of planned withdrawals would prevent a repeat of the disastrous losses incurred in the defense of

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Taejon. Since the 1st Cavalry Division could not defend Yongdong indefinitely, the division conducted a delaying action on the way back to the Naktong.

X. July 22, 1950

The 8th Cavalry Regiment became the first element to make contact with forward elements of the 24th Infantry Division, relieving the 21st Infantry Regiment northwest of Yongdong at 12:30 PM on July 22, 1950. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, moved into position on the Taejon-Yongdong Road north of town near Ojong ni while the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, covered the southern flank astride the Kumsan-Muju Road. There was no contact between the battalions and there was no friendly troops stationed in the town itself.31 With the 8th Cavalry initially deployed north and west of Yongdong, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, dug in east of the town in the vicinity of the village of Kwan ni to prevent a possible envelopment. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, remained in Hwanggan for the moment. The 8th Cavalry did not have long to wait for contact with the enemy.

The 1st Cavalry Division's first PIR was dated 6:00 PM July 22 and reported only one minor contact by an 8th Cavalry Regiment patrol with a NKPA patrol in the previous 24 hours. Division aerial observers, however, reported large numbers of refugees moving east towards Yongdong. The PIR warned that based on recent engagements, "it is expected [that the] enemy has large remaining forces." Five possible enemy courses of action against the division were listed: 1) Attack the 5th Cavalry Regiment with elements of 2-3 divisions; 2) Envelop one or both flanks of the 8th Cavalry Regiment; 3) Attack the left flank of the division; 4) Defend current positions with current forces; 5) Reinforce current units and execute any of the preceding four options. The PIR advised that the most likely enemy course of action adopted the first two options, attacking both the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments concurrently. The next most likely course of action involved an attack on the division's left flank.32

Eighth Army's next PIR for midnight on July 22 reported a change in the enemy's intentions, stating that the NKPA was most likely shifting its main effort to the central sector along the Chongju-Hamchang and Yongju-Andong axes in the ROK I Corps's zone to the north of the 1st Cavalry Division's zone. This new evaluation of the enemy's intent resulted from reports described the Taejon area as "relatively quiet," the NKPA's failure to maintain heavy pressure along the Taejon-Kumchon axis after the 24th Infantry Division's withdrawal from Taejon, and a terrain analysis of the enemy's likely avenues of approach. Recent bad weather supported this conclusion, Eighth Army believed, and limited American aerial reconnaissance and "reduced opportunities for identifications in retrograde operations." These conditions provided the NKPA "with an excellent opportunity for lateral movement and reconcentration of elements of the 2 to 3 divisions previously committed in the TAEJON area."33

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XI. July 23, 1950

On the morning of July 23, the 1st Cavalry Division moved its forward command post from Kumchon to Hwanggan to more effectively direct operations in the Yongdong area. The Eighth Army authorized the division to commit the 5th Cavalry at its discretion, and the remainder of the regiment moved forward from Hwanggan to defensive positions east of Yongdong with the Regimental Command Post established in Kwan ni.34

The 8th Cavalry's baptism of fire began in the 1st Battalion's sector northwest of Yongdong. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the day, and reports of enemy tanks surfaced for the first time. Southwest of town, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, area remained quiet. Artillery fire from the 11th, 77th, and 99th Field Artillery Battalions accounted for five enemy tanks and 15 other vehicles. The threat of envelopment became a real concern to the 8th Cavalry as an aerial observer saw groups of what appeared to be NKPA soldiers dressed in white southwest of Yongdong.35

Civilian refugees remained a constant problem. Artillery units were particularly concerned that refugees sympathetic to North Korea or North Korean agents could transmit battery locations to the NKPA for use in targeting. The artillery proved particularly vulnerable to sniping and attack from infiltrators since the soldiers had to man their guns continually. To prevent these attacks from happening, a patrol from the division artillery cleared civilians from a town southwest of Yongdong on July 23. This action, a necessary precaution, ran contrary to the 1st Cavalry Division and Eighth Army's policy of encouraging villagers in the countryside to stay in their homes. This incident represents the only recorded instance of such an event in the last week of July 1950.36

To assist in the screening of these refugees, the 1st Cavalry Division received a Republic of Korea Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment assigned to work with its U.S. counterpart. 37 The 545th Military Police Company also handled refugees in the Yongdong area with assistance from the Korean National Police. These military policemen and their Korean augmentees shouldered the Herculean task of keeping the roads open for vital military movements while trying to prevent disguised enemy soldiers or sympathizers from crossing the lines. While performing this mission on July 23, a military policeman and his Korean National Police partner were killed when their jeep inadvertently drove over a friendly mine on the outskirts of Yongdong.38

The division's 6:00 PM July 23 PIR interpreted attacks on the 8th Cavalry Regiment during the morning and afternoon as NKPA reconnaissance efforts and warned that: "[I]ndications of movement around our flanks bear out his [the NKPA's] continued use of the double or single envelopment." The PIR reported that screening of refugees moving through the division's zone, conducted by American military police and intelligence personnel with South Korean soldiers

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and intelligence personnel, resulted in the detention of several individuals suspected as enemy agents. Furthermore, two persons claiming to be Red Cross personnel were apprehended with a map showing the locations of all the division's artillery battalions. The PIR concluded that the NKPA's possible and probable courses of action would not change.39

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 23 noted that a refugee had reported 10,000 troops with 10 light artillery pieces located west of Taejon. The PIR again concluded that the NKPA's most likely course of action focused its main effort toward Hamchang and / or Andong, north of the 1st Cavalry Division's sector, but the PIR now modified this conclusion by stating that the NKPA would at the same time attempt a deep envelopment south of Eighth Army's left flank through Chongju and Namwon. The second most likely course of action focused the main effort against the 1st Cavalry Division along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with the deep envelopment. The NKPA's combat effectiveness and morale rated as good.40

XII. July 24, 1950

The battle on July 24 continued with artillery and mortar fire and increased enemy infiltration. The enemy initiated a series of ambushes behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on the battalion's main supply route. Attacks made by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, supported by tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, to clear this obstacle proved unsuccessful. The battalion commander was wounded and subsequently evacuated. The 8th Cavalry realized that they needed better defensive positions or the NKPA would trap the regiment in Yongdong just like the 34th Infantry at Taejon. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry attached, and the 77th Field Artillery Battalion in support, shifted from its positions east of Yongdong to the high ground southwest of town to meet this threat while the remainder of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry remained in position east of Yongdong. The purpose of this maneuver was to defend the area west of Yongdong, thus preventing the 3rd NKPA Division from outflanking the 1st Cavalry Division or penetrating the undefended American rear area. By the evening of July 24, both threats became serious enough to require a withdrawal from Yongdong.41

Realizing the serious danger to the 8th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division issued Operations Plan 10-50, calling for a disengagement and withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry to keep the NKPA from outflanking the regiment and decisively engaging the cavalrymen in Yongdong.42 The Eighth Army's strategy did not include fighting for every town and village. The Eighth Army lacked the necessary strength for that purpose. Instead, the Eighth Army opted to withdraw behind the last major defensible terrain feature, the Naktong River. The division's withdrawal became part of this army-level strategy. The plan called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement from the NKPA and

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rearward movement out of Yongdong toward Hwanggan, where the 8th Cavalry would assume the role of the division's reserve.

The 7th Cavalry, meanwhile, had arrived in Korea on July 22, 1950, as part of the division's second lift from Japan. The east coast of Korea was suffering a determined NKPA attack, and the 1st Battalion remained in the Pohangdong area to defend the port and adjacent airfield. The remainder of the 7th Cavalry moved forward to the Yongdong area, arriving in its designated assembly area near the village Sot Anmak in the late afternoon. The 7th Cavalry's mission charged them with preventing enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry in the event the 8th Cavalry could not break contact and move east from Yongdong.43 With the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, employed on the east coast, the already under-strength 7th Cavalry lacked a reserve force. Ordered to reorganize the regiment to create a reserve (called a "provisional force" in the quotation below), Colonel Nist, the regimental commander, made his estimate of the situation very clear in a conversation with the division operations officer on July 24:

I have no wish to "fight the problem"[;] however I feel that I must point out the following simple facts: a. That if this force is employed there will be no Headquarters Company, 7th Cavalry (Inf) since I have taken every available man including communications personnel in order to give the maximum firepower to my provisional force. b. That I have irreparably crippled the 2nd Battalion because I have stripped their motor section of drivers, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and ammunition in forming the provisional force.44

Despite the regimental commander's reservations, he had no alternative. Fortunately, this provisional force was never committed and the 7th Cavalry, less its 1st Battalion, went forward as originally organized. The 7th Cavalry joined the NKPA in combat, reporting its first enemy contact at 8:00 PM on July 24 when the North Koreans fired on an outpost.45 The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 24 PIR echoed Eighth Army's evaluation of NKPA effectiveness and morale and highlighted continual efforts by the enemy to infiltrate the division's zone and establish road blocks. The division estimated that it had inflicted 1,000 casualties on the enemy. The PIR rated the enemy's most probable course of action as: "[C]ontinue pressure on front while developing our left flank and 27th Regiment's right flank."46

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Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 24 reported increased pressure from the NKPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 27th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). Based on this activity, Eighth Army revised its estimate of the enemy's most probable course of action, now stating that the main effort would move along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with a deep envelopment through Chongju and Namwon.47

XIII. July 25, 1950

July 25 became an eventful day that marked the 1st Cavalry Division's withdrawal from Yongdong and the first significant commitment of the 7th Cavalry to combat. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke through the ambush where its battalion commander had been wounded the day before, leaving behind Company F, a platoon of tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, and an element of the 16th Recon Company to act as a rear guard. The rapid advance of the NKPA cut off this rear guard, and this ad hoc force had to make its way out on its own.48 The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke contact and escaped from Yongdong thanks to the division artillery's superior firepower. The 5th Cavalry withdrew from Yongdong and occupied defensive positions east of town. The day's operations proceeded as planned, but the night would change that fact dramatically.

The events on the night of July 25-26, 1950, remain unclear. Confusion reigned in the forward area as units moved up and back at the same time. The 5th Cavalry relieved the 8th Cavalry. The 8th Cavalry then moved to and occupied an assembly area in the division rear near Hwanggan. Hwanggan is approximately three to four miles east of No Gun Ri. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, moved to the rear during the day and reported, before reaching its planned position, that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had relieved them. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, reported the battalion position by radio and later sent the division an overlay showing the unit's location. A slight discrepancy exists between the two reported locations.49 The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, was most probably near the road approximately 1,200 yards north-northeast of the village of Kari as shown on a position overlay sent to the 1st Cavalry Division on July 25. The location of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, is important because this site helps to establish the exact position of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, on the night of July 25 and the early morning hours of the July 26.

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 25 PIR estimated that a NKPA regiment had attacked two battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, indicating that at least one enemy division opposed the 1st Cavalry Division. Enemy combat efficiency remained good, but the PIR did not estimate the enemy's most probable intentions.50 The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved forward with elements of the Regimental Headquarters to support the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry from

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Yongdong on the evening of July 25. The regiment reported its command post location to the division at 8:25 PM, giving the grid coordinates of a position directly across the road from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The 7th Cavalry Regiment's commander later reported that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had contact with 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and that they had no contact with the enemy.51 What happened during the next several hours remains unclear, particularly with regard to the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.

Several factors require careful consideration when evaluating the 7th Cavalry's performance on July 25. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had not yet joined the regiment, which gave the 7th Cavalry a distinct disadvantage in strength. Likewise, the 7th Cavalry did not have an assigned artillery battalion in direct support. July 25 was only the regiment's second day in the forward area and its first week in Korea. Soldiers were aware of the enemy's infiltration tactics. In the words of the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, refugees clogged the roads, and he heard a vehicle pass his location, possibly a tank.52 Military traffic and refugees crowded the road from Yongdong to Hwanggan, but no other reports of a tank in the rear area exist. The battalion commander most likely heard a vehicle from a withdrawing element belonging to the 8th Cavalry and not a North Korean tank. The fact that he thought it was a tank is indicative of the high level of fear and apprehension present among the soldiers.

Pressure increased on the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment on the right flank of the 1st Cavalry Division to the north of the 7th Cavalry's positions. A further withdrawal became necessary to avoid a North Korean flanking movement. Regimental operations officers arrived at the division forward command post to receive orders for the next stage of the withdrawal. Sometime during, or shortly after, this conference late on the night of July 25, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the 25th Infantry Division sector to the regiment's north.53 Without specific orders and not in contact with the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, withdrew in a disorganized and undisciplined manner. The 5th Cavalry reported in its periodic operations report that the 5th thought the 7th Cavalry was moving forward to a "destination unknown" at around midnight.54 What the 5th Cavalry probably heard was not the 7th Cavalry's movement forward but the beginning of that regiment's disorganized withdrawal.

Sometime during the night, probably after the breakthrough rumor circulated, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, thought that the NKPA had attacked the battalion; resultantly, the battalion withdrew from its established position. Probably believing themselves in danger of envelopment, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved out in haste and became disorganized. The Regimental War Diary suggests that the battalion was under extreme NKPA pressure and withdrew to avoid envelopment.55

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Throughout the 25th of July, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, remained in defensive positions near Pohangdong about 95 miles away on the coast of the Sea of Japan. This battalion became involved in an incident that further illustrates the problems all units in Korea suffered with the numerous refugees on the battlefield. During the hours of darkness on July 25, a group of unidentified individuals approached the battalion perimeter. The soldiers opened fire, and a platoon leader led a patrol to determine the nature of situation first hand. He discovered that they were unarmed civilian refugees and recognized that they posed no threat. His patrol escorted the refugees through the lines, rendered aid to the wounded, and sped them to the rear.56

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 25 estimated that 3,000 enemy troops had attacked the 1st Cavalry Division's left flank during July 25 and that the attacks had cost the NKPA 1,000 casualties. An estimated 1,000 NKPA troops, supported by an unknown number of tanks, attacked the 27th Regimental Combat Team to the right of the 1st Cavalry Division. Six to 10 tanks were sighted east of Yongdong. Eighth Army continued to predict that the enemy's most probable course of action focused the main effort along the Taejon- Kumchon axis, together with the deep envelopment to the south around Eighth Army's left flank.57

XIV. July 26, 1950

With the 1st Cavalry Division clear of Yongdong, the division's units spent July 26 preparing new positions and reorganizing. The 8th Cavalry remained in the division rear near Hwanggan. The 5th Cavalry Regiment initially occupied forward positions near the village of Andae ri. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, finally arrived from Pohangdong and relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on the high ground overlooking Andae ri on Hill 207 in the late afternoon. Hill 207 represented the high ground east of the double railroad overpass near No Gun Ri. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, spent the day reorganizing and recovering stragglers and equipment lost during the previous night's disorganized withdrawal. The battalion's soldiers had abandoned vital radios and crew served weapons during that movement. Nearly 200 men were missing. Major Witherspoon, the Regimental S-3 (Operations Officer), set up a collection point by the roadside, probably in the vicinity of Andae ri, and consolidated the battalion.58 The battalion spent much of the day going back and forth recovering the abandoned equipment and rounding up the stragglers. According to the 7th Cavalry War Diary, the battalion's leadership did not regain full control of the situation until 9:30 PM.59 After the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reorganized, the soldiers dug in on a ridgeline immediately east of and overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road from the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. They recovered much of the equipment, but 119 men still remained missing.

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The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 26 PIR again provided no analysis of the enemy's most probable course of action. The PIR reported, however, that a diary taken from a dead guerrilla indicated that the enemy had an observation post in the division's rear "which commands almost all our positions." The PIR further reported that: "[D]efinite organized guerrilla tactics have been used with indications of coordination and direction from NK forces. Previous to this date only individual and small groups sniping has taken place in our rear areas." The division's pilots reported the first "flak AA [anti-aircraft] fire" since arriving in Korea.60 Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 26 estimated that three NKPA divisions opposed the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions: the 3rd Division in the Yongdong area; the 2nd Division on the 3rd's left flank; and the 15th Division northwest of Sangju. The NKPA's combat efficiency and morale still rated as high, but its logistical support now proved "extremely sporadic and uncertain due to friendly air activity." Eighth Army continued to believe that the enemy's main effort would follow along the Taejon-Kumchon axis together with the deep envelopment to the south around Eighth Army's left flank.61

XV. July 27, 1950

The division now occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry to the west of town near No Gun Ri. The 7th Cavalry was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry still on the regiment's right and the 5th Cavalry to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry was not in direct contact with the enemy but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yongdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yongdong on the railroad tracks. In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor. However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet. The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support.62

The commander of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion was not the only visitor on July 27. An observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry. A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the Daily Telegraph and London Herald of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines.63 None of these visitors later reported observing that large numbers of refugees had been, or were being, killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

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The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 PIR reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yongdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yongdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division.64

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 27 reported that the NKPA, during July 27, had mounted two strong drives: one against South Korean units in the Hamchang-Yongju area and a second, using two divisions supported by strong artillery fire and a small number of tanks, in the Yongdong-Sangju area against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. Eighth Army's intelligence staff still believed that the enemy's main effort would follow along the Taejon- Kumchon axis together with a deep envelopment of Eighth Army's left flank. The PIR also warned that the enemy would "continue and increase guerrilla activity throughout EUSAK [Eighth U.S. Army - Korea] zone and sabotage rail, highway and other communication facilities."65

XVI. July 28, 1950

On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry's right flank turned critical. The NKPA launched an all-out attack against the 27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions. This movement opened a gap between the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yongdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to restore the divisional boundary. The 27th Infantry also counterattacked and regained contact with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.66 The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day.67 Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks. The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success. Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.68

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 28 PIR described the preceding 24 hours as "relatively quiet" with some infantry probes of U.S. positions and "intermittent artillery fire" in the division's forward areas. The division's

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intelligence staff estimated three NKPA battalions to the division's front with "a concentration of unknown strength on our left flank." Enemy combat efficiency and morale remained good, and the PIR concluded that the "enemy's main effort apparently is north of our line in the 27th Infantry ZR [Zone of Responsibility]. Indications still point to a build up on our left flank."69 To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM to withdraw to the southeast at first light on July 29.70 With the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in the lead, the regiment passed through Hwanggan and occupied positions adjacent to the 5th Cavalry. This move did not occur without incident, however. Like the night of July 25-26, the regiment became confused and did not arrive in its new positions until sometime after 9:00 AM, even though the regiment had no contact with the enemy. Some indications suggest that this confusion represented another instance of poor coordination within the 7th Cavalry. The Operations Order called for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to have priority of movement. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, would travel over the railroad tracks behind the battalion's position and through the railroad tunnel into Hwanggan to join the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, already moving rearward on the road.71 Apparently, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry left its positions before the 2nd Battalion and arrived in Hwanggan first, creating a traffic jam that delayed the regiment's progress.

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 28 noted several developments in enemy tactics reported by the 25th Infantry Division. An unconfirmed report mentioned that NKPA soldiers used American uniforms to infiltrate U.S. lines. Several reports described NKPA units mounting frontal "banzai" attacks of 50 or more men to fix American units while other NKPA elements moved to envelop the American position. Finally, the 25th Infantry Division reported that during an enemy attack, a small group of NKPA soldiers offered to surrender. When the Americans ceased fire and moved forward to apprehend the enemy soldiers, a company-sized NKPA force concealed nearby attacked the American unit. Overall, the PIR evaluated the situation in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone as "stable;" however, the 25th Infantry Division to the north of the 1st Cavalry faced "aggressive attack [sic] combined with infiltration tactics." Eighth Army's estimate of the enemy's most likely course of action remained the same: the main effort moving along the Taejon-Kumchon axis, combined with a deep envelopment of the army's left flank and guerrilla action against the army's rear areas.72

XVII. July 29, 1950

July 29 marked the withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry from the vicinity of No Gun Ri and the arrival of the NKPA in Hwanggan. The 1st Cavalry Division continued its phased withdrawal to the Naktong River. No friendly forces returned to this area until the September breakout from the Naktong River defenses.

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The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 29 PIR reported some NKPA patrol activity in the division's zone during the last 24 hours but "no concerted pressure at any point." The PIR offered no estimate of the enemy's most likely course of action.73 A disturbing entry appeared in Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 29: the 25th Infantry Division reported that a soldier who escaped the ambush of his patrol had seen NKPA troops shooting wounded American soldiers they had captured. The PIR further reported some reduction in the NKPA 3rd Division's pressure against the 1st Cavalry Division's front but warned that aerial reconnaissance had revealed a large build-up in the vicinity of Chirye and south of the 1st Cavalry's new positions around Kumchon. Eighth Army evaluated this build-up as an effort by the NKPA 3rd Division to envelop the 1st Cavalry's left flank through a gap between the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Division to its south. However, Eighth Army now considered the Taejon-Kumchon axis as the NKPA's secondary effort; increasing pressure in the 24th Infantry Division's zone, particularly around Kochang and Hadong, suggested that the enemy's main effort had shifted to envelop Eighth Army's left flank coupled with increasing guerrilla activity in Eighth Army's rear areas.74 During the next 12 hours, little action occurred in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone; the division's 6:00 PM July 30 PIR reported only intermittent artillery fire, some sniping and tank fire, and a small patrol. Captured NKPA documents and aerial reconnaissance indicated two regiments to the division's front with a possible second division in the vicinity of Yongdong. The division intelligence staff concluded that the "enemy seems to be content to hold the ground gained with the probability of his building power to again start an envelopment of this division."75

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 30 noted that no "significant attacks" occurred in the Kumchon area in the previous 24 hours. While many believed that a regiment in the vicinity of Chirye was attempting to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army's intelligence staff felt that the NKPA had reduced its forces facing American and South Korean units in the Kumsong- Hamchang area and only intended to fix these units and not break through them. Instead, the NKPA used the forces redeployed from the Kumsong-Hamchang area to reinforce units conducting the deep envelopment of Eighth Army south of Taejon along the Chinju-Masan axis and in the vicinity of Kochang. The PIR warned that this effort to outflank Eighth Army, combined with continued pressure against South Korean units along the Yongju-Andong axis, "could provide the means for double envelopment of U.S. and ROK forces in the Yongdong- Hamchang area."76 The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 31 PIR reported intermittent mortar and artillery fire, some direct fire from tanks, and some patrol action. The NKPA made only one significant attack in company strength at dawn against the

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7th Cavalry Regiment. The division intelligence staff noted that the enemy's infantry activity indicated "that they still [relied] predominantly on infiltration, surprise and light automatic weapons and do not press determined attacks against our strong points." The PIR continued to rate the enemy's combat efficiency and morale as good. As for NKPA intentions, the PIR reported that the enemy intended to envelop the division's northern flank and break through the 5th Cavalry Regiment on the division's southern flank to drive toward the Naktong River crossing site near Waegwan.77

The following days saw the continued, phased withdrawal of the entire Eighth Army back to the next defensible terrain: the Naktong River. The Eighth Army's PIRs proved remarkably accurate in spite of the fluid and dynamic enemy situation. This intelligence success allowed the Eighth Army's divisions to block effectively the threat of a NKPA flanking maneuver and therefore reach the Naktong to fight another day.

XVIII. U.S. Air Force operations in July 1950

One of the UN's few advantages was air power in the form of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) assets. Fighters, bombers, fighter-bombers, transports, and reconnaissance aircraft helped to slow the North Korean advance. In fact, the UN air forces neutralized the North Korean air force and gained air superiority over South Korea and most of North Korea during the first month of the war. In addition to air superiority, UN tactical air power's other missions included interdicting North Korean supply lines and providing close air support for friendly ground forces, which required attacks on buildings, bridges, roads, and railroads. All types of vehicles and troops appeared as military targets both at the front and behind enemy lines. Beyond the constantly shifting bomb line, tactical air elements freely attacked interdiction targets without fear of hitting friendly forces. Pilots sometimes identified what appeared to be large groups of refugees, moving at their own risk in the combat zone, as enemy troops and supply carriers.78 As mentioned earlier, the North Koreans often used civilian refugees as human screens for patrols and flanking movements and as supply bearers. By July 26, 1950, stories abounded in the Air Force, the Army, and elsewhere about North Korean soldiers posing as civilians and infiltrating U.S. lines dressed in the traditional Korean white garb. Eighth Army refugee policies soon denied the refugees entry or allowed passage through the lines at specific times during the day. These directives further provided that the U.S. soldiers turned the refugees over to the South Korean National Police.79

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XIX. Air-Ground operations in July 1950

A discussion of air-ground operations is important because the AP said in a December 29, 1999, article that U.S. jets attacked Korean civilians and the Korean witnesses stated that U.S. airplanes strafed them.

In July 1950, Field Manual (FM) 31-35 (dated August 1946) explained air- ground operations and the Tactical Air Control System that would manage these operations. FM 31-35 provided for a Joint Operations Center (JOC) manned by U.S. Army and Air Force intelligence and operations personnel. The Joint Operations Center received Army requests for air support and planned and ordered daily air operations. At the heart of the Joint Operations Center rested the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), which provided aircraft control and warning and directed all airborne activity. The Joint Operations Center also communicated with individual Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP). The TACPs, which operated on the ground, mobile and close to the front lines, directed the aircraft to targets.80

XX. The Joint Operations Center

The first Korean War Joint Operations Center was established at Itazuke Air Base, Japan, on July 3, 1950. Later that month, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced; the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW); the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group (FBG); and five F­80 fighter-bomber squadrons established their headquarters at this location. The Joint Operations Center deployed to Korea on July 6, co- locating with Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division, at Taejon. The first three Tactical Air Control Parties, each comprised of a forward air controller (a pilot), a radio operator, and a mechanic driver, began operating at Chonan on July 5, 1950. Their AN/VRC-1 radio system was mounted in the rear of a jeep. The AN/VRC-1 consisted of an SCR-193 High-Frequency radio for point-to-point contact and an SCR-522 VHF radio for air-to-ground contact. Radio performance suffered greatly from the bumpy roads, and the radios proved difficult to maintain. Furthermore, the High-Frequency (HF) radio could only range 30 miles.81

XXI. The Tactical air controller

Air Force leadership soon determined that the Air Force needed another element to maintain effective contact between the Joint Operations Center and the Tactical Air Control Parties and to direct the F­80s to a target before the aircraft ran out of fuel. That component was the Airborne Tactical Air Controller, which, in the absence of enemy air opposition, could conduct tactical reconnaissance over the battlefield and immediate enemy rear areas and provide air-to-air direction for tactical aircraft arriving from Itazuke.82

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A control team tested the L­5G liaison aircraft on July 9, 1950, but the aircraft proved too slow and its power generator fitted the SCR-522 airborne radios poorly. The next day, a T­6 with an eight-channel AN/ARC-3 radio worked successfully.83 As the front squeezed in upon Taejon, the T­6s evacuated to Taegu on July 13 and fell under the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron's command the following day. The Joint Operations Center followed in stages between July 14 and 19. Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, moved from Itazuke to Taegu on July 23 and set up headquarters adjacent to Headquarters, Eighth Army.84 This arrangement allowed Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker (Eighth Army) and Major General Earl E. Partridge (Fifth Air Force), and their respective staffs, to communicate target requests and generally manage the air campaign better. This arrangement permitted face-to-face discussions of sensitive matters instead of communicating via paper. On July 24, the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group (re-designated from squadron status two days earlier) assumed control of the Tactical Air Control Center; the Tactical Air Control Parties; and, for a short period, the airborne controllers, who, beginning on July 15, were called Mosquitoes.85 On August 1, 1950, the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (TCS), Airborne, was established at Taegu under the operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, to operate the T­6s.86 Thus, by July 26, 1950, the fundamental components of the Tactical Air Control System existed: the JOC (call sign Angelo); the TACC (call sign Mellow or Mellow Control); at least six Tactical Air Control Parties (call signs Angelo Queen, Mike, Love, X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra); and eight combat- ready T­6s (call signs Mosquito Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, Jig, King, and Uncle). A critical point to note is that an ordinary ground soldier could not talk directly to a T­6 and request an air strike. Only the Tactical Air Control Party with the jeep-mounted AN/VRC-1 radios could talk to the Mosquito or an F­80. At best, the infantry or cavalry soldier only carried a hand-held "walkie-talkie" radio or the larger backpack SCR-300 radio. To request an air strike, an Army unit, usually at the battalion level or higher, passed a request up through Army channels to the Joint Operations Center; the Joint Operations Center would validate the request and pass it to the Tactical Air Control Center (Mellow). This process included Mellow checking with the deployed Tactical Air Control Parties, Mosquitoes, and Army spotters to acknowledge the target and direct the next available F­80s, F­51s, or Navy aircraft to attack the target. This procedure was slow. A moving target could easily have vanished between the time a ground soldier reported something and an aircraft arrived.87 Sometime in mid-August 1950, the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron began installing SCR-300 radios in some of the T­6s on a test basis. Although this experiment worked, talking directly with ground units still remained difficult.88 In an interview, a former 1st Cavalry Division Army Liaison pilot stated that he could talk to the Division G-3 but could not communicate with the ground forces. He did state that on one occasion he communicated with them by dropping a "message sack."

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XXII. Tactical air operations on July 26, 1950

At 25/1359Z July 1950, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, issued Operation Order (OPORD) 24-50 for July 26, covering all forces under its operational control, to include B­26, RF­80, F­51, T­6, and F­80 aircraft. Some specific targets were designated, and B­29 operating areas were identified. In addition to orders to conduct armed and visual reconnaissance of Taejon, Hamyang, and Yongju; escort B­26s; conduct weather reconnaissance; and provide area fighter support for B­29s, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing provided close support missions as directed by Mellow. The first flight arrived in the target area by first light followed by other flights at 15-minute intervals.89 At 5:35 AM local time on July 26, the Fighter-Bomber Wing issued its fragmentary order (FRAGO, or implementing order) for the 26th. The FRAGO outlined a B­26 escort mission; the strafing of an airfield at Konan as mentioned in the operations order and provisions for strip alert (S/A); the employment of Combat Air Patrols (CAP); and nighttime activities for the F­82s; in addition, the FRAGO identified takeoff times and intervals for the F­80 units to provide close- support missions.90 An examination of the F­80 mission summary reports for July 26 shows that the missions flown match the missions scheduled.91 The Air Force History Team found mission summary reports for four (8th, 9th, and 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons, and the 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) of the five F­80 squadrons flying on 26 July 1950.92 For the fifth squadron (80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron), the team found handwritten materials providing mission numbers, flying times, and target areas. The 36th Fighter- Bomber Squadron did not fly on July 26.93 The F­80s carried six .50-caliber machine guns and two or four five-inch, high-velocity aerial rockets (HVAR). At this time, F-80s could not carry bombs or napalm from Japan because of fuel limitations.94 The primary mission of the F­80s and the F­82s in the Fifth Air Force was the air defense of Japan. As of mid-July 1950, two F­80 squadrons (the 7th Fighter-Bomber Squadron and 41st Fighter Interceptor Squadron) and one F­82 squadron (339th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) remained with the air defense and training missions in northern and central Japan.95 The need for better ground attack aircraft led the Air Force to convert some squadrons back to the propeller-driven F­51s from the jet-propelled F­80s. At that time the F­51s could carry bombs and fly from Korean bases. The 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron converted to F­51s on July 16 and deployed to Pohang on the east coast of Korea. The 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron followed on August 7.96 The sector of primary interest for this report is the central front, where the North Koreans were driving down the main railroad from Taejon toward Taegu. Taejon fell on July 20 and the North Koreans took Yongdong on July 25. The UN held the next significant town on the rail line, Hwanggan, until July 29.97 Thus, one of the key targets on July 26 was Yongdong and any North Korean forces

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moving through that location. (See U.S. Air Force Mission Diagram and Charts in Appendix E.) Most of the missions could contact Mellow upon arriving over Korea. Many were handed off once or twice to a Mosquito controller, a Tactical Air Control Party, or an Army air spotter. On July 26, those missions contacting Dragon Fly, the 24th Infantry Division air spotter, occurred in the 24th Division area to the south of the 1st Cavalry Division area. Some aircraft found no targets. Most missions went to Taejon, Yongju, and Tanyang in the north or Hadong in the south. Most of those aircraft that flew to Yongdong either hit the town or proceeded north, west, or south. However, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's Mission #2 strafed vehicles one mile east of Yongdong around 7:00 AM on July 26. The 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's mission #11 strafed a double railroad tunnel west of Yongdong around 5:00 PM on July 26. The 39th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's mission #11 at 8:00 PM on July 26 reported a tank and three trucks damaged east of Yongdong. The team found no information on 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron Mission #7, which may have gone to Yongdong around 2:00 PM on July 26. None of the F­80 mission reports on July 26 mention observing or strafing a large group of people in white clothing.98 Of the three F­51 units, specific reports exist only on the Royal Australian Air Force No. 77 Squadron. This squadron flew two missions of four aircraft each. The first mission was primarily an escort mission for B­26s charged with bombing pontoon bridges across the Han River near Seoul. After completing the escort mission, the F­51s, armed with .50-caliber machine guns and five-inch rockets, contacted Mellow, who steered them to Chongsan to attack various targets. One of the aircraft contacted Mosquito Jig, who directed the plane to targets north of Yongsang-Ni. Mellow directed the second mission, also four F­ 51s with machines guns and rockets only, to strafe roads west and north of Namwon up to Taejon. Very few targets were visible. After landing at Taegu and refueling, the four F-51s became airborne again; Mellow vectored them to Yongju. They then flew to Tangyang and Punggi before returning to Iwakuni.99 The 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group, operating out of Pohang on the east coast, almost fought a separate war in supporting the ROK forces against attacks south from Yongdok toward Pohang. OPORD 24-50 gave the 40th the authority to use all of its aircraft on the east coast. Some "three-hour" intelligence reports describe 16 F­51 missions from Pohang mostly to Yongdok, Yonju, and Tanyang.100 No mission reports were available. The mission report section of Fifth Air Force intelligence issued the "Three-Hour Report" at three-hour intervals. This report provided brief results of missions flown during the previous three hours based upon the exit information provided to Mellow by aircraft leaving the combat area. Many of these reports match the mission reports completed by the squadron intelligence officer after debriefing the pilots. In the absence of mission reports for the two U.S. F­51 squadrons and the totaling of all sorties by type of aircraft in summaries such as

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the recapitulation report, the three-hour reports provided the only source available to differentiate mission results from K-2 and K-3 in Korea and Itazuke air base in Japan. The Air Force History Team located a few three-hour reports for July 26, on the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) at Taegu but found no mission reports. The 51st flew at least 10 missions. One morning mission and two late afternoon missions occurred in the Yongdong area on July 26. During one of the late afternoon missions, three F­51s dropped four 500-pound napalm bombs in the Yongdong area.101 The three-hour reports also indicate that before dawn on July 26, an F­82 on a night intruder mission dropped two napalm bombs on Mangyong. One bomb was a dud.102 In addition to the absence of mission reports for the two F­51 units, the Air Force researchers could find no reports for the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron T­6s. This unit did not exist formally until August 1 although the T­6s flew from 10 July onward. Mission reports exist from November 1, 1950, when the squadron became a group. Nonetheless, the daily "Final Recapitulation- Summary of Air Operations" report for July 26, 1950, issued by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force intelligence, does not identify any targets struck that day anywhere near No Gun Ri.103

XXIII. Friendly fire incident on July 27, 1950

An event that might bear on the alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri concerns a friendly fire incident that occurred in the Hwanggan area on July 27; an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 AM, prompting the regimental commander to request that a TACP be assigned immediately.104 This location is approximately 500 meters east of the double railroad overpass and 100 meters south-southeast of the single railroad overpass. A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was an F-80 from one of the 35th FBS's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour).105 The 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing fragmentary order for July 27, 1950 106 matched the F-80 squadron mission summary reports; the requirements and take-off times agreed with each other.107 Given the timing of the day's missions, only the three missions flown by the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron with take-off times between 0600K and 0640K could have flown in the target area at 0715K (K, or Kilo, time represents local time in Korea). A weather reconnaissance flight to Korea from the 36th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (Mission 36-1) took off from Itazuke, Japan, at 0545K but returned at 0720K. The first of the 0700 flights, Mission 39-2, took off at 0710K and did not arrive in Korea until 0735K. Mission 39-1 was a strip alert scramble that occurred at 0755K. 108 The Final Mission Summary Reports for July 27, indicated that Mission 35- 1, Contour George, flew in the Yongdong-Hwanggan area while 35-2, Contour Roger, and 35-3, Contour William, flew elsewhere. The four F-80s of Mission 35-

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1 departed Itazuke at 0600K. They contacted Mellow over Taejon and destroyed a flak emplacement hidden in a damaged C-47 sitting on the Taejon airfield. Pineapple Control (an Army L-5 or L-17 from the 1st Cavalry Division) then directed Mission 35-1 to Yongdong, and the four planes flew up the road northeast toward Hwanggan without incident.109 The pilots reported seeing U.S. artillery firing into Hwanggan, but they were mistaken because the town remained in U.S. hands for a few more days. At least one F-80 strafed a "wooden area into which many vehicle tracks were leading", probably the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's command post. The strafing destroyed two trucks but claimed no lives.110

XXIV. Strafing and civilians

On July 25, 1950, Colonel Turner C. Rogers sent a memorandum, subject: Policy on Strafing Civilians, to his immediate superior, Brigadier General Edward J. Timberlake, Vice Commander of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced (ADVON) (Korea).111 In his memorandum, which was not an order, Colonel Rogers mentioned that the Army requested that the Air Force strafe all civilian refugee parties that approached the Army's positions. He pointed out that air operations involving the strafing "of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and to the U.S. government in its relation with the United Nations." Rogers argued that the refugee issue was primarily an Army problem and that the Army should screen civilians as they came through the lines. He further recommended that Fifth Air Force aircraft not attack refugee groups unless they were "definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or [to] commit hostile acts."112 No reply to the memorandum or comment exists in the files. A notation on the copy found in the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) implies that General Timberlake saw the memorandum and referred it to public relations. A similar statement was found in a Navy document describing operations conducted on July 25, 1950:

Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.113

Since both the Rogers's memorandum and this document are dated July 25, 1950, it is most likely that they were referencing a single discussion in the Joint Operations Center, where both USAF and USN operations officers were co- located. The Navy statement reinforces the judgment that pilots were expected

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to exercise between selecting targets and the Army's desire to target NKPA troops wearing white, not noncombatants. Colonel Rogers, a 37-year-old West Point graduate with fourteen years of Air Force service, completed the Air War College in June 1950 and became available for an assignment to the new Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced. He arrived in mid-July 1950 and was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, just before the advanced headquarters deployed from Itazuke to Taegu.114 On March 13, 2000, the Air Force Inspector General representative interviewed Major General Turner C. Rogers, USAF (Retired), the author of this memorandum. General Rogers could offer no further information on the document in question.115

In interviews with USAF combat pilots who flew in Korea during July- August 1950, the pilots stated that their orders were to confirm their targets as military or hostile before firing. Their attack priorities were tanks, trucks, and buildings. None of these individuals recall being given orders to strafe any civilian refugee parties that were approaching Army positions. A thorough search of all available records failed to produce any requests made by the Army to the Air Force or the Navy asking them to conduct operations against known refugees as described in the July 25, 1950, Rogers memorandum or the USS Valley Forge Intelligence Summary of the same date.116 On August 5, 1950, the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron replaced the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) at Taegu. This organization supplied most of the pilots and aircraft deployed to Taegu in mid-July and became known as the Dallas Project. The Air Force History Team found two examples of how these F­ 51 pilots felt about, and dealt with, the prospect of strafing civilians. Lieutenant Duane E. Biteman patrolled the Naktong river line. He had very general instructions not to let refugees cross the river into the Pusan perimeter. For a "couple of hours," he made low passes along the river, firing warning bursts into the river shallows to force the refugees away from the river and hoping that they would not cross and force him to shoot.117 In another incident, a Forward Air Controller directed the squadron commander, Major Harry Moreland, and his wingman, Captain Daniel James, to a large number of enemy troops moving down the road. Upon inspecting this group, Moreland and James saw mostly women and children and did not attack.118 In addition, some of the Australian pilots of No. 77 Squadron felt troubled at shooting people in white clothing. But when the Mosquito Forward Air Controllers assured the Australian pilots that the targets were legitimate and would blow up when hit, the pilots attacked. "It's a gut wrenching business," said Australian pilot John Flemming.119

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XXV. Imagery

As part of the research effort, the Air Force History Team searched for tactical reconnaissance and gun camera film. The Team found 8th TRS film of the No Gun Ri area dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. Some patterns are apparent near the tracks. A National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) photo interpreter maintains that these patterns show "an imagery signature of probable strafing."120 However, the Air Force Team showed this film to four retired photo interpreters of national reputation. All of them agree that the film shows no signs of bombing or strafing on the railroad tracks.121 The USAF History office consulted several photo analysts of national reputation, the first analyst found "no evident [sic] of strafing" on the larger pattern and "no apparent strafing damage" on the smaller pattern. The second analyst, the author of three books on World War II photo analysis, saw "no sign of strafing" on the large pattern and "no sign of . . . ground disturbance suggesting strafing" on the smaller pattern. The third analyst, who had been the senior Air Force instructor at the Department of Defense Advanced Imagery Interpretation School, saw "no evidence of strafing" in either pattern. The fourth analyst, whose photo-analyst career encompassed teaching, Special Operations, and various international assignments, found "no evidence or any indication of strafing by either cannon or machine-gun" on the larger pattern and "no evidence of strafing damage" on the smaller pattern.122 A thorough investigation of the Air Force's role during this period of the Korean War yielded no evidence to suggest that Air Force aircraft strafed Korean refugees or enemy soldiers at, or near, No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950. In fact, no evidence of any Air Force activity in the vicinity of No Gun Ri exists. The Air Force Team did not find all mission reports for the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron or the T­6 Mosquitoes, which leaves three missions of the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron at midday for which we cannot account. However, the final Fifth Air Force recapitulation report for operations on July 26, 1950 shows no target struck in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on the 26th, and the imagery analysis shows no evidence as well.

XXVI. U.S. Navy air operations in July 1950

Naval air power played a potentially relevant role in the fighting during this period as well, but no evidence exists that suggests that U.S. Naval aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets. Attack Squadron Fifty-Five (VA-55) and Fighter Squadron Fifty-Three (VF-53) participated in air operations during the last week of July 1950. Both squadrons deployed aboard Valley Forge (CV 45) as part of Carrier Air Group Five (CVG-5) from 1 May through December 1, 1950. Other squadrons deployed as a part of CVG-5 that could have participated in air operations near No Gun Ri were VF-51, VF-52, VF-55, Composite Squadron 3 Detachment C (VC-3 Det C), and VC-11.123

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A thorough study of the command histories and after-action reports held by the Naval Historical Center indicates that these squadrons also did not participate near No Gun Ri. Yet several documents provided some insight into close air support mission management and illustrated the priority placed on developing an effective command-and-control network. The available archival records recount problems employing air assets to support the ground troops from the very beginning. On July 22, 1950, this challenge was evident when carrier-based aircraft "were placed under the airborne control of the 5th AF while in support of ground forces in Korea."124 On July 25 the results of the July 22 Navy missions were summarized in a memorandum to General Partridge, Commanding General, Headquarters, Fifth Advance, K-2, by noting that "the Navy had been unable on the 22d [July] to make contact with your control [Air Force]."125 As a part of the working solution documented in the CINCPACFLT [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet] Interim Report of Korean No. 1 on July 28, 1950, the Navy sent "a liaison officer to JOC [Joint Operations Center], 5th AF [Air Force] to arrange assignment of naval aircraft to specified forward air controllers (airborne)."126 The stated purpose of the liaison was to develop joint command- and-control procedures for the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

XXVII. Naval air mission targeting guidance

Naval air mission targeting guidance for the last week of July varied widely from clearly defined objectives to somewhat general targeting suggestions. Stronger, more precise guidance gave "instructions to hit bridges, columns of troops, tanks, and any other assembly which looks as if it might be military."127 Other documented guidance is available in the Valley Forge Report of Operations that indicated that "the target area assigned was designated `free Navy opportunity area' since facilities on the ground for close troop support were not made available to Navy planes. Principal targets were enemy troops, armor and vehicles, rolling stock, barge traffic and lines of communication."128 Attacks against readily identifiable military targets were a priority. Identifying non-personnel military targets proved relatively easy. However, the existing tactical situation called for targeting ground forces, which proved more difficult. Non-combatant civilians often commingled with enemy combatants, and pilots struggled to distinguish enemy troops based upon clothing. Two particular situations illustrate how the Navy relied on the judgment of its pilots as these pilots evaluated targets as hostile or friendly. On July 25, after an initial attack against ground contacts, "the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians[;] other groups were investigated by non-firing runs."129 Three days later the Valley Forge Operations Report noted that, "as on previous

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days, pilots saw groups of people in white shirts, apparently working in the fields, but paying no attention to the planes."130 Pilots deemed these groups as civilian and not openly hostile. The pilots did not attack. Both the interim evaluation report and the Valley Forge Operations Report contain observations on weapons loading for specific aircraft. From the operations report, "the most practical close support load for the ADs was 1-500# GP, 1-220# fragmentation bomb and 1 napalm bomb plus a maximum number of HVARs or 100# GP. The F4Us carried a 500# bomb or napalm and maximum HVARs [High-Velocity Air Rockets] or 100# GP. All aircraft carried a maximum load [sic] of 20mm ammunition at a ratio of 1 HEI, 1 AP and 1 incendiary. The ADs were loaded with 2000# GP and 1000# GP on occasions when specific targets called for those types of explosives."131 Expanding on that general description, the interim evaluation provided further details on ordnance loading:132

Ordnance/Aircra 20mm Bombs Rockets ft cannon F4U Load Able 800 rds 1x1000# 8-5"HVAR Load Baker 800 rds 2x150gals 8-5" HVAR (Napalm) AD Load Able 400 rds 3x500# 12-5" HVAR Load Baker 400 rds 3x150 gals 12-250# (Napalm) Frags Load Charlie 400 rds 2x1000# 12-250# Frags

As far as ship positioning, the Valley Forge Report of Operations describes air wing operations on July 25 and 26 from a position about 30 miles southeast of Pohang. On July 28 and 29, the air wing operated off the west coast of Korea from an unspecified location.133

XXVIII. Naval air mission planning

As reflected in after-action summaries, missions during the last week of July were planned carefully. The action summary for July 26 stated that: "The missions for the various [aircraft] divisions were a result of information [presumably intelligence] concerning enemy dispositions issued by the Army and Air Force at Taegu last night. Tactical Air Control parties based in Korea established communication with the strike planes and assigned the various targets in and near the North Korea front lines."134 In missions applying that planning factor, the VA-55 history report indicated that attacks "destroyed seventy percent (70%) of the village of Yongdong, minor damage to a railway

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bridge at Yongdong and many enemy troops destroyed."135 The Valley Forge Operations Summary offered more detail: "Still on call to the TAC, the planes dropped 7 500#, 20 100#, 21 HVARs (High Velocity Air Rocket) on a small town 7-8 miles NNE of Yongdong" (No Gun Ri is seven miles east-northeast of Yongdong. This location is not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. There are numerous villages north-northeast of Yongdong at a range of seven to eight miles.).136 "Four ADs (Skyraiders), directed to "wipe out" Yongdong, hit the town with napalm, leaving it burning fiercely."137 From the action summary for July 28, the report details a close air support mission in which "four ADs reported to TAC and Yongdong, where he (the pilot) explained that the first tunnel north of the city was occupied by enemy troops, the second one north by friendlies. Four napalm hits were put into the tunnel, after which large quantities of black smoke issued from the ends. This target is evaluated as damaged with countless loss of lives."138 The operations report further details attacks on other villages near Yongdong but without sufficient detail to determine the exact location. A thorough analysis of the available Navy air activity documentation yields a picture of competent Navy air planners working closely with their Army and Air Force counterparts to fight the war as efficiently and effectively as possible. The military leadership, down to the individual pilot, recognized fully the presence of civilians in the war zone, and leaders at each level of command acted to avoid engaging these non-combatants. No evidence exists that shows that Navy aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets.

XXIX. Conclusion

This focused discussion on the intelligence, ground combat, and air operations of late July 1950 outlines the events based upon all currently available archival and secondary-source evidence. The battlefield between Yongdong and Hwanggan remained a very fluid place from July 25 to July 29. Unfortunately, both sides met on a complex battlefield rife with the natural obstacles of war: civilians, villages, and road and rail networks. The U.S. maintained a reasonably accurate and informed intelligence picture of the enemy, but the NKPA tactic of infiltrating enemy soldiers dressed as civilian refugees behind U.S. lines truly challenged the soldiers' ability to distinguish friend from foe. U.S. soldiers new to combat and to the country encountered a war unlike the one fought barely five years earlier in World War II. Guerilla-type tactics reigned, and the threat existed everywhere, even behind friendly lines. Rumors carried great weight among the Soldiers, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, showed the effects of such hearsay when they withdrew on the night of July 25 in disarray and not in enemy contact.

The air war over Korea played an important role in the Eighth Army's daily operations. However, the only documented air strike in the immediate vicinity of Hwanggan area occurred northeast of No Gun Ri on July 27 and damaged the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post but wounded no one. The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 or 27. On July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge were

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directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns. These available facts help to paint a clearer, more informed picture of the events in those crucial first days of the U.S. military's involvement in the Korean War.

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Endnotes

1 War Department Field Manual 30-5, Military Intelligence: Combat Intelligence (Washington: War Department, February 1946), 8. The next revision of FM 30-5 was published in 1951.

2 Ibid, 13.

3 Ibid, 70-71.

4 Ibid, 8.

5 John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh, Military Intelligence (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 111-113. Two unofficial post-war publications, intended for officers with little or no intelligence experience assigned to intelligence positions, were Colonel Stedman Chandler and Colonel Robert W. Robb, Front-Line Intelligence (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), and Robert R. Glass and Philip B. Davidson, Intelligence Is For Commanders (Harrisburg, Penn: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948). On inadequate training in patrolling, see Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, Appendix C-2, copy in File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Box 558, Chief of Staff Decimal File 1950, Record Group 319, NARA; "Some Infantry Lessons From Korea," (n.d., but from internal evidence probably 1952), 7-8, copy in File Geog V Korea 321 Infantry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

6 "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," Appendix C; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces on Section II, Conclusions, and Section III, Recommendations, of Report of First Office, Chief of Army Field Forces' Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 August 1950," 1-2, enclosure to letter, 28 August 1950, General Mark W. Clark to General J. Lawton Collins, File 350.07 Far East, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 128, RG 319, NARA; Matthew M. Aid, "US Humnint and Comint in the Korea; From the Approach of War to the Chinese Intervention," Intelligence and National Security, v.14, no.4 (Winter 1999), 27, 45. The quote is from Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces," 2.

7 Aid, "US Humnint and Comint in the Korean War," 19-27, 30-41. On American war planning, see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950 (New York: Garland, 1988).

8 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950," 1 August 1950, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA; Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), "Standard Operating Procedure: Intelligence," 10 July 1950, File Oper Rpt 1950-51, Box 7, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, RG 338. The division's intelligence SOP was firmly grounded in FM 30-5; 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Annex B (Intelligence) to Operations Order 9-50, 22 0700-K July 1950, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

9 "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950;" Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 2400 19 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

10 Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), War Diary July 1950, Entry for 18 and 19 July 1950, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

11 Most of the various sources used by army and division intelligence staffs to develop their analyses are noted in the Periodic Intelligence Reports these staffs produced. For communications intelligence, see Aid, 45-48. Doctrine concerning sources is in FM 30-5, 25-31.

12 FM 30-5, 75-77.

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13 Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, "History of the North Korean Army," July 1952, 56-58, 74-75, 79-80 (copy in File Geog V Korea 314.7 North Korean Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 263; "Report of the First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 8.

14 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 210-213.

15 Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-11N, 21 April 1948, Department of the Army.

16 Letter, Douglas MacArthur, 15 November 1957, sub: Manuscript South to the Naktong. In Records of the Army Staff, Box 747, RG 319, NARA.

17 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

18 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

19 Letter, Headquarters III Corps, 24 August 1953, sub: Manuscript South to the Naktong. In Records of the Army Staff, Box 746, RG 319, NARA.

20 War diary, 24th Infantry Division, 12-13 July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Infantry Divisions 1940-1967, 24th ID, Box 528, RG 338, NARA.

21 War diary, 8th Cavalry Division, July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 65, RG 338, NARA.

22 "United States Army in the Korean War: The Medics' War," by Albert E. Cowdrey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1990.

23 Letter, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), 1 August 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Division 1940-967, Box 34, RG 338, NARA.

24 "G-2 Monthly Narrative for 25 June to 31 July 1950;" Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 2400 19 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

25 Serial Number 28, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 Journal, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Cavalry Divisions 1960-1967, Box 54, RG 338, NARA.

26 War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

27 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #9, 2400 21 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July) Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

28 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Annex B (Intelligence) to Operations Order 9-50, 22 0700-K July 1950, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

29 Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

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30 War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

31 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

32 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #1, 1800 22 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

33 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #10, 2400 22 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

34 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

35 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

36 Periodic operations report, 1st Cavalry Division, 23 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

37 Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

38 Activities report, Headquarters 545 Military Police Company, 5 August 1950. In the records of Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4406, RG 407, NARA.

39 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #2, 1800 23 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

40 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #11, 2400 23 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

41 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

42 Operations plan, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

43 Ibid.

44 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

45 Ibid.

46 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #3, 1800 24 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

47 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #12, 2400 24 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

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48 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

49 Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

50 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #4, 1800 25 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

51 Joint Message Form, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 26 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

52 War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

53 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

54 Message, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

55 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

56 War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

57 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #13, 2400 25 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

58 "Of Garry Owen in Glory: The History of the 7th U. S. Cavalry," by Lt. Col. Melbourne C. Chandler. Hendricks-Miller Typographic Co. Washington, D.C. 1960.

59 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

60 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #5, 1800 26 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

61 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #14, 2400 26 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

62 War diary summaries, Headquarters 77th Field Artillery Battalion, 27 July 1950. In the records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

63 War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA; Report, First OCAFF, 16 August 1950. In the Records of Army Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 1950, Box 558, RG 319, NARA.

64 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #6, 1800 27 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

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65 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #15, 2400 27 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

66 War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

67 War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

68 Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 1800 28 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA; Valley Forge Report of Operations, 16 July to 31 July 1950 <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/v- forge.html>

69 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 1800 28 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

70 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

71 War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

72 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #16, 2400 28 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

73 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #8, 1800 29 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

74 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #17, 2400 29 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

75 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #9, 1800 30 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

76 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #18, 2400 30 July 1950, File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950, Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

77 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #10, 1800 31 July 1950, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

78 Roy E. Appleman, "US Army in the Korean War, South to Naktong, North to the Yalu (June- November 1950)," Washington DC, OCMH, DA, 1961. Hereafter cited as "Appleman"; ROK, Ministry of National Defense, "The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War," Vol. IV, "The United States Forces in the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951." Hereafter cited as "ROK MOND Hist, Vol. IV"; USAF Historical Study No. 71, "United States Air Force Operations in the Korean War, 25 June-1 November 1950," USAF Historical Division, 1 July 1952. Hereafter cited as "Hist Study #71."

109

79 Monograph, HQ EUSAK, "Enemy Tactics," 26 Dec 51. pp. 112-120; Rpt, 5AF/OA and TARS. "Enemy Use of Camouflage in the Korean Campaign." TARS Special Report No. 32. 22 Jan 51, pp. 8-12; HQ FEC Military Intelligence Section. Daily Summary of Intelligence/G-2 Estimate of the Situation. No. 16-2863, 110500K to 120500K. 11-12 Jul 50, PI and I-e N020-2868, 160500K- 170400K. 16-17 Jul 50. PI-b. No. 23-2871. 190400K-200400K. 19-20 Jul 50. PI-f. No. 24-2871. 200400K-210400K. 20-21 Jul 50. PI-i; R.J.H Johnston, "Infiltrating Tactics by Reds Confusing to GIs in Korea," New York Times, 24 Jul 50, p. 1, 5; A.M. Rosenthal, "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans," New York Times, 27 Jul 50, p. 1, 3; Carl Mydans, "Refugees Get in the Way," Life, 21 Aug 50; John Osborne, "Report from the Orient: Guns are not Enough," Life 21 Aug 50, pp. 76- 78, 81-85; 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, with G-2 and G-3 Sections, Jul 50. Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Report 1949 - 1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

80 War Department Field Manual FM 31-35, "Air-Ground Operations," 13 Aug 46, Document 12. Hereafter cited as "FM 31-35, Aug 46"; Fifth Air Force Historical Data, Phase I - Korean War, 25 June-31 October 1950, vol. II, chap. IV, "Air-Ground Support," pp. 132-148. Hereafter cited as "Hist 5AF"; 5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50.

81 Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, pp. 18-23 and Vol. II, Chap IV, pp. 132-148; Historical Study #71, pp. 23-25; George R. Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, "US Army in WWII, the Technical Services. The Signal Corps: the Outcome (mid 1943-1945)," Washington DC, OCMH, DA, 1966, p. 494, 501, 502, 641.

82 Hist 5AF, Vol. II, Chap. IV, pp. 149-150; Hist Study #71, p. 26; Hist 6147 TCS (A), July 1950, pp. 2-3.

83 Hist 5AF, Vol. II, Chap IV, pp. 151-155; Hist Study #71, p. 26; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, pp. 4- 5; Air Technical Service Command, "Graphic Survey of Radio and Radar Equipment Used by the Army Air Forces," 1 Mar 45, AN/ARC-3.

84 Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, pp. 18-28; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, pp. 6-7; 5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, extract, Document 13. Msg, COMAF 5 to ADV HQ FAF, OPR 1831, 12/1056Z Jul 50; Msg, Mississippi to Tailboard. 18/0530Z, Jul 50.

85 Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 25; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, p. 7; 5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50.

86 Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 27; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Aug 50, p. 1; 5AF ADV GO 12, 29 Jul 50.

87 Hist 5AF, Vol. II, Chap. IV, pp. 132-159; Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50; 5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, extract, Document 13; MSG, CG EUSAK to CG 20AF, et al, GX 20468 KGO, 24/1530K, Jul 50; Hist Study #71, p. 26.

88 Hist 6147 TCS (A), Aug 50, p. 12.

89 Msg, COMAF FIVE ADV to JOC, et al, ADV-B-129, 25/1359Z, Jul 50.

90 Msg, COMFTRBOMWG 8 to COMFTRBOMGP 8, et al, OPR 319G, 26/0535K, Jul 50.

91 "List of F-80 Sorties for 26 Jul 50," Mar 2000; Computer List "F-80 Sorties 26 July 1950," 28 Jul 2000, 27 pages.

92 "Fighter-Bomber Final Mission Summary (FEAF Intel Form #5)," Reports, either the original handwritten forms or teletype copies, for the 8 and 9 FBS and the 39 FIS exist in Archives II RG 342, Mission Reports, boxes 9, 15 and 22. Typed facsimiles of the 35 FBS Reports are included

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in the 35 FBS history for Jul 50 located at AFHRA and available at AFHSO on microfilm roll K0487.

93 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, Box RD 3564.

94 Air Materiel Command, "USAF Standard Aircraft Characteristics," MCRE Report No. 2, amended through 22 Dec 50.

95 Hist 5AF, Vol. III, Chap. I; Hist Study #71, p. 14; Msg, COMAF FIVE to COMFTRWG 35, et al, OPS 1882, 16/2335Z, Jul 50.

96 Hist Study #71, p. 20; Msg, 5AFHQADV to 35FTRGP, ADV631, 10/0151Z, Jul 50; Msg, COMAF 5, to ADV HQ FAF, OPR 1831, 12/1056Z, Jul 50; Memo, L/G G.E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, to M/G E.E. Partridge, CG 5AF, 23 Aug 50, with 1 attachment, paper on Pohang by Col. R.W. Whitty, CO K-3, 17 Aug 50, Document 26. Hereafter to be cited as "Whitty Paper."

97 Appleman, p. 196-205; ROK MOND HIST, vol. IV, chap. VII, pp. 145-152; Melbourne C. Chandler, "Of Gary Owen in Glory," 1960, pp. 245-248.

98 Computer generated map, "Yongdong, South Korea, F-80 Sorties - July 26, 1950," See Appendix E.

99 Ltr, Exec., Historical Records (Air Force), Air Force HQ, Dept. of Defense, Australia, to Chief, Training Branch, IG, DA, US, 2000/1566 Pt. 1, 29 Feb 2000, with 2 attachments, No. 77 Squadron RAAF Unit History Sheet, Detail of Operations and Narrative [Combat] Reports, July 1950.

100 Msg, COMAF FIVE ADV to JOC, et al, ADV-B-129, 25/1359Z, Jul 50, Document 16; Whitty Paper, Document 26; 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," for K-3 (Pohang) for 26 Jul 50 for 0900K, 1200K, 1500K, 1800K and 2100K.

101 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," for K-2 (Taegu) for 26 Jul 50 for 0900K (2), 1200K, 1500K, 1800K (2) and 2100K.

102 5AF Intelligence "Three Hour Report," 26/0600K/July 1950 (Itazuke).

103 5AF Intelligence, "Final Recapitulation - Summary of Air Operations Period 0001K-2400K, 26 Jul 50," attachment to "Dec 99 TAC Air Briefing."

104 HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950, in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 - 1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

105 MSG, COMAF 5 ADVON to COMFTRBMRWG 8, AOC B211, 27 / 0546Z July 1950.

106 MSG, COMFTRBOMWG8 to COMFTRBOMGP8, et al, OPR 328G, 26 / 1200Z July 1950.

107 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, Box RD 3564; 36 FBS Mission Summary Reports are located on AFHRA microfilm roll K0488. The 80th FBS did not fly on 27 July 1950; "List of F-80 Sorties for 27 Jul 50," 25 September 2000.

108 80 FBS mission data for 26 Jul 50 partially reconstructed from working papers found in Archives II, RG 342, 5AF OA Files, box RD 3564; 36 FBS Mission Summary Reports are located

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on AFHRA microfilm roll K0488. The 80th FBS did not fly on 27 July 1950; "List of F-80 Sorties for 27 Jul 50," 25 September 2000.

109 "Fighter-Bomber Final Mission Summary (FEAF Intel Form #5) for 27 Jul 50 missions 35-1, 35-2, 35-3, 36-1, 39-1, and 39-2.

110 Ibid; 7th Cavalry War Diary.

111 Memorandum to General Timberlake, "Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees," Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. Hereafter cited as "s Memorandum."

112 Ibid.

113 Valley Forge (CV 45), Report of Operations, 16 July to 31 July 1950, 16. (Hereafter Report of Operations) <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/v-forge.htm>

114 T.C. Rogers biography in "Generals of the Army and the Air Force," vol. 2, no. 10, Dunleavy Publishing Co., Washington DC. November 1954, p. 16.

115 SAF/IGI Report; Interview Officer.

116 Appendix 5; E-mail, SAF/IGI to SAF/IGI, "No Gun Ri Report," 26 Jul 00, with attachment, Document 33. Hereafter to be cited as "SAF/IGI Report."

117 Jennie E. Chancey and William R. Forstchen, eds., Hot Shots, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2000, p. 28-32.

118 Warren Thompson, F-51 Mustangs Over Korea, Osprey Front Line Colour #1, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 1999, p. 42.

119 David Wilson, Lion Over Korea, Belcanon, Australia, Banner Books, 1994, p. 24.

120 E-mail, AFRES to AFHSO/HOS, "NIMA Meeting," 13 Jul 00; NIMA Final Report, "NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun-Ri, Republic of Korea, Imagery of 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950," ND, p.11.

121 E-mail, AFRES to AFHSO/HOS, "PI Analysis and Bio," 26 Jul 00, with 2 attachments, (1) Bio, (2) Analysis.

122 Ibid.

123 Grossnick, Roy A., et al, United States Naval Aviation, 1910-1995 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 699-704.

124 Korean War, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, Interim Evaluation Report No.1, 25 June to 15 November 1950, Volume III, 228. Hereafter Interim Evaluation Report.

125 Rogers Memorandum.

126 Interim Evaluation Report, 224.

127 Rogers Memorandum.

128 Report of Operations, 16.

112

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Interim Evaluation Report, 235.

133 Report of Operations, 2.

134 Ibid.

135 VA-55, Historical Report, 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1950, 8. <http://www.history.navy.mil/download/va105122.PDF>

136 Report of Operations, 20.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

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Chapter 4 - Analysis of interview data

I. Introduction and evaluation of witness statements

A. Introduction

During the Review, both the U.S. and ROK Teams asked witnesses to recall events that occurred 50 years ago in the last week of July 1950. After obtaining the statements, the reliability of the witnesses' memory as reflected in the witnesses' statements was assessed. The U.S. Team's assessment was that statements of both the Korean and American witnesses, taken by themselves, contained limited information that was clear enough to allow the Team to develop detailed findings of fact or draw firm conclusions. The U.S. Review Team concluded that some of the events as described in the witness statements could have taken place but not necessarily on the dates, in the sequence, or at the locations the witnesses stated. The reviews of witness statements included in this chapter identify areas of consensus between statements and outline possible sequences of events.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed veterans from a wide variety of organizations and backgrounds. Interviewees included mostly enlisted men, but some officers from companies, battalions and regiments across Divisions and Corps headquarters were interviewed. The interviewers also took statements from United States Air Force veterans, primarily pilots, and civilian reporters.

Recognizing the fallibility of human memory after the passage of 50 years, the U.S. Review Team treated witness statements as evidence to be integrated with all other available information. The press accounts of events at No Gun Ri, to include the first Associated Press accounts mentioned in Chapter 1, treated witness statements as authoritative. In December 1999, at the beginning of the interview portion of the review process, the U.S. and ROK Teams agreed that each respective Team would interview that Team's own witnesses and then share the witness statements. The U.S. Review Team did not interview any Korean witnesses or observe the conduct of the Korean interviews. The quality and the content of the Korean statements concerned the U.S. Review Team given the very serious nature of the allegations. Since these statements are translations from Korean into English, some meaning may have been lost. However, in the translated statements, Korean witnesses described events using precise times, dates, and military terms such as "reconnaissance plane" and "artillery." Since the Korean witnesses were farmers and children from rural villages in South Korea, it is unclear to the U.S. Review Team how the

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Koreans acquired this specialized knowledge. In some Korean statements, the witness was asked in a lengthy question if a summarized account of another witness was correct. It is also sometimes difficult to tell in the text of the translated statements if a witness is restating hearsay. Statements that include responses to direct questions in an active-voice response (for example, "I saw..." and so on) reduce the possibility that the witness is restating hearsay. Nevertheless, the U.S. Review Team reviewed and analyzed the statements of 49 of 76 Korean witnesses. Only 49 witness statements were analyzed because the remaining statements did not contain sufficient information to permit close scrutiny and analysis. Each Team sent the other Team copies of the witness statements and the other Team arranged for translation of the statements. Almost 200 U.S. witness interviews were transcribed verbatim in a question-and-answer format by certified court reporters. Copies of these transcripts were given to the ROK Team. Korean witness statements were not provided in uniform formats.1 When possible, U.S. interviewers attempted to clarify conflicting or ambiguous responses in U.S. interviews with additional questions or re- interviews. The U.S. Review Team did not have the same opportunity with the Korean witnesses. However, in December 1999, the U.S. Review Team asked the ROK Review Team to ask the Korean witnesses 45 questions. The response to U.S. request provided by the ROK Review Team was a series of short-answer or one-word responses to the questions from 20 witnesses. In February 2000, the U.S. Team was notified that a law firm represented the "victims and survivors of No Gun RI." The U.S. Review Team contacted the law firm on February 22, 2000, and stated that the Review Team would consider any relevant information they wished to provide from their clients. The U.S. Review Team received no information from the law firm.

B. Evaluation of witness statements

Witness statements are based on their memories. The memory process has three stages: acquisition of memory (something happens), retention of the memory (storage) and retrieval of the memory (recall).2 All fact-finding requires an assessment of the accuracy or reliability of the witnesses' ability to remember events. Could the person giving the statement have seen, heard, and done what he or she is describing in the way he or she describes it? Memory is influenced by many factors, including, but not limited to, violence; stress; age at the time of the event and at the time of recall; illness, to include psychiatric and physical illnesses; 3 passage of time since the event; contamination; bias; and the interview process itself.4

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Contamination of memory affected all witnesses.5 Veterans read histories,6 magazines and newspaper articles,7 watched televisions programs,8 spoke to and corresponded with each other, and attended reunions.9 Korean witnesses discussed events with older family members, other victims and officials10; met with U.S. Veterans11; read books, magazines, and newspaper articles12; participated in group meetings13; and watched television programs.14 One veteran, when he was asked if he had seen something in Korea, actually stated to his interviewer that: "I'm hoping that I am not confusing something I have seen on television."15 A good example of distortion and contamination of memory concerns Mr. Edward Daily, one of the veterans interviewed by the Associated Press in September 1999. The AP identified Mr. Daily as a machine gunner with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. In his AP interview, he described being haunted by the memories of the shootings of refugees at No Gun Ri. According to available military records, Mr. Edward Daily was a member of 27th Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, from March 18, 1949, to March 16, 1951, and not H Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Mr. Daily attended reunions and spoke to other veterans about serving in Korea with them. The veterans believed he had served with them based on his behavior.16 In meetings in September 2000 in Washington, D.C., members of the ROK Review Team stated that Korean witnesses still believe that Mr. Daily was at No Gun Ri. Some Korean witnesses met with Mr. Daily in South Korea. Mr. Daily's conversations with Korean and American witnesses contaminated their memories. Under optimal conditions, the ability to remember dates, distances, quantities, geography, locations and the names of people and places varies from one individual to another. In addition to an individual's normal memory gaps, individual memories can be distorted or biased.17 The distortions and biases in their memory may result from exaggeration, exposure to other accounts of the events, stress, and age.18 Systematic exaggeration, also known as harmless "war stories" that embellish the contribution that some veterans made to the war effort, could have affected the accuracy of the veteran's statements. Interactions with interviewers and the questioning technique can introduce distortions into a statement.19 The subject of the interview may want to help the interviewer or may not want to provide answers that reflect unfavorably upon him or her.20 Age affected the memory of all witnesses, both Korean and American. The age of the witnesses at the time of the incident affects that person's ability to remember the incident fully.21 The U.S. veterans were approximately 18 - 39 years old at the time of the events. Approximately 19 Korean witnesses22 were the same age as the veterans at the time of the events. Although these witnesses may have understood and remembered events at the time they happened, some of their memories 50 years later are now likely to be affected by age-associated memory impairment. Over half of the Korean witnesses were under 16 years of age at the time of the incidents. Childhood memories can fade

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over time. A child less than 10 years old cannot recall exact sequences of events, times, and places as well as an adult's ability to do so.23 Furthermore, although people remember events in their childhood, these memories are subject to distortion and bias over time. The Korean witnesses who were children during the war may not have understood what was happening. Their statements contain comments that suggest that they did not understand war or weaponry. Finally, another criterion used to evaluate witness statements was physical impossibility. Could the witness have seen or heard what he or she described given the terrain, human physical abilities, and the effectiveness of certain weapons? Could a witness have done what he or she described doing? Was it physically possible? The U.S. Team's internal evaluation of witness statements considered all witness statements; the opinions of experts; and used the skills of all personnel assigned to the U.S. Team, to include a military historian, attorney, Korean linguist, and interviewers on the U.S. Team. The U.S. Review Team consulted photographs, maps, a terrain model, and computer imagery of the No Gun Ri vicinity. The next two sections of this chapter are the reviews of the witness statements.

II. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force veterans reviews

A. Purpose

The purpose of this section is to outline the U.S. interview process24 and review and summarize veterans' testimony. Official written records and the witness statements are inconsistent; however, the purpose of this section is not to reconcile these inconsistencies but to review and summarize the witness statements.

B. The interview process

The U.S. Review Team gathered the names of veterans who might have information about the alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Names of potential interviewees came from eight sources:

1. The National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO.

2. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Washington, DC.

3. The Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), Washington, DC.

4. The National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD.

5. The Inspector General No Gun Ri Review web site, toll free voice and fax lines, and letters from concerned citizens.

6. Veterans Service Organizations (VSO).

7. Korean War-related web sites.

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8. Media accounts.

C. Contact lists

From an initial list of over 7,375 names, the U.S. Review Team developed a contact list of 3,213 names. The U.S. Review Team crosschecked all names identified on the contact list against official record sources to authenticate the list. Neither official data sources (National Personnel Records Center, Defense Manpower Data Center, Department of Veteran's Affairs, and the National Archives and Records Center Administration II) nor the media accounts gave current addresses and telephone numbers for potential interview subjects. The U.S. interviewers relied on the Internet for information on potential interview subjects that was not available in official sources. Few of the official veteran information data sources from which the U.S. Review Team took most of its leads, as well as leads from media accounts, gave current locator information. Addresses and telephone numbers of individuals were obtained using official records and Internet searches. The names of those identified as deceased, as well as those who could not be located due to insufficient information such as incomplete names, were deleted from the list of potential interview subjects. If the U.S. interviewers could not contact a veteran by telephone who was listed by the 7th Cavalry Korean War Veterans Association, the U.S. Review Team sent a registered letter asking the veteran to contact the U.S. Review Team. In addition, the U.S. Review Team sent registered letters to veterans from the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments asking them to contact the U.S. Review Team. Air Force veterans' interviews were treated as a separate subset when developing the contact list and during the interview process. Air Force and Army researchers located Fifth Air Force personnel rosters containing names of American pilots assigned to Japan and Korea during the June-July 1950 timeframe. The U.S. Review Team created a contact list of a representative cross-section of pilots from the three F-80 fighter-bomber squadrons, the T-6- equipped 6147th Tactical Air Control Squadron, members of the Headquarters Staff of Fifth Air Force, and one officer from a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Individuals who contacted the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) hotline were screened and added to the contact list if they offered information pertinent to this review. Air Force veterans previously interviewed by the news media were also included on the list as well as those individuals referred by other veterans during personal interviews. All U.S. interviewers received advice and training in interview techniques; interview structure; gender-based differences in interviews; setting and uniform; and the use of visual aids. Before interview questions were constructed and interviews conducted, a psychiatrist from Walter Reed Medical Center briefed members of the U.S. Review Team on conducting interviews with traumatized witnesses. The psychiatrist also addressed potential problems of interviewing

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aged veterans concerning the complex issues involved with recalling events that occurred over 50 years ago.

D. Interview categories

The U.S. Army veterans fell into three broad categories:

Category 1: Individuals identified from the sources listed above who were in the vicinity of No Gun Ri area or who were in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, at the time of the alleged No Gun Ri incident.

Category 2: Individuals with second-hand knowledge. This category includes individuals that were not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri area but who received information about the alleged No Gun Ri incident from individuals who may have been in the area at the time of the alleged incident.

Category 3: Those individuals who were in other units or locations other than No Gun Ri, but who could provide background or contextual information. U.S. Air Force veterans were also divided into three categories.

Category 1: Individuals with direct, first-hand knowledge of policies, procedures, and the situation during July 1950 and who may have taken part in air strikes in the last week of July 1950.

Category 2: Individuals with direct, first-hand knowledge of the policies, procedures, and the situation in July 1950.

Category 3: Individuals with indirect knowledge of policies, procedures, and the situation during the late-July 1950 period.

Organization charts depicting the persons interviewed and their unit of assignment at the time of the incident are at the end of this chapter.

E. Interview schedules

Category 1 interviews for Army and Air Force Veterans began on February 28, 2000. Interviews of individuals in Category 2 and 3 began on December 29, 1999. Prior to completing the interviews, the interviewees were asked if they knew of other individuals whom the U.S. Review Team could contact who might have information concerning the No Gun Ri incident. Veterans who were referred by interviewees in Category 1 were placed in the same category. The referrals remained in Category 1 even if the subsequent interview revealed that the information they offered placed them in another category or indicated that they had arrived in Korea after July 1950.

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The U.S. Review Team scheduled face-to-face interviews with veterans if an initial screening or a telephonic interview indicated that they had direct knowledge about the No Gun Ri allegations. Face-to-face interviews of selected veterans occurred both in Washington, DC, and at the veteran's residence, depending on whether the veteran was able to travel. As part of the interview process, the U.S. Review Team used a variety of graphic aids, to include period maps, a three-dimensional terrain model, and computer-based digital imagery of the No Gun Ri area. These tools allowed the veteran to place himself "on the ground" where he thought he was located and to view the terrain from this position. After screening the contact list of over 3,000 names, approximately 200 veterans were interviewed and some veterans were re-interviewed. Approximately 3,046 identified veterans either had no information or had unlisted telephone numbers. Eleven veterans contacted by the U.S. Review Team declined to be interviewed.

F. Interview results

Official records were used to establish place names, unit locations, and dates. When veterans were interviewed, dates, unit locations, and place names were used in questions. Almost all of the interviewees had a difficult time remembering specific dates, locations, and events. The early weeks of the Korean War were chaotic, with units rarely staying in any one location longer than a matter of days. Most soldiers did not have maps in the beginning weeks of the conflict because maps were in short supply. Furthermore, many veterans interviewed were not in a position of responsibility that required them to determine their location at any given time. No two interviewees remembered the exact same sequence of events. However, there was consistency among most interviewees on three major points. First, none of the veterans recalled seeing "hundreds" of dead refugees in the double railway overpass as stated by the South Korean witnesses. Second, all veterans interviewed said that the use of deadly force was never authorized against civilians who posed no threat to the unit. However, most veterans felt that if the unit received fire from individuals in civilian clothes, they could use deadly force to defend themselves. Third, most Army veterans indicated that they were warned of incidents in which North Korean soldiers dressed as civilians and intermingled with civilians to infiltrate U.S. lines and ambush U.S. forces from the rear. Likewise, the soldiers received instructions to be wary of groups of individuals dressed in civilian clothes. A few soldiers did not receive these warnings.25 Several interviewees claim that U.S. soldiers directed small arms fire toward or over the heads of a group of unidentified individuals in civilian clothing to prevent them from coming into U.S. lines.26 Several veterans stated that they received or observed small-arms fire from the direction of groups of individuals in civilian attire and that U.S. soldiers returned that fire.27 With the exception of Mr.

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Edward Daily, none of the veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated that they ever received orders to shoot and kill Korean civilians at the double railroad overpass near No Gun Ri. Of the 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans interviewed, only three recalled displacing South Koreans from unknown villages.28 However, seven members of the 5th Cavalry Regiment indicated that they evacuated or escorted Korean civilians from their villages in late July and early August 1950. On July 25, 1950, the date the Korean witnesses state they were evacuated, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was in Yongdong, approximately five miles from Im Gae Ri. The soldiers who said they evacuated civilians did so based on instructions from their units' chain of command. The primary reasons cited were to improve local security and to remove the non-combatants from the combat zone for their own protection. All stated that they never used deadly force while evacuating civilians. Most soldiers believed that the Koreans returned to their villages as soon as the U.S. units moved out of the area. One of the veterans interviewed said that he escorted a large number of Koreans (approximately 300) from their village toward the rear area where they were turned over to another U.S. military unit with Korean translators.29 Throughout the United States Air Force (USAF) veteran interview process, several recurring themes pertaining to the situation in the early weeks of the Korean War came to light. The majority of the USAF veterans interviewed were under the impression that North Korean People's Army (NKPA) soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups; several pilots even visually observed the infiltration taking place.30 None of the USAF veterans interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the deliberate strafing of civilians.31 All pilots interviewed stated that they neither received nor heard about any orders to strafe civilians. They vividly recall stern verbal policies implemented to prevent attacks on non-combatants. A couple of the pilots interviewed recognized the place name Yongdong. Several pilots flew missions on July 26, 1950. However, none of these men could recall any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.32 The term "refugees" was used in the interviews and in this section of Chapter 4 to describe all individuals dressed in civilian attire moving on roads and railways whether they were Korean civilians, North Korean soldiers dressed in civilian attire, or civilians carrying arms or supplies in support of the North Koreans. Where interviewees could distinguish between civilian non-combatants or civilian-clad North Korean infiltrators, their ability to identify infiltrators is noted in this section of Chapter 4.

G. Analysis of media account interviews

In the Associated Press (AP) accounts in September 1999 about the incident at No Gun Ri, Edward Daily is the only U.S. veteran who states that he

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received orders from the chain of command (relayed by a runner) to shoot refugees intentionally without regard to their non-combatant status. In a NBC Dateline interview on December 29, 1999, Edward Daily repeated his account of what happened at No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team interviewed Edward Daily later.33 Mr. Daily provided a detailed description of events at No Gun Ri. Military records were also reviewed, including rosters and morning reports. The records indicated that Mr. Daily was a member of the 27th Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, from March 18, 1949, to March 16, 1951, and not H Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. His unit was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on the dates the killings are alleged to have happened. Further, with the exception of one noncommissioned officer, who recalled seeing Mr. Daily in March / April 1951 after he was assigned to H Company, no other veteran interviewed can remember physically meeting Mr. Daily while in Korea.34 In follow-up interviews by the media and the U.S. Team, Mr. Daily could not explain the discrepancies between the records and his memories. This Review relied on the accounts of witnesses whose testimony was supported by records indicating that they were members of units present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. Because the U.S. Review Team could not place Mr. Daily in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, his account of what occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri was not used in this Review. However, because Mr. Daily spoke to many veterans, granted widely quoted interviews in the media, and met with Korean witnesses, the U.S. Review Team considered the impact that he could and did have on their recollection of events.

Two other veterans, Mr. Delos Flint and Mr. Eugene Hesselman, also spoke to the AP concerning their involvement in the alleged incident. Mr. Flint stated that he was caught with other soldiers and refugees in a strafing attack, and they then took cover in a culvert. Some time after taking cover in the culvert, he stated that they received fire in the culvert and that fire may have come from his fellow soldiers. Mr. Hesselman mentioned in the AP account that his Company Commander at the time, Captain Melbourne C. Chandler said: "The hell with all those people. Let's get rid of all of them." Mr. Hesselman also stated that an occasional shot could be heard originating from the underpasses. Once the shooting subsided, Hesselman stated that soldiers searched the underpasses and someone produced a sub-machine gun. The U.S. Review Team contacted both men. Mr. Flint declined an interview. Mr. Hesselman, when initially contacted, stated he did not want to be interviewed at that time. Despite repeated attempts by the U.S. Review Team to contact Mr. Hesselman both telephonically and in writing, he did not contact the U.S. Team. An examination of morning reports and the 7th Cavalry Regiment War Diary in the National Archives indicated that Mr. Flint was wounded on July 25, 1950, and evacuated no later than July 26, 1950, and that Mr. Hesselman was wounded and evacuated no later than July 27, 1950. It is likely that Mr. Hesselman and / or Mr. Flint were not present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri at the

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time of the alleged incident. No other veterans interviewed can confirm the presence of either individual in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Since the U.S. Review Team could not interview either man, the U.S. Review Team cannot explain or resolve the contradiction between the published accounts of the incident by Mr. Flint and Mr. Hesselman, with their probable absence from the area as indicated by military records and other interviews.

Mr. Norman Tinkler told reporters that he shot refugees at No Gun Ri. In the AP article released in September 1999, he is quoted as saying: "We just annihilated them." He also said, "War is not just comprehended, but it has to be done. And it's the individual that has to make the decision." In U.S. News & World Report (www.usnews.com), dated May 12, 2000, he is quoted as saying: "Refugees came through our positions the day before and pulled pins and threw three hand grenades at our guys. I wasn't going to let them get near me. I was on a .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine gun that fires 700 rounds a minute. I was located on the right side of the railroad tracks facing the bridge, between a quarter and a half-mile away. And yes, I fired at them. Nobody gave me orders. Nobody was there to give me any orders. There was just me and one other guy on this gun. Nobody else around. I saw maybe 150 refugees go in that bridge tunnel. I fired one belt, 250 rounds. I could see maybe a couple feet of one edge of the tunnel and I aimed at that and moved the elevation knob up and down, ricocheting bullets into the tunnel." On July 23, 2000,The Wichita Eagle featured an interview with Norman Tinkler in which Tinkler claimed to have "looked down the barrel of his tripod-mounted machine gun toward a throng of Korean women and children -- perhaps a hundred of them -- a thousand yards away. For a minute or two, he pulled the trigger, firing hundreds of rounds." According to that press account, "Tinkler defended his actions, saying he shot because he thought enemy troops were hiding among the refugees, waiting to ambush."

Members of the U.S. Review Team contacted Mr. Tinkler on several occasions, but he refused to be interviewed. The U.S. Team's research indicates that Mr. Tinkler was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in July 1950. Mr. Tinkler's account of the number of refugees and the fact that he does not recall any specific orders given to shoot refugees is consistent with other veterans' statements. However, without an interview of Mr. Tinkler, a more detailed account is not possible. Based on all information examined by the U.S. Review Team and a terrain analysis of the No Gun Ri area, which factored in the distance and angles Mr. Tinkler stated he fired from at No Gun Ri, the U.S. Review Team concluded that this firing, combined with other firing described by U.S. witnesses, could not have caused the "hundreds" of casualties alleged by the South Korean witnesses.

The AP article reported that Colonel (Retired) Robert M. Carroll, then a 25-year-old first lieutenant, remembered battalion riflemen opening fire on the refugees from their foxholes. The AP article stated, " 'This is right after we get

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orders that nobody comes through, civilian, military, nobody,' said Carroll, of Lansdowne, Va." The AP also quoted Carroll as saying, "There weren't any North Koreans in there the first day, I'll tell you that. It was mainly women and kids and old men." To the AP, Carroll further recalled that he then left the area and knew nothing about what followed.

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Colonel Carroll said that: "He remembered elements from one of the line companies firing their weapons at a group of about 50 Korean refugees on a railroad track, many were women and children dressed in white over garments." The refugees reacted to the firing by huddling in a group. They did not appear to be a threat so he stopped the unit from firing at them. He stated that none of the refugees had been shot. In his comments to the U.S. Team, Colonel Carroll indicated that the AP used only a few quotations from their interview with him, which lasted approximately three hours.

The AP also interviewed Colonel (Retired) Herbert Heyer, who was the battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in late July 1950. The AP article stated that: "Heyer, of Sandy Springs, Ga., [who] denied knowing anything about the shootings and said, 'I know I didn't give such an order.' " The article also quoted other veterans as saying the colonel apparently was leaving the battalion's operations to his subordinates at the time. When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Heyer said, "I know that there's a lot more information but I just don't have the information to give you, because I don't know. I can't remember. Now, one thing it has been fifty years ago and a lot has happened during that fifty years. Of course it suddenly surfaced with this Associated Press interview. That's the first I've heard since then." The Associated Press also reported that: "One battalion lieutenant located by the AP said he was in the area but knew nothing about the killing of civilians. 'I have honestly never, ever heard of this from either my soldiers or superiors or my friends' said John C. Lippincott of Stone Mountain, Ga. He said he could have missed it because 'we were extremely spread out.' " When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Colonel (Retired) Lippincott said: "Because honestly before this -- this occurred and I read all the events I would have sworn to you it never happened, because I was right there all the time. I never heard a word of it mentioned till I saw it in the paper. And I want you to know that as long as I was there I had never received an order as a Platoon Leader that -- to kill all civilian refugees coming through the lines because some 'em may be North Korean Soldiers. Now, we did receive word and warning, and warnings and admonishments that the North Koreans are trying to infiltrate our lines and they're dressed like refugees. So they may be among the refugees. You gotta be extremely, extremely careful. Well, I imagine a soldier could interpret that many ways. You know, by saying well if that occurs we don't let

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any of 'em through. But those were the kind of warnings and admonishments we received. Never -- I was never told to kill all civilians that attempted to come through the lines."

The AP article also stated "the Koreans said the Americans may have been seeing their own comrades' fire, ricocheting through from the tunnels' opposite ends. 'That's possible', said Preece. 'It could actually have happened, that they were seeing our own fire, ...We were scared to death'," said Preece, a career soldier who later fought in Vietnam.

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Sergeant First Class (Retired) George Preece said, "I've got a feeling it was a blast. A muzzle blast coming out of that tunnel. Again, now, it could have been. I'm not putting that out of possibility, but I don't see how. I mean it could have been. I mean ricochets from this guy shooting from this tunnel. I've had that told to me before too, but it's -- I don't believe that." He also said: "I saw flashes coming out from under the bridge and you saw where the shells were hitting. And it's close to that machine- gun over there. You could see where it was hitting the dust, hitting the rocks, and things...And when they [soldiers] shot into it, there wasn't that many rounds shot into it." Other veterans also present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri say they were misquoted in the original AP account. Mr. Herman Patterson was quoted in the AP report as saying that: "It was just a wholesale slaughter." In his statement to the U.S. Team, he said the AP misquoted him and that this quotation referred to his unit at the Naktong when they were overrun.35 He said he told the AP (September 29, 1999) that: "It was a damn near massacre of us." Mr. James Kerns is quoted as saying that "he, Preece and another GI found at least seven dead North Korean soldiers in the underpasses, wearing uniforms under peasant white." In his statement to the U.S. Team, Mr. Kerns said he never said such a thing.36 He told the U.S. Review Team that he saw between four and nine bodies laying down in the culverts but was not sure if they were dead.37 Mr. Kerns said he only told the AP that he saw some grenades and a burp gun in the tunnel. The AP article stated "[that] others recalled only heavy barrages of American firepower, not hostile fire." This comment was followed by a quotation from Mr. Louis Allen, who said, "I don't remember shooting coming out." The implication here is that veterans remembered Americans firing into the (No Gun Ri) tunnel but not refugees firing from the tunnel. However, when the U.S. Review Team interviewed Mr. Allen, he stated that he was on re-enlistment leave when the 7th Cavalry Regiment deployed to Korea and that he did not link up with his unit, F Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, until August 1950 in the vicinity of Taegu.38 In its September 29, 1999, article regarding No Gun Ri, the AP reported that: "At 1st Cavalry Headquarters, division commander Major General Hobart R.

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Gay was told South Korean refugees were killed by North Korean troops in a crossfire at No Gun Ri, the division information officer recalled. 'I think that's what he believed,' said Harold D. Steward, an ex-colonel from San Diego." Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steward told the U.S. Review Team that he was misquoted; what he said was there were confirmed reports of civilians killed in crossfire throughout the Eighth Army sector. He did not specify areas where these incidents might have taken place. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steward stated that he never said that civilians were killed at No Gun Ri in a crossfire.

The AP based their article, "Papers Back Korean Refugee Claims" dated December 29, 1999, on six Air Force pilots interviews: Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dewald, Major (Retired) Hall, Major (Retired) Kroman, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Son, Colonel (Retired) Lancaster, and Colonel (Retired) Wimer. The article claimed that: "American jets attacked groups of Koreans in civilian clothes on suspicion they harbored enemy infiltrators." However, with the exception of Colonel (Retired) Lancaster, who declined to be interviewed, the remaining pilots told the U.S. Review Team that the AP sensationalized the information they provided. For example Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dewald told the U.S. Review Team that no people wearing civilian clothes were ever attacked unless they were observed firing on -- or were part of a group that was firing on -- friendly forces or aircraft. Further, Major (Retired) Kroman claimed the AP misquoted him.39 With regard to civilian casualties during the Korean War, Major (Retired) Kroman said he told the AP he "couldn't say for a fact civilians were not killed in the war," but the AP quoted him in their story as stating he was "sure civilians were killed."

H. Battlefield observers

Individuals identified as Battlefield Observers were those whose duty position required them to circulate through their units' area of operations and obtain current information on topics such as unit morale, the current friendly and enemy situation, and news stories concerning the unit. Included in this category are military policemen, chaplains, staff judge advocates, and aerial observers. Civilian reporters present in the 1st Cavalry Division area during the last week of July 1950 are also included in this category.

During the course of the interview process, the U.S. Review Team interviewed members of the 1st Cavalry Division Public Information Office and civilian reporters covering the conflict at the time of the incident. The 1st Cavalry Public Information Office, a team of reporters and photographers, produced press reports for release outside the 1st Cavalry Division. In addition, the U.S. Review Team took statements from veterans of the 1st Cavalry Division's 545th Military Police Company, whose mission included control of traffic, refugees, and stragglers; the 1st Cavalry Division Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, whose mission included legal work for the Division's major units and the investigation of

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possible war crimes; and Army chaplains assigned in the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Due to the nature of their mission and their presence throughout the 1st Cavalry Division area of operations, it is likely that military policemen, lawyers, and chaplains would have heard of this incident. The U.S. Review Team interviewed five civilian reporters who covered the Korean War and were present in Korea at the time of the alleged incident: Jim Becker, Max Desfor, Lachie McDonald, Walter Simmons, and Denis Warner.40 Each reporter said that he found the occurrence of such an incident difficult to believe. If killings had happened, they believed someone in the press would have reported the incident. Mr. McDonald and Mr. Warner were both in the 7th Cavalry Regiment area of operations at the time of the alleged incident. They would have been in a position to hear about an event involving refugees taking place in the immediate area. During the conflict, reporters did in fact report incidents involving the death or injury of Korean civilians.41 The U.S. Review Team interviewed eight individuals from the 1st Cavalry Division Public Information Office. None had heard of the No Gun Ri incident while in Korea. Several stated that if they had heard of an incident of this nature, where refugees or civilians were killed, a reporter would have been sent to cover the story. The first time they heard of the No Gun Ri incident was when the AP story broke in the fall of 1999. Eight members of the Public Information Office were interviewed including the officer in charge of the 1st Cavalry Public Information Office at the time of the incident. One officer recalled that he heard of North Korean soldiers infiltrating American positions disguised as South Korean refugees in July and August 1950.42 During the conflict he also recalled that he visited the regiments often and talked to many individuals who were in the area; no one mentioned the incident alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Additionally, in March 2000, this officer attended a reunion of the 1st Cavalry Public Information Office. He said that he and his fellow veterans discussed the No Gun Ri incident, and no one remembered hearing of a similar event involving refugees in July 1950.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who served as an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate in the 1st Cavalry Division Staff Judge Advocate's Office.43 His duties included providing legal support to combat units such as preparing courts-martials, boards, and the investigation of war crimes. In his interview with the U.S. Team, he stated that he does not believe a massacre in the vicinity of No Gun Ri could have taken place without the Staff Judge Advocate's Office learning about it. He and another 1st Cavalry Division Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer, regularly visited the frontline units. He does not recall hearing of an incident like the one alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team interviewed three veterans (two officers and an enlisted military policeman (MP)) from the 545th Military Police Company, 1st Cavalry Division.44 An officer stated that the 545th Military Police Company

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handled traffic control; refugees and stragglers; and, later, the reconnaissance mission for the division when the 16th Reconnaissance Company suffered significant losses late in July and early August 1950. With regard to refugees, he said the 545th Military Police Company would screen refugees at checkpoints; otherwise, they just kept them moving through the area and kept the roads clear.

An officer stated that the Military Police in the unit performed random searches and sometimes found refugees with parts of weapons and / or ammunition. All three men recall hearing that the North Koreans were using refugee groups to infiltrate behind friendly lines. Later in the war, the enlisted MP recalled seeing dead bodies dressed in white lying along the roadside with weapons strewn next to them. These veterans did not recall anything about an incident like what allegedly occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. One officer interviewed, said he attended almost every Division staff meeting and regularly worked with all commanders in his duties as the Division's Military Police Company Commander; he did not recall anyone ever mentioning an incident like No Gun Ri. He believed that the battalion commanders would have reported something as significant as what the South Korean witnesses said occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri or that he would have received reports through his unit or obtained information from his unit's patrols.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who was the 7th Calvary Regimental Chaplain at the time of the alleged incident, and the Chaplain, who replaced him.45 They remember counseling soldiers on a daily basis on personal concerns, but they stated that no soldier ever sought counseling for an incident similar to the mass killings of noncombatants alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division's air section and who flew numerous observation missions at the outset of the conflict.46 During one of his missions flown during the latter part of July 1950, he recalled being approximately five miles to the northwest of Kumchon (which is approximately 14 miles southeast from No Gun Ri) when he monitored a request to fire white phosphorous at 400 to 500 Korean refugees moving along some railroad tracks. From his aircraft, he determined that the refugees were not a threat and immediately stopped the fire mission. No rounds were fired. During this time frame, he also noted a continuous flow of refugees moving to the southeast towards the Naktong River and what later became the Pusan Perimeter. He did not observe and was not aware of any other incidents where U.S. forces targeted Korean refugees.

I. Soldiers on the battlefield

After completing the witness interviews, the U.S. Review Team based their assessment on the interviews of those veterans who may have been in the No Gun Ri area. Based on other records, the U.S. Review Team knew many other veterans passed by or were in the vicinity around the village of No Gun Ri

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in late July 1950. The discussion in this chapter reviews interviews with veterans and not the entire historical record.

The U.S. Team's methodology was geographically and historically driven: the U.S. Review Team correlated positions, which the veterans claimed to have occupied, with geographic locations derived from historical accounts. For example, most 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, veterans remembered off- loading ships in Korea in July 1950. Based on historical data, their off-load would have taken place at Pohangdong on July 22, 1950. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans then remembered moving by truck or train to an assembly area. They did not recall the name of that assembly area, but it was probably in the vicinity of Hwanggan. Next they then began their movement from Hwanggan towards Yongdong to support the 8th and the 5th Cavalry Regiments. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, did not get to Yongdong as it fell to the enemy on July 25, 1950, prior to the battalion's arrival. However, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, would have been relatively close to Yongdong since they began their approximate 10-mile movement to Yongdong from Hwanggan on or about July 24, 1950. On July 25 - 26, 1950, something occurred, an order to move or perceived enemy contact that precipitated a very chaotic 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, withdrawal. This event was the single best memory milestone during the U.S. veteran interviews. The location to which the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, withdrew would have been in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. U.S. Review Team identified 37 individuals as being present in the vicinity of No Gun RI. In this section of the report, these witnesses are identified by their position in July 1950 (officer, noncommissioned officer, enlisted soldier, pilot or reporter). Witnesses are not identified by name to protect their privacy. While other veterans may have been in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, the U.S. Review Team could not place them in the vicinity of No Gun Ri with any degree of certainty based on their statements.

Of these veterans, two enlisted soldiers said they fired in the direction of the refugees.47 One solider stated that he fired over the heads of the refugees to keep them pinned down, and another soldier said he fired into the refugees only after receiving fire from their direction. Two more men -- a noncommissioned officer and an enlisted soldier -- occupied positions close enough to the double railroad overpass to witness the events there.48 The rest of the interviewees were in outlying positions some distance from the double railroad overpass and could observe some of the events there.

Statements from the veterans revealed the following:

• No individual recalled being given orders to shoot and kill civilian refugees

in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

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• Several soldiers assumed that there was an order to fire on the civilians

because artillery and mortar fires were used that may have hit the civilians. While these soldiers were adamant that there was an order, they had no information to support their assertions. These soldiers did not know who gave the order, did not hear the order, did not know when the order was given, and they personally did not receive the order.

• Twenty-eight individuals recalled observing refugees in the vicinity of No

Gun Ri.

• No individual recalled seeing Korean National Police near No Gun Ri in

late July 1950.

• Four individuals recalled seeing casualties as a result of the firing into a

tunnel or culvert (A soldier saw four to five bodies, but he does not know if they were wounded or dead. He thinks they were injured from strafing. Another soldier saw a few people he thought were dead from a distance, but the bodies were gone the next morning. A third soldier saw bodies from a distance, but he did not know the number or if they were wounded or dead. A fourth soldier thinks he saw several to 15 casualties but does not know if they were wounded or dead).

• One individual recalled seeing medical support being provided to the

individuals in civilian clothing under the double railroad overpass in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

• Twenty-four individuals believed they were in the No Gun Ri area from less

than 24 hours to two days. Five individuals believed they might have been in the No Gun Ri area longer than two days.

• Ten individuals stated that they either received or saw fire in the vicinity

of No Gun Ri coming from the direction of the refugees [The first witness (saw firing from overpass/tunnel) - I couldn't say who was firing. I only knew that firing was coming from the direction of the overpass to us. Fire was coming from the tunnel...at night; the second witness (received fire from the vicinity of the tunnels or overpasses) - we heard small arms fire, machine-gun fire and rifle fire in that direction and we looked over there, and then we received some rifle fire from the tunnel; the third witness (saw firing from culvert/ditch) - off to my left there was a group of refugees that were firing at the Heavy Weapons Company, and the Heavy Weapons Company returned fire at those refugees who were in a culvert; the fourth witness (saw firing coming out of the tunnel)- it seemed to me like it was more or less rifle shots coming out of the tunnel, and they were single shots; the fifth witness (received fire from the area of the tunnel in the side of a mountain) - We did receive some mortar fire and we did receive some small arms fire. Nothing of any great intensity at all; the sixth witness (saw firing at a road or railroad track) - Probably the reason why I remember that is because that was really the first encounter of engagement, shooting-rifle shooting back in one direction or whatever...the first thing that I can call an encounter with the so-called enemy; the seventh witness (saw firing coming out of the culvert) - I saw the flash of fire coming out of the culvert toward Howell Company not in my direction; the eighth witness (saw firing

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coming out of the tunnel) - automatic fire flashes came out of the tunnel around here; the ninth witness (saw firing at roadblock) - I'm not sure if they fired in response to somebody firing at them or how it occurred. I just don't know...It just kind of erupted and we didn't know what had happened because they had a roadblock down there; the tenth witness (center of the railroad tracks facing the refugees) - When I heard the Burp gun go off and they said we were being fired on, it was just a few seconds after that when a shell, the first shell come in.].

• Seven individuals recalled seeing casualties outside the tunnels.

• Twelve individuals stated that people in civilian clothing were fired upon

outside of the tunnels / bridges in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (One noncommissioned officer said refugees were hit by US indirect and machine gun fire; thought there may have been 50 (refugee) casualties; a soldier saw a group of 5 to 10 Koreans, dressed in white overgarments, firing from a ditch along the road at US forces and US forces returned fire; another noncommissioned officer saw mortars, rifles and machineguns fired toward the refugees; a second soldier thought 10 to 15 refugees were fired at but did not know what initiated the firing; an officer remembered that one of the line companies fired weapons at a group of about 50 Korean refugees, but none of the refugees were hit or injured. They did not appear to be a threat so he stopped the shooting; a third soldier said a machine gun fired over the heads of the refugees on tracks. Burp gun fire came from the tracks toward friendly positions and US soldiers returned fire; a third noncommissioned officer said refugees kept stacking up at a roadblock used to prevent them from passing through US lines, shots were fired at that location; a fourth noncommissioned officer remembers mortars hitting near the refugees; a fourth soldier said a heavy machine gun fired a burst of rounds in front of the refugees, did not think anyone had been wounded. One machine gun began firing into the tunnel during the night. The following morning, a young Korean refugee was shot at but not hit; a fifth soldier saw rounds impacting in the vicinity refugees on tracks. He also thought that he saw secondary explosions following the impacting rounds; a fifth noncommissioned officer said rounds were fired in the vicinity of refugees because they were just sitting on the road blocking everything; a second officer heard shots fired at the refugees but could not tell where they were coming from).

• Three individuals recalled displacing South Koreans out of villages.

• Sixteen individuals said they saw U.S. aircraft strafing targets in the

vicinity of No Gun Ri (Ten of the 16 did not observe the target and two of the 16 said their position was strafed. Four of the 16 said U.S. aircraft strafed refugees (A noncommissioned officer said refugees were killed when an enemy tank they were riding on was strafed; a soldier said refugees in the vicinity of an enemy tank were killed when it was strafed; an officer said refugees were hurt when an enemy column that was intermingled with them was strafed; another noncommissioned officer observed aircraft strafing refugees June-August 1950).

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• All members of the chain of command, which the U.S. Review Team

interviewed, did not recall hearing of a "No Gun Ri" incident prior to the AP story in September 1999 (8 officers).

• Ten individuals saw enemy tanks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (2 officers, 5

noncommissioned officers, and 3 enlisted soldiers).

• Seven individuals heard and observed mortar, tank, or artillery fire landing

among the refugees (A noncommissioned officer said refugees were coming down the road and a South Korean interpreter told them they couldn't come by this way ... a warning shot from artillery was fired ... they kept coming and about a dozen artillery rounds landed among the refugees; a soldier said about six mortar rounds landed toward the front of the refugee group to warn them not to cross the bridge; a second soldier said four to six enemy tank rounds landed among the refugees that were trying to take cover in a culvert; a second noncommissioned officer said refugees were coming down a road with hills on both sides toward U.S. lines when mortar rounds landed among them, which made them disperse; a third noncommissioned officer said mortar rounds were fired in the vicinity of the tunnel ... don't know whose mortars they were ... the refugees were sitting on the road blocking everything when the rounds were fired; a fourth noncommissioned officer said two mortar rounds landed among the refugees by a bridge and they scattered, they were not allowed to pass our lines; a third soldier said refugees were coming down the railroad tracks and artillery or mortar rounds landed among them ... don't know if it was friendly or enemy fire).

• Sixteen individuals recalled hearing weapons fire lasting from only a few

minutes to 60 minutes in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. (A noncommissioned officer - not very long, max 4-5 minutes; a soldier - very short; a second soldier - one to four machine-gun bursts were fired; a second noncommissioned officer - not five minutes; a third noncommissioned officer - refugees in ditch were engaged for 15-20 minutes; a third soldier - 15 to 20 minutes; a fourth soldier - sporadic fire, 30 minutes to an hour 20-30 rounds at a time; a fifth soldier - 15 minutes; a fourth noncommissioned officer - it wasn't more than 5 minutes if that long; a fifth noncommissioned officer - not more than 10 rounds fired; a sixth soldier - a matter of minutes; an officer - 15 minutes; a sixth noncommissioned officer - 5 to 10 minutes; a seventh noncommissioned officer - 5, 10 maybe 20-30 minutes, I don't know; an eighth noncommissioned officer - whole incident lasted 4 or 5 minutes; a ninth noncommissioned officer - just minutes).

The U.S. Review Team also interviewed veterans from the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. Those units withdrew through the No Gun Ri area along the Yongdong-Hwanggan road around the time of the alleged incident. Most of the veterans interviewed did not describe the large numbers of casualties that were described by Korean witnesses. In fact, most veterans interviewed stated that

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they saw nothing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri that corroborated the allegations in the Associated Press report and the Korean account.

J. Sketch of events

U.S. Army veterans' statements described events, which occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The descriptions included references to multiple terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. These references are to a double-arched tunnel, a culvert, a single-arched tunnel, a railroad tunnel that goes through a hill or mountain, and references to roads and streams. Likewise, Korean witnesses describe these same terrain features. Events appeared to have occurred at or near all of these features. A review of veterans' statements indicated that most veterans were warned by their chain of command or through word of mouth of incidents in which North Korean soldiers infiltrated refugee groups either by intermingling with them or disguising themselves as civilians in order to pass through U.S. lines; many veterans had first-hand experience of this. Some veterans recall an exchange of fire at different times and near different terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. A single veteran recalled a high body count.49 However, he could not recognize terrain features of the No Gun Ri area from the models, maps, and photographs that the U.S. Review Team showed to him. This veteran's description of events was so inconsistent with other descriptions of the events the U.S. Review Team was unable to conclude, based upon his statement, that hundreds of deaths occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Some of the inconsistencies in the veteran's statement were: he believes the enemy was firing on the civilians; two enemy soldiers in civilian clothing were discovered among the refugee casualties; dead bodies were stacked on the railroad track right before they left the area; American soldiers that were amongst the refugees were killed and wounded and they had to immediately depart the area because the North Koreans were attacking them.50 Another veteran that he identified as being there with him did not support his statement when interviewed. Events appear to have transpired in several areas: a double-arched tunnel like the one described in media accounts, a culvert that is a relatively smaller opening underneath railroad tracks, a single-arched tunnel that is a relatively larger opening underneath railroad tracks, and a railroad tunnel that goes through a hill or mountain. While all these features are located in the No Gun Ri area, features like these are also present in other areas along the route of withdrawal that the 7th Cavalry Regiment used during the outset of the conflict.

The U.S. Review Team believes that the similarities of the terrain features in different areas contributed to confusion in the veterans' memories. What occurs in each event at these locations varies with each veteran's memories, but something appears to have transpired at each location. Given the lapse of time, what happened at each terrain feature cannot be reconstructed to any degree of

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reasonable certainty. However based solely upon witness interviews, some veterans' statements support the following sketch of events.

The double-arched tunnel is the double railroad overpass and is the principal man-made terrain feature that refugees have described in their accounts. Photographs of it have been featured in the Associated Press reports. In veterans' interviews, this feature has been referred to as a double-arched tunnel, double tunnels, tunnels, and culverts. The term that was used in the interview is the term that is used in the following paragraphs. Based upon interviews with some veterans, weapons were fired near or at the double-arched tunnel during daylight hours after elements of 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived in the vicinity of the double arched tunnel. Some refugees were observed moving on the railroad tracks.51 U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, occupied positions in the vicinity of the double-arched tunnel.52 Two soldiers stated that they observed U.S. soldiers were fired upon from the double tunnel.53 Two soldiers stated that there was machine-gun fire on the entrances of tunnels.54 Two soldiers stated U.S. soldiers returned fire for anywhere from five to 15 minutes.55 A veteran stated that he directed the soldiers to "cease fire."56 One soldier believed there might have been 50 casualties.57 Another soldier stated he carried a refugee boy back into the tunnels under the bridge and saw U.S. medical personnel providing medical aid.58 This soldier saw only 15-20 refugees in the tunnel.59 Two soldiers stated that there was mortar and artillery fire in the area at this time.60 The next morning one soldier stated that he saw between four and nine bodies lying in the culverts and other refugees in the area. He also saw burp guns and grenades inside the culvert.61 Based again upon interviews with some veterans, weapons were also fired near or at the single-arched tunnel, which is located 250 yards from the double railroad overpass, either the late afternoon of the day that weapons were fired at the double railroad overpass or the day after. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, occupied this area. Soldiers saw refugees in a large single tunnel.62 At night one soldier stated that one machine gun fired into the tunnel, and he recalled seeing red tracers ricocheting around the tunnel entrance.63 Another soldier stated that soldiers fired a few rounds at the tunnel to keep the refugees inside.64 The following morning a refugee boy emerged from the tunnel, and, according to one soldier, a rifleman fired on him but he was not hurt.65 Refugees were observed in front of the single-arched tunnel, possibly crossing from the railroad tracks to the road. Based upon the veterans' statements, the refugees could have been shot by small-arms fire near the single-arched tunnel opening. One veteran passed through a single-arched tunnel while on a reconnaissance patrol and observed over 100 refugees. He recalled that there were many casualties and that there were old men, women, and children in the group.66 The veteran thought that the casualties were caused by the North Koreans.

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Finally, the veteran's statements used to develop the sketches of events above and the other veteran's interviews indicated that they did not hear, receive, or see in writing any orders given to fire on refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The veterans interviewed who could describe events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri did not support the Korean account describing many casualties and prolonged fire on the double railroad overpass.

K. Overview of the U.S. Air Force witness interviews

Associated Press reports also indicated that air strikes occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri; therefore, the U.S. Review Team included the statements of U. S. Air Force veterans in the review. The pilots had different perspectives of the air order of battle, depending on the types of aircraft and missions they flew during the early days of the Korean War. Once again, the review below is based solely upon veterans' statements. For example, the U.S. Review Team knows that the pilots' recollections of the armament they carried are not correct, but these are their recollection of events.67 At first, fighter-bomber pilots assigned to the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (FBS) flew missions in the F-80 "Shooting Star" aircraft out of Itazuke Air Base (AB), Japan, and converted in the mid- summer of 1950 to the F-51 "Mustang" out of Taegu Air Base, Republic of Korea. At first, pilots assigned to the 9th FBS flew missions with brand-new F-80C aircraft from Japan and in mid-September 1950 operated out of Taegu AB, ROK.

Pilots from each squadron admitted that missions were not as effective when operating from Japan due to the tight fuel limitations of the F-80. These pilots stated that they could ill-afford to loiter over Korea searching for targets because of this short fuel capability, and they often returned to base with minimum fuel on board to complete the mission. One pilot stated that after striking a target, he and his fellow pilots would immediately contact forward air controllers (FAC) for additional targets until low fuel warnings forced them to return to base.68 He estimated that the average mission from Itazuke AB lasted approximately two hours and ten minutes, with approximately 70% of the mission dedicated to time enroute to and from the target area. This limitation was alleviated when the 9th FBS began operating out of Taegu AB in September 1950. He also commented on the navigational challenges due to the lack of radio aids in Korea as well as the time required to `step down' through weather patterns over Korea. Several pilots pointed out that the F-80 was designed for air-to-air operations and was not suited for the close air support and air-to-ground role it performed during the Korean War.69 Although pilots recalled excellent visibility from the cockpits of both the F-80 and the F-51 aircraft, the high airspeeds of the F-80 made acquiring and attacking ground targets in a single pass difficult. The slower airspeeds of the "Mustang" and other propeller-driven aircraft flown by the

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U.S. Navy and Marines enabled their pilots to make more accurate target identification runs prior to commencing air strikes. Forward Air Control (FAC) pilots flying the T-6 "Texan" aircraft in Korea also commented on the limitations of the F-80s in Korea. A pilot commented that slower planes such as the F-51 Mustangs flown by U.S. and Australian pilots, as well as Navy aircraft, were much more effective and accurate than F-80 jets.70 The problem this pilot highlighted concerning F-80s was their lack of ability to identify and confirm the target assigned by FACs. They loitered at high altitudes to conserve fuel until a FAC directed them onto a target. They would then descend at high airspeeds and attack with rockets, machine guns, and finally bombs, all in one pass. He said the average time from initial contact to the end of an attack with a flight of F-80s was approximately five minutes, and this pilot never saw an F-80 make more than one pass on a target. Propeller-driven aircraft, on the other hand, had time to make multiple confirmation passes (often firing initial tracer rounds visible by the T-6 pilots who could confirm they were firing in the correct location). These aircraft sometimes spent more than 20-30 minutes working a single enemy target. He also reported occasions when there was confusion over battle damage assessments resulting from effects on the same target. Pilots recalled that both the F-80 and F-51 aircraft carried virtually the same armament but in differing quantities. Fifty-caliber machine guns, five-inch high velocity aerial rockets (HVAR), various bombs (500-pound common), and napalm tanks (arrived in theatre within the first two months of the war) were commonly carried on strike missions. Pilots commented on the effectiveness of napalm destroying enemy trains using tunnels for cover. Many pilots agreed that the WWII leftover HVAR rockets were highly inaccurate and unpredictable. One pilot remembered firing a rocket from his F-80 that reversed it's course 180 degrees, nearly shooting him down.71 The statements by the pilots were in general terms; like their fellow veterans in the U.S. Army, pilots struggled to recall day-to-day events.

The interviews with the 17 veterans from the Air Force revealed the following:

• Sixteen of the 17 USAF veterans interviewed were under the impression

that NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups.

• At least five pilots interviewed visually confirmed that this infiltration was

taking place. Interviewees stated they would have refused any orders to strafe civilians intentionally, although no such orders were ever received.

• The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) interviewee regularly observed

NKPA soldiers dressed in civilian clothing.

• Nobody interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of, anyone

participating in the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950.

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• All USAF interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to

prevent the attack of non-combatants although no one recalled any written policies on this subject.

• All pilots interviewed stated visibility from their cockpits (F-51, F-80, and

T- 6) was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed (especially F-80 pilots) said it was very difficult or impossible to distinguish between enemy troops and friendly forces, primarily as a result of the high airspeeds flown.

• Although several pilots interviewed remembered the name Yong Dong

and knew they flew missions on July 26, 1950, none could remember any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. None of the USAF veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage. Major General (Retired) Turner C. Rogers was interviewed because while conducting research for this review, an Air Force historian discovered an archived memorandum, written by then Colonel Rogers, the Deputy Chief for Operations, Advanced Headquarters Fifth Air Force, to his commander on July 25, 1950, with the following subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees, regarding policy of strafing civilian refugees. Major General (Retired) Rogers had arrived in Korea only a few days before writing the memorandum, which expressed concerns about an Army request to strafe civilians approaching U.S. positions. In his memo, Major General (Retired) Rogers recommended a policy be established "whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts." The recommended policy appears to be the practice followed by the pilots the U.S. Review Team interviewed. Pilots sought out targets such as trucks, tanks, moving troops,72 and groups of men in uniform.73 The pilots fired when they were told a target was hostile 74and fired back when fired upon.75 Major General (Retired) Rogers also recommended informing Eighth Army Headquarters of this position, but no other documents or policy directives relating to this memo have been located. After the passage of 50 years, determining why this memorandum was written or to place it into context is difficult. Major General (Retired) Rogers was interviewed, but he did not remember the July 25, 1950, memo and did not remember any details about his duty position at Advance Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.76

III. Korean witness review

A. Purpose

The purpose of this section is to provide a review of the Korean witness' statements. The Korean witness statements reflect different perspectives, contain varying amounts of detail, and provide some common elements. Each witness statement describes the events using different words

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and images. Some statements are clearer and more detailed than others. When one reviews all the statements, a picture of what the Koreans believe happened in July 1950 emerges.

The review creates an initial composite sketch of the Korean witnesses' view of the events during the last week of July 1950. The initial composite sketch contains six key events. This section of the chapter will outline each key event described in the witness statements and will present an impression of the incident based on the witness statements. The review will summarize the witness statements without weighing the inherent probability or improbability of the witnesses' description of events. However, the review will note discrepancies, inconsistencies, and other problems in the statements that may reflect problems with memory.

B. Media accounts

Reporters have interviewed Korean witnesses77 as well as the U.S. veterans. In fact, the Associated Press (AP) interviewed the Korean witnesses for their September 1999 Associated Press Report.78 The Associated Press summarized their interviews stating: "The 30 Korean claimants, survivors and victims' relatives said it was an unprovoked, three-day carnage. `The American soldiers played with our lives like boys playing with flies,' said Chun Choon-ja, a twelve year old girl at that time."79 The Associated Press further wrote that: "'People pulled dead bodies around them for protection,' said Chung Koo-ho, 61. `Mothers wrapped their children with blankets and hugged them with their backs toward the entrances. ...My mother died on the second day of the shooting.'" The AP report paints a vivid picture of events from the Korean perspective. The report also states that: "Sounds of slaughter haunt Park Hee-sook's memory too. `I can still hear moans of women dying in a pool of blood,' said Park, then a girl of 16. `Children cried and clung to their dead mothers.'"80 The AP explains that: "All 24 Korean survivors interviewed individually by the AP said they remembered no North Koreans or gunfire directed at Americans." The AP report does not identify all "24 Korean survivors" by name, however.

C. Korean statements

The sources of the Korean witness statements available for analysis are as follows:

• The undated interview summary conducted by the No Gun Ri Truth

Investigation Testimony Hearing Team. This document captures the salient points of most of the principal witness' stories.

• Detailed statements that the No Gun Ri Fact-Finding Panel took from 24

witnesses in the Yong-dong District Office Operations Room from

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November 25 to 26,1999. Most of these statements came from individuals already interviewed by the No Gun Ri Truth Investigation Team. When a witness gave a statement to the No Gun Ri Truth Investigation Hearing Team and the No Gun Ri Fact Finding Panel, the two statements were compared.

• Statements from a second round of interviews that the Fact-Finding Panel

conducted from December 29 to 30, 1999; the Panel interviewed 17 witnesses during this two-day session.

• Witness statements that appear to have accompanied one of the initial

claimant petitions.

• Eyewitness accounts chronicled in the Investigation Report published by

the Committee for Justice and Human Rights of the National Council of Churches in Korea on April 22, 1998.

• Questionnaires that the No Gun Ri Incident Fact-Finding Team for the

Korean Ministry of Defense sent to other potential witnesses or to people who lived in the No Gun Ri area in July 1950. Only those questionnaires with names (39 of the 45 in that packet) that include some form of narrative response are included in this analysis.

• Finally, the U.S. Review Team requested that the South Korean witnesses

answer 48 specific questions. Twenty witnesses provided some short- answer responses to these questions, but only those witnesses whose answers included sufficient relevant detail were included in this analysis by name.

The statements were translated from Korean to English. For the purpose of this review, a description of an event or events attributed to a person by name constitutes a witness statement. Seventy-six people gave some form of statement. The U.S. Review Team had multiple statements from the same people. These statements included summarized accounts, questionnaires, and question and answer transcripts. The statements of 49 out of 76 witnesses included sufficient enough detail for close scrutiny and analysis.

D. Initial composite sketch of events

Many Korean statements describe a similar sequence of events from July 25 to July 29, 1950. Each witness offers a slightly different version with his or her own details. An overview of the statements yields the following initial composite sketch of events. The initial composite sketch of events is a simple compilation of the witnesses' statements.

• On July 25, U.S. Army soldiers urgently instructed the residents of Im Gae

Ri, together with some refugees from Joo Gok Ri, to begin moving south along the Seoul - Pusan road to avoid the danger that the shifting battlefield would bring them. (The village of Im Gae Ri is three miles off the main road.)

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• Led by the soldiers, the refugees trudged south along the road in the late

afternoon. (The route led toward Pusan but actually followed a southwest- to-northeast trajectory at this point.)

• After a brief foot march, the U.S. soldiers directed the refugees to a

riverbank (possibly near Ha Ga Ri) to spend the night, but no one could sleep because of an artillery battery firing nearby. The soldiers shot at two or three of the refugees who tried to stand and move around during the night, possibly wounding or killing some people.

• The next morning, July 26, the refugees awoke to find the soldiers gone

and the area quiet. The refugees continued southward on their own, family cows and oxcarts in tow, until they reached Seo Song Won Ri. Withdrawing American vehicles made walking on the road nearly impossible for the refugees.

• The refugees soon encountered an American roadblock, and the soldiers

directed them onto the railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the road to relieve some of the traffic congestion. Up to 400 hungry and tired refugees sat down to eat some multi-grain powder. They sent small children to seek out water nearby. Nearly 100 abandoned refugee bags from a group that had passed the area earlier littered the railroad tracks.

• Three or four American soldiers walked among the refugees, inspecting

their bags by picking at the contents with fixed bayonets. The soldiers confiscated all farming tools or anything that might resemble a weapon.

• One soldier in a nearby bean field spoke into a radio while the soldiers

carried out their inspection.

• A lone, propeller-driven reconnaissance airplane buzzed overhead

unthreateningly.

• Suddenly, the soldiers disappeared and, within minutes, American jet

aircraft strafed the seated refugees with bombs and machine-gun fire.81 Refugees fled in all directions. Scores of people died instantly. Others fell wounded and cried for help. Cows and oxen exploded in blood. The refugees' baggage burst into flames. Many took cover in a small, water- filled ditch below the tracks.

• Once the airplanes left the scene, several American soldiers ventured

forth and directed the surviving refugees into the twin tunnels beneath the railroad tracks. Many refugees had already fled, and the soldiers fired at those who continued to run. One of the tunnels had a stream running through it.

• Bullets suddenly saturated the tunnel's interior in concentrated bursts.

The shooting forced everyone to remain prone in the crowded tunnels. More people died from the American small-arms fire.

• Two soldiers approached the tunnel entrance and spoke in English or

Japanese with some of the refugees. The soldiers quickly departed.

• The shooting continued for four days, from July 26 to July 29. During this

time, several of the younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, leaving only women, children, and the elderly in the tunnel.

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(For a discussion of the tactical situation of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, see Chapter 3.)

• Seven refugees witnessed or participated in the piling of dead bodies in

front of the tunnel's entrance to protect those still alive in the back.

• The refugee's water source was a blood-saturated stream that ran through

one of the tunnels.

• On July 29, the refugees ventured forth from the tunnel once they realized

that the soldiers had departed.

E. Key events according to the Korean witnesses

The narrative outlined above offers several key events for analysis. These six key events are as follows:

a. The evacuation from Im Gae Ri (often spelled Imkyeh-ri) on July 25.

b. The night spent on the riverbank (July 25).

c. The move to the railroad tracks and the personal-effects inspection (July 26)

d. The soldier talking on the radio and the subsequent air attack (July 26)

e. The move to the twin tunnels and the U.S. soldiers' involvement in this process (July 26)

f. The events inside the tunnel and the shooting that occurred (July 26 to July 29)

F. Review and discussion

The key events examined in further detail below represent a holistic approach to analyzing each witness's statements. The U.S. Review Team compared and contrasted all versions of a witness's statement and then compared these composite, one-person statements (49 in all) with the larger body of Korean witness statements. After the comparisons among the Korean witness statements, a particular witness's account of events may be corroborated or remain muddled, inconsistent, or inconclusive. In making these comparisons, the current age of the witness, the age of the witness at the time of the events described, and the amount of time that has passed since the events occurred were all considered because these factors affect one's ability to remember.

The analysis that follows will explore each of the six key events in detail and look for similarities and differences between the descriptions of the key events given by the witnesses. Witnesses are not described by name, but are referred to their status (child, teenager, and adult) in July 1950.

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G. First key event - the evacuation from Im Gae Ri on July 25, 1950

Some Korean witnesses refer to a hostile attitude on the part of the U.S. soldiers who came to Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkae-ri, Imkyeh-ri, and Im Ga Ri) and directed the refugees gathering there to evacuate.

• Twenty-eight of the 49 witnesses specify that several U.S. soldiers told the

refugees to pack up and head south in the late afternoon or early evening of July 25.

• Some witnesses refer to five or six soldiers while others mention two

soldiers plus a Japanese-speaking interpreter. The Korean witness statements indicate that U.S. soldiers in the area encouraged the refugees gathering in Im Gae Ri, some of whom hailed from Joo Gok Ri, to leave the area to avoid the potential fighting expected to occur between the U.S. and North Korean forces. Some Korean witnesses recall that the soldiers offered them transportation that never materialized.

• Only 16 Korean witnesses claim that U.S. soldiers evacuated them

specifically from their home village of Im Gae Ri on July 25. Other witnesses who claim that the soldiers evacuated them simply refer to 'an evacuation' but do not specify the location.

• Ten Korean witnesses mention the evacuation but state that they were

from other villages or were simply evacuated through Im Gae Ri without specifying their village of origin.

• The 10 Korean witnesses who indicate that they originated from other

villages name a wide variety of hometowns. Some of these 10 witnesses simply explain that they left their own unnamed village for another safe haven or passed through other villages like Joo Gok Ri or Im Gae Ri. One 11-year-old witness mentions that he hid in a cave called Kwangsan for three days following his evacuation. Several witnesses state that they were evacuated from the following locations: Joo Gok Ri, Yak Mok Ri, Seo Song Won, and Ha Ga Ri. Four witnesses between the ages of 11 and 17 indicate that the soldiers were hostile and aggressive toward the refugees during the evacuation.

• A Korean witness (17 years old) remembered the U.S. soldiers treating

the refugees like North Korean prisoners.

• A Korean witness (child) asserted that the soldiers prodded the refugees

with rifles and shot three or four people who strayed from the group.

• Two additional witnesses describe the soldiers as yelling, gesturing, or

firing their weapons in an effort to exhort the group to move southward.

These four accounts are the only ones that mention any hostility on behalf of the American soldiers at this point, which suggests that the behavior either occurred in isolated instances or that the refugees perceived the soldiers'

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mannerisms incorrectly. A pattern of hostility aimed at the refugees in this instance does not seem to be a strong, common theme.

H. Second key event - the night spent on the riverbank (July 25 to 26)

This second key event is important because several witnesses claim that the American soldiers shot and killed some refugees who attempted to leave the group during the night.

• A total of 16 witnesses from both age groups clearly recall that the U.S.

soldiers directed them to a riverbank to spend the night.

• Two witnesses suggested that the riverbank was near the hamlet of Ha

Ga Ri with an elementary school close by. One detail is repeated in some statements. The detail is a description of what may be the incessant firing of an artillery battery located nearby.

• Seven witnesses refer to a sleepless night caused by loud explosions in

the refugees' vicinity.

• Some witnesses actually stated that the noise stemmed from an American

artillery battery firing nearby. Eleven witnesses report some measure of violence against a few refugees who tried to leave the group in the night to urinate or to do something else. Some witnesses recall finding dead bodies among the group the next morning. The witnesses who state people were shot are listed below.

• A Korean witness (child) asserted that the U.S. soldiers shot three or four

refugees who strayed from the group.

• A second Korean witness (adult) stated that the soldiers shot one refugee

who stood up without permission, and another Korean witness (adult) claimed that the soldiers shot four people for the same reason.

• A third witness (teenager) further reported that the soldiers shot three

people during the evacuation, but he does not specify if the shooting occurred before arriving at the riverbank.

• A fourth witness (teenager) saw the soldiers shoot and wound a woman

who did not move down to the riverbank quickly enough; in addition, a nearby child died from the shooting. Despite these detailed assertions, the notion that the Americans fired upon the sleeping group falls outside the parameters of the common picture that emerges from all of the witness statements because a small number of witnesses (four) mention it. Each of these four accounts is different from the other accounts. Since the accounts lack common elements, they may or may not be

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describing the same thing. In addition, a few Koreans described a pitched battle raging around the huddled group.

• A witness (teenager) insisted that severe fighting, which included artillery

fire, occurred that night all around the refugees; small-arms crossfire even wounded some of the people.

• A second witness (child) described bullets swooshing and whizzing

throughout the night, even killing three people.

• A third witness (teenager) further described fireballs falling onto the

refugees in the night and killing some of them. These accounts of a possible battle are moderately similar to one another; these accounts remain inconclusive and may be the product of confused memories. Overall, the refugees describe spending an uncomfortable and noisy night beside the river due to artillery pieces firing nearby and then awaking in the morning to discover that the soldiers had left the area.

I. Third key event - move to the railroad tracks and baggage inspection (July 26)

Witness descriptions of this event show a significant amount of agreement among the statements.

• Thirty-seven of the 49 witnesses state that the group continued to move

south (actually northeast on the stretch of highway between Hwanggan) after departing the riverbank on the morning of July 26.

• Three Korean witnesses (two adults and a teenager) state that U.S.

soldiers led the group away from the riverbank, a detail that is not included in other witness statements.

• The refugees, upon waking to discover that no American soldiers

remained at the riverbank to escort them, simply continued moving along the Seoul - Pusan road until they encountered a U.S. roadblock at a place called Seo Song Won Ri (some accounts refer to the location as Seo Song Won and Sapjaegul).

• The roadblock, manned by a handful of U.S. soldiers, stopped the refugee

group and directed them off the road and onto the railroad tracks that ran parallel to, and elevated above, the Seoul - Pusan road. Two witnesses stated that the soldiers wanted to make way for U.S. military vehicle traffic on the main road.

• The refugees climbed, with some difficulty, the small rise onto the railroad

tracks above the twin tunnels. Many people struggled to get their cattle and oxen up the small hill.

• The soldiers directed the refugees to sit down once everyone was on the

railroad tracks. The refugees then began to eat whatever food they had with them. Several witnesses mention that they ate a type of multi-grain powder and sent the smaller children to seek water.

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• The number of refugees present at this point is unknown, but several

hundred may have been present.

• One witness (teenager) remembers seeing over 100 abandoned bags

littering the tracks. A key detail that shares a broad consensus among the witnesses concerns the personal effects search the soldiers conducted.

• Twenty-three of the 49 witnesses clearly recall that a few U.S. soldiers

walked among the refugees and inspected their bags. There are different descriptions of how the soldiers conducted the search. Some witnesses mention that the soldiers searched from both ends of the group simultaneously. Others recall that only two or three soldiers picked through the bags with bayonets affixed to the ends of their rifles.

• The search appeared to yield nothing. A Korean witness (teenager)

specifies that a soldier discovered a YoonDoo, a metal device used to iron clothing, among his family's personal effects, but he does not mention if the soldiers confiscated the item.

Approximately one half of the statements support the common view that an inspection occurred, but the soldiers' search method and other minor details remain sketchy. Overall, the Korean accounts suggest with some consistency the following sequence of events. First, the refugees awoke on the riverbank on the morning of July 26 to discover that the soldiers had left the area. The group then continued generally south (actually northeast on the section of road previously mentioned) before encountering a U.S. roadblock at Seo Song Won Ri. The U.S. soldiers directed the refugee group onto the elevated railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the twin tunnels. The soldiers then held the group in place and searched some or all of the refugees' personal effects.

J. Fourth key event - soldier talking on the radio and air attack (July 26)

One can derive a general outline of this event from the witness statements, but little consensus exists on details.

• As the soldiers searched the refugees' bags on the railroad tracks, several

witnesses testify that they observed a U.S. soldier using a radio.

• A Korean witness' account describes how a soldier operated the radio

from a bean field nearby. The witness was a child in July 1950.

• 10 witnesses mention seeing a radio in use. Some of these witnesses

believe that the soldier, or soldiers, used the radio to communicate with a propeller-driven plane circling overhead. Of the 10 witnesses, no one explains the implied connection between

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the radio operator and the plane, or planes, circling above. The timing of the air attack may have led them later to perceive a connection between the radio operator and the aircraft.82 On the other hand, a large number of the witnesses, 34 out of 49, state a strafing attack hit the refugees on the railroad tracks.

• Sixteen of these witnesses were 17 to 29 years of age.

• Some witnesses insist or imply that the attack was deliberate and had

something to do with the soldiers fleeing the scene or talking on the radio.83

• Six witnesses recall seeing U.S. soldiers fleeing the area or noticing that

the soldiers had disappeared. However, most witnesses clearly remember that the air attack occurred after the soldiers completed their baggage search. The strafing attack is a common element in the Korean statements.

• Fourteen witnesses reported at least one reconnaissance plane flying

overhead before the attack aircraft arrived on the scene.

• Two Korean witnesses (a child and a teenager) mentioned seeing two

reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead.

• Three witnesses, when prompted by the U.S. questionnaire that asked

them to distinguish the type of aircraft they saw, stated that the reconnaissance aircraft was propeller driven.

The sighting of the reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead before the strafing remains inconclusive in the absence of further supporting statements. However, many Korean witness accounts of the strafing indicate that more than one aircraft was involved in the strafing attack.

• Three Korean witnesses (1 adult and 2 teenagers) stated that as many as

four planes participated in the air attack.

• In response to U.S. questions, several witnesses described the attacking

aircraft as jets as opposed to propeller-driven aircraft.

Some Korean statements include the same observation that some type of high explosive ordnance fell upon the refugees.

• Three witnesses clearly mentioned that the planes used on-board

machine-guns in addition to the bombs.

• At least three witnesses suggested that the aircraft made several passes

on the group, but this point remains inconclusive.

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The Korean descriptions of the strafing attack are horrific. The Korean accounts consistently state that the explosives devastated the people and the cattle located on the open railroad tracks. Several witnesses who were young at the time provide compelling descriptions of the events.

• A Korean witness (child) never mentions bombs or aircraft but instead

remembers flames everywhere searing his face and bullets piercing his legs.

• A second Korean witness (child) remembers machine-gun bullets riddling

her mother's legs while at the same time losing her left eye from an explosion.

• A third Korean witness (teenager) recounts that the explosions blew a

large piece of flesh onto him; his own injuries left him barely able to walk. These descriptions and the injuries described add poignancy to their statements. Other Koreans recalled a variety of similar details such as bodies dropping everywhere, cows and oxen exploding, and personal baggage catching fire. The casualty estimate for the air attack remains inconclusive because only five witnesses attempt to quantify the losses. The numbers range from 50 to 150 dead; in one instance, a witness (young adult) simply stated that hundreds died.

No common number is currently available, but the overall body of statements strongly suggests that many people suffered from the air attack's effects. Some Korean witnesses state that the soldiers fired upon the refugees who tried to escape the strafing attack. Those refugees not injured in the air attack fled to the surrounding hills, took refuge in a water-filled ditch below the tracks, or ran inside the twin tunnels located below the railroad tracks.

• Seven witnesses testified that the soldiers fired upon the fleeing or hiding

refugees.

• A witness (adult) described how the U.S. soldiers shot at refugees who

tried to escape over the mountain.

• Another witness (teenager), whom the soldiers fed and evacuated by jeep

right after the strafing attack, stated that the soldiers fired upon the refugees who scattered to avoid the air attack.

• An additional witness (teenager) insisted that U.S. soldiers fired at the

people hiding in the water-filled ditch.

The U.S. Team has at least five reports of U.S. soldiers treating the wounded immediately following the air attack.

• The first witness (child) remembered some soldiers pulling her from the

water-filled ditch after the attack and hugging her.

• The second witness (adult) remembers being wounded in the thigh and

that a U.S. soldier applied a pressure dressing to stop the bleeding.

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• The third witness (teenager) remembers that the soldiers treated her

wound on the railroad tracks.

• The fourth witness (child) remembers he was wounded in the hand and

soldiers evacuated him to a hospital.

• The fifth witness (teenager) remembers a soldier helped her by giving her

clean clothing from a deserted home after her clothes were covered in blood from a head wound.

Other Korean witnesses indicated that the soldiers helped Korean civilians leave the area of the tunnels.

• The first witness (teenager) said that on the afternoon of July 26, soldiers

came to the tunnel and directed the refugees to leave the tunnel and get on a truck. She stated that 11 civilians -- not all of the people in the tunnel -- left the tunnel and went to the truck.

• The second witness (teenager) stated that soldiers helped take two

Korean boys away in a jeep from the tunnel area.

These contrasting accounts of how U.S. soldiers behaved (providing aid to refugees and firing on refugees after the strafing) cannot be reconciled. Because only a portion of the Korean witness statements indicate that the soldiers were present after the strafing, the U.S. Review Team cannot say conclusively that the soldiers were present after the strafing. The common elements in the Korean descriptions of this event are that the refugees were attacked on the railroad tracks by at least two aircraft and an undetermined number of people were injured. Those people who remained uninjured or slightly injured hid in a water-filled ditch below the tracks, took refuge in the twin tunnels, or fled from the scene completely.

K. Fifth key event - the move to the twin tunnels and the U.S. soldiers' involvement in this process (July 26)

The refugees who initially entered the twin tunnels beneath the railroad went there voluntarily to avoid the air attack. Many refugees took refuge in the water-filled ditch at the base of the tracks and near the tunnels' entrance. This ditch was most likely part of a stream that fed into one of the tunnels. In fact, most of the witnesses' statements agree that one of the two tunnels had a stream flowing through it. A witness (teenager) estimated that nearly 300 people already occupied the twin tunnels before those who initially hid elsewhere entered them.

U.S. Review Team does not know, based on a review of the witness statements, if the remaining refugees from outside the tunnel entered the twin tunnels voluntarily or under the soldiers' direction.

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• Ten witnesses reported that two or more soldiers approached the

refugees after the air attack and directed them to join the others inside the twin tunnels.

• Two witnesses (teenagers) stated that the soldiers forced the refugees

into the tunnels at gunpoint by firing their weapons. Less than one-fourth of the witnesses mention this point, so, based on the witness statements, the U.S. Review Team does not know if the remaining refugees entered the twin tunnels with or without guidance from the American soldiers. The Korean witnesses agree that the refugees who survived the strafing filled the two tunnels so that everyone was packed tightly inside with little or no room to move around. Only those people in the overpass segment with the stream had a water source.

L. Sixth key event - the events inside the tunnel and the shooting that occurred (July 26 to July 29)

Once again, one can derive a general outline of events from the witness statements, which is, according to the Korean statements, that a large number of people died inside the twin tunnels from small-arms fire. Likewise, the duration of the event cannot be conclusively established from the Korean witness statements. Witnesses who were children at the time of the event gave most of the time estimates, and the U.S. Review Team is not confident that their time estimates are accurate.

• Some Korean statements allege that the heaviest firing occurred on the

afternoon of the first day, July 26.

• Six witnesses stated that the firing was heaviest on this day.

• Most of the witnesses state, in the active voice, that they knew that U.S.

soldiers were firing on them from an unseen location.

• Some witnesses refer to the shooting as it occurred throughout the day (or

days).

• Nine witnesses reported that they could observe the American soldiers

firing from the mountain across from the mouth of the tunnels.

• A witness (teenager) believed that the shooting came from a distance and

was not concentrated on the tunnel.

• A second witness (adult) reported that the soldiers fired on the refugees

from the back of the mountain.

Many Korean witness statements allege that machine-gun fire impacted upon, or within, the tunnels while the refugees were inside them. A witness (teenager) stated he could clearly see, from his location inside the tunnel, American soldiers digging in on the mountain and wearing T-shirts. He further stated that the date of his observation was July 27. A handful of other witnesses simply recall seeing U.S. soldiers moving around on the mountain in varying numbers. Once again, the lack of additional statements that mention the U.S.

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soldiers on the mountain renders the statements inconclusive on this particular point.

Korean witnesses say that two or more soldiers came to the entrance of the tunnel on what many recall as the first day (July 26).

• Eleven witnesses refer to at least two U.S. soldiers approaching one of the

tunnel entrances before or after the first shootings took place.

• A witness (teenager) described how his sister, an elementary

schoolteacher who spoke either English or Japanese, conversed with these two Americans. He offers no further details.

• Another witness (teenager) stated that his father, who spoke English,

talked with the soldiers and learned that the soldiers believed that there were spies among the refugees. He further described that one soldier said that he, the soldier, could not follow his orders to kill the refugees but would instead select a few of the younger people, charge them as spies, and thereby fulfill his mission.

Multiple Korean statements indicate the observation that some soldiers approached the tunnel entrances on the first day at least to check on the refugees' status.84 No one can say with any degree of certainty what the soldiers said to the refugees when the soldiers approached the tunnel.

Several witnesses state they had escaped from the tunnels either on the first day or at some point after the first night.

• Seventeen witnesses specifically stated that they escaped alone or with

other people.

• Some statements mention that most of the younger men and boys

escaped on the first night, leaving only women, children, and the elderly to remain in the double railroad overpass. Two compelling details common to several statements are the drinking of the blood-saturated water within one of the tunnels and the stacking of bodies at the tunnel entrances to protect those still alive in the back.

• Sixteen Koreans recalled drinking bloody water from the stream that

flowed through one of the tunnels. Even more witnesses refer to an insatiable thirst during their time inside the tunnels. The wounded that could not control their desire for water drank from this bloody stream.

• A witness (child) remembers drinking water from a rubber boot.

• Another witness (adult) described how the blood sank to the bottom while

the water remained on top.

The other compelling detail that appears in more than one Korean witness statement is that dead bodies were piled at the tunnel entrances.

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• At least 11 refugees offered clear details about how they, or their family

members, stacked bodies at the entrance of the tunnels to shield and protect those people still alive in the back. The references to the tunnels' rear and front entrances may refer to the downstream and upstream openings of the double overpass.

• A witness, who was ten years old at the time, recalls his older brother and

his mother helping to pile the bodies at the tunnel entrance. He also had the misfortune to watch his sister, who was eleven years old, pull the remains of her left eye from its socket.

Nearly all the Korean witnesses explained that they had to remain fully prone in the tunnels at all times to avoid the shooting, which occurred either at night, during the day, four times a day, or in some other pattern. Little consensus exists with regard to the frequency or timing of the shooting, so the transcripts are inconclusive in this regard. Some witnesses describe events which seem to imply they were there for at least a period of hours or days for example:

• Three witnesses (teenagers) reported that a woman gave birth inside the

tunnel.

• Seven Koreans support the assertion that many of the younger men and

boys probably left the tunnel on the first night.

• Six other accounts support the assertion listed above by stating that

primarily women, children, and the elderly occupied the twin tunnels. Other Korean statements suggest that the incident in the twin tunnels lasted for a period of four days but provide no details upon which the time estimate was based. Six Koreans who offered dates or the number of days they stayed in the tunnel were 16 years old or younger at the time. The Koreans in this age group probably heard of the dates after the war and applied them to their memories of the events at the twin tunnels. Three Koreans between the ages of 19 and 20 proffer any precise estimate of the length of time spent in the tunnels, but the larger body of statements does not clearly support these estimates.

• A witness (adult) claimed that he spent three nights and four days in the

tunnel.

• A second witness (adult) reported that the shooting lasted until July 27.

• A third witness (adult) claimed to have escaped from the tunnel on July

28.

• A fourth person (adult) claimed to have remained in the tunnel for five or

six days.

• In summary, the range of days that certain Korean witnesses claim to

have spent in the tunnel is as follows: one day: five witnesses; two days:

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seven witnesses; three days: three witnesses; and four or more days: five witnesses. The age of the first three witnesses listed above lends greater weight to their memories, but some confusion with the Koreans' lunar calendar and the United States' version of the calendar seems apparent from some of the statements. Yet many of the Koreans' accounts described at least one night spent in the tunnels. The confusion between calendars, the chaos of the war, and the varying accounts suggest, as a common view, that the refugees may have remained in the tunnel for possibly two days (perhaps from July 26 to 27); four days, or longer, receives little support from the larger group of statements. In effect, the statements do not offer enough specific or corroborative evidence to determine the time allegedly spent in the twin tunnels.

M. Revised composite sketch of events

The previous analysis of the six key events amends our initial composite sketch of events from the Korean perspective. The initial composite sketch represented a simple compilation of the witnesses' statements. The critical analysis of the key events, following our initial composite sketch, indicates that the statements of a very small number of witnesses support some details in the initial compilation, less than 10 of 49. However, the critical analysis highlights common elements that many of the witnesses recall about the key events. The revised composite sketch below follows directly from the analysis:

• On or about July 25, U.S. Army soldiers urged the residents of Im Gae Ri,

together with some refugees from Joo Gok Ri and other villages, to move generally south along the Seoul - Pusan road to avoid the danger that the shifting battlefield would bring them.

• Led by the soldiers, the unknown number of refugees trudged south via

northeast along the road in the late afternoon.

• After a brief foot march, the U.S. soldiers directed the refugees to a

riverbank to spend the night, but no one could sleep because of what seemed like an American artillery battery firing nearby and some sporadic small-arms fire.

• The next morning, July 26, the refugees awoke to find the soldiers gone

and the area quiet. The refugees continued on their own, family cows and oxcarts in tow, until they reached Seo Song Won Ri.

• The refugees soon encountered an American roadblock, and the soldiers

directed the refugees onto the railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the road, possibly to relieve some of the traffic congestion.

• Several American soldiers inspected their bags.

• Suddenly, at least two aircraft strafed the refugees with bombs or other

explosives and machine-gun fire. Refugees fled in all directions.

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• Many refugees took cover in a small, water-filled ditch and in the twin

tunnels beneath the railroad tracks. One of the tunnels had a stream running through it.

• Everyone had to remain prone in the crowded underpasses to avoid the

bullets that were suddenly fired toward the tunnel's interior from an unknown source. Many more people died from the small-arms fire.

• Two U.S. soldiers approached the tunnel entrance to observe the

refugees inside. The soldiers soon departed.

• The weapons firing at the double tunnel continued for an undetermined

number of days (but for no longer than four days).

• Most of the refugees who died in the tunnels were killed on the first day

(probably July 26). At some point, several of the younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, leaving only women, children, and the elderly to remain in the tunnel.

• A number of refugees were aided by U.S. soldiers and others were

evacuated.

• Many of the refugees piled dead bodies in front of the tunnel's entrance to

protect those still alive in the back.

• The only water source available was the blood-saturated stream that ran

through one of the tunnels.

• The refugees ventured forth from the tunnel once the area fell silent and

the weapon's firing stopped.

Several witnesses attempt to quantify the number of dead that resulted from both the strafing and the tunnel shootings. Unfortunately, they use only broad, unsubstantiated estimates that range from 50 to 300 bodies both on the railroad tracks and within the tunnels. The best estimate comes from 27 witnesses who offer some quantifiable numbers. These witnesses mention specific family members or friends whose deaths they witnessed as a result of the strafing attack or the small arms fire within the tunnels. The number totals approximately 70 dead; the wounded are not included in this number. With regard to the recovery of the victims' remains, seven Korean witnesses said that they returned to the tunnel area four to seven days after the incident to recover bodies.85 These witnesses said they saw some or many dead decomposing bodies in the area and that some bodies had been temporarily buried. One Korean witness reported that refugee bodies from villages other than Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri were not buried until mid August.86 In addition to retrieval of the dead after leaving the tunnel, some Korean witnesses mention that they had contact with soldiers of the North Korean People's Army after leaving the tunnel.87 One witness indicated that NKPA soldiers stayed in the mountains near her village (Im Gae Ri) and actually came into the village to eat.88

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N. The interview process

(Interview process chart)

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O. Interview Organization Charts

(5 interview organization charts)

155-159

Endnotes

1 Some statements are summaries, some statements are a mix of summaries and questions and answers and some are questions and answers.

2 Gianelli, Paul C. and Imwinkelreid, Edward J., Scientific Evidence, 3d Edition, LEXIS, 1999, p. 429.

3 Further, extreme stress or terror during an incident degrades a person's ability to remember an entire sequence of events in detail. After a traumatic event, some individuals may develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Most psychologists believe that PTSD may systematically distort memories of those affected. The U.S. Review Team believed that PTSD might have affected the memories of U.S. and Korean witnesses. OEMA discussed this affect with the team. See note 4 below.

4 Briefing by Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA), Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at Arlington, VA for the U.S. Review Team on August 30, 2000 and consultations with the team in August and September 2000. U.S. Team consultation with a Forensic Psychologist assigned to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service in September 2000.

5 The U.S. Review Team discussed distortion and contamination of memory with OEMA and the forensic psychologist mentioned in note 4.

6 For example, interview with USAF veteran.

7 U.S. veteran interviews (1 noncommissioned officer, 1 officer and 2 soldiers).

8 U. S. veteran interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 2 soldiers).

9 U.S. veteran interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 1 soldier).

10 One meeting that occurred in November 1997, see National Council of Churches Letter to President Clinton dated April 22, 1998 and enclosures. In a November 3, 2000 ROK and US Team Working Group meeting, the members of the ROK Review Team mentioned that the "survivors" group held two demonstrations recently in Seoul.

11 One such meeting occurred in South Korea in November 1999 in conjunction with the filming of the NBC Dateline report on No Gun Ri, which ran on December 28, 1999.

12 For example a documentary novel was published in Korea about the experiences of the "survivors", Jung Eun Yong, Friend, Do you know our sufferings? The book was discussed during the television documentary in note 14 below.

13 For example in November 1997 as indicated in a National Council of Churches Letter to President Clinton dated April 22, 1998.

14 For example television documentary "Testimony in 47 years" broadcast by MBC-TV in Korea on November 2, 1997, cited in report attached to the letter to President Clinton noted above.

15 U.S. interview with soldier.

16 U.S. interviews (2 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 3 soldiers).

17 Discussions with OEMA see note 4.

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18 Discussions with OEMA and forensic psychologist. See note 4.

19 Discussions with OEMA. See note 4.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 19 Korean witnesses out of the 49 witnesses whose statements the US Team analyzed.

23 See note 4 OEMA briefings.

24 Diagram (Interview Process) at the end of Chapter 4.

25 U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 2 soldiers).

26 U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 1 soldier).

27 U.S. interviews with 3 soldiers.

28 U.S. interviews with 3 soldiers.

29 U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.

30 U.S. interviews with 5 pilots.

31 The pilots used the word civilian in their interviews.

32 Nine pilots who flew missions according to mission reports.

33 U.S. interviews with Daily, April 4-5, 2000, July 10, 2000.

34 U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer. When first interviewed, many veterans (2 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 3 soldiers) believed that Mr., Daily had been with them in Korea. One veteran (noncommissioned officer thought that he heard Mr. Daily's name called during a mail call in Korea. When re-interviewed in June 2000, they were unable to recall specific instances when they saw Mr. Daily in Korea but believed at first that he had been there because of his attendance and behavior at reunions and conversations at reunions. These veterans, upon further reflection, did not actually remember seeing Mr. Daily in Korea or Japan.

35 U.S. interview with soldier.

36 U.S. interview with soldier.

37 Veterans used the words culvert and tunnel and double tunnel interchangeably. In the interviews if it was clear from the context what feature the veteran was talking about, we did not ask additional questions. In an interview if it was not clear which feature the veteran was talking about, interviewers attempted to clarify with additional questions or in some cases a re-interview. In the end, some interviews were not clear and these interviews have been interpreted to the best of the U.S. Teams' ability,

38 U.S. interview with soldier.

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39 U.S. interview with pilot.

40 Interviews with Simmons, May 26, 2000; Interviews with Becker, March 23, 2000; Interviews with Desfor, May 19, 2000; McDonald, March 24, 2000; Interview with Warner, March 29, 2000.

41 See for example John Osborne, "Report from the Orient: Guns are not enough", Life, Vol. 29, No. 8, August 21, 1950.

42 U.S. interviews with officer.

43 U.S. interview with officer.

44 U.S. interviews (2 officers and 1 soldier).

45 U.S. interviews (2 officers).

46 U.S. interview with officer.

47 U.S. interviews (2 soldiers).

48 U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 1 soldier).

49 U.S. interview with soldier.

50 Chapter 3, p. 88 - 89.

51 U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.

52 U.S. interviews (1 officer and 2 noncommissioned officers).

53 U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 1 soldier).

54 U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers)

55 U.S. interviews (1officer and 1 noncommissioned officer).

56 U.S. interview with officer.

57 U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.

58 U.S. interview with officer.

59 U.S. interview with officer.

60 U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers).

61 U.S. interview with soldier.

62 U.S. interviews with 2 soldiers.

63 U.S. interview with soldier.

64 U.S. interview with soldier.

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65 U.S. interview with soldier.

66 U.S. interview with soldier.

67 Some F-80 pilots recall using bombs early in the war, but while based in Japan F-80s were not armed with bombs. Heavy ordnance would limit the range of the aircraft such that they could not reach their targets in Korea then return to Japan.

68 U.S. interview with pilot.

69 U.S. interview with pilot.

70 U.S. interview with pilot.

71 U.S. interview with pilot.

72 U.S. interview with pilot.

73 U.S. interview with pilot.

74 U.S. interview with pilot.

75 U.S. interview with pilot.

76 U.S. interview with officer.

77 Journalists interviewed Korean and American witnesses. See for example notes 11 and 14 in the introduction to this chapter.

78 Sang-Hun Choe and Charles S. Hanley, "Ex-GIs Tell AP of Korea Killings," September 30, 1999, Associated Press reprinted at http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/apoonline/19990930.

79 Chun Chon-ja provided a witness statement that the U.S. Review Team reviewed.

80 Park Hee-sok provided a witness statement that the U.S. Review Team reviewed.

81 Soldiers could not communicate directly with aircraft as the Koreans believed. See Chapter 3.

82 Despite the witnesses' beliefs, U.S. soldiers could not communicate with aircraft. The soldiers did not have access to the radio frequencies used by the aircraft. See Chapter 3, Combat Operations in July 1950.

83 The air attack was not called for by the soldiers on the ground, despite the refugees' belief that it was. See Chapter 3, Combat Operations in July 1950.

84 One U.S. witness did go down to the tunnel entrance and saw U.S. personnel in the tunnel

85 Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

86 Ibid.

87 Three Korean witness statements (adult, child, and a third witness whose age was not provided). The ROK Review Team took five Korean witness statements in April 2000 and

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provided them to the U.S. Review Team in November 2000. One of these witnesses gave short statement in an earlier interview. The four new witness statements and the additional longer witness statement taken in April 2000 are not included in the 76 witness statements that U.S. Review Team had received earlier which are discussed in this chapter.

88 Korean witness statement (child).

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Chapter 5 - Key issue analysis and findings

The U.S. Review Team's research relied upon textual material found in the National Archives, press reports, official histories, and Korean and American witness statements, and other sources. By comparing and contrasting all of these available information sources, the U.S. Review Team developed a clearer picture of the events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in July 1950. These findings represent the conclusions the U.S. Review Team could derive based on the availability or absence of 50-year-old evidence and memory.

This report uses the terms "civilians" and "refugees". For the purpose of this report, refugee is defined as a person who is fleeing to a place of safety; implied within that definition is that a refugee is an innocent person. During the Korean War, NKPA soldiers infiltrated refugee columns, and civilian collaborators or persons assisting the NKPA were also in refugee parties. The NKPA collabora tors and soldiers dressed in civilian clothing so that they could pass as refugees and blend in with refugees traveling through the U.S. forces' lines. Therefore, the term civilian is used if it could not be determined that civilians being described were "refugees" as defined above. If the sentence or paragraph is a quotation, reference to a witness statement, or document that used the word refugee, the word refugee is used.

For reference, an organizational chart of the 1st Cavalry Division is included in Appendix E. The major subordinate units of the 1st Cavalry Division were the 5th Cavalry Regiment, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

I. Key issue 1: condition of U.S. forces in July 1950

U.S. soldiers were young, under-trained, under-equipped, and unprepared for the tactics used by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The soldiers of the Army of Occupation in Japan functioned primarily as a constabulary in a conquered land and not as combat-ready war fighters. Their training was hampered by the lack of adequate equipment and proper training areas. While company and battalion training had been completed in the 1st Cavalry Division within a year of the war's outbreak, regimental training, which involves more complex maneuver and coordination, had not been conducted.1 Classes for critical specialties such as maintenance and communications were also inadequate. They simply did not have all the means necessary to prepare for war. Complicating the problem of training was a lack of combat experience; most of the leaders at company and below had none. The condition of U.S. forces in July 1950 is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Compounding the 1st Cavalry Division's personnel problems was the requirement to bring the 24th Infantry Division up to strength prior to that division's

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earlier departure for Korea. The 1st Cavalry Division transferred nearly 800 men, most of them from the top four senior non-commissioned officer grades, to the 24th.2 This loss of noncommissioned officers with whom the soldiers had trained weakened the cohesion of the division and further reduced the number of leaders with combat experience at the small-unit level. The Army made every effort to correct these shortfalls through promotion and reorganization, but no unit can effectively perform its mission with so many critical non-commissioned officers missing. The authorized peacetime manning levels for 1950 meant that the three infantry regiments in each division had only two of the three battalions normally assigned. Likewise, each regiment lacked its authorized tank company. The division artillery battalions were also reduced from three to two firing batteries. In addition, the 1st Cavalry Division's equipment was largely of World War II vintage. The under-strength regiments, loss of noncommissioned officers, and World War II equipment significantly weakened the combat power of the 1st Cavalry Division when it deployed to Korea. The lack of training also left soldiers unprepared for the North Korean tactics they encountered. Unlike the expectations expressed by one veteran who thought they were going to fight guerillas, the NKPA was well trained and nearly a third had combat experience in the Chinese Communist Forces during the Chinese civil war. The North Koreans were well supplied with tanks and artillery and used their equipment skillfully in massed, combined-arms attacks. The NKPA also used envelopment tactics that were unfamiliar to the U.S. soldier coming from Japan.3 Documentary evidence also reflects U.S. concern with the particularly troublesome and constant infiltration techniques of North Korean soldiers who routinely slipped through American lines disguised as civilians and then attacked the American positions from the rear. From the earliest days of the war, U.S. soldiers routinely captured infiltrating NKPA soldiers wearing peasant clothing over their uniforms.4

During U.S. Review Team interviews, Army veterans indicated that they were warned of incidents in which North Korean soldiers wore civilian clothes, intermingled with civilians to infiltrate U.S. lines, and ambushed U.S. forces from the rear. Likewise, the soldiers received instructions to be wary of groups of individuals dressed in civilian clothes. Sixteen of the 17 USAF veterans interviewed believed that NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups. At least five USAF veterans testified to having visually confirmed that this infiltration was taking place.

Finding: Based on the documentary evidence, as well as the statements by U.S. veterans, the U.S. Review Team concluded that most American units and soldiers were not adequately prepared for the combat conditions that they

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confronted in Korea in June and July 1950. No experience or training equipped them to deal with an aggressive enemy that employed both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics or with a large refugee population, which the enemy was known to have infiltrated. Shortages of experienced noncommissioned officers, along with inadequate equipment and doctrine, made it difficult for individuals or units to adapt to these conditions.

II. Key issue 2: U.S. and ROK refugee control policies

The U.S. troops were completely unprepared for the stark reality of dealing with the numerous, uncontrolled refugees who clogged the roads and complicated the battlefield to an unexpected degree. U.S. forces also encountered the NKPA practice of using civilian dress as a cover for infiltration early in the war. U.S. and ROK refugees control policies are outlined below and are discussed more extensively in Chapter 2.

In late July 1950, the ROK government and the Eighth U.S. Army head quarters issued refugee control policies to protect the U.S. and ROK forces from NKPA infiltration and attacks from the rear. Additionally, these policies were aimed at reducing the adverse impact of refugees on military operations. This adverse impact included the crowding of main supply routes, which stymied the U.S. and UN troops' ability to rush ammunition forward and evacuate casualties to the rear. These U.S. and ROK refugee policies depended heavily upon the constant presence of, and coordination with, the ROK National Police to handle the uncontrolled refugee population. Despite comments attributed to Major General Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander, that he would not employ the Korean National Police in his division's area of operations, the official records, including his refugee policy directive of July 23, 1950, made the National Police responsible for handling refugees.

The first policy document to address controlling of refugee movement, titled "Control of Refugee Movement", was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23,1950. The movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only; no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways; no fields could be worked; no school, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort; and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive. The policy makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highways, and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the 1st Cavalry Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening.5

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On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Participants from the Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police, United Nations, and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement.6 As a result of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950:

Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be assigned three National Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National Police will immediately clear the area. Food, water, and comfort items for these refugees will be provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.

Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups, in battle areas or rear areas, after the hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive.

Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this information. National Police will further disseminate this information to all Korean civilians by means of radio, messenger, and the press.7

The NKPA frequently used civilian clothing and refugees to conceal their movements. The Eighth Army's policy was intended to deny the NKPA that tactic while also safeguarding civilians by prohibiting refugees from crossing battle lines (Battle lines are the areas where there is contact with the enemy or contact is about to occur). The policy did not state that refugees could not cross friendly lines and contains instructions for the handling of refugees in friendly areas (friendly lines are forward troop positions not in contact with the enemy). The policy emphasized

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the Korean government's responsibility for the control and screening of refugees to provide for their welfare. Nothing in this policy was intended to put refugees at risk.

On July 27, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker's Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees. These instructions included maintaining daily contact with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies; conducting surveillance and inspections of police and South Korean Army refugee checkpoints; screening, checking, and interrogating detainees deemed to be of counter intelligence value; and checking and reporting on curfew regulations and enforcement.8

Leaflets also provided a method of conveying the theater policy on refugee movement to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulated that the leaflets would say that civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines, that the civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police, and that refugees will move only by daylight. The leaflets also had to state that the National Police would rigidly enforce these orders to protect the ROK and UN forces.9 The UN forces and the Eighth Army relied heavily upon the ROK National Police's assistance in controlling the refugee problem and executing the joint Eighth Army and ROK refugee policy. An example of the ROK National Police's indispensable help appears in a monograph written by Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Powhida entitled "Civilian Control in South Korea."10 As a member of the 1st Cavalry Division's G-3 (Operations) section and liaison officer to two of the infantry regiments in mid-July 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Powhida described how he arrived in Yongdong on or about July 21 and directed the Korean police chief to use his 90-man police force to move the teeming refugee columns down trails and off of the highways. The police then directed the refugees to Kumchon for screening and subsequent evacuation. Even though Lieutenant Colonel Powhida rated the effectiveness of this hasty operation at 50 percent, the presence of the ROK National police certainly brought greater order to the chaos and helped the ground forces keep the lines of communication open.

Most veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment interviewed by the U.S. Review Team were enlisted men during the Korean War. They did not receive copies of policies from higher headquarters. In general, the U.S. veterans' recollection of refugee control policies was they should be careful with refugees. These soldiers received instructions and orders from their sergeants and platoon leaders. Many U.S. veterans remember receiving warnings that there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. A few soldiers do not remember hearing

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that there were infiltrators among the refugees. The veterans who remembered more specific details about refugee control remembered specific actions to be taken; for example, keep refugees off the roads, do not let refugees pass, or search refugees and let them pass. One veteran, when asked about refugees, said they were supposed get them off the road, keep them off the road, and send them south. The policy not to let refugees cross battle lines was designed to protect U.S. forces in light of the infiltration tactics used by the North Koreans and the congestion on the roads.

Finding: From its study of the refugee control policies in effect during the last week of July 1950, the U.S. Review Team found that the Eighth U.S. Army published, in coordination with the ROK government, refugee control policies that reflected two predominant concerns: (1) protecting U.S. and ROK troops from the danger of NKPA soldiers infiltrating U.S. - ROK lines, and (2) precluding uncontrolled refugee movements from impeding flows of supplies and troops. The published 1st Cavalry Division refugee control policy dated July 23, 1950, re flected the same two concerns. The task of keeping innocent civilians out of harm's way was left to ROK authorities. By implication, these policies also protected refugees by attempting to ensure they were not in harm's way.

III. Key issue 3: tactical situation July 22-29, 1950

Immediately after the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked in Korea, the Eighth Army directed the division to move forward to the Yongdong-Kumchon area. The 1st Cavalry Division deployed both the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments to defend Yongdong. The 8th Cavalry Regiment moved forward to relieve the 24th Infantry Division's 21st Infantry Regiment and to prevent the occupation of Yongdong from the northwest and southwest.11 A more detailed picture of the tactical situation is found in Chapter 3. (Also, see the maps in Appendix E, which show the locations of units during the last week of July).

With the 8th Cavalry initially deployed north and west of Yongdong, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, dug in east of the town in the vicinity of the village of Kwan ni to prevent a possible envelopment. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, remained in Hwanggan for the moment.12 On July 22, 1950, the 8th Cavalry received their first enemy contact in the 1st Battalion's sector northwest of Yongdong. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the day, and reports of enemy tanks surfaced for the first time. Southwest of town, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, area remained quiet. Artillery fire from the 11th, 77th, and 99th Field Artillery Battalions accounted for five enemy tanks and 15 other vehicles. The threat of envelopment became a real concern to the 8th Cavalry as an aerial observer saw groups of NKPA soldiers dressed in white southwest of Yongdong.13 The threat of envelopment meant

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that the enemy would penetrate their positions and move in behind them, thus cutting them off and destroying them. Realizing the serious danger to the 8th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division ordered the regiment to disengage and withdraw to keep the NKPA from out flanking the regiment and decisively engaging it in Yongdong. Eighth Army's strategy did not include fighting for every town and village. The Eighth Army lacked the necessary strength for that purpose. Instead, the Eighth Army opted to withdraw behind the last major defensible terrain feature, the Naktong River.

The division's withdrawal became part of this Army-level strategy. The plan called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement and rearward movement out of Yongdong to Hwanggan, where the 8th Cavalry would assume the role of the division's reserve.14 Hwanggan is approximately 2.5 road miles east of No Gun Ri.

The 7th Cavalry, meanwhile, had arrived in Korea as part of the division's second lift from Japan. The east coast of Korea suffered a determined NKPA attack, and the 1st Battalion remained in the Pohangdong area to defend the port and adjacent airfield. The remainder of the 7th Cavalry moved forward to the Yongdong area, arriving in its designated assembly area near the village Sot Anmak in the late afternoon of July 24. The 7th Cavalry's mission was to prevent enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry in the event the 8th Cavalry could not break contact and move east from Yongdong.15 On July 25, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, had to break through an NKPA roadblock in order to extract themselves and reposition east of Yongdong. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, broke contact and escaped from Yongdong thanks to the division artillery's superior firepower. The 5th Cavalry withdrew from Yong dong and occupied defensive positions east of town. The day's operations proceeded as planned.16 The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, moved forward with elements of the Regimental Headquarters to support the withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry from Yongdong on the evening of July 25. The regiment reported its command post location to the division at 8:25 PM, giving the grid coordinates of a position directly across the road (today known as Highway 4) from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The 7th Cavalry Regiment's commander later reported that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had contact with 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and that the regiment had no contact with the enemy. What happened during the next several hours remains unclear, particularly with regard to the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.17

Several factors require careful consideration when evaluating the 7th Cavalry's performance on July 25. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was in Pohangdong and had not yet joined the regiment, which gave the 7th a distinct disadvantage in strength. Likewise, the 7th Cavalry did not have an assigned artillery

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battalion in direct support. July 25 was the regiment's second day in the forward area and it was in its first week in Korea. Soldiers were aware of the enemy's infiltration tactics. In the words of the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, refugees clogged the roads, and he heard a vehicle pass his location, possibly a tank.18 Military traffic and refugees crowded the road from Yongdong to Hwanggan, but no other reports of a tank in the rear area exist. The battalion commander most likely heard a vehicle from a withdrawing element belonging to the 8th Cavalry and not a North Korean tank. The fear of NKPA tanks may have caused the commander to identify the vehicle as a tank. Pressure increased on the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment on the right flank of the 1st Cavalry Division. Continuing the division's withdrawal became necessary to avoid a North Korean flanking movement. 1st Cavalry Division regimental operations officers arrived at the division forward command post to receive orders for the next stage of the withdrawal. Sometime during, or shortly after, this conference late on the night of July 25, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the 25th Infantry Division sector to the regiment's north.19 Without specific orders and not in contact with the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, began a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal, believing that the NKPA had attacked and would envelop the battalion. The Regimental War Diary suggests that the battalion was under extreme NKPA pressure and withdrew to avoid envelopment.20 It is very important to understand what was happening throughout the day light hours of July 26 within the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, as they spent the day reorganizing and locating stragglers. The battalion's soldiers had abandoned a significant amount of equipment, including vital radios and crew-served weapons during their disorganized withdrawal in the early morning hours of that same day. Nearly 200 men were unaccounted for. Major Witherspoon, the Regimental S-3 (Operations Officer), set up a collection point by the roadside, probably in the vicinity of Andae Ri, and consolidated the battalion. The battalion spent the entire day going back and forth recovering the abandoned equipment and rounding up the stragglers. This activity would have placed the soldiers and their vehicles exactly in the same location west of the No Gun Ri double railroad overpass where the Korean witnesses claimed (a) the air strike occurred in the early afternoon of July 26 and (b) the Americans engaged them with machine gun fire and drove them into the double overpass. It also placed these soldiers directly to the front of 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry positions in the vicinity of Andae Ri and on Hill 207 throughout the entire day. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which had arrived from Pohang during the afternoon of the 26th, relieved 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, later that day. Hill 207 was the high ground west of what is now Highway 4, overlooking the double railroad overpass. Other elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were also passing through the vicinity of the double railroad overpass throughout the day on the 26th as the Division executed its withdrawal to Hwanggan.

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According to the 7th Cavalry Regiment War Diary, the battalion's leader ship did not regain full control of the situation until 9:30 at night on July 26. After the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reorganized, the soldiers dug in on a ridgeline overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road and railroad to the north of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.21 As they reorganized, they recovered much of their equipment, but 119 men remained unaccounted for.

On July 27, 1950, the division occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry Regiment southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment to the west of town. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment still on the 7th Cavalry's right and the 5th Cavalry Regiment to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in immediate contact with the enemy, but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yongdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yongdong on the railroad tracks. In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor.

However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet.22 The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support. Additionally, an observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry.23 A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the Daily Telegraph and London Herald of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines.24 They would have been in position to hear about an event involving refugees taking place in the immediate area. They did not report an incident involving refugees. The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR)25 reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yongdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yongdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division.

On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's right flank turned critical. The NKPA 4th Division launched an all-out attack against the

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27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions. This movement opened a gap between the two divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yongdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to regained contact with the right flank of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry.26 The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over, however. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day. Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks. The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success. On July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.

To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM on July 28 to withdraw to the southeast at first light on July 29. With the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in the lead, the regiment passed through Hwanggan and occupied positions adjacent to the 5th Cavalry. The withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry from the vicinity of No Gun Ri early on the morning of July 29 marked the end of friendly activity in the area. The area was then under NKPA control. No U.S. troops returned to this area until after the breakout from the Naktong River defenses in September 1950. The NKPA's first patrols entered Hwanggan later that day.27

Finding: The U.S. Review Team found that, in the early morning hours of July 26, 1950, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, without specific orders, but believing they were being enveloped, conducted a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal from a position east of Yongdong to the vicinity of No Gun Ri. They spent the remaining hours of July 26 until late into that night recovering abandoned personnel and equipment from the area where the air strike and machine-gun firing on Korean refugees is alleged to have occurred. On July 26, 1950, at 9:30 at night, 119 men were still unaccounted for. It will probably never be possible to reconstruct the activities of the scattered soldiers of the 2nd Battalion.

The U.S. Review Team determined that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the afternoon of July 26, 1950. They relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and established their position east of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. The U.S. Review Team found that there was repeated contact reported between the 7th Cavalry and enemy forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 27 and July 28. The records indicate by this time that the 7th Cavalry had been told

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that there were no friendly forces to the west and south of No Gun Ri (i.e. back toward Yongdong). The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reported an enemy column on the railroad tracks on July 27, which they fired upon. On July 29, the battalion withdrew as the NKPA advanced. The U.S. Review Team concluded that, based on the available evidence, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was under attack, as they believed, between July 27 and July 29, 1950, when in position near No Gun Ri.

IV. Key issue 4: assembly and movement of villagers

The U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the civilian refugees at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village. The U.S. and ROK policy in July 1950 stated that Korean civilians (with key exceptions) should not evacuate their villages. The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri; but, based on the absence of historical documentation, statements by Korean witnesses, and the lack of mention in the U.S. statements, this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of any U.S. action. The Korean statements indicate that over 400 Koreans were present in Im Gae Ri on July 25. Some of the Koreans who assembled at Im Gae Ri were from other villages and were probably unknown to the Im Gae Ri residents. Twenty-eight Korean witnesses stated that U.S. soldiers told them to evacuate Im Gae Ri on July 25. According to several Korean witnesses, soldiers warned them of potential fighting in the area through a translator. Some witnesses stated that the Americans told them that they were being moved for their safety. Some U.S. veterans remember escorting refugees from villages, but these veterans cannot remember the villages' names or the dates the evacuations occurred. Therefore, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village. A detailed analysis of U.S. and Korean interviews is located in Chapter 4. While the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that the movement of the villagers occurred as described by the Korean witnesses, there was no sound military reason for soldiers to travel approximately three miles off their designated movement route to the village of Im Gae Ri during a hasty withdrawal for the purpose of encouraging an additional 400 refugees onto the already crowded roads and aggravating further the congested conditions. It is also unlikely that the soldiers would have performed this evacuation given the wide spread knowledge and fear of North Korean infiltrators believed to be present in refugee concentrations. Following their departure from the village of Im Gae Ri, the Korean witnesses state that they spent a night on a riverbank. Some witnesses describe what appears to be artillery firing nearby. Most Korean witnesses describe the night on the riverbank as uncomfortable. When they awoke in the morning, the soldiers were gone. Four Korean witnesses state that U.S. soldiers shot and

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killed some refugees on the riverbank who attempted to leave during the night. A small number of Korean witnesses further stated that the U.S. soldiers behaved violently toward anyone who tried to leave the riverbank that night. Based upon the limited available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot establish if these incidents occurred as described. Korean witness statements suggest that Korean refugees encountered U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri as both the soldiers and the refugees moved east. Some Korean witnesses believed that the U.S. soldiers escorted them. It is possible, given the misunderstandings created by language barriers and cultural differences, that as the southward flow of refugee and military traffic merged together, soldiers and refugees moved side by side. Resultantly, the refugees may have incorrectly believed that the U.S. soldiers were escorting them. As the refugees moved toward Hwanggan, some Korean witnesses state that the U.S. soldiers directed them from the road (what is now Highway 4) onto the railroad tracks. Three 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans recalled displacing South Koreans from unknown villages on unknown dates.28 The U. S. Review Team assesses that the 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in the vicinity of Im Gae Ri on July 25 based upon official records and operational overlays of the Regiment's positions. Seven veterans of the 5th Cavalry Regiment indicated that they evacuated or escorted Korean civilians from their villages in late July and early August 1950. The veterans could not name the village. A patrol from the 5th Cavalry Regiment may have told the villagers who had assembled at Im Gae Ri to leave. In addition, 28 U.S. veterans who were interviewed remembered seeing refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, but their estimate of how many is imprecise. Generally, the veterans who remembered evacuating refugees said they evacuated civilians based upon instructions from their units' chain of command. The primary reasons the veterans cited were to improve local security and to remove the non-combatants from the combat zone for their (the refugees') own protection. All U.S. veterans stated that they never used deadly force while evacuating the civilians. Most soldiers believed that the Koreans returned to their villages as soon as the U.S. units moved out of the area. The veterans do not have detailed recollections of their actions and do not remember places, names, or dates. As mentioned earlier, U.S. and ROK policy in July 1950, stated that Korean civilians should not evacuate their villages, and the 1st Cavalry Division Commander prohibited refugee travel by night to protect friendly troops from North Korean infiltration.29 The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery reported the only documented case of 1st Cavalry Division soldiers clearing civilians from a village. On July 23, southwest of Yongdong, Division Artillery soldiers told villagers to leave their homes, which were located close to the artillery positions.30

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If U.S. soldiers encountered a refugee group on the road at night, these soldiers may have tried to prevent the group from moving because they feared infiltrators. The soldiers may have also tried to prohibit movement at night because this movement violated the existing U.S. refugee control policy. Also, if soldiers directed refugees off the road, this action would have been consistent with refugee control policies designed to keep the roads clear for troop movement.

Finding: The U.S. Review Team could not determine the reasons why the refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri, but the U.S. Review Team concluded that this gathering of refugees was probably not the result of U.S. action. Based on some of the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village, but the soldiers who did so were not from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

V. Key issue 5: air strikes in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

The U.S. Review Team concluded that the air strikes / strafing during the last week of July 1950 that may have caused casualties was not the result of a pre-planned or directed strike on civilian refugees. The U.S. Review Team concluded that any air strikes / strafing that hit Korean civilians were due to misidentification of targets or that civilian casualties occurred because civilians were in the area of military targets. The U.S. Review Team's conclusions were based on witness statements, a review of official records, and the NIMA imagery analysis (Appendix C). See Chapter 3 for details of air operations in Korea. The South Korean witness' statements collectively paint a picture of a horrific air attack occurring on July 26, 1950; but many of these witnesses do not agree on the details. They agree only on the fact that an air strike / strafing occurred as the refugee group stood upon the railroad tracks. Some U.S. veterans' statements indicated they saw some strafing. Most of the veterans could not or did not see any aircraft firing on civilians. All but one of those veterans who witnessed such a strike on civilians stated that the civilians either rode upon, or moved beside, an advancing North Korean tank or tanks. Many Korean witnesses stated that U.S. soldiers directed the refugees onto the railroad tracks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri and then used a radio to request an immediate air strike on the group. The Korean witness statements do not agree on all the details surrounding the air strike or strafing. Ten of the witnesses mention seeing a radio in use among the U.S. soldiers.31 The air attack's timing may have led them later to perceive incorrectly a connection between the radio operator and the aircraft.32 By contrast, a large number of the witnesses, 34 out of 49, stated that a strafing attack hit the refugees on the railroad tracks.33 Many Korean witness accounts of the air strike / strafing indicate that more than one aircraft was involved in the attack. In response to some U.S. questions, several witnesses described the attacking aircraft as jets as opposed to propeller-

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driven aircraft.34 In addition, some Korean statements simply state that some type of high explosive ordnance fell upon the refugees. Three Korean witnesses clearly mentioned that the planes used on-board machine-guns in addition to the bombs.35 At least three witnesses suggested that the aircraft made several passes on the group.36 The Korean descriptions of the air strike / strafing are compelling. One eight-year-old witness never mentions bombs or aircraft, but instead remembers flames everywhere searing his face and bullets piercing his legs. 37 An eleven- year-old witness remembers machine-gun bullets riddling her mother's legs, while at the same time losing her left eye from an explosion.38 A witness who was an 18- or 19-year-old adult at the time recounts that the explosions blew a large piece of flesh onto him; his own injuries left him barely able to walk.39 An investigation of the Air Force's documented role during this period of the Korean War yielded no evidence to suggest that Air Force aircraft strafed Korean refugees or enemy soldiers at, or near, No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950. The U.S. Air Force History Team found most mission reports for jet aircraft flying missions over Korea on July 26, 1950. However, the Fifth Air Force final recapitulation report for the day shows no target struck in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26.40 The only documented USAF air strike in the immediate vicinity of Hwanggan area occurred southwest of No Gun Ri on July 27. This was a friendly fire incident in which an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 in the morning. A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was a F-80 from one of the 35th Fighter- Bomber Squadron's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour). The 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing fragmentary order for July 27,1950, matched the F-80 squadron mission summary reports; the requirements and take-off times agreed with each other. The F-80 strafed a "wooden area into which many vehicle tracks were leading", undoubtedly the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's command post.

The strafing destroyed two U.S. trucks but claimed no lives. As a result of the careful scheduling of the air assets, as expressed in the daily frag order, 5th Air Force ADVON could, within a half-hour, identify the aircraft involved. If a similar incident occurred on July 26, it would have been detected and reported as was the one on July 27. The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26 or 27. However, on July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns.

At least 10 of the Korean witnesses stated that they observed a U.S. soldier using a radio to call for the air strike. It is important to note that an ordinary

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ground soldier could not talk directly to a T-6 and request an air strike. Only the TACP with the jeep-mounted AN/VRC-1 radios could talk to the Air Force elements, including the strike aircraft. At best, the infantry or cavalry soldier carried a hand-held "walkie-talkie" radio or the larger backpack SCR-300 radio. To request an air strike, an Army unit, usually at the battalion level or higher, passed a request up through Army channels to the Joint Operations Center; the Joint Operations Center would validate the request and pass it to the Tactical Air Control Center (Mellow). This process included Mellow checking with the deployed Tactical Air Control Parties (ground-based U.S. Air Force elements that controlled U.S. Air Force close air-support missions), Mosquitoes, and Army liaison aircraft to acknowledge the target and direct the next available F­80 jets, propeller- driven F­51s, or Navy aircraft to attack the target. This procedure was slow. A moving target could easily have vanished between the time a ground soldier reported something up through channels and an aircraft arrived.41 There was only one Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) operating in support of the 1st Cavalry Division during this period of time. This TACP was not located in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period of July 26 to July 29, 1950. The accidental air strike on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, caused the 7th Cavalry Regimental Commander to request immediately that he be assigned a Tactical Air Control Party in order to control aircraft in his area and to preclude further friendly fire incidents.42

The U.S. Air Force History Team found 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron film of the No Gun Ri area dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. The Air Force Team showed this film to four retired photo interpreters of national reputation. All of these interpreters agree that there is evidence of probable bomb craters in the vicinity of the various tunnel openings to the west of No Gun Ri near Yongdong. They also state that the film shows no signs of bombing or strafing on the railroad tracks just west of No Gun Ri. A National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) photo interpreter maintains that some patterns near the tracks approximately 350 yards from the double railroad overpass show "an imagery signature of probable strafing" but no bomb damage. The NIMA interpreter's view specifically states that probable strafing occurred in two locations along the western track bed. One of these locations coincides with the location identified by the Korean witnesses as the area where they were strafed. The four retired photo interpreters disagree with this conclusion. Determining the exact date when this damage occurred is not possible, but the NIMA interpreters' view point is that some evidence exists to suggest that an air strike could have occurred in late July in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.43 If the air strike occurred as described by the Koreans, and if American soldiers fired on the Koreans as they were taking cover under the double railroad overpass, the Koreans moved across open ground for a distance of approximately 300 meters. Their movement would have been directly into the line of fire from American soldiers in the vicinity of the double railroad overpass. What is more likely is that, if the civilians were receiving fire from the vicinity of the double

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overpass, they would have moved west, away from the incoming fire and away from the double railroad overpass in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. This movement would have placed the civilians behind the safety of a ridgeline and out of the alleged line of fire. Interviews with U.S. Army veterans also suggest the possibility that an air strike / strafing may have occurred on July 26, 1950, but only one veteran could give a date while the others could not provide dates. Sixteen U.S. veterans interviewed said they saw what they believed were U.S. aircraft on strafing runs.44 The breakdown of what the veterans saw is as follows: Ten veterans did not see the target strafed. Only six veterans could identify the target that the aircraft strafed. Of these six, two veterans identified the target as a tank that had people, perhaps refugees, moving near it or riding on the tank's outer hull. One veteran said refugees mixed with an enemy column were strafed,45 and one veteran said he saw refugees strafed in July - August 1950. Finally, two veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment said their own position was hit by strafing and in fact they were strafed on July 27, 1950.

Although some U.S. veteran's statements indicate they saw strafing, other U.S. veteran' statements support the U.S. Review Team' s conclusion that soldiers could not have called for an air strike. In their statements, U.S. veterans said communications were very difficult, and at times they did not have radio communication with Battalion and Regiment due to equipment shortages (batteries). In late July they relied primarily on landlines. One veteran stated his company could not have communicated with aircraft given their equipment.

The statements of the U.S. pilots interviewed do not support the description given by the Korean witnesses of the air strike / strafing. Several U.S. Air Force veteran pilots that the U.S. Review Team interviewed remembered the name Yongdong and knew that they flew missions there on July 26, 1950. None of these veterans remembered any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Sixteen of the 17 U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed believed that the NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups. At least five pilots interviewed visually confirmed that this infiltration was taking place.46 A Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) veteran regularly observed NKPA soldiers dressed in civilian clothing.47 Several pilots stated that they would have refused any orders to strafe civilians intentionally, although they never received any such orders. No USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants; although no one recalled any written policies on this subject. Furthermore, all pilots interviewed stated that the visibility from their F-51, F-80, and T-6 cockpits was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed

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especially F-80 pilots) said that distinguishing between enemy troops and friendly forces proved very difficult or impossible, primarily as a result of the high air speeds flown. None of the U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage.

Finding: An exhaustive search of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy records, and interviews with U.S. pilots did not identify an air strike in the No Gun Ri area on July 26, 1950. The number of Korean witness statements describing the strafing and the photograph interpretation by NIMA does not permit the U.S. Review Team to exclude the possibility that U.S. or allied aircraft might have hit civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during an air strike/ strafing on July 26, 1950. On July 27, 1950, an air strike did in fact occur on the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's position near No Gun Ri that both the Air Force and Army recorded in official documents. On July 28, there was also an air strike on NPKA forces near 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. If Korean civilians were near the positions of these strikes, they could have been injured.

The U.S. Review Team concluded that strafing may have occurred near No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 and could have injured or killed Korean civilians but that any such air strikes were not deliberate attacks on Korean civilians. The U. S. Review Team concluded that any air strikes / strafing occurring on July 26 took place under the same conditions as the air strikes / strafing on July 27, specifically an accidental air strike / strafing caused by the misidentification of targets and not a pre-planned strike. An accidental air strike / strafing could have happened due to several factors: target misidentification, lack of reliable communications, absence of a Tactical Air Control Party in the 7th Regiment, and the fluid nature of the battlefield. It was not a pre-planned strike on civilian refugees.

VI. Key issue 6: ground fire in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

The U.S. Review Team concluded that ground fire, including small-arms, artillery, and mortar fire, hit and injured or killed some Korean refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July, 1950. The U.S. Review Team's research found no official records describing the shooting of a large number of refugees in the No Gun Ri area during the last week of July 1950.

Some U.S. and Korean witness statements indicate that U.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period July 26-29, 1950, as discussed below. Briefly, the Korean description of the events on July 26, 1950, is that refugees were strafed or bombed on the road. Some fled the area or hid in ditches and others went into the double railroad overpass tunnel where they were fired upon from different locations, for a period of up to four days, with the heaviest fire occurring on July 26 (which was the first day they report spending in the double railroad overpass). See Chapter 3 for details on U.S. tactical operations.

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On the afternoon of July 26, 1950, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, replaced the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, in the vicinity of Hill 207 near the village of Andae Ri. Records of the 5th Cavalry for July 26-29 indicate no incident involving refugees.48 The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, was reorganizing on July 26, after a disorganized night withdrawal from a location east of Yongdong to the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, completed this re organization at about 9:30 PM on July 26; however, 119 men were still unac counted for. It took a position on the ridgeline overlooking the hamlet of No Gun Ri and across the road (what is now Highway 4) from 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. In order for soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, to reach their position on the ridgeline as they reorganized, they would have used this road. If there was heavy firing from the higher ground above the road into the double railroad overpass, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, would have also been in the path of that fire. On July 27, the 1st Cavalry Division informed the 7th Cavalry Regiment that no friendly troops were operating to their south or west. The 7th Cavalry Regiment would then have considered movement to their front as probable North Korean activity. Therefore, the regiment may have believed that, with the possible exception of a friendly patrol, nothing but the enemy existed between them and Yongdong. The reported position of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, on the ridgeline overlooking the village of No Gun Ri is inconsistent with the positions the veterans remember occupying. Some veterans described positions that are on the opposite side of the road (Highway 4) in the area initially occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and later on the 26th by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. While the U.S. Review Team cannot resolve this inconsistency, there are some possible explanations. Some soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, were unaccounted for following the disorganized withdrawal on the night of July 25 / 26. They may have dug into the positions they described for some period of time, possibly temporarily mixing in with another unit. Some soldiers may simply have dug in the wrong positions on the other side of the road near Hill 207, even after the reorganization. The veterans may also have been confused as to the north / south orientation of the area. At this time, the unit was retreating along the road, which ran to the northeast, not toward what most of them believed was the south. The veteran's memories may also be flawed and confused. After the passage of 50 years, some inconsistencies will never be explained. U.S. veterans from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, described several terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, including a double railroad overpass, single culvert, and a single tunnel.49 The only way the directional orientation of their descriptions can be correct is if one assumes that they were at those positions on Hill 207 instead of along the ridgeline overlooking the village

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of No Gun Ri in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's reported position. Given the degree of disorganization of the battalion, some soldiers, including possibly some of the 119 men missing, may not have been at their battalion's reported position. Korean witnesses describe these same terrain features. The features are also shown on the August 6, 1950, U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph. In interviews, twelve U.S. veterans stated that firing of various types including machinegun, mortar, and rifle firing occurred near unidentified people in civilian clothing outside the tunnels/ bridges in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (See Chapter 4). Some veterans stated that they fired over the heads of civilians to prevent movement toward U.S. positions. Some veterans stated that they observed U.S. fire as a response to perceived hostile fire from the refugee positions in the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. Three veterans remembered seeing fire from U.S. soldiers directed at a double railway overpass. Some veterans also remember intermittent NKPA and U.S. artillery and mortar fires throughout this period.

In all of the U.S. interviews, the firing described occurs for short periods of time (less than 60 minutes), unlike the descriptions of some Korean witnesses that the firing continued up to four days. However, there is no indication that anything resembling mass killings took place. The U.S. veterans did not receive orders to kill civilian refugees. Some U.S. veterans received an order to stop refugees and not to let them pass at No Gun Ri. As a result of that order, soldiers fired over the heads or in front of refugees to prevent their movement. Soldiers also fired in response to perceived hostile fire. The issuance of orders is discussed in Finding 7. Finally, the events as described in the U.S. witness interviews could not have caused the large number of casualties attributed by Korean witnesses to the ground fire at the double railroad overpass. Based on interviews, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers believed that they could take action in self-defense. Soldiers believed they could fire when fired upon or when they perceived hostile intent. Some of the ground fire was in self-defense; that is, in response to perceived hostile fire.

Some Korean witnesses estimated that the firing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, which they state occurred during the day and night, lasted up to four days. Some Korean witnesses statements provide a range of times for the duration of the events at the double overpass from three to five days, but the statements are not consistent and the estimates of the duration of the event do not corroborate each other. The Korean statements suggest there were a large number of casualties, and a number of Koreans state that U.S. soldiers offered them assistance or medical aid. Korean witnesses describe the same terrain features as the U.S. veterans, but Korean accounts focus on the double railroad overpass. Korean witnesses

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stated that there was heavy firing on the double railroad overpass from U.S. soldiers on the afternoon of July 26. Some Korean witnesses stated that they went under the double railroad overpass after being strafed on the railroad track above it but that others also fled the area. After entering the tunnel, Korean witnesses state that they received heavy fire from outside the tunnel for an undetermined number of days. They remained prone in the tunnel to avoid being hit by weapons firing into the tunnel. Most of the deaths occurred on the first day; at some point, some younger men and children escaped from the tunnel. Nine Korean witnesses believed that the firing was coming from the hill above the overpass. Other descriptions imply that firing was coming from both sides of the tunnel. Multiple Korean witnesses said that soldiers came to the tunnel to check on the civilians on the first day. Yet this is also the day on which the Korean witnesses indicated that they received the heaviest fire that killed many people and the day, on which they remained prone on the tunnel floor, placing bodies at the entrances of the tunnels to shield people in the tunnel. It is also the day on which two Korean witnesses indicate that soldiers transported Koreans from the tunnel in a jeep and on a truck. The U.S. Review Team cannot explain these inconsistencies. In the Korean description of the events at No Gun Ri, Korean witnesses state that at some point younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, and only women, children, and the elderly remained under the railroad overpass. If, as some Korean statements imply, both openings of the tunnel were covered by weapons fire during the day and night, the escape to either the west or east was unlikely. If, however, the firing was brief and sporadic, people could have fled the tunnel area.

A more plausible explanation of events, based on the available evidence, is that there was sporadic firing on July 26, as described above, for very short periods of time; there was much more intense fire beginning on July 27 as the 1st Cavalry Division retreated and the NKPA advanced toward Hwanggan. Official records indicate that the NKPA attacked the 7th Cavalry on July 27 and 28, and the 7th Cavalry employed every means at its disposal to defend itself, including the use of small-arms fire, mortars, and artillery. Even after the heaviest documented fighting, the aerial reconnaissance photograph of August 6, 1950, shows no bodies, animal carcasses, or signs of graves in the vicinity of the double overpass (See Appendix B, Tab 3, and Appendix C). Some Korean witnesses stated they recalled returning to the area to look for family members during the period of early to mid-August and that there were numerous bodies in the area. Fighting positions and vehicle tracks are visible in the aerial photograph while human and animal remains are not. Forensic examinations of the site around the double railroad overpass found bullets and bullet marks that were analyzed. Analysis of the bullets found

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in the area of the double railroad overpass showed they were of U.S. manufacture. Soviet bullets were also found in the area. The bullets could have come from U.S. weapons or captured U.S. weapons being used by NKPA soldiers who passed through this area. U.S. Forces moved back through this area in September 1950. For a review of the forensic work, see Appendix C, Tab 2.

Finding: Although the U.S. Review Team cannot determine what happened near No Gun Ri with certainty, it is clear, based upon all available evidence, that an unknown number of Korean civilians were killed or injured by the effects of small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950. These Korean deaths and injuries occurred at different locations in the vicinity of No Gun RI and were not concentrated exclusively at the double railroad overpass.

Some U.S. veterans describe fire that lasted for a few to fifteen minutes. Some Korean witnesses describe fire day and night on the tunnel for as long as four days. Because Korean estimates of the length of time they spent in the tunnel are so inconsistent, the U.S. Review Team drew no conclusion about the amount of time they spent in the tunnel. The firing was a result of hostile fire seen or received from civilian positions or fire directed over their heads or near them to control their movement. The deaths and injuries of civilians, wherever they occurred, were an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing.

VII. Key issue 7: issuance of orders to fire on refugees

The U.S. Review Team interviewers asked the U.S. veterans if they received orders or heard orders given to shoot civilian refugees. The veterans interviewed stated that they were not given orders to fire on refugees, and they did not hear orders to fire on refugees. However, the U.S. Review Team found that U.S. soldiers were given an order to stop the refugees or not let the refugees pass. In the absence of any other guidance this order could have been misunderstood or misconstrued. A more extensive review of the U.S. veterans' statements is found in Chapter 4. Most U.S. veterans did not believe they were authorized to use deadly force against civilian refugees. Several veterans who received the instruction / order "do not let refugees pass" either "assumed" or "believed" that if the refugees tried to pass, they could use deadly force. A platoon leader who said that deadly force was not authorized against refugees also knew of the instruction "do not let the refugees pass." The platoon leader said that a soldier might have misunderstood this instruction and believed he could use deadly force to prevent civilian refugees from passing if they did not stop when directed to do so.

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In interviews with the U.S. Review Team, several veterans stated they assumed there was an order to fire on civilians because artillery and mortar fires were used that may have hit civilians.50 These veterans were adamant that there was an order, but they had no information to support their assertions. When interviewed, the veterans did not know who gave the order, they did not hear the order, they did not know when the order was given, and they personally did not receive the order.

Some U.S. veteran interviews indicate that U.S. ground forces fired at or towards civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the period July 26 - 29, 1950. The reasons the soldiers took these actions are discussed in the next two paragraphs. Some firing at civilians occurred because soldiers said that they were told to keep the civilians pinned down or stopped. Two soldiers said they fired shots over their heads to keep the civilians from moving; they were not ordered to target and fire on the civilians. The only reference to orders prompting these actions was the order that the refugees were to be stopped or would not be allowed to approach and pass through friendly positions.

Several other veterans stated they observed firing at the civilians in response to perceived hostile fire from the positions near the double railroad overpass and elsewhere. Based on veteran's interviews, the U.S. Review Team found that soldiers believed that they could take action in self-defense against civilians; that is, if they were fired upon or if they saw actions that indicated hostile intent. Some veterans said they observed firing in the direction of the double railroad overpass in response to fire from that location. Return fire in this case would have been an action in self-defense, and no orders were required. The U.S. soldiers were repeatedly warned that North Korean soldiers wore civilian clothing over their uniforms in order to infiltrate U.S. positions. The U.S. soldiers were also told that North Korean soldiers would hide within refugee columns.

Former officers of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, that the U.S. Review Team interviewed remain adamant that the battalion commander issued no order to fire on refugees at any time. One former member of the battalion believed he saw a small group of civilians on the railroad tracks and that soldiers fired warning shots over their heads to stop them and keep them away from the battalion's position.

While conducting research, the U.S. Review Team found four references containing entries regarding actions against civilians. The first reference was an abbreviated message which appeared in the 8th Cavalry Regiment message log dated 10:00 AM on July 24, 1950, that stated: "No refugees to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." This message did not

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constitute an order from the 1st Cavalry Division to fire upon Korean civilians at No Gun Ri. There is no evidence that this message was retransmitted to, or received by subordinate units within the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the unit in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on July 26. By July 26, 1950, the last elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment were withdrawing from the vicinity of No Gun Ri to the division rear near Hwanggan. The U.S. Review Team found no evidence that the 8th Cavalry message was transmitted to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments or any other subordinate element of the division.

The policy set by the 1st Cavalry Division Commander in his order of July 23, 1950, titled "Control of Refugee Movement" makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. It stated: "Municipal authorities, local police and the National Police will enforce this directive." The U.S. Review Team concluded that the 8th Cavalry Regiment log entry did not constitute an order to fire upon Korean civilians at No Gun Ri.

The second reference was a 25th Infantry Division Commander's memorandum to commanders, issued on July 27, 1950. On the 25th of July, 1950, the 25th ID Activities Report stated: "Refugees and Korean Civilians were ordered out of the combat zone in order to eliminate possible serious traffic problems and to aid in blocking the infiltration of North Korean Forces through the lines. These instructions were passed to the civilians through the Korean Police."51 The July 27, 1950 memo to Commanders reads: "Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly."52 The area "between the blue lines" was in front of the 25th Infantry Division's main line of defense -- no-man's-land at best -- an area about to be occupied by the enemy. Two things are clear: actions had been taken in conjunction with the Korean National Police to clear the civilians out of the danger area; and, those actions were intended to ensure that noncombatants would not find themselves in harms way when the advancing NKPA subsequently made contact along the Division's front. After the area was deemed to be cleared, anyone caught in civilian clothes and suspected of being an enemy agent was to be turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps, and not to the Korean Police immediately. There is nothing to suggest any summary measures were considered against refugees, or people dressed like them. The 25th Infantry Division was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The third reference was a memorandum, written by Major General (Retired) Turner C. Rogers, then Colonel Rogers, the Deputy Chief for Operations, Advanced Headquarters Fifth Air Force, to his commander on July 25, 1950, with the following subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees. This memorandum is not an order. It is a written record reflecting one officer's concerns about the

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strafing of civilians. Some people have interpreted the memorandum to mean that blanket orders to fire on civilians existed. The U.S. Review Team does not agree with this interpretation. The memorandum was prepared a few days after Colonel Rogers arrived in Korea. The memorandum expressed Colonel Rogers' concern about an un specified Army request to strafe civilians approaching U.S. positions and recommended a policy be established "whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts." The recommended policy appears to be the practice followed by the USAF pilots the U.S. Team interviewed. Pilots sought out targets such as trucks, tanks, moving troops,53 and groups of men in uniform.54 The pilots fired when they were told a target was hostile55 and fired back when fired upon.56 Despite the memorandum by Colonel Rogers, no USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. U.S. Air Force interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants, although no one recalled any written policies on this subject. No USAF veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. Furthermore, all pilots interviewed stated that the visibility from their F-51, F-80, and T-6 cockpits was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed (especially F-80 pilots) said that distinguishing between enemy troops and friendly forces proved very difficult or impossible, primarily as a result of the high air speeds flown. None of the U.S. Air Force veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed Major General Rogers, but he did not remember the July 25, 1950, memo and did not remember any details about his duty position at Advance Headquarters Fifth Air Force.57 The fourth entry the U.S. Review Team found was a statement similar to the Colonel Rogers' memorandum in an extract from the Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge Activity Summary, a Navy document describing operations conducted on July 25, 1950:

Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be

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civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.58

Like the U.S. Air Force's official records, no documentary evidence exists that shows that Navy aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets. A study of the command histories and after-action reports held by the Naval Historical Center indicates that the only units available for missions on July 26, Attack Squadron

Fifty-Five (VA-55) and Fighter Squadron Fifty-Three (VF-53), were not used near No Gun Ri. Both squadrons deployed aboard the Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge (CV 45) as part of Carrier Air Group Five (CVG-5) from May 1 through December 1, 1950. In addition, the Navy leadership, down to the individual pilot, recognized fully the presence of civilians in the war zone, and leaders at each level of command acted to avoid engaging these non-combatants.59 Since both the Rogers' memorandum and this document are dated July 25, 1950, it is possible that they are referencing a single discussion in the Joint Operations Center, where both USAF and USN operations officers were co located. The Navy statement reinforces the judgment that pilots were expected to exercise between selecting targets and the Army's desire to target NKPA troops wearing white, not noncombatants.

During the U.S. Review Team's research, no other documents or policy directives relating to the COL Rogers' memorandum or the U.S. Navy extract, such as the originating Army request for strafing action or any implementing documents prepared in reply to Colonel Rogers' memorandum, were located. After the passage of 50 years, determining why this memorandum was written is im possible.

Finding: Based upon the available evidence and despite some conflicting statements and misunderstandings, the U.S. Review Team concluded that U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot and kill Korean civilians during the last week of July 1950 in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. A veteran stated that soldiers could have misunderstood the order not to let refugees pass or to stop refugees. Some veterans did believe that if a civilian would not stop, they could use deadly force to prevent civilians from passing. Some veterans stated that there was an order to shoot civilians at No Gun Ri but had no information to support their assertions. These soldiers did not know who gave the order, did not hear the order, did not know when the order was given, and personally did not receive the order. As a result, the U.S. Review Team concluded that these veterans assumed that an order was given because artillery and mortars were fired. The U.S. Review Team also considered media statements quoting veterans who claimed that an order to shoot Korean civilians was given at No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team was unable to confirm these

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reports because the witnesses either were not at No Gun Ri at the time or refused to speak to the U.S. Army. Although the U.S. Review Team found four references (entry in the 8th Cavalry Regiment Message Log, 25th Infantry Division Commander's order, Colonel Rogers' memorandum, and an extract from the U.S. Navy's Aircraft Carrier Valley Forge Activity Summary) discussing actions against civilians, it did not find evidence of an order given to soldiers by a U.S. commander, orally or in writing, to kill Korean civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950.

VIII. Key issue 8: number of Korean deaths and injuries

The U.S. Review Team cannot conclusively determine the number of Korean deaths and injuries resulting from U.S. combat action in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. During meetings with the U.S. Review Team, ROK Review Team on August 3, 2000 and November 3, 2000 reported an unverified number of 248 casualties, which they stated was provided to them by the Yongdong County Office. The ROK Steering Group, at a meeting on December 7, 2000, in Seoul, ROK, repeated that the unverified number of casualties was 248. The initial Associated Press articles reported hundreds of people killed.60 Korean witness statements contain different estimates of how many people were killed or injured and how the bodies were buried. These witness statements described refugees piling dead bodies at the entrances of the tunnel,61 dead cows on the railroad tracks,62 bodies scattered near the railroad tracks,63 and dozens of people dying.64 Six Korean witnesses described the use of a mass grave or heard that a mass grave near the double tunnels was used.65 Seven Korean witnesses said that they returned to the tunnel area four to seven days after the incident to recover bodies.66 These witnesses said they saw some or many dead decomposing bodies in the area and that some bodies had been temporarily buried.67 One Korean witness reported that refugee bodies from villages other than Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri were not buried until mid August.68 Despite these reports, no bodies or animal carcasses, or signs of the decomposition of bodies, were observed on the August 6, 1950, U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph that was analyzed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Some Korean statements describe only the deaths or injuries of family members,69 and others only estimate the total number of deaths and injuries.70 Korean witness estimates range between 60 -100 dead in the double tunnel and 50 - 150 dead or injured from strafing / bombing.71 An evaluation of Korean and U.S. veteran witness statements is found in Chapter 4. The U.S. Review Team's research revealed no official records of refugee deaths or injuries in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 26 and July 29, 1950. Some U.S. veterans describe dead or injured civilians.72 These estimates range

190

from a few to a single veteran who gave a number of 200. The soldiers did not check bodies, and some estimates appear to be guesswork or not related to this incident. Most U.S. veterans who passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950 during their withdrawal toward the Naktong River did not observe human or animal remains or graves in the area.73 The U.S. Review Team believes that it is unlikely that hundreds of dead bodies were present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950 based on the statements of U.S. veterans and the examination of the August 6, 1950, aerial photograph by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.74

Finding: Based on the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team is unable to determine the number of Korean civilians who were killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. During their investigation, the ROK Review Team reported that the Korean survivors' organization claimed an unverified number of 248 South Korean civilians killed, injured, or missing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 25 and 29, 1950. This report was recorded by the Yongdong County Office. The ROK Steering Group, at a ROK-U.S. Steering Group meeting on December 6-7, 2000, in Seoul, ROK, reiterated the claim of 248 casualties. The actual number of Korean casualties cannot be derived from the U.S. veteran statements and Korean witness statements. The U.S. Team believes that number to be lower than the Korean claim. An aerial reconnaissance photograph of the No Gun Ri area taken on August 6, 1950, shows no indication of human remains or mass graves in the vicinity of the No Gun Ri double railroad overpass. Korean burial customs, farming in the area, lack of reliable information, wartime disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time preclude an accurate determination of the numbers involved.

Conclusion

During late July 1950, Korean civilians were caught between withdrawing U.S. forces and attacking enemy forces. As a result of U.S. actions during the Korean War in the last week of July 1950, Korean civilians were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team did not find that the Korean deaths and injuries occurred exactly as described in the Korean account. To ap praise these events, it is necessary to recall the circumstances of the period. U.S. forces on occupation duty in Japan, mostly without training for, or experience in, combat were suddenly ordered to join ROK forces in defending against a determined assault by well-armed and well-trained NKPA forces employing both conventional and guerilla warfare tactics. The U.S. troops had to give up position after position. In the week beginning July 25, 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division, withdrawing from Yongdong toward the Naktong River, passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Earlier, roads and trails in South Korea had been choked with civilians fleeing south. Disguised NKPA soldiers had mingled with these refugees. U.S. and ROK commanders had published a policy designed to limit the

191

threat from NKPA infiltrators, to protect U.S. forces from attacks from the rear, and to prevent civilians from interfering with the flow of supplies and troops. The ROK National Police were supposed to control and strictly limit the movements of innocent refugees. In these circumstances, especially given the fact that many of the U.S. soldiers lacked combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, some soldiers may have fired out of fear in response to a perceived enemy threat without considering the possibility that they might be firing on Korean civilians. Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S. veterans' statements re viewed by the U.S. Review Team support a hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians. What befell civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950 was a tragic and deeply regrettable accompaniment to a war forced upon unprepared U.S. and ROK forces.

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Endnotes

1 Book 2, Combat Effectiveness Reports 1st Quarter, and Book 3, Combat Effectiveness Reports 2nd Quarter, enclosures to Headquarters Eighth U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Command Report G-3 Section, 1 January 1950 thru 30 June 1950," Box P726, Historical Section, Eighth United States Army, RG 338, NARA.

2 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

3 Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-105, Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea), August 1950. In Army Intelligence Decimal Files 1950, Entry 2A, Box 572, RG 319, NARA.

4 Narrative Historical Report, 25th Infantry Division, 8-31 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

5 Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA; see Chapter 2 of this report for a more detailed discussion of the refugee control policies.

6 Informal Check Slip, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) HQs, 26 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, 8th Army Adjutant General Section 1944- 1956, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 729, RG 338, NARA.

7 Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees, In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.

8 Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.

9 Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950. In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950, Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA.

10 Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTC J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1951-1952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA. 11 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid

15 Ibid and Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

193

16 War Diary , 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

17 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

23 "Report of the First OCAFF (Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces) Observer Team to the Far East Command", 16 August 1950, RG 387, entry 55, Box 171, NARA.

24 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950. In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

25 Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report

1. 5, 1800 26 July

1950, Box 45, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, RG 338, NARA.

26 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

27 War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

28 Interviews with three soldiers March 3, 2000.

29 Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 July 1950, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.

30 Periodic Operations Report No. 13, 23 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

31 Korean witnesses are not identified by name but are identified by their status in July 1950, that is adult, teenager, or child. 4 children, 4 teenagers and 2 adults saw the radio.

32 Five Korean witness statements (3 teenagers, 1 child, and 1 adult).

33 Korean witness statements (including 8 children, 4 teenagers, 2 adults and one person whose age was not provided).

34 Korean witness statements (3 children, 2 teenagers and 3 adults).

35 Korean witness statements (3 adults).

36 Korean witness statements (1 child and 2 teenagers).

194

37 Korean witness statement (child).

38 Korean witness statement (child).

39 Korean witness statement (child).

40 See Chapter 3.

41 See Chapter 3.

42 HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950, in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 - 1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

43 See Appendix C.

44 U.S. interviews with 4 officers, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 10 enlisted soldiers.

45 U.S. interviews with 2 noncommissioned officers, 1 officer and 1 enlisted soldier.

46 U.S. interviews with 4 pilots.

47 U.S. interview with pilot.

48 Based on the statements of Korean witnesses, the refugees who were fired on did not arrive in this area until after or about the same time the 5th Cavalry Regiment was departing.

49 While these terrain features are located in the No Gun Ri area, similar terrain features in Korea may contribute to confusion in the veteran's memories.

50 One of the soldiers who believed there must have been an order to fire mortar rounds conceded that he believed the mortar round he saw fall was a warning round. Several veterans including 3 noncommissioned officers and 2 enlisted soldiers believe there must have been an order.

51 Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50.

52 Ibid.

53 U.S. interview with pilot.

54 U.S. interview with pilot.

55 U.S. interview with pilot.

56 U.S. interview with pilot.

57 U.S. interview with officer.

58 Valley Forge (CV 45), Report of Operations, 16 July to 31 July 1950, 16. <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/v-forge.htm>

59 See Chapter 3.

60 See Chapter 1.

195

61 Korean witness statements (1 child and 1 teenager).

62 Korean witness statement (adult).

63 Korean witness statement summarized in ROK, "On-Site Technical Investigation." provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

64 Different Korean witnesses give different estimates including the following: 60 dead bodies in the tunnel; 60 to 100 people died in the tunnels; the bombing killed about 100 -150 people and there were 50 -60 bodies were on the railroad track.

65 Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Korean witness statement summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation."

69 Korean witness statements (3 children and 1 teenager) and witness statements summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation."

70 Ibid.

71 See note 5.

72 U.S. Veteran estimates of wounded and dead varied for example 8 - 9 who could have been dead or injured, possibly several dead or injured, close to two hundred, and maybe 50 -60 killed or injured I am just not sure. At least ten veterans talk about refugees being killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However, some of the veterans who observed dead or injured refugees and do not know how or when they were wounded.

73 Appendix B, Tab 1.

74 Appendix D and Appendix B, Tab 2.

196

Appendix A - Records research

I. Research methodology

The Inspector General's Office was tasked by the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of the Army to conduct research to enable a full and fair accounting of incidents alleged to have occurred involving citizens of the Republic of Korea in, or traveling through areas under the control of the U.S. Army operating in the Republic of Korea in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, during the last week of July 1950. The research project would include but not be limited to aerial photography and map analysis, interviews from veterans, primary source textual documentation, and still photography. The multi-pronged research project began by establishing teams in the different areas focusing on textual documentation, interviews, and map analysis of the area in question. A research team, an interview team, and a mapping/aerial photography team began piecing together the early days of the Korean War. The textual research team's efforts are described in length later in this section. The interview team's main goal was identifying individuals with firsthand knowledge of the area in question and the activities occurring there during the last week of July 1950. Personnel payroll records, Veterans Service Organizations, Korean War web sites, the Inspector General's No Gun Ri web site, and media accounts were used to create a listing of potential interviewees who had served during the Korean War. Further information regarding the interview team's methodology and findings are covered in Chapter 4.

The mapping/aerial photography team began by locating historical aerial photography, contemporary with the alleged incident. Additional information on the mapping/aerial photography team's efforts are covered in Appendix C.

A diverse research team consisting of elements from the Army Inspector General's Office and professional researchers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Louis District undertook the textual documentation research project. Simultaneously the Air Force and the Navy conducted independent research regarding allegations of a strafing incident involving civilian refugees just prior to the No Gun Ri alleged incident. While conducting their research, the Air Force research staff reviewed records pertaining to the Army's investigation. They informed the Army of any significant documents or grouping of documents pertaining to the alleged incident. Their research methodology and findings are found in Chapter 3.

The textual research team began by identifying repositories with the greatest possibility of having pertinent information. Then they visited each location to conduct research. A research team systematically reviewed records

A-1

for approximately eight months and a detailed listing of the repositories selected and their activities are described in the following paragraphs.

II. Research repositories

The following sections describe in lengthy detail records reviewed and/or research strategies at each of the research locations identified as having information on the Korean War.

(301) 713-6800

The National Archives is the main repository for relevant records pertaining to operations in the Republic of Korea during 1950. Since there are few electronic finding aids and no Korean War era textual documents on computer, the research team did a manual review of paper documents. The research team took a very broad, expansive approach to conducting the research at the National Archives. Numerous record groups were identified as potentially useful. The research team consulted and included the recommendations of senior archivists and reviewed numerous finding aids to pinpoint pertinent records dealing with activities in Korea during the first year of the war. Generally military records for 1950 were reviewed. Appropriate Command, division, and unit records were reviewed as well as non-military and captured North Korean documentation. While reviewing captured materials particular emphasis was placed on information pertaining to combat operations occurring between Yong Dong and Hwanggan, reports of alleged atrocities, instructions or orders on the use of ROK civilians on the battlefield, any maps showing positions in the area being examined, and reconnaissance reports. Still pictures, motion pictures/films, cartographic, and microfilm holdings were also reviewed by the research team.

The following paragraphs describe the numerous avenues of research conducted by the research team. The detailed listing describes record groups and entries reviewed as well as the individual boxes.

Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State

Entry 205L: Interfiles to the Decimal Files, 1950-1955 Boxes 1-10

Entry 229A: Country Files, 1934-1953 Boxes 1-2

A-2

Entry 399A: Top Secret Subject File (Lot 56D 151), 1945-1950 Boxes 12-19

Entry 399B: Regional Affairs Subject Files, 1929-1953 Boxes 1-6

Entry 399C: Country Files, 1929-1953 Boxes 7-20

Entry 436: Division of Historical Policy Research and Its Predecessors, Special Studies and Reports, 1944-1950 Boxes 1-16

Entry 697: Miscellaneous Subject Files (Lot 55D 560), 1946-1954 Boxes 1-8

Entry 719: Working Papers and Source Material for Miscellaneous War Histories, 1940-1950 Boxes 60-68

Entry 1130: Subject File (Lot 53D 26), 1949-1953 Boxes 1-14

Entry 1138: Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memorandums (Lot 55D 458), 1950 Box 1

Entry 1193: Records of Dean Acheson, Country File, 1949-1953 Boxes 23-24

Entry 1196: General Correspondence Files (Lot 53D 444) Boxes 30-33

Entry 1198: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1953 Boxes 1-3 Entry 1199: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1948-1959 Box 3

Entry 1203: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (John Moore Allison) (Lot File 55D 282), 1950-1952 Box 1

Entry 1208: Numerical File, 1949-1955 Boxes 34, 40

A-3

Entry 1215: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1948-1955 Box 1

Entry 1225: Briefing Books and Reference Materials Relating to Korea, 1947- 1956 (microfilm C0044) Reels 14-19

Entry 1228: Miscellaneous Records Relating to Japan and Korea, 1945-1953 Boxes 1-2

Entry 1231: Alpha-Numeric File of Korea, 1952-1957 Boxes 1-5

Entry 1251: Korean Project of the Division of Historical Policy Research Boxes 1-45

Entry 1260: General Records of the Executive Secretariat (Lot 56D 459), 1948- 1956 Boxes 1-9

Entry 1360: Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, Division of Research for Far East, 1946-1952 Box 1-5

Entry 1361: Records of Division of Research for Far East (Lot 58D 245), 1946- 1952 Boxes 6-9

Entry 1420: Records Relating to the International Refugee Organization and the Displaced Persons Commission, DP Subject File, 1944-1952 Boxes 1-16

Entry 1460: Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Lot 53D 403), 1950-1953 Boxes 1-30

Entry 1469: Records of the Historical Studies Division Research Memorandums (Slash Series), 1946-1954 Boxes 1, 2

Entry 1471: Records of the Historical Studies Division Research Projects, 1945- 1954 Boxes 2, 6, 11-21

Entry 1508: Office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Administration Subject Files, 1946-1953 Boxes 1-2

A-4

Entry 1526: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files, 1949-1953 Boxes 1-2

Entry 1530: Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files of Francis H. Russell, 1945-1952 Box 5

Entry 1559: Records Relating to International Information Activities, 1938-1953 Boxes 97, 113, 162

Entry 1583A: Records of Policy Planning Staff Relating to State Department Participation in the National Security Council, 1935-1962 Boxes 19-21

Entry 1595: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1947-1963 Boxes 1-21

Entry 1603: Records Relating to Bacteriological Warfare (Lot File 65D 473) Box 1

Entry 1605: Department of State Documents Relating to United Nations Affairs (Lot File 71D 440), 1945-1964 Boxes 1-8

Entry 1620: General Records of the Executive Secretariat (Lot 56D 459), 1948- 1956 Boxes 1-9

Entry 3069: Subject and Country Files, 1941-1962 Boxes 1-4

Entry 5224: Records Relating to Korea, 1952-1966 Boxes 1-6

Entry 5298: Records Relating to Military Matters, 1942-1966 Boxes 5-23

Entry 203C: Decimal File, Purport Card Index, 1950-1954, Dispatches/Telegrams/Airgrams/Instructions Boxes 378-383

Entry: Decimal File, 1950-1954 Boxes 2882-2888

A-5

Entry: Records Relating to Worldwide Program Objectives, 1948-1957 Boxes 7, 8

Entry C0012: Records of the Chinese Affairs, 1945-1955 (microfilm) Reels 15, 16, 21, 22

Entry C0043: Confidential U.S. State Department Special Files Japan, 1947- 1956 (microfilm) Reels 26, 27

Entry C0042: Confidential U.S. State Department Files Korea, 1940-1957 (microfilm) Reels 1, 2

Entry LM081: Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea Decimal Files, 1950-1954 (microfilm) Reels 1-32

Record Group 84 Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Entry 2845: Seoul (Korea) Mission and Embassy General Records, 1953-1955 Box 1

Entry 2846: Seoul Korea Mission and Embassy Classified General Records, 1952-1955 Boxes 1-19

Entry 2847: Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea: Seoul Mission and Embassy, Miscellaneous Classified Records, 1948-1955 Box 1

Entry 2848: Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea: Seoul Mission and Embassy, Miscellaneous Classified Records, 1948-1955 Box 1

Record Group 92 Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General

Entry 1892C: General Correspondence Geographical File, 1949-1950 Box 78

Entry 1892F: Classified Geographic File, 1946-1952 Box 39

Entry 1894A: General Correspondence Miscellaneous File, 1939-1959

A-6

Boxes 497-498, 507-508

Entry 1894D: Classified Miscellaneous File, 1946-1952 Boxes 3-4, 15-18, 36-38, 42-43

Entry 2116J: Copies of Formerly Security-Classified Documents relating to the Quartermaster Corps in the Korea War, 1950-1951 Boxes 1-24

Records of the Office of the Surgeon General

Entry 1014: Refiles from the U.S. Army Center for Military History (DA Form 543) Boxes 4, 6-50

Entry: Historical Medical Units Boxes 217-251, 261, 285, 289, 290, 296, 297, 317, 318, 336, 337, 341, 342, 347, 354, 475-500, 566-568

Entry: General Headquarters Records of the U.S. Army Hospitals Boxes 1, 85-111

Entry: Minutes of the Surgeon General's Early Morning Conference Boxes 2, 3

Entry: Psychiatry and Neurology Consultant Boxes 1-8, 10

Entry: Legal Office Boxes 1-11

Entry: AMEDD Office of the Surgeon General Boxes 1-8, 51-54, 269

Entry: Office of the Surgeon General (AMEDD), 1947-1961, Dental Activities, Far East, 1950-1951 Boxes 199, 202, 208, 210, 211

Record Group 153 Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General

Entry 181: International Affairs Division War Crimes Branch; Investigations of Atrocities Against POWs in Korea, 1952-1954 Boxes 911, 915-962

Entry 182: War Crimes Division, Historical Reports of the War Crimes Division, 1952-1954 Boxes 1, 3

A-7

Entry 183: Operation Big Switch Interrogation Reports, 1953-1954 Boxes 1-6

Entry 186: War Crimes Division, Historical Reports of the War Crimes Division, 1952-1954 Boxes 1-2

Entry 306: International Affairs Division War Crimes Branch, Investigations of Atrocities Against POWs in Korea, 1952-1954 Boxes 910, 916, 964-976

Entry 1029: War Crimes Branch; Records Regarding War Crimes in Korea, 1950-1953 Box 1

Entry 1030: War Crimes Branch; Reading File, 1951-1957 Box 1

Entry 1031: War Crimes Branch; Historian Background Files Boxes 1-2

Record Group 159 Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Army)

Entry 25C: Index to Decimal Correspondence, 1917-1954 Boxes 1-26

Entry 25D: Office of the Inspector General (Army) Subject, Name, and Military Unit Indexes to Formerly Secret Correspondence, 1917-1954 Boxes 1-27

Entry 26G: Administrative Office Mail and Records Section Decimal File Unclassified through Secret Correspondence, 1947-1962 Boxes 781, 782

Entry: Administrative Office Mail and Records Section, Decimal File, June 1952- June 1953 Box 1668 Record Group 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff

Entry 5: Central Decimal File, 1948-1950 Boxes 1-93, 231-253

Entry 7: Geographic File, 1948-1950 Boxes 1-24

A-8

Entry 48: Chairman's File, General Bradley, 1949-1953 Boxes 1-8

Entry 94A: Incoming Messages (Declassified) Boxes 1-10

Entry 100: JCS Report for Senate Committee on Korean Operations Korean Highlights Boxes 1-7

Entry 101: History of the Korean Conflict: Korean Armistice Negotiations, May 1952-July 1953 Boxes 1-3

Entry 102: JCS Historical Office, Dr. Edward P. Lilly (Papers) on Psychological Warfare Boxes 1-21

Entry 103: The Joint Chief of Staff and National Policy Boxes 1-2

Record Group 242 National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized

Entry 299: Captured Korean Documents Boxes 17-185

Record Group 247 Records of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains

Entry 484: Chaplain's "201" Files Boxes 1-26 (RA) Boxes 1-80 (ROTC)

Record Group 263 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

Entry 19: Records Relating to the CIA History Staff's History Source Collection, 1946-1978 Boxes 1-5

Entry 21: (Record Copy of) G.S. Jackson and H.P. Claussen Organization of the CIA, 1950-1957 Boxes 1-2

Entry 24: Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, 1941-1959 Boxes 325-382

A-9

Entry: (Record Copy of) G.S. Jackson and H.P. Claussen "Organization of the CIA," 1950-1957 Boxes 1-2

Record Group 319 Records of the Army Staff

Entry: Records of the Medical History Division Box 1

Entry: ATIS-FEC Boxes 309-316

Entry 2A: Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1950 Boxes 464-484, 548-556, 558-564, 566-624, 625, 751-753, 760

Entry 4: Top Secret Correspondence, 1948-1962 Boxes 1-19

Entry 14: General Council Minutes, 1942-1952 Boxes 896-911

Entry 26: G-1 Decimal Files, 1951-1952 Boxes 442, 443, 751-770, 773, 798, 1273-1280, 1286, 1287

Entry 33: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Counter Intelligence Corps Collections Boxes 1-5

Entry 47: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 143-151, 167

Entry 47E: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 1-7

Entry 47E: Secret Records Regarding Miscellaneous Organizations, Associations, Subject and Titles, 1942-57 Boxes 1-3

Entry 47F: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 53-55, 127-130, 170

Entry 47F: Foreign Training Program Control Files 1950-1956 Boxes 1-19

Entry 47G: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1951-1952 Boxes 1-18, 24, 33, 163, 164

A-10

Entry 47I: Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1951-1952 Boxes 1-3, 162-170, 183

Entry 51: Records of the Office of the Chief of Information, Summaries of Korean War Armistice Negotiations, July 1951-July 1953 Boxes 1-2

Entry 57F: Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1950 Boxes 1-95

Entry 57G: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence) Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1951 Boxes 1-75, 82-105

Entry 60: Records of the Public Affairs Division, Security Classified Correspondence, 1950-1964 Boxes 1-24

Entry 61: Record of the Public Affairs Division Correspondence, 1951-1954 Boxes 1-24

Entry 63: Microfilm Copy of Unpublished History Studies, 1943-1965 Boxes 1, 2, 3, 5

Entry 64: Security Classified Correspondence of the Economics Division Relating to Korea, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands Boxes 1-24

Entry 65: Records of the Economic Division Relating to Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands, 1949-1959 Boxes 1-10

Entry 82: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence) Administrative Division, Library Project File, 1946-1951 Boxes 279, 313-317, 807-833, 937, 938, 1053, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1348-1354, 1397-1416, 1432, 1433, 1435-1437, 1458-1460, 1470, 1477-1481, 1526, 1767, 1768, 1775-1777, 1796, 1996, 1997, 2019, 2220, 2143-2150, 2189-2192, 2233, 2352-2364, 2378, 2373, 2318, 2428-2436, 2537, 2629, 2630, 2634, 2636, 2649, 2695-2700, 2717-2725, 2765-2767, 2780, 2974, 2975, 2987, 2997, 3214-3216, 3263, 3247, 3302, 3324-3338, 3406, 3462-3490, 3491-3534, 3548, 3691, 3713-3716, 3801

Entry 82A: Reports and Messages, 1918-1951 Boxes 20-23, 26, 40-45, 95, 403, 404, 439, 911, 1135, 1171, 1175-1214, 1225, 1229, 1235, 1237

A-11

Entry 84E: Geographical Index to the Numerical Services of Intelligence Documents (ID File), 1944-51 Boxes 83-87

Entry 85: Army-Intelligence Document File Boxes 2859, 3084, 3136, 3143, 3165, 3242, 3253, 3267, 3274, 3299, 3326, 3330, 3353, 3360, 3431, 3472, 3513, 3628, 3664, 3669, 3697, 3736, 3745, 3782, 3815, 3817, 3827, 3855, 3868, 3980-3982, 3988, 4006, 4016, 4018, 4019, 4032, 4037, 4038, 4043-4045, 4053, 4061, 4069, 4070, 4079, 4092, 4095, 4098, 4101, 4104, 4142, 4147, 4153, 4171, 4221, 4240, 4245, 4250, 4266, 4275, 4278, 4286, 4290, 4292, 4296, 4300, 4301, 4308, 4311, 4375, 4377, 4425, 4435, 4451, 4452, 4443-4445, 4458, 4463-4465, 4467, 4468, 4475, 4473, 4470, 4483, 4486, 4488, 4505, 4508, 4513, 4518, 4520, 4521, 4526, 4540, 4541, 4550, 4566, 4570- 4572, 4586, 4605, 4623, 4626, 4632, 4639, 4649, 4657, 4674, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4704, 4710, 4712, 4740, 4750, 4761, 4795, 4789, 4821, 4822, 4837, 4866, 4882, 4901, 4920, 4931, 4938, 4953, 4959, 4986, 5059, 5078, 5130, 5282, 5297, 5298, 5359, 5364, 5405, 5458, 5459, 5473, 5500, 5504, 5529, 5544, 5625, 5652, 5741, 5761, 5767, 5786, 5813, 5838, 5850, 5855, 5866, 5867, 5888, 5890, 5903, 5936, 5939, 5948, 5957, 5975, 5990, 6019, 6839, 7511, 9919

Entry 95: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Operations, Decimal File, 1950-1951 Boxes 529-600

Entry 97: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Operations, General Decimal File, 1950- 1951 Boxes 118-127, 174-185

Entry 99: Korean Armistice Negotiations Boxes 698-723

Entry 99A: Korea Message File, June 1950-May 1954 Boxes 724-727, 737-746, 748-751

Entry 101: General Administrative Files, 1947-1952 Boxes 9-11

Entry 101A: Special Correspondence Maintained by the Top Secret Control Office, 1943-1952 Boxes 1-7

Entry 103: Classified Decimal File, 1949-1954 Box 1

Entry 109: Bulky File, 1944-1950 Boxes 19-32

A-12

Entry 111: Records Relating to the Ammunition Shortage During the Korean Conflict, 1953 Boxes 1-24

Entry 113: G-4 Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 626, 698, 904, 905, 1083, 1084

Entry 143: Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Correspondence Relating to the Historical Program of the U.S. Army, Pacific, 1949-1960 Boxes 1, 2, 62-65

Entry 145: Records of the Historical Services Division, Publications, S/D Report Korea Box 10

Entry 145: Records of the Historical Services Division, Publication, Personnel Policies in the Korea Conflict Box 1

Entry 145D: Security Classified Microfilm, Copies of Unpublished Studies in the History of World War II and the Korean Conflict Boxes 15-25

Entry 146: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, Minutes of Staff Meetings, 1950-1954 Box 1

Entry 147: Records of the Office of the Special Warfare Reports, 1951-1954 Box 1

Entry 148: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare, Organizational Records, 1950-1953 Box 1

Entry 153A: Record of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare Correspondence, 1951-1954 Boxes 1-40

Entry 154: Records of the Plans and Operations Division, Records Maintained by the Records Message Branch Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 1-30, 190-268

Entry 158: Records of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare Security Classified Intelligence Studies of Communist Nations (Country Books), 1951- 1958

A-13

Boxes 1-60

Entry 160: Records of the Plans and Operations Division, Combined Forces Planning Memoranda, November 1948-July 1951 Boxes 1-4

Entry 233: Records of the Congressional Investigations Division, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1943-1951 Boxes 78-90

Entry 241: Records of the Office of Plans and Policies Subject File, 1947-1954 Boxes 709-725

Entry 260A: Records of Executive Office, Unclassified, Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 1-24

Entry 287: U.S. Army Chief of Information, Troop Information and Education Division, Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 418-437

Entry 1013A: CI Files, 1950-1958 Boxes 1-46

Entry 1037: U.S. Army Center of Military History Boxes 14, 15, 21, 38

Entry 1084: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Numbered CHIC Reports Boxes 1-14

Entry 1085: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Numbered CHIC Reports Boxes 1-14

Entry: Subject Index to Miscellaneous Top Secret Documents, 1950-1959 Box 1

Entry: Top Secret Intelligence Documents Boxes 1-13

Entry: Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Records Re Military Attaches, Personnel Related Records Box 2

Entry: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Background Papers (Korea) Boxes 714-748

Entry: U.S. Army Center of Military History "Strategy and the Army"

A-14

Boxes 5 - 6

Entry: Records of the Historical Services Division, Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict Box 1

Entry: Top Secret Classified Subject and Administration Records, 1941-1962 Boxes 12-13

Entry: Correspondence Relating to the Historical Program of the U.S. Army, Pacific, 1949-1960 Boxes 1-2

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) CIC Collection; Historians Background Material Files Concerning CIC History Boxes 5-10

Entry: G-2 ACSI, CIC Files, Korea Boxes 1-46

Entry: S-Series Dispatches and Cables, 1941-1964 Boxes 1-70

Entry: Records of the Military Assistance Division, General Correspondence, 1950-1962 Boxes 1-26, 30, 31

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection, Historian's Source-File of CIC Publications Boxes 1-4

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Command Reporting Files Boxes 1-25

Entry: Counter Intelligence Corps Collection Historical Photographic Files Boxes 1-5

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Counter Intelligence Corps Collection; Organizational History Files, 1950-1957 Boxes 65-66

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development Troop Basis Files, 1950-1970 Boxes 1-24

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1950 Boxes 6, 23

A-15

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1951-1952 Boxes 29, 73

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1953 Boxes 6, 21, 70, 71, 72, 75

Entry: Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1954 Boxes 8, 22, 28, 72, 76

Entry: CIC Historians Background Material Boxes 1-5

Entry: CIC Collection Historians Miscellaneous Source File Boxes 1-7

Entry: CIC Collection, Historians Background Material Files Boxes 1-15

Entry: CIC Collection Historian's Background Material Files Concerning CIC History Boxes 1-35

Entry: Records Relating to Army Attaches, Station Files, 1943-1956 Boxes 1-24

Entry: Clandestine Intelligence Operation Controlled Files Section I, 1946-1963 Boxes 1-47

Entry: CIC Organizational History Files, Histories of Numbered CIC & MI Units, 1941-1942 Boxes 1, 2, 3, 4, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 82

Entry: Records of the Military Assistance Division General Correspondence, 1950-1962 Boxes 3, 5, 21-26, 30, 31

Entry: Records Relating to Special Studies of the Army Intelligence System, 1944-1953 Boxes 16-31

Entry: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), List of Special Dispatches, Intelligence Documents Boxes 8, 48

A-16

Entry: Records of the Special Programs Branch General Records of the Special Programs Branch, 1951-1965 Boxes 1-8

Entry: Investigative Records Repository Box 113

Record Group 330 Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Entry 22: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Office of Military Assistance, Statistical Section Subject File, July 1950-August 1952 Boxes 111-120

Entry 133: Office of the Secretary of Defense Decimals Files, Legislative and Public Affairs, Office of Public Information Boxes 17-41

Entry 138: Newspaper Clippings and Digests November 1948-July 1952 Boxes 585-608, 609-632, 633-656

Entry 185: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Van Fleet Report Files Boxes 10-24

Entry 198: Office of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section, Index Classified Numeric File, September 1947-December 1951 Boxes 1-14

Entry 199: Office of the Secretary of Defense Decimal Files, Office Administration Secretary Correspondence Control Section, 1943-1953 Boxes 171-218

Entry 200: Office of the Secretary of Defense Numeric File, Office of the Administration Secretary, Correspondence Control, July-December 1950 Boxes 557-606

Entry 207A: Reports on Special Investigations, 1948-1951 Box 1

Entry 207B: Reports on Special Investigations, 1948-1951 Boxes 1-2

Entry 208: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Messages and Teletypes Boxes 403-428

Record Group 331 Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters World War (II)

A-17

Entry 26: SCAP (Formerly Top Secret) Decimal Files, 1948­April 1952 Boxes 1, 3, 4, 8, 12

Entry 26: SCAP, Decimal Files, 1948-1952 Boxes 785, 1224, 3163, 3681, 3682, 8660, 9330, 9331, 9400

Record Group 333 Records of International Military Agencies

Entry: General Subject and Message File, 1953-1957 Boxes 8, 9

Entry: HQ United Nations Command Boxes 25-40

Entry: United Nations Command Armistice Affairs, Division General Subject Files, 1951-1952 Boxes 1-9

Entry: HQ United Nations Command Boxes 1-24, 41-47

Record Group 335 Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army

Entry 3A: General Correspondence Security Classified, July 1947-1950 Boxes 1, 2, 17, 26-31, 61, 63, 67, 84, 85, 145, 147, 148

Entry 3B: Security Classified General Correspondence, July 1941-December 1964 Box 62

Entry 5: General Correspondence, July 1947­December 1950 Boxes 1-70, 491-496

Entry 9: Confidential Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance Papers, July 1950-July 1952 Box 1

Entry 12: National Security Council Numbered Documents Boxes 5-12

Entry 14: National Security Council Progress Reports, 1950-1961 Boxes 12, 13

Entry 15: Policies of the Government of the United States Relating to National Security, 1947-1952

A-18

Box 14

Entry 24A: Under Secretary of the Army General Decimal Files, 1949-1950 Boxes 23, 26-41

Entry 24B: Under Secretary of the Army, General Decimal Files, 1947-1952 Boxes 1-22, 24, 25

Entry 26: Office of the Secretary of Army, Security Classified General Correspondence, January 1949-December 1950 Boxes 59-127

Entry 26A: Under Secretary Security Classified General Correspondence, 1947- 1954 Boxes 1, 2, 29

Entry 66: Civilian Personnel Division; Administrative Management Office Historical Reports and Surveys Subject File, 1947-1954 Boxes 1-4

Entry 67: Civilian Personnel Division; Administrative Management Office Current Special Reports Subject File, 1947-1954 Boxes 1-6

Record Group 337 Records of the Headquarters Army Ground Forces

Entry 1: Inspection Reports, 1948-1954 (Combat Arms Advisory Group FECOM) Box 25

Entry: 29K Army Field Forces, G-3 Troop Training Division, Maneuvers, Special Projects and Ammunition Branch, Army Secretary, Joint Tactical Air Support Board Decimal File, 1949-1951 Boxes 476-487

Entry 30C: Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section, Plans Division, Army Mobilization Plan I, 1959-1950 Boxes 490-496

Entry 31: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces Headquarters General Staff, G-4 Section Administrative Division Classified Decimal File, 1949- 1950 Boxes 17-20

Entry 32B: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces Headquarters General Staff, G-4 Section Administrative Division Decimal Files, 1949-1950 Boxes 35-64

A-19

Entry 51A: Army Field Forces Headquarters, Subject File, 1941-1950 Boxes 16-26

Entry 54A: Top Secret Decimal Files Boxes 1-22

Entry 54B: Classified Central Files, 1949-1950 Boxes 71-93, 99

Entry 55B: Classified Central Files, 1951-1952 Boxes 1-106

Entry 55C: Classified Central Files, 1951-1952 Box 99

Entry 55D: Classified Central Files, 1953 Boxes 1-47

Entry 55F: Classified Central Files, 1954 Boxes 1-24

Entry 55H: Secret Decimal File, March 17-December 1948 Boxes 1-24

Entry 55I: Secret Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 25-47

Entry 103A: Decimal File, 1949-1954 Box 2

Entry: Classified Central Files, 1953 Boxes 48-50

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army 1944-56, Adjutant General Section, Awards Case Files, 1950 Boxes 1215-1222

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army 1944-56, Adjutant General Section, Awards Case Files, 1950 Boxes 1223-1229

Entry: General Staff, G-4 Section, Administrative Division, Classified Decimal File, 1948 Boxes 1, 13-18

A-20

Entry: Classified Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 171-179

Record Group 338 Records of U.S. Army Commands

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Staff , 1946-1956 Boxes 1, 2, 4

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 1946-1956 Boxes 5, 11, 15

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 1946-1956 Boxes 33-40, 44-48, 50-55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 80, 81

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Adjutant General Section, 1944-1956 Boxes 4, 5, 457, 458, 464, 471-477, 485, 486, 491, 494-502, 505, 710, 711, 713-723, 725-731, 734-737, 739, 740, 750, 751, 752, 754, 755, 766, 767, 783, 799, 801, 802, 806, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1183

Entry: Unprocessed Records-War Diaries, 15 July 1950 - 4 August 1950 Boxes 1-6

Entry: Eighth U.S. Army, Historical Section Boxes P533, P725-P727, P7889-P796, P798-P813, P816-P818

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspector General's Section, 1946-1951 Boxes 35-42

Entry 34065A: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Correspondence, 1949-1950 Boxes 44-46

Entry 34124: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspection General's Section Reports of Investigation, 1950-1951 Boxes 1-22

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 Box 1

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Co-ordination, 1950 Boxes 17-19, 23, 24

A-21

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Theater Intelligence Division, Intelligence Reports of the Targets Branch, 1950-1951 Boxes 1-7

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Correspondence, 1949-1950 Boxes 7-10, 16

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General Section, Operations Division, Top Secret General Correspondence, 1949-1950 Boxes 1007-1010, 1012-1026

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 MIS (D/A) Intelligence Division Targets Branch General correspondence, 1945-1951 Boxes 2-15

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Division, General Correspondence, 1952-1951 Boxes 1-4

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Medical Section Boxes 1-2

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Administration Division General Correspondence, 1946-1951 Box 55

Entry: Records of General Headquarters, FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952 Boxes 56-61, 66-69, 73-76, 81-84

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952 Boxes 62-65

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, Top Secret General Correspondence, 1946- 1951 Boxes 70-72, 78-80

A-22

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Troop Control Division, Memorandum and Endorsements ("Action File") January-July, 1950 Box 1

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, General Correspondence, 1946-1952 Boxes 1-56

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Administration Division, Staff Studies and Intelligence Estimates, 1958-1951 Boxes 1-12

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Planning Division, Memorandums ("Action File"), 1949-1950 Boxes 1-2

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Inspector Generals Section, Reports of Investigation, 1950-1951 Box 18

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, MIS (DIA) Intelligence Division, Translator and Interpreter Service, General Correspondence, 1947-1950 Boxes 5-14, 18-21

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General's Section, Operations Division, Secret General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 611-622

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Administration Division Daily Journals Boxes 1-24

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Adjutant General's Section, Operations Division, General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 170, 171, 174-217, 267-269

Entry: Records of General's Section, Operations Division, General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 218-281

Entry 15041: Miscellaneous Classified Records of U.S. Army Schools, 1947- 1963 Boxes 11, 12, 14-19, 21-24

A-23

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Military History Section, Command and Staff Section Reports, 1947-1952 Boxes 336-356

Entry: 25th Infantry Division, St. Louis Refiles Wartime Awards, 1950 Boxes 1-3

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Adjutant General's Section Operations Division, Secret General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 628, 638, 639, 679, 721

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC, Military History Section, Command and Staff Section Reports, 1947-1952 Boxes 357-369

Entry: Records of General Headquarters FEC, SCAP, and UNC Medical Section Radio Messages, 1951-1952 Box 4

Entry: Records of HQ, U.S. Army, Pacific Military History Office, Organizational History Files Boxes 27-32, 73

Entry: Miscellaneous Awards Case Files Boxes 128-129

Entry: Records of HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files Boxes 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 56-58, 73, 77, 79, 80, 85, 88, 89, 93, 130, 131, 139, 187, 242, 276, 279, 280, 290

Entry 34065A: Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 General Correspondence, 1949-1950 Boxes 1, 23-27, 119-121

Entry: Far East Command, Chemical Section, General Correspondence, 1949- 1951 Boxes 2-5

Entry: Unit Records, 1st Cavalry Division (Artillery) Boxes 105-110

Entry: 1st Cavalry Division Boxes 1-23, 25-27, 34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 54-57, 127, 131, 140, 141, 165, 806

A-24

Entry: 5th Cavalry Regiment Boxes 3-22

Entry: 7th Cavalry Regiment Boxes 25-42

Entry: 7th Reconnaissance Troop (7th Infantry Division) Box 1

Entry: 8th Cavalry Regiment Boxes 43-66

Entry: 24th Infantry Division Boxes 504, 505, 512, 515, 516, 528-532, 538-540, 545-547, 606-608

Entry: 25th Infantry Division Boxes 606-608, 616, 634-640, 664-669, 680-691, 735, 736, 740, 753, 760, 761, 765-772, 784, 788, 790, 804, 805, 807-816, 829-841, 881, 890-892

Entry: 27th Regimental Combat Team Boxes 268-281

Entry: UNCACK Boxes 608,621, 623

Entry: 9th Corps Box 46

Entry: Korean Military Advisory Group Decimal File, 1948-1953 Boxes 18-35

Entry: Unit Records KMAG Historical Reports, 1950 Boxes 4-6

Entry: KMAG Unit Histories, 1950-1952 Box 13

Entry: 8th Army Boxes 1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 15, 16, 27, 33-48, 710, 711, 713, 735-737, 739, 740, 754, 750-752, 755, 766, 767, 783, 799, 801, 802, 806, 1179-1183

Entry: 8th Army General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 714-731

Record Group 349 Records of Joint Commands

A-25

Entry 21: Confidential and Secret Decimal Correspondence File, November 1950-1954 Boxes 1-42

Entry 23: Publications File, 1950-1954 Boxes 43-44

Entry 70A: Far East Command Joint Welfare Board Subject File, 1945-1955 Boxes 11-22

Entry 74: General File, January 1946-October 1953 Boxes 7-16

Entry 84: Decimal and Subject Correspondence File (Northeast Command), 1950-1956 Boxes 1-8

Entry 96: Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence, 1948-1950 Boxes 1-16

Entry 115: Security Classified Operations Plans, 1950-1960 Boxes 4-5

Record Group 389 Records of the Office Provost Marshal General

Entry 433A: Classified Decimal File, 1941-1950 Boxes 50-184

Entry 433B: Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1951-1952 Boxes 187-222

Entry 437: Records Relating to the Participation of the Provost Marshall in the Preparation of the Geneva Convention, 1946-1949 Boxes 669-679

Entry 439A: Historical File, 1941-1958 Boxes 1-53

Entry 452B: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1942-1957 Boxes 1-113

Entry 467D: Records of the Legal Branch, General Correspondence, 1942-1957 Boxes 1-15

A-26

Entry 467E: Records of the Legal Branch, Miscellaneous Records, 1942-1957 Boxes 1-8

Entry 470: Reports, 1942-1950 (Statistical Reports of Criminal Investigations 1944-1950) Boxes 1709-1713

Entry 470A: Monthly Statistical Reports of Criminal Investigations, 1950-1954 Boxes 1-5

Entry 481: Operations Division Confinement Branch Subject File, 1947-1950 Boxes 2044-2057

Record Group 407 Records of the Adjutant General's Office

Entry 360B: Records Maintained by the Communications Branch; Army AG Classified Decimal File, 1948-1954 Boxes 3851-3874, 3898-3921, 4020-4043

Entry 361A: Army­AG Decimal File, 1940-1950 Boxes 1-25

Entry 361B: Army AG Decimal File, 1951-1952 Boxes 1-30

Entry 363C: Army AG Decimal File, 1949-1950 Boxes 1-24, 360-383, 449-454, 457, 458, 690-704

Entry 368B: Foreign Occupied Areas Boxes 1998-2007, 2064-2103

Entry 428A: Army AG Command Reports, 1949-1951 Boxes 1-36

Entry 429: AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954 Boxes 1081-1100 (8th Army), 3470-3559 (24th Infantry Division), 3746- 3770 (25th Infantry Division), 4404-4427, 4429-4451, 4497-4520 (1st Cavalry Division)

Entry 429B: U.S. Army Forces-Far East Boxes 1-8

Entry 1027: Administrative Service Division, Special Reports Branch, Civil Affairs Reports, 1955-1958 Boxes 1-10

A-27

Entry: United Nations Command/Far East Command General Headquarters Boxes 346-384

Record Group 500 (This record group was unnamed at the time of report publishing, but consists of records from Eighth Army).

Entry: Historical Section Eighth Army Boxes 14-16, 19, 23-25, 49, 55-57, 272-280, P631, P725-P729

Entry: G-2 Classified Correspondence, 1950 Box 45

Entry: G-2 Action Files, 1950 Box 57

Entry: G-2 Administrative Files, 1950 Boxes 51 - 52

Entry: Adjutant General Section Classified General Correspondence, 1949 Boxes 421 - 422

Entry: Adjutant General Section Classified General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 714, 719-725

Entry: Adjutant General Section General Correspondence, 1950 Boxes 475 - 476 Motion Pictures Branch Film: 342 Control # NWDN(m) 342-USAF-18823 Still Pictures Branch

Record Group 111 Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer

Entry: Overseas Geographic File Albums, 1870-1955 Volumes 38-134, 184-201, 2329, 2337-2339, 2377-2382, 2490-2500a, 2501, 2502, 2507, 2509, 2515-2517, and 2522-2558

Entry 111-SC: Prints: Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity, 1900-1981 Boxes 137, 184-192, 194-200

Record Group 319 Records of the Army Staff

Entry: Staff Prints: Photographs of the U.S. and Foreign Nations, 1942-1964

A-28

Box 38

(314) 538-4216

Since the research plan included interviewing veterans of the Korean War, a listing of soldiers was needed. Personnel from the Corps of Engineers, St. Louis District began the enormous task of compiling unit rosters of those individuals who served in Korea during the first year of the war. The National Personnel Records Center, Military Personnel Records (NPRC, MPR) houses the entire collection of retired military personnel records including unit payroll rosters. An accurate listing of soldiers who served during the Korean War was not available at any other repository, therefore, one had to be created.

The research team's first task was to copy from microfilm all the applicable unit payroll rosters. In most cases unit rosters were updated semi-annually in July and January including additions and subtractions from the roles. Most of the time the July 1950 rosters were used for the listing. However, in some cases other months were used if the July 1950 roster was unavailable or non-existent. Due to the poor condition of the microfilm, several different months of the rosters were acquired so that they could be compared for accuracy. The January 1951 rosters were the latest rosters used for verification. Once all of the rosters were photocopied, a database was constructed identifying the soldiers. A file was created for each soldier, with name, rank, army service number, and unit. Upon completion the list was turned over to the Inspector General's Office interview team. Their methodology and actions are discussed in Chapter 4.

The following list describes the Divisions and units who served in the Korean War during 1950. Names of soldiers in each of these units was created from the best possible sources, however, may not be completely accurate since the clarity of the rosters was poor. Rosters were obtained for all of the activities, units, and organizations listed below.

• 1st Cavalry CIC

• 1st Cavalry Division

HQ HQ Company

• 5th Cavalry

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 7th Cavalry

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ 3rd Bn, HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 8th Cavalry

A-29

Companies: C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Medical, Mortar, Officers

• 14th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service

• 15th MD Detachment

• 19th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 21st Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 24th Infantry Division

Companies: HQ HQ Company

• 24th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 24th MI Detachment CIC

• 25th Infantry Division

Company: HQ HQ Company

• 25th MI Detachment CIC

• 27th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical Mortar, Service, Officers

• 27th Ordnance Maintenance Company

• 34th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical Mortar, Service, Officers

• 35th Infantry Regiment

Companies: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, Heavy Tank, HQ HQ 1st Bn, HQ HQ 2nd Bn, HQ HQ 3rd Bn, HQ HQ, Medical, Mortar, Service, Officers

• 24th MP Company

• 25th MP Company

• 545th MP Company

• KMAG

• 8063rd MASH

• Operations Section ("Mosquito" Unit)

4205 Suitland Road

A-30

(301) 457-7000

The Washington National Archives was visited by the research team. The 01 master accession listing was consulted and all pertinent accession were reviewed. Some of the accessions identified were in the process of being transferred from the records center to the National Archives in College Park.

Accession 338-78-0010 8th U.S. Army Command Report Files, 1952-1957 Boxes 1-5

Accession 338-78-0013 8th U.S. Army Historical Background Materials, 1952- 1954 Boxes 1-7

Accession 338-78-0029 Far East Historical Background Files, 1950-1953 Boxes 1-2

Accession 338-78-0657 Annual Historical Summary File, 1951-1979 Box 1

Accession 338-81-0504 Korea, 1951-1976 Box 1

(816) 926-6272

The research team visited the Federal Records Center. After reviewing SF 135s it was determined that all pertinent accessions of records had been shipped to the National Archives in College Park. These identified records had not yet been processed or accessioned into their inventories, however these unprocessed documents were reviewed at College Park.

(816) 833-1400

The Truman Library is one of the Presidential Libraries operated under the auspices of the National Archives system. The research team visited the library and reviewed unit histories, state department records, photographs, and personal papers. The following describes actual records reviewed by the research team.

A-31

Harry S. Truman Library Student Research File, (43) Korean War: N. Korea's Invasion of S. Korea; Boxes 1-2

Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Administration; Subject File: Korea, Japan Surrender of August 1945-Korea, July 1950; Box 71

Papers of George M. Elsey; Harry S. Truman Administration; Subject File: Korea, 19 July-November 1950; Box 72

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Subject File; Foreign Affairs File, (J-Luxembourg); Box 182

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Korean War File, Wake Island Conference; Box 244

Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files; Korean War File, V-W; Box 243

RG 407; U.S. Army Unit Diaries, Histories and Reports, 1944-1951; Sixth-Eighth U.S. Army; Boxes 5-18

Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, CIA Index to Daily Korean Summaries, June 1950-June 1951; Box 248

Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Intelligence File, Situation Reports; Box 262

Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, DoD, Misc., Pertinent Papers on the Korean Situation, Volumes 1-2; Boxes 15-17

Department of State Records; Boxes 2,3, 8

Papers of Harry S. Truman, 471 (Misc.) to 471 B (Korea); Boxes 1305, 1383

Harry S. Truman; WHCF: Confidential File; Justice Department: (7 of 10, Soviet

Espionage Report; November 1946 to Korean Emergency [3 of 3, Terrain Study, Seoul and Environs]); Box 22

State Department-White Paper on China-Galley Proofs, Annexes, Chapter V to

State Department Weekly Review, September-October 1950; Box 59

President's Secretary's Files; Subject File, NSC (Reports-5-Sowers); Box 198

President's Secretary's Files; NSC Meetings: Meeting 56 (4 May 1950 to Meeting 64 (10 August 1950); Box 208

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President's Secretary's Files; NSC Meetings: Meeting 65 (17 August 1950) to Meeting 70 (2 November 1950); Box 209

President's Secretary's Files, NSC Meetings: Meeting 71 (9 November 1950) to Meeting 79 (12 January 1951); Box 210

Memoranda for the President, Meeting Discussions to Meetings Personnel; Box 220

President's Secretary's Files, O.R.E., 1949 to O.S.I., 1950; Box 257; O.S.I.-I.S.

Reports to Situation Report #6; Box 258

Papers of Harry S. Truman; Naval Aide Files; State Department Briefs, 1950; Box 22

Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Department of State; Chronology, June 1950-February 1951; Box 1. Box 2, UN Security Council, 1950 Topical File; Civil Affairs in Korea; ROK Executions in December 1950; File 30; Box 8

Korea Bulletins, 1950; Box 3

Papers of Eben A. Ayers; Korean War; Box 9

(717) 245-3131

Research was conducted at the Military History Institute (MHI). Primary and secondary source documentation including background information of Roy Appleman was reviewed. MHI has undertaken an oral history project whereby Korean War Veterans have and continue to complete surveys regarding their experiences in Korea. These surveys were reviewed and they provided background information. They also provided names of potential interviewees. The research team reviewed maps and still photography collections.

Korean War Surveys, Boxes 1-2

Office of Center of Military History, Korean War Notes, Boxes 1-2

The Hobart R. Gay Papers, Oral History Transcripts, Box 1

The S.L.A. Marshall Papers, Korean War 24th and 25th Division by Gen. Barth, Box 1

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KORS 25th Infantry Division, Surveys, Boxes 1-2

The Clay and Joan Blair Collection, Combat Leadership in Korea, Boxes 1-2

The Roy Appleman Collection, Chronological files: 25 June 1950 to 30 November 1950, Box 1

The Thomas W. Herren Papers, Korean Communication Zone and Northern Area Command 1952, 1953, 1956, Boxes 1-3

(757) 441-2965

The holdings at this library consist of primary and secondary documentation, including donated items. The main body of records reviewed included Far East Command and Message Traffic. The holdings included personal papers and scrapbooks. The following describes a detailed listing of all reviewed items.

RG 6 Far East Command, 1947-1951

Box 2, Correspondence Korean War, June-September 1950

Box 9, FECOM General Orders, January 1951

Box 24, CIC District Field Reports, 22 January-7 July 1950

Box 25, CIC District Field Reports, 22 July 1950-15 March 1951

Box 100, Series 3: Operation; Administrative Order-Op Plan, Chow Chow

Box 102, Operation Plan "Linter"; Outline of Planning Data, 19 July 1950; Staff Study "Undershot," October 1948

RG 9 Messages (Radiograms), 1945-1951

Box 6, Air Force, November 1949-June 1950

Box 7, Air Force, July 1950-February 1951

Box 13, China, July 1950-April 1951; CINCAL, May 1947-March 1951; CINCFE sitrep, 28 June-15 July 1950

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Box 29, War CX DA, January-April 1951; War CX Miscellaneous, 25 June 1950- 19 July 1950

Box 34, Eighth Army, August 1949-December 1950; Army Eighth (JL Com), August-December 1950; Eighth Army Incoming, August-December 1950

Box 35, Eighth Army Incoming, July-October 1950

Box 36, Army Eighth Incoming, November 1950-January 1951

Box 37, Eighth Army Outgoing, August 1950-March 1951

Box 38, Army 8 Outgoing, August-December 1950

Box 39, EUSAK Incoming, 29 July-September 1950; EUSAK Outgoing, 13 July- August 1950

Box 40, FEAF Incoming, 25 June-December 1950; War FEAF, January-11 April 1950; FEC, January-August 1947; FEC Formosa, August 1950

Box 43, Japanese Government Outgoing, August-October 1945; JLCOM, January-April 1951; War JLCOM Incoming, August-October 1950

Box 44, JLCOM Incoming, November 1950-April 1951; JLCOM Outgoing, August 1950-April 1950

Box 45, JLCOM Outgoing, January-April 1951; JCS November-December, 30 June 1950-5 April 1951; JCS Outgoing, October 1945, July 1950-April 1951; KMAG, July 1949-June 1950

Box 46, KMAG, August 1950-April 1951

Box 83, State Department, July-December 1949; State Department Incoming, January 1950

Box 84, State Department Incoming, February 1950-12 July 1950

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Box 88, State Department Korea Incoming, June-December 1950; State Outgoing, Korea, July-December 1950; X Corps Incoming, September-15 November 1950

Box 98, XXIV Corps, December 1948-January 1949; USAFIK, September- October 1945, April-June 1949; USAFIK Outgoing, 25 June-12 July 1950; USARPAC, 18 November 1947-30 October 1948; USARPAC, 18 November 1947-June 1949

Box 121, Personal for #1, July 1946-March 1951; Personal for Generals Almond, Brooks, Irwin, People; Telecons DA-CINCFE, July 1950-April 1951; Telecons, June-25 August 1950

RG 16a Major General Courtney Whitney

Box 5, MacArthur Official

Two Korean War Scrapbooks

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Appendix B - Analysis of forensic evidence

Introduction

This appendix provides the analysis of casualty estimates (Tab 1) and an analysis of the forensic evidence collected in the vicinity of the No Gun Ri site. The casualty estimate analysis is an attempt to answer the question: can either the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950? As a result of consultations between them, both Review Teams agreed that the ROK Review Team would be responsible for recovery of ballistics evidence and firearm examinations. The ROK Review Team would report their results to the U.S. Review Team.

This appendix includes the assessments of ROK forensic testing conducted by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Laboratory and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Tab 2). This appendix also contains a forensic pathology analysis by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology of the USAF reconnaissance photograph taken of the No Gun Ri area on August 6, 1950 (Tab 3).

Enclosed:

Tab 1 (Casualty Estimates)

Tab 2 (Analysis of ROK Forensic Testing - Ballistics and Firearms)

Tab 3 (Forensic Pathology Analysis)

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Tab 1 - Casualty estimates

The U.S. Review Team was directed to answer the question: can either the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950? The answer is the U.S. Review Team cannot verify how many refugees were killed or injured. The ROK Review Team believes further investigation is required. The allegations in the initial Associated Press articles described hundreds of people killed.1 Korean witnesses reported piling dead bodies at the entrances of the tunnel,2 dead cows on the railroad tracks,3 bodies scattered vicinity of or near the railroad,4 and dozens of people dying. 5 U.S. veterans who passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950, during their withdrawal toward the Naktong River, did not observe human remains or graves in the area.6 USAF reconnaissance imagery taken over the area on August 6, 1950 did not show evidence of human remains or graves.7 After interviewing U.S. veterans and examining the aerial photograph, the U.S. Review Team asked the ROK Review Team if they had evidence of human remains or graves in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The U.S. Review Team received a report from the ROK Review Team on the number of Koreans killed and injured and "handling of the dead."8 The U.S. Review Team initially believed this document reflected the official position of the ROK Review Team. The ROK Review Team indicated in a meeting with the U.S. Review Team that the information in the report they had provided to the U.S. Review Team must be verified by a subsequent investigation. Nonetheless, the Korean report, which includes summaries of investigative work and witness interviews, the witness statements discussed described in Chapter 4, the analysis of the aerial photograph described in Appendix B, Tab 3, and Appendix D, comprise the material that the U.S. Review Team evaluated in responding to the question; can the U.S. or ROK Review Team verify how many refugees were killed in the incident? Based on a Korean survey, the ROK Review Team indicated some refugees from different locations went to the vicinity of a village called Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkyeh-ri and Im Ga Ri) and that villagers of Im Gae Ri and others who had sought refuge there were told by American soldiers to evacuate the village. The ROK Review Team reported that approximately 477 people left the village and went south on along Road #4 (now Highway 1) and later moved on to the railroad tracks, where these refugees were strafed and bombed by U.S. aircraft and then fired upon while in the double tunnel near No Gun Ri by U.S. soldiers.

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The ROK Review Team indicated that there were several Korean estimates of the number of people killed and injured which were derived from different sources. Some of the estimates reported by the ROK Review Team are:

• Based on a reenactment of the incident there could have been 240 - 290 victims: 50 -100 injured on the railroad track and 190 in the tunnel.
• In August 1950, an Im Gae Ri village official reported the number of dead as 120. He made this report to the North Korean People's Army on

August 7- 8, 1950 at their request. He arrived at that estimate by subtracting the number of villagers who returned to the village from the number of villagers who left.

• ROK "victim" reports show 175 dead, 51 wounded and 20 missing.
• A document seized from the North Korean People's Army indicated one hundred deaths occurred in a tunnel or railroad tunnel near Yongdong.
• North Korean reports in North Korean newspapers indicated 400 deaths, (North Korean People's Herald, August 19, 1950) and 200 deaths (The

Democratic Korea, September 7, 1950) at the double railroad overpass.

According to the ROK Review Team, only a small number of bodies or identified graves can be accounted for because:

• Many bodies were not buried in marked graves. Korean burial customs at that time were that children and unmarried minors were buried in

unmarked graves. Many of the refugees were reported to have been children and unmarried minors.

• Some gravesites have not been maintained because all descendants of the family have died.9
• The bodies of strangers10 and the bodies of refugees whose entire family died were left untouched until August 10, 1950. After that date, they were buried in a mass grave, which has been disturbed in the intervening years by family members searching for bodies and farming activity in the area. When farmers uncovered bones, they removed and disposed of bones.

Korean witness statements contain different estimates of how many people were killed or injured and how the bodies were buried. Six Korean witnesses report the use of mass graves or hearing that a mass grave near the double tunnels was used.11 Some Korean statements describe only the deaths or injuries of family members12 and others estimate the total number of deaths and injuries.13 Some U.S. veterans describe dead or injured refugees.14 The U.S. veterans' estimates range from several to two hundred, but the soldiers did not check bodies and some estimates appear to be guesswork. Korean witness estimates include 60 -100 dead in the double tunnel and 50 - 150 dead or injured from strafing/bombing.15

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Another source of casualty estimates is as reported by the Associated Press16 on June 15, 2000. It was a document captured from a North Korean Cultural Officer (North Korean Communist political cadre serving with the armed forces). The document contained a story that the NKPA had found bodies in a tunnel near Yongdong. This story as related in instructions to cultural officers on "Cultivation of Hatred to Obtain Revenge" dated August 2, 1950 and signed by Kim, Cheh Ouk, of the Military Affairs Committee, 1st Army Group, might contain an element of truth in spite of its propagandistic purpose. The NKPA may have found civilian bodies in a tunnel, not in the railroad overpass near No Gun Ri but in one of the railroad tunnels in the vicinity of Yongdong on the main double railroad line. One of these tunnels was bombed with high explosives and napalm on July 28, 1950 as reported in the Eighth Army Operations Journal. At that time the NKPA was probably using the tunnel to store ammunition and other supplies. The area around the tunnel would also have been subject to artillery fire intended to delay the advance of the NKPA 3rd Division out of Yongdong. This propaganda states that artillery fire and strafing caused the deaths, but does not mention any other type of ground fire, including machine guns. The NKPA was in desperate straits when this report was distributed, unable to break through the Naktong defenses. Propaganda about alleged atrocities was one of many ways to bolster the lagging fighting spirit of the NKPA. In the same article, the AP also mentioned an article in the August 19, 1950 (issue #49) Chosun In Min Bo, the NKPA newspaper, which carried a story relating the finding of bodies in the Hwanggan area on July 29, 1950. The details are graphic and follow a propaganda line commonly used by the North Koreans who regularly accused South Korean and United Nations forces of the very atrocities they themselves were committing: In its description of the Chosun In Min Bo article, the AP article reports North Korean troops moving through the Hwaggan area "encountered... indescribably gruesome scenes under the railway tunnels and in nearby fields... About 400 bodies of old and young people and children covered the scene so that it was difficult to walk around without stepping on corpses." This depiction of hundreds of casualties is unsupported either by the reconnaissance film analysis discussed in Appendix C or the forensic pathology analysis in Tab 3 to this Appendix.

According to the information the ROK Review Team provided to the U.S. Review Team, Koreans returned to retrieve bodies from July 29, 1950 to November 15, 1950. According to the information provided there were bodies inside the double railroad overpass, along the side of the railroad and two bodies retrieved were in other areas. Based on the available evidence, the U.S. Review Team cannot determine the numbers killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However, the U.S. Review Team concluded that it is unlikely that hundreds of dead bodies were present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950, based on the testimony of U.S. veterans and the examination of the August 6, 1950 aerial

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photograph by Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).17 The U.S. Review Team concluded that some Koreans were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 but that the precise number may never be determined for many reasons. The reasons include Korean burial customs, farming practices (when farmers uncovered bones, they removed and disposed of the bones), lack of reliable information, wartime disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time.

Endnotes

1 See Chapter 1.

2 Korean witness statements (2 children).

3 Korean witness statement (teenager).

4 Korean witness statement summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team, August 2000.

5 Korean witness statements indicate there were 60 dead bodies in the tunnel, 60 to 100 people died in the tunnels, the bombing killed about 100 - 150 people and there were 50 - 60 bodies were on the railroad track.

6 Chapter 4, p. 136.

7 See Appendix B, Tab 3 and Appendix C.

8 ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team, August 2000.

9 Presumably the locations of these graves are also unknown.

10 People from places other than the local villages.

11 Six Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

12 For example a child's grandfather was killed, child's mother and aunt were killed, and teenager's sister was killed.

13 For example one Korean witness stated 50 - 60 bodies were scattered on the railroad track and the double tunnel was packed with bodies. See ROK "On-site Technical Investigation" provided to U.S. Review Team August 2000.

14 U.S. Veteran estimates of wounded and dead varied for example 8 - 9 who could have been dead or injured, possibly several dead or injured, close to two hundred, and maybe 50 - 60 killed or injured I am just not sure. At least ten veterans talk about refugees being killed or injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. However some of these veterans observed dead or injured refugees and do not know how or when they were wounded.

15 See note 5.

16 Choe, Sang-hun, "Document cites Korean War Killings", http://wire.ap.org./APnews, June 15, 2000. 17 See Appendix C and Appendix B, Tab 2.

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Tab 2 - Analysis of ROK forensic testing - Ballistics and firearms

I. Introduction

The U.S. Review Team believed that in a search, bullets would be recovered from the double overpass area located near No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team had multiple reasons for that belief including: (a) Korean and U.S. witness statements that firing occurred: (b) combat action in the area1; and (c) the NKPA presence in this area after U.S. Forces left.2 As noted in Chapter 3, prior to July 26, 1950, the NKPA captured many weapons and used the weapons, so when one finds a U.S. bullet, one cannot assume a U.S. soldier fired it. 3 The U.S. Review Team does not know exactly what action occurred in and around this area after July 29, 1950; for example, strafing or gunfire could have occurred. Because the U.S. Review Team does not know what happened in the vicinity of the double overpass before, during or after the last week of July 1950, the U.S. Review Team cannot draw any firm conclusions about the significance of physical evidence recovered at the location in July 2000. The U.S. Review Team believes that the ROK Review Team, based on comments they made at a meeting in November 2000, believes the bullets that were recovered from the area are conclusive evidence that the events occurred as described by the Korean witnesses. As a result of consultations between the U.S. Review Team and the ROK Review Team, The Inspector General agreed that the ROK Review Team, the counterpart of the U.S. Review Team, would be responsible for recovery of evidence and forensic examination of the evidence recovered to include bullets, cartridges, and other material in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. It was agreed that the ROK Review Team would report their results to the U.S. Review Team. In July 2000, the Republic of Korea's Defense Investigative Command (DIC) No Gun Ri Investigation Team conducted a forensic assessment of the No Gun Ri incident site and tested materials recovered at the site.4 The ROK Review Team reported the results of the DIC assessment and testing to the U.S. Review Team. In addition, the ROK Review Team provided a six-piece sample of material that they stated was recovered by the DIC Team to the U.S. Review Team. Based upon interactions with our Korean counterparts, the U.S. Review Team believes the DIC Team retained all remaining items found at the site. Firearms examiners and ballistics experts perform two different roles. Firearms examiners determine if a particular weapon fired a bullet or cartridge.5 Ballistics experts study the projectiles fired by firearms and the effect of the projectile on a target.6 These experts address questions such as what weapon was fired and where was the weapon fired from.

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The U.S. Review Team asked for technical assistance from two agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Laboratory. No firearms examiners or ballistics experts were detailed to the U.S. Review Team. The U.S. Review Team relied upon the technological and forensic expertise of the CID and the FBI to review the DIC's conclusions and assessment. Specifically, the U.S. Review Team asked the laboratories to review the DIC Team's assessment of the site and the items recovered at the site, to review and comment on the methodology, and to assess the Korean conclusions.7 After the U.S. Review Team received the CID evaluation of the DIC Report, the U.S. Review Team requested additional information from the ROK Review Team. The U.S. Review Team provided copies of the DIC response8 on the methods that the DIC Team used to reach four of their conclusions to CID and the FBI who provided additional comments. 9

CID and the FBI concurred one could use the Korean methods to determine the difference between 7.62 millimeter (mm) Soviet and .30 caliber U.S. bullets, to determine that the extracted and unextracted bullets were identical, to determine that the marks were bullet marks and to determine the firing directions.10 However, the methods used by the DIC Team are not the methods used by CID and the FBI.

FBI examiner noted from a purely forensic science perspective, any conclusions drawn from an unprotected area where weapons were discharged fifty years ago should be viewed with extreme caution.11 The U.S. Review Team's position is that one cannot conclusively say who fired the bullets and when the bullets were fired.

II. DIC team's assessment and conclusion

The DIC Team provided the following "assessment and conclusion."12

• The marks on both ends of the double overpass and both ends of the culvert "were caused by real shooting in short distance."
• They found a total of 316 marks at the overpass and culvert, and found 59 bullets embedded in the concrete. Only 20 bullets were removed. The DIC Team removed bullets that had special features. The DIC team defined special features as bullets that had different sizes, types and markings. The DIC considered the other 39 unextracted bullets to be identical to the removed 20 bullets.
• There were six possible firing positions from which fire was directed on the double overpass and culvert areas. The DIC Team called the areas that could be hit by weapons fire from these six firing positions targets.

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• They found 193 items at the double overpass and culvert. The items included .30 caliber empty cartridges, bullets, unfired cartridges, one M1 rifle cartridge clip, one LMG (light machine gun) link, and other fragments. In addition, the DIC team found Soviet-manufactured material. This material included empty cartridges and bullets for the Soviet-made Mosin-Nagant rifle and DP/DT MG (machine gun).
• The DIC Team stated all bullets embedded in both ends of the double overpass and culvert were confirmed as U.S.-made .30 caliber and .50 caliber cartridges. No Soviet-made bullets were detected.

(Six photos of bridge area)

For reference, the DIC Team provided the above photographs of the double overpass and culvert areas in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.13

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III. Discussion of the DIC assessment and conclusions

The DIC Team determined the distance between the firearms fired and the target. The DIC Team's determination was the shootings at the double overpass and the culvert occurred at short distances because the bullets were deeply embedded. The U.S. Review Team does not accept the DIC's conclusion that the firing was from a short distance because they did not use the methods that the FBI would have used. The FBI indicated that gunshot residue and angle determination examinations are two main factors that they use to determine weapon discharge distances, not how deeply bullets are embedded.14 The DIC Team also did not define short distance. 15 The U.S. Review Team does not accept DIC's conclusion about all 316 marks in the overpass and culvert.16 They may be bullet marks. In fact, some appear to be bullet marks based on visual examination by non-experts,17 but based on the DIC work we cannot be certain. As the CID reviewer stated, to conclusively make this determination one needs to detect traces of bullet jacketing (copper) of bullet cores (lead), or trace amounts of both lead and copper. The DIC Team's report did not indicate that such traces were found in any of the 316 wall marks. The DIC Team conducted a visual examination of the marks.18 CID agrees one can do an inspection, but they would also do the work described above.19 Even if they are bullet marks we do not know when they were made. The DIC Team concluded there are six possible shooting locations. The U.S. Review Team cannot agree that there were six possible shooting positions based on the DIC Team's work and the passage of time. The FBI indicated after reviewing the initial DIC assessment that in the absence of additional firearm examinations, the actual number of firers, number of weapons, type of weapons fired (Soviet or American) and their locations cannot be determined. Additional firearms identification-type examinations could determine how many weapons were involved at each of the suspected shooting sites.20 To properly complete this examination, one must recover all of the bullets at all of the sites and compare them microscopically.21 The FBI and CID agree one can use the method described by the DIC Team to determine firing angles.22 The ROK Team provided the U.S. Review Team with a six-piece sample from the materials found in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The FBI examined the material and reviewed the DIC's assessment and conclusions. The DIC assessment does not clearly indicate how many bullets and cartridges cases were recovered and whether or not these specimens were intercompared to each other. These intercomparisons are the basis on which FBI examiners determine the number of weapons and firers in an incident.23 The material samples provided included three .30 caliber bullets fired from a barrel rifled with four grooves with a right twist.24 The FBI used a search of the General Rifling

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Characteristics file and determined that U.S. military M1 firearms produced such rifling marks on the bullets.25 As noted in Chapter 3, prior to July 26, 1950, the NKPA captured many weapons and used the weapons. 26

The DIC Team stated no enemy bullets were found in the walls.27 To firmly conclude there were no enemy bullets at the site, CID states all bullets present would have to be removed and analyzed.28 Further, there were two Soviet type .30 caliber (7.62X54R) bullets included in the bullet sample.29 These bullets had no rifling marks, and the FBI could not determine from the report or samples if these bullets were recovered as fired bullets.30 The U.S. Review Team does not know if the DIC Team conclusion is correct.

The DIC team removed only 20 of the 59 bullets identified as embedded in the double overpass, but they concluded the remaining 39 unextracted bullets were identical without a microscopic examination. The Koreans did a visual examination of the bullets embedded in the wall and extracted a sample to examine. They concluded that the bullets left unextracted were identical to the bullets extracted. They concluded the unextracted bullets were .30 and .50 U.S. caliber bullets. The FBI and CID concur that the DIC could visually examine the bullets embedded in the wall to determine if the unextracted bullets matched the extracted bullets.31 However, the FBI's and CID's method of determining if bullets are identical is microscopic examination.32 Also, research indicates that the barrels of some .30 caliber firearms used by U.S. forces and North Korean Forces display the same characteristics of four lands and grooves with a right twist.33 To determine if a bullet was fired from a U.S. firearm or a North Korean firearm, the FBI firearm examiners would measure the width of the lands and grooves and compare them to known published specifications.34 The DIC Team did not state that they did this.

IV. Conclusion

The Republic of Korea's Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team's report is an extensive report. However, as the FBI examiner noted from a purely forensic science perspective, any conclusions drawn from an unprotected area where weapons were discharged fifty years ago should be viewed with extreme caution.35 The bullets and bullet marks although not conclusive, do corroborate the statements of U.S. veterans and Korean witnesses that weapons were fired. The U.S. Review Team views the presence of bullets and bullet marks in the double overpass and in the culvert area as another piece of evidence to be weighed with all other evidence. The ROK investigation team stated that Soviet bullets and casings were found on the north side of the railroad tracks in two separate locations.36 This is an area from which U.S. veterans said they received fire. If one assumes that the U.S. bullets and bullet marks found in the vicinity of the double railroad overpass were the result of U.S. soldiers firing toward that point, as reflected in

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some of the witness statements, then it logically follows that one must also believe that the Soviet bullets and cartridges found in the vicinity of the overpass resulted from hostile fire directed at the U.S. soldiers from the vicinity of the double railroad overpass, as reflected in several U.S. veteran statements. The Korean peninsula was a war zone as noted in the narrative; combat forces passed through this area after July 29, 1950. We do not know exactly what action occurred in and around this area after July 29, 1950; for example strafing, firefights or isolated gunfire could have occurred. The uncertainty generated by a lack of knowledge means that drawing firm conclusions based on physical evidence recovered from the site to include bullets or cartridge material is impossible.

Endnotes

1 Chapter 3, p. 88 - 89.

2 Chapter 4, p. 160.

3 Chapter 3, p.13.

4 Korean Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team Report (DIC Report) dated 12- 26 July 2000.

5 Giannelli, Paul C., and Imwinkelreid, Edward J., Scientific Evidence, 3rd Edition, Lexis, Charlottesville, VA 1999, p. 607.

6 Ibid. p. 608.

7 Memorandum for FBI, Subject: Forensic Analysis Request, dated 2 October 2000 and Memorandum for U.S. Army. Crime Laboratory, Subject: Analysis Request dated 8 August 2000.

8 The standard working practice of the DAIG Review Team is to send copies of documents to our Korean counterparts. The Korean response is undated but titled "Response to U.S. Questions on DIC Report"

9 Memorandum for United States Army Inspector General, DAIG, Subject: Request for Assistance, dated 31 October 2000. Written memorandum for the FBI pending, results summarized to U.S. Review Team on 31 October 2000.

10 Ibid.

11 FBI Laboratory Report of Examination (FBI Report), Case No. 95A-HQ-1326915, dated 16 October 2000.

12 DIC Report, dated 12 -26 July 2000.

13 Photos, Korean Defense Investigative Command No Gun Ri Investigation Team Report, dated July 2000, pg. 1 insert.

14 FBI Report.

15 Ibid.

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16 Memorandum for United States Army Inspector General, Subject: Request for Assistance, dated 31 October 2000.

17 Members of the DAIG Review Team have visited the double overpass and seen what appear to be bullet marks.

18 Undated "Response to US Questions on DIC Report" p. 3.

19 Memorandum for Inspector General dated 31 October 2000.

20 FBI Report, p.1

21 Ibid. p.1

22 See note 5 above

23 See note 16.

24 Ibid. pgs. 1-2

25 Ibid. p. 2.

26 Chapter 3, p.13.

27 DIC Report, p. 23

28 Memorandum, Subject: Evaluation of a report titled "Forensic Test Results of the No Gun Ri Incident" for the Department of the Army Inspector's General's Office (USACIL Case Number 2000-CID131-0730) dated 30 August 2000 (CID Report).

29 During a meeting in December 2000 with the ROK Review Team, LTG Ackerman, The Inspector General, was told that Soviet bullets and casing were found on the north side of the railroad tracks in two separate locations.

30 Ibid. p. 2

31 See note 5 above.

32 CID Report and FBI Report.

33 FBI Report.

34 FBI Report.

35 FBI Laboratory Report of Examination (FBI Report), Case No. 95A-HQ-1326915, dated 16 October 2000.

36 See note 28.

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Tab 3 - Forensic pathology analysis

I. Introduction

The Department of the Army Inspector General Agency Review Team (U.S. Review Team) requested expert forensic assistance from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) during the No Gun Ri Review.1 The AFIP is a Department of Defense tri-service agency with specialized departments and more than 120 staff pathologists.2 As a part of its mission, AFIP consults on death investigations throughout the world.3 The U.S. Team sent the following items to AFIP for analysis:

1. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) produced contour maps. In its report AFIP refers to NIMA as the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

2. Recent color photographs of the No Gun Ri area.4

3. A black and white U.S. Air Force aerial reconnaissance photograph dated August 6, 1950 taken in the area where the No Gun Ri incident is alleged to have occurred.5

AFIP has conducted thousands of investigations into deaths and has considerable experience in the recovery of bodies.6

II. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology observations

Based on the material provided for review, AFIP stated that the condition of the open area to the South (upstream) of the double overpass is not consistent with the condition you would expect the site to be in if multiple deaths from machine gun fire had occurred at this location. The site condition is also not consistent with bodies being dragged through the area.

If hundreds of deaths had occurred in the vicinity of the identified area, you would expect to see evidence of decomposition, body parts and scavenger activity. AFIP detected no evidence of decomposition, such as ground staining caused by fluids from decomposing bodies including blood. There were no signs of scavenger activity.

III. Conclusion

Based on their review of the materials provided, AFIP concluded there was no evidence that there were hundreds of deaths in the open areas in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

Endnotes

1 Per unwritten request from U.S. Review Team in July 2000.

2 http://www.afip.org

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3 http://www.afip.org and Memorandum, Subject: Review of material relating to an alleged incident in the area of No Gun Ri. ROK in July 1950, AFIP-OME, dated 25 July 2000.

4 U.S. Eighth Army, photograph book, "No Gun Ri Terrain Orientation, 8th U.S. Army and U.S. Forces Korea" dated 23 November 1999. The U.S. Review Team requested that the EUSA IG office take still photographs of the No Gun Ri area on 23 November 1999.

5 Defense Intelligence Agency, photograph, "No Gun Ri" dated 6 August 1950. DIA identified two aerial reconnaissance missions flown on 6 August and 19 September 1950 that were catalogued as mission numbers R-377A and R-110A flown over the No Gun Ri area along a mission track.

6 Memorandum, Subject: Review of material relating to an alleged incident in the area of No Gun Ri, ROK in July 1950, AFIP-OME, dated July 25, 2000, p. 4.

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Appendix C - Imagery research and analysis

I. Introduction

In November 1999, The Department of the Army Inspector General Review Team (U.S. Review Team) requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) survey its archives for photographic or textual records of the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the Korean War. The U.S. Review Team asked DIA to focus on the period from July 25 to November 1, 1950. DIA found no textual records but identified two aerial reconnaissance missions flown on August 6 and September 19, 1950, that were catalogued as mission numbers R-377A and R-110A flown over the No Gun Ri area along a mission track that included the Yongdong-Hwanggan corridor.

Following this discovery, the U.S. Review Team formally requested that the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the Department of Defense functional proponent on matters relating to imagery and aerial reconnaissance, perform an analysis of the aerial reconnaissance film11. The Republic of Korea's Image Analysis Team, Aerial Imagery Intelligence Squadron, 39th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Republic of Korea analyzed the film on behalf of the ROK Review Team2. Both examinations focused on the road, rail lines, tunnels and bridges3. NIMA was further tasked to search for possible mass gravesites and evidence of human remains along the Yongdong-Hwanggan portion of the film.

II. Imagery research chronology of events

Defense Intelligence Agency holdings

DIA searched its holdings after receiving the U.S. Review Team's request in November 1999. DIA 's first search parameter was for any material showing the No Gun Ri area during the period 25 July to 1 November 1950. Although this search produced no textual records, DIA did find two canisters of overhead reconnaissance film dated August 6 and September 19, 1950. Continuing its search, DIA found 148 more canisters of imagery that were candidates for review. A physical examination of these 148 canisters in December 1999 and January 2000 determined that this film did not contain pictures of the No Gun Ri area. Throughout the searches, the advanced age and fragile condition of the film required special handling, to protect the film.

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Washington National Record Center holdings

In mid-January 2000 the U.S. Review Team expanded its film search into the holdings of the Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Maryland, and to the National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, Maryland to ensure our search was as thorough as possible. In November 1999, DIA had compiled a massive list of aerial photography held by WNRC that might contain reconnaissance film over the Republic of Korea and the Yongdong-No Gun Ri Area of Interest (AOI). The U.S. Review Team, with the DIA list as a finding aid, narrowed the timeframe parameter for the physical search to the period July 25 to August 5, 1950 using the August 6, 1950 film as a data point. From March to June 2000, the U.S. Review Team members, assisted by WNRC employees, painstakingly searched through individual film canisters (each one approximately 12 inches high, six inches in diameter, and weighing several pounds). The imagery is stored in boxes with up to five cans in a box, two boxes deep on a shelf and up to seven rows high. The imagery on the original negatives was handled carefully. Ultimately, the U.S. Review Team examined over 45,000 film canisters. The WNRC search occurred in three phases:

Phase one was a database survey of records DIA had identified as likely candidates containing Republic of Korea, 1950, aerial photography. This database had complete identification information (such as location and date) that greatly expedited locating these materials in the stacks. This identification information permitted rapid culling of relevant boxes in which to search. Many of the canisters had complete labels that made determining relevance easy. However, some of the canisters identified in this phase had incomplete identification data on them. For the canisters with incomplete data, the U.S. Review Team physically examined each canister. None of the canisters contained No Gun Ri related material.

Phase two was the physical search of more record groups, derived from a second database that DIA identified as possibly containing 1950 Republic of Korea aerial photography. However, this database listing contained no inventory of the individual cans in the record groups. Therefore, this phase took longer because the researchers needed to open every box in the record groups. This task involved thousands of boxes and film canisters. No relevant materials were discovered.

Phase three, the final phase consisted of physically searching unlisted record groups that might fit our parameters. This phase used the NARA Accession Number Master List, WNRC, as a search tool. This method represented the least specific data tool. It would cover the remainder of any

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known or suspected Korean War materials for the period in question and fulfill our mandate. No relevant materials were discovered.

Upon completion of the search, the U.S. Review Team surveyed and examined over 45,000 canisters of aerial reconnaissance film that yielded a total of 260 canisters of potentially relevant aerial imagery. Close examination of these 260 canisters revealed that none were from the No Gun Ri area. The August 6 and September 19, 1950 film were the only useful photographic products derived from this effort.

National Archives and Records Administration II

In January and February 2000, the U.S. Review Team examined NARA II holdings and found several canisters of Korean Era gun-camera footage. No footage was from the No Gun Ri area. As the search continued, the U.S. Review Team located additional gun-camera film in June 2000. The U.S. Review Team asked NIMA to assess this imagery. The film segment consisted of 31 usable frames of film covering approximately 1.25 seconds in "real time." The scene consisted of a double railroad track with a road paralleling it. Both the road and railroad crossed a secondary stream where it joined a larger primary stream. Although analysts could not determine the location of the activity, it was evident, when compared to the August 6 and September 19, 1950, film, that this was not the No Gun Ri area. Therefore, it will not be discussed any further.

III. The August 6 and September 19, 1950 film

The 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Air Force, flew both reconnaissance missions. The film sets contained embedded reconnaissance track frames that enabled the analysts to identify positively the Yongdong- Hwanggan corridor, the No Gun Ri railroad overpass, Highway 1, and other salient features4. The film format is 9 inch X 9 inch taken by vertical cameras with a focal length of 152mm (6 inch). NIMA rated the quality of the film as "good" with a National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) of "7" (Cultural Features: Identify individual railroad ties). The altitude for the August 6 mission was 3500 feet while the 19 September's mission was 3800 feet. The August 6, 1950 film was the primary focus for analysis since it was closer to the time frame of the alleged incident. Analysts used the September 19 film for comparison with the August 6 film, looking for changes or other disturbances in the terrain for comparative purposes. The U.S. Review Team asked NIMA to analyze the two reconnaissance missions along the track from Yongdong to Hwanggan. NIMA's task was to analyze and assess the state of the road, rail lines, tunnels and bridges, and look for possible gravesites and evidence of human remains.

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(Two maps)(Four aerial photos)

The ROK Review Team's imagery analyst also examined and provided an analysis of the August 6, 1950, aerial reconnaissance film. The ROK Review Team raised several independent concerns and noted differences between the US and ROK evaluation. Therefore, the U.S. Review Team requested NIMA reexamine the film with the intent of responding to the concerns expressed by the ROK Review Team in an effort to answer remaining questions and ensure that a thorough analysis of the August 1950 film had been achieved5. After review of the ROK analysis of the aerial reconnaissance film and a meeting with the ROK Team's imagery analyst and a reexamination of the film, NIMA's original conclusions remained unchanged.6

IV. Description and analysis

The description and analysis of the area shown in the photographs follows below.7

A loose surface, all-weather road runs parallel to the east side of the dual rail line. This road is identified as Route 1 on the 1957 Yongdong map (designated as the Highway 4/Kyoung Bu Expressway on contemporary maps)8. Approximately 30 meters east of the double overpass on Route 1 is an intact highway bridge. This bridge is approximately 5 meters wide, 20 meters long, and 3.5 meters high; it spans the same streambed as the double overpass. Approximately 220 meters south of the double overpass on the west rail line is a 50-meter section of track that has damage patterns consistent with the results of possible strafing (361249N 1275244E). Just east of the damaged area, and at the base of the rail embankment, is a line of fighting positions. Between the double overpass and the Route 1 highway bridge are vehicle tracks fording the stream.

Approximately 55 meters further upstream from the ford to the east is the start of a line of fighting positions on the south bank of the streambed. This line of fighting positions starts at the bend of the stream and extends for approximately 250 meters to the south.

Approximately 300 meters east of the double overpass along Route 1 is a disrupted road bridge as it appears on the August 6, 1950 film. The bridge is reconstructed in the September 19, 1950 film. Approximately 260 meters due east of the double overpass is Hill 207, which reveals burial mounds and fighting positions. There is evidence of ordnance impact throughout the area.

Located about 200 meters southwest of the No Gun Ri Railroad Bridge is a small area9 (361226N 1275231E) that has damage patterns consistent with the

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(Map)

results of probable strafing10. This field extends about 50 meters along the west track bed. Located about 1200 meters southwest of the No Gun Ri Railroad Bridge is a large area11 (36126N 1275231E) that has damage patterns consistent with the results of probable strafing. This field extends about 50 meters along both sides of the track bed.

The August 6 imagery appears to have been taken during midday as indicated by the limited shadowing exhibited by the various structures and vegetation. This is verified by annotations that appear on the various frames throughout out the reconnaissance track.

V. Conclusions

The NIMA analysis drew the following conclusions:

There are no indications of human remains or mass graves in, under, or around the No Gun-Ri overpass or culvert or surrounding area12.

The road bridge immediately east of the double overpass does not appear to have undergone recent construction prior to the date of the image13.

Probable strafing occurred in two locations along the western track bed14. The analyst ruled out that artillery, mortars, or standard aerial bombs caused the ground marks.

Entrances to the various tunnels all appeared intact and open. There is evidence of probable bomb craters noted in the vicinity of the various tunnel openings.

The September 19, 1950 images showed that the disrupted road bridge in the August 6, 1950 film had been rebuilt. The September 1950 film provided no significant additional information.

Endnotes

1 NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun Ri, Republic of Korea 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950.

2 Working papers provided to the US Team entitled Analysis on Overhead Imagery.

3 The U.S. Review Team provided a duplicate negative of the 6 August and 19 September 1950 missions to the ROK Team.

4 Lead frame is a photograph of a section of a 1:250,000 map reference J52T - J52U showing the flight path and approximate location of film frames.

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5 NIMA Imagery Analysis Review and Comments on the Republic of Korea's No Gun-Ri Investigation Team's "Analysis on Overhead Imagery" Date of Imagery 6 August 1950.

6 Supplemental comments were provided by NIMA on 3 November 2000.

7 See Figures 1 - 4 NIMA Imagery Analysis Report No Gun Ri, Republic of Korea 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950

8 Map Sheet HWANGGAN, Series L754, Sheet 3318 III

9 NIMA Analyst identified this area as "probable northeast strafed area." (See Tab 2, App D, P.11)

10 The ROK analyst identifies this area as "artificial patterns... (Estimated not due to air strike")

11 NIMA Analyst identified this area as "probable southwest strafed area." (See Tab 2, App D, P.11)

12 The ROK imagery analyst concurred with this conclusion. It had been reported that remains were present as late as 10 August 1950. According to NIMA, the quality of the 6 August 1950 film was good enough that an object the size of a human body roughly between 4 and 6 feet in height would have been visible.

13 It was reported that the bridge was down between 26 July 1950 and was rebuilt prior to the date of the aerial photograph

14 These are the two areas described on page 7

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Tab 1 - NIMA imagery analysis report, No Gun-Ri, Republic of Korea, 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950

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I. Introduction

II. Equipment and Techniques

III. Film Quality Assessment

IV. Gun Camera Film Assessment

V. Analysis of 6 August 1950 Imagery

A. Bridges

B. Tunnels

C. Mass Graves

D. Human Remains

E. Strafing

VI. Analysis of 19 September 1950 Imagery

A. Bridges

B. Tunnels

C. Mass Graves

D. Human Remains

E. Strafing

VII. Conclusions

Appendices

1. Bridges and Culverts

2. Analyst Comments

2

I. Introduction

1. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was formally requested by the US Army Inspectors General Office to review a segment of gun camera film reportedly taken in the vicinity of No Gun-Ri, Republic of Korea (ROK) during July - August 1950. Additionally, NIMA was specifically requested to "conduct analysis on two reconnaissance missions flown on 6 August and 19 September 1950, respectively, between Yongdong and Hwanggan, ROK (Map 1). The primary focus (of the analysis) should be bridges, tunnels and possible areas of mass graves. In addition, look for evidence of strafing damage and human remains."

2. Upon discussions with the assigned US Army Inspectors General Investigator, it was decided that the 1950 reconnaissance missions would be examined in their entirety for evidence of road, railroad, and bridge damage. Emphasis would be placed on those frames in the vicinity of the No Gun-Ri, ROK railroad bridge (Map 2) -- particularly in the search for human remains and mass graves (Figures 1 - 4 overlap -- from right to left -- to define interest area).

3

(Two maps)(Four aerial photos)

II. Equipment and Techniques

1. Evaluation and analysis of the gun camera film was conducted by initially viewing the segment of film in question on a 16mm motion picture viewer at the National Archives, College Park facility. The film was then transported to the photo lab of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling AFB, Washington DC, where the film segment was digitized in a 2k by 2k format, producing 31 discrete image files. The image files were placed on a DIA fileserver in a shared directory. NIMA personnel at Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, pulled the files via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) into an ULTRA 60 workstation, where they were transferred to an 8mm tape and moved to an INTERGRAPH system for viewing and analysis.

2. Evaluation and analysis of the 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950 was performed on fourth generation Duplicate Positive (DUPPOS) film (transparency)1. Analysis was performed at Building 213, using a RICHARDS HFO-4 Light Table, equipped with a Bausch and Lomb Zoom 500 Stereoscope, Bausch and Lomb 15X Ultra Wide Field eyepieces, 1X and 4X (Bausch and Lomb) and 1.25X (Cambridge Instruments) optics (objectives).

3. Standard analytical techniques were used -- mono-viewing, stereo-viewing, enlargement (via zoom capabilities of the stereoscope and the various available optics) and varying the light intensity.

4. Selected frames of both the 6 August 1950 imagery (frames 15, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 40) and the 19 September 1950 imagery (frames 43 - 49) were digitized by DIA and provided to NIMA on an 8mm tape. Third generation negatives were used as the base media for the digitization. The digitized images were NOT used for analysis, instead they were used only for the production of the various graphics/prints used in this report.

1 At the time of this analysis, the Original Negative (ON) of this imagery was in the possession of DIA. To support the IG investigation several second generation copies had been made from the ON resulting in damage to the ON. By the time NIMA was requested to provide an analysis, DUPPOS copies were being made from a third generation Duplicate Negative (DUPNEG). While generational degradation had occurred, loss of quality was deemed insufficient to affect overall analysis.

4

(Map)

III. Film Quality Assessment

1. Gun Camera Film - The film provided for the tasked review/assessment was standard 16mm motion picture film. There was no accompanying location/date data provided with the film (National Archives researchers stated that they believed it to have been taken in the vicinity of No Gun-Ri during the July/August 1950 timeframe). The following identifying data was found on the film: 342USAF18823 R-3 REEL 3/4 B-WIND KODAK SAFETY POSITIVE. Provided film was a copy (frames where segments were connected showed an "oval," but were otherwise blank (opaque), no true cuts or splices were noted). Film quality was fair, the images appeared grainy and showed signs that both the original and the copy were probably scratched. Motion within the tasked segment was smooth, possibly indicating that the aircraft guns were not firing while the camera was activated.

2. 6 August 1950 Imagery - This was a 9 inch x 9 inch format film taken with an unknown model framing camera. According to the mission data provided on the film leader, the mission was flown by the 5th Air Force (5AF), as sortie/mission number 337A. The camera had a focal length of 152mm (6 inches) and was flown at an altitude of 3500 feet. The scale of the resulting imagery was calculated by the imagery analyst at 1:70002; resolution was such that individual railroad ties could be distinguished under magnification. The provided film was a fourth generation DUPPOS and quality of the resulting film was rated by the analyst as good, with a National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) rating of 7.3 Imagery appeared to have been taken at midday -- minimal shadowing was exhibited by various structures and vegetation. Imagery covered an area from Sinan-ni (Sinan-Yeong4) to Yongdong (Yeongdong), ROK (see Map 3).

3. 19 September 1950 Imagery - This was also a 9 inch x 9 inch format film taken with an unknown model framing camera. According to the mission data provided on the film leader, the mission was flown by the 5th Air Force (5AF), as sortie/mission number 1105A. The camera had a focal length of 152mm (6 inches) and was flown at an altitude of 3800 feet. The scale of the resulting imagery was calculated by the imagery analyst at 1:7600, resolution was again such that individual railroad ties could be distinguished under magnification. The provided film was again a fourth generation DUPPOS , and was rated by the analyst as good, also with a NIIRS rating of 7. Imagery appeared to have been taken at

2 Scale was determined using the following formulas: Photo Scale Reciprocal (PSR) = Altitude (height) in Feet times 12 divided by focal length in inches (F) or H x 12 / f = PSR; Scale (S) = 1 divided by PSR or S = 1 / PSR (or it can be sxpressed S = 1 : PSR).

3 Under the NIIRS rating system, values of 0-9 are used (imagery rated 0 is poor quality and uninterpretable, while imagery rated as 9 is excellent quality. Imagery on which individual railroad ties can be distinguished, for example, is given a NIIRS rating of 7.

4 Spelling differences for place names are found on the various maps used in this analysis.

5

midday -- minimal shadowing was exhibited by various structures and vegetation. Imagery covered an area from Kimchon (Gimcheon) to Yongdong (Yeongdong), ROK (see Map 3).

6

IV. Gun Camera Film Assessment

1. The film segment in question consisted of 31 usable frames of film, covering approximately 1.25 seconds in "real" time.

2. The segment showed a road paralleling a closely separated double railroad track and corresponding rail and road bridges crossing a secondary stream near where it joined a larger primary stream. Both bridges appeared damaged.

3. The gun camera film provided was NOT taken in the vicinity of No Gun-Ri along the road/railroad between Yongdong and Hwanggan - the railroad between these two areas was a double railroad, most of the distance displaying a marked degree of separation between the two rail beds. Further there was a marked separation between the railroad and the road, except in the immediate vicinity of No Gun-Ri where the road and railroad run in close proximity. Additionally at No Gun-Ri, the road/railroad crossed a primary stream - not a secondary stream as depicted in the gun camera film (Figure 5).

4. While the gun camera film may have been taken during the July - August 1950 time period as the National Archives researchers believed, where it was taken is not known. Furthermore it was not taken in the areas imaged on the 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950 imagery provided to NIMA for analysis.

7

(Gun camera photo)

V. Analysis of 6 August 1950 Imagery

A. Bridges

1. On imagery between Kimchon and Yongdong, ROK, 35 separate bridges (this count includes both rail and road bridges, culverts, and overpasses) were noted. Geographic coordinates are provided in Appendix A.5

2. All overpasses, culverts, railroad and road bridges were intact and appeared serviceable, except a road bridge near the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge located at 361258N 1275259E (Figures 6 and 7) and the Wonsabu railroad bridge located at 361254N 1275759E (Figure 8), both of which were unusable.

3. No bridges appeared to have undergone any recent repair.

5 All provided coordinates are based on film to map correlation, coordinates were NOT mensurated. Coordinates were derived from Map Sheet HWANGGAN, series L754, Sheet 3318 III, WGS 84. UTM coordinates were converted to Geographic Coordinates via the Coordinate Conversion Program in the National Exploitation System (NES).

8

(Three aerial photos)

B. Tunnels

1. Two railroad tunnels were noted between Hwanggan and Yongdong. Craters caused by various types of munitions were noted throughout the areas in the vicinity of the tunnels.

2. The tunnel in the vicinity of Hwanggan near 361141N 1275140E (north most opening), extended approximately 750 meters on a northeast to southwest orientation. The approaches at each end appeared intact and no debris was noted around the openings on the tracks.6

3. The tunnel in the vicinity of Mugunjom near 361329N 1275350E (north most opening), extended approximately 500 meters, also on a northeast to southwest orientation. The approaches at each end appeared intact and no debris was noted around the openings on the tracks (Figure 9).

6 The imagery analyst chose NOT to provide a print of the Hwanggan railroad tunnel from the 6 August 1950 imagery. The entire tunnel was not imaged on a single frame, and the location of the tunnel entrances on the available frames would have made resulting prints confusing to the reader.

9

(Two aerial photos)

C. Mass Graves

1. There were no indications of mass graves in the vicinity of the No Gun-Ri Railroad bridge.7 (Figure 10)

2. Fighting positions (foxholes) were noted along the river, extending from the bend in the river east of the highway bridge (361255N 1275255E) along the river/stream bank southwest to approximately 361235N 1275247E (Figures 11 and 12). A heavy concentration of fighting positions was massed in the vicinity of 361229N 1275259E. Stereoscopic examination of the fighting positions revealed that the majority were open (meaning not filled in or covered over) (Figure 13).

7 Analyst Comment: The "signature" or appearance of mass graves may depend upon terrain and cultural factors as well as the circumstances that have forced the decision to create a mass grave, i.e. natural disaster, disease, mass executions, etc. The signature that an imagery analyst searches for is a newly dug linear trench or rectangular-appearing pit. Typically mass graves have been located on imagery, after the grave has been filled and covered and when some other indicators have pointed the analyst in the right direction to look.

10

(Three aerial photos)

D. Human Remains. The area around the No Gun-Ri, ROK railroad bridge and the nearby fighting positions was carefully examined for indications of human remains. There were NO indications of human remains found on the imagery examined for this project.

11

E. Strafing

1. An imagery signature of probable strafing was noted on the 6 August 1950 imagery in two areas, near the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge.

2. The probable northeast strafed area was located at 361249N 1275244E (Figures 14 and 15). This location, approximately 200 meters southwest of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge, was on the western track bed. Extending approximately 50 meters along the track bed was a random pattern of light toned "circular" and "irregularly" shaped marks or craters. These marks exhibited the same tonal qualities as nearby probable bomb craters, appearing to be of the same material (probably disrupted dirt) as the bomb craters. Examination of these light toned marks using frames 34 and 35, and standard stereoscopic techniques indicated that the marks had no "height", meaning that the marks were on the surface of the ground or only slightly depressed or evenly mounded. No shadows were noted at any of ground marks. The analyst conclusion was that the area had probably been strafed by an aircraft; the pilot was able to concentrate his firing along the western trackbed.8 Cratering / soil disruption was noted on the embankments in this area.

2. The probable southwest strafed area was located at 361226N 1275231E (Figures 16 and 17). This location, approximately 1200 meters southwest of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge, was also situated along the western track bed. Like the probable northeast strafed area, the southwest site extended for approximately 50 meters. Unlike the northeast area, which was concentrated on the track bed, the southwest site extended along both sides of the trackbed. Numerous small craters, too small to have been made by artillery, mortars or standard aerial bombs, appeared clustered in a line on either side of the tracks in that area and on the embankments lining the tracks.

8 This concentration of craters (or soil disruption) within the trackbed and size of the marks caused the analyst to rule out: artillery, mortars, and standard aerial bombs. The analyst further ruled out "scattered refugee belongings", because of the uniform light tone (white) of the marks (craters) -- it was felt that "refugee belongings" would exhibit "gray tones" resulting in a more mottled appearance of the area.

12

(Four aerial photos)

VI. Analysis of 19 September 1950 Imagery

A. Bridges

All railroad and road bridges were intact and appeared serviceable except the Wonsabu Railroad bridge located at 361254N 1275759E. The damaged road bridge located at 361258N 1275259E, had been repaired between 6 August and 19 September 1950 (Figure 18).

13

(One aerial photo)

B. Tunnels

There was no change in the status of the two tunnels reported on the 6 August 1950 imagery. The approaches at each end of both the Hwanggan and Mugunjom railroad tunnels appeared intact, with no debris noted around the openings on the tracks (Figures 19 and 20). Additional munitions cratering had occurred in the area of both tunnels between the 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950 imagings.

14

(Two aerial photos)

C. Mass Graves

1. There were still no indications of mass graves in the vicinity of the No Gun-Ri Railroad bridge.

2. The previously identified fighting positions (foxholes) were still visible along the river, extending from the river bend east of the highway bridge along the river/stream bank to the southwest (Figure 21). The heavy concentration of fighting positions noted at 361229N 1275259E remained. Stereoscopic examination of the fighting positions revealed that the majority were still open (meaning not filled in or covered over) (Figure 22). Most of the positions were showing the effects of weathering, having begun to collapse over time.

15

(Two aerial photos)

D. Human Remains

The area around the No Gun-Ri, ROK railroad bridge and the nearby fighting positions was carefully examined for indications of human remains. There were NO indications of human remains found on the imagery examined for this project.

16

E. Strafing

1. The imagery signature of probable strafing noted on the 6 August 1950 imagery was less evident on 19 September 1950.

2. The probable northeast strafed area located at 361249N 1275244E (Figure 23), still exhibited the effects of the probable strafing; the ground surface between the rails appeared uneven and presented a "pockmarked" feel when viewed in stereo. The time interval between 6 August and 19 September 1950 allowed the scene to "weather" -- returning the rail bed in the probable strafed area to a more uniform gray tone. The rails through the probable strafed area appeared intact, however at one location it appeared that the tracks may have been bowed outward slightly and several of the cross ties appeared to be missing and broken. Some probable gouges or craters were still visible along the embankment walls.

3. The probable southwest strafed located at 361226N 1275231E (Figure 24), exhibited the same weathering effects, hiding the numerous small craters along the sides of the track.

4. It should be noted that most of the craters in both areas caused by other munitions of various types showed this same weathering effect, darkening in the later coverage.

17

(Two aerial photos)

VII. Conclusions

1. The areas imaged on both 6 August 1950 and 19 September 1950 exhibited evidence of military operations. Numerous craters caused by munitions of various types were found throughout the area.

2. Two bridges were damaged as noted on the 6 August 1950 imagery; one bridge had been repaired by 19 September 1950. There were no indications of any bridge having undergone repair on the 6 August 1950 imagery.

3. Probable strafing resulting in disruption of the soil along the railbed, occurred in two locations within 2000 meters of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge. Imagery analysis has ruled out artillery, mortars, standard aerial bombs or refugee property as the cause of the disrupted appearance of the areas.

4. Entrances to the various railroad tunnels all appeared intact and open.

18

Appendix 1

Bridges and Culverts

Visible/Located on Imagery

Kimchon to Simchon

1. 360733N 1280523E

2. 360727N 1280522E

3. 360727N 1280508E

4. 360735N 1280448E

5. 360718N 1280440E

6. 360746N 1280359E

7. 360755N 1280302E

8. 360807N 1280203E

9. 360748N 1280129E

10. 360906N 1280129E

Simchon to Hwanggan

1. 361004N 1280046E

2. 361012N 1280045E

3. 361020N 1280049E

4. 361033N 1280047E

5. 361036N 1280023E

6. 361049N 1280027E

19

7. 361105N 1280001E

8. 361155N 1280016E

9. 361213N 1280016E

10. 361239N 1275958E

11. 361255N 1275935E

12. 361300N 1275937E

13. 361303N 1275921E

14. 361250N 1275801E

15. 361254N 1275759E - Figure 8

16. 361244N 1275745E

17. 361241N 1275719E

18. 361306N 1275619E

19. 361308N 1275611E

20. 361311N 1275535E

21. 361330N 1275457E

22. 361335N 1275438E

23. 361331N 1275426E

Hwanggan to Yongdong

1. 361336N 1275404E

2. 361315N 1275315E

3. 361306N 1275256E

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4. 361258N 1275259E - Figures 7 and 18

5. 361257N 1275250E - Figure 10 - No Gun-Ri Railroad Bridge

6. 361256N 1275253E - Figure 10 - No Gun-Ri Road Bridge

7. 361253N 1275251E

8. 361212N 1275219E

9. 361205N 1275212E

10. 361125N 1275116E

11. 361100N 1275033E

12. 361051N 1275036E

13. 361005N 1274853E

14. 361010N 1274813E

15. 361026N 1274801E

16. 361013N 1274801E

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Appendix 2 - Analyst comments

1. Other than hearing a few news reports about the No Gun-Ri incident, the imagery analyst did not know the details of any of the allegations being made in the press. When tasked with this project, other than locating the area on a map and having a US Army National Ground Intelligence Center analyst point out the No Gun-Ri bridge on the 6 August 1950 imagery, the analyst made no attempt to familiarize himself with the stories surrounding this case. The analyst was not provided (nor did he request) any background materials from the US Army IG office.

2. Analytical assessments, while made in a vacuum about the details of the events of the target area, were not made without the review of other NIMA imagery analysts. Six analysts, with varying degrees and types of analytical experience, were asked to view suspect areas and state their opinions -- in all cases probable strafing was the opinion expressed.

3. Since no available imagery covered the timeframe between the claimed incident date of 26 July 19509 and the 6 August 1950 imagery examined for this study, no analytical method or technique can be used to determine when the probable strafings occurred. If information was available about environmental conditions at No Gun-Ri in late July and August of 1950, then it might be possible to estimate when the probable strafing occurred. But absent that environmental information, all that can accurately be said is that the probable strafing occurred before the images were taken on 6 August 1950.

4. Analysis is best performed on imagery as close to the original negative (ON) as possible. With each successive reproduction (or generation) there is a loss of quality. Depending on the quality of the ON, features that can be viewed in a second generation DUPPOS may be totally indistinguishable by the fourth to sixth generation. (Explanation of film generations - the original negative, also called the mission negative, is the first generation, a DUPPOS made from that ON is the second generation, a DUPNEG made from the first DUPPOS is the third generation and the DUPPOS made from the DUPNEG is the fourth generation. Generally odd numbered generations are Negatives, while even numbered generations are Positives.)

5. Use of film vs. digitized imagery for analysis - There is an ongoing debate about using digitized historic imagery for analysis. It is the opinion of the imagery analyst, who accomplished the No Gun-Ri research, that using the digitized media opens the analysis to charges of altering the image. The problems with using digitized historic imagery begins with the actual digitization process. To avoid "saturation" the technician may adjust the process to "tone down" "bright" areas, this tone adjustment may result in the loss of details in "darker" areas of the image. When the digitized historic material is brought up on a computer screen for

9 It was the understanding of the imagery analyst that the alleged No Gun-Ri incident is reported to have occurred at sometime between 26 and 29 July 1950.

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viewing (or analysis) to "enhance" the image, gray tones can be altered or adjusted to "bring out" features the analyst is interested in viewing. This altering of the gray tones may cause the analyst to miss something or read into the scene something that was not on the basic filmed image. "Cleaning up" or digitially removing scratches, chemical spots, or dust that were on the basic film could result in covering or further altering features that might be important to the overall analysis. For this report, digitized historic imagery was used only for creating graphic; analysis was based on a fourth generation DUPPOS of the historic film.

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Tab 2 - NIMA imagery analysis review and comments on the Republic of Korea's No Gun-Ri investigation team's "Analysis on overhead imagery" (date of imagery 06 August 1950)

C-8

I. Introduction

1. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was formally requested by the US Army Inspectors General Office to review and comment on issues addressed in the Republic of Korea's No Gun-Ri Investigation Team's "Analysis on Overhead Imagary" (sic) (prepared by the Image Analysis Team, Aerial IMINT Squadron, 39th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Republic of Korea). Specifically NIMA was requested to:

a. Determine if the items addressed in the report are accurate.

b. Comment on the doctrine and procedures used by the USAF during 1950 to "index" aerial reconnaissance missions.

c. Assess terrain conditions, as impacted by weather, that can be ascertained from analysis of images over the No Gun-Ri area.

d. Comment on the anomaly between frames 34 and 35 identified as "mislabeled" in the report.

2. The text of the Republic of Korea's No Gun-Ri Investigation Team's "Analysis on Overhead Imagary" (sic) has been reproduced exactly and indicated by italicized print within the text of this report (Appendix A is a ROK government document and will not be reproduced for the final report. Requests for release of this document should be submitted to the Korean government), while the NIMA imagery analyst's findings and comments are in regular print. Most of the Korean Image Analysis Team (KIAT) comments concern the imagery frames in the vicinity of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge (Figure 1).

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II. Doctrine and procedures of the US Air Force in 1950

1. NIMA IA could not determine the specific unit doctrines and procedures that were in use by the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (8 TRS) of the US Fifth Air Force in August 1950. While a copy of the unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual would have been the best source of this information, no such document was located or provided to NIMA. Without the SOP, NIMA IA determined that a review of US Air Force regulations and technical manuals of the era would provide indications of the requirements and procedures that would have served as the basis for the unit developed SOP.

2. NIMA IA reviewed a copy of TM 30-245/NAVAIR 10-35-685/AFM 200-50, Image Interpretation Handbook, dated December 1967, which superceded the 1954 editions of the publication, TM 30-245/NAVAER 10-35-610/AFM 200-50, Photographic Interpretation Handbook, dated 1 April 1954. A review of the section on plotting in the 1954 publication referenced Air Force Regulation 95-7, for detailed requirements for plotting and imagery titling.

3. NIMA IA requested copies of any Air Force regulations or technical manuals that would have been in effect in August 1950 that concerned plotting and indexing of aerial photography. Researchers at the National Archives located and provided copies of Army Air Force Regulation (AAFR) 95-7, PHOTOGRAPHY, MAPS AND CHARTS, Titling and Identification of AAF Still Photographic Negatives, dated 18 July 1946; Air Force Regulation 95-18, PHOTOGRAPHY, USAF Standard Plotting System for Aerial and Radar Scope Photography, dated 30 June 1954; and Air Force Regulation 95-7, PHOTOGRAPHY, Titling, Identification and Disposition of USAF Aerial Photographic Negatives, dated 01 April 1958. While none of the referenced regulations were specifically in effect in August 1950, statements common to the regulations and the 1954 technical manual suggests that certain requirements were carried forward in the intermediate editions. Specific applicable statements from the referenced regulations and technical manuals have been extracted and included as Appendix B.

4. Titling data on the various frames of the 06 August 1950 imagery and the preparation of the field plot used as the leader frame (called the INDEX by the KIAT and here after in this document to avoid confusion) were in accordance with procedures and requirements noted in the referenced regulations and technical manuals that were in effect prior to and after 06 August 1950.

III. Imagery information

1. Date & Time: 1950. 8. 6, 14:00 - 14:30 -- Titling data on the various film frames and the index, indicated a date of "6 Aug 50"; a probable time over target of 1400 was annotated on frame 1 and a time of 1430 was annotated on frame 86 (various intermediate times were annotated on frames within the mission). Evaluation of shadows caused by various objects on the imagery indicated a midday to early afternoon imaging time.

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2. Area: Area along the railroad and Rt. 4, YD~HG, ChoongBuk -- Actual coverage on the mission was from Sinam-Ni to an area west of Yongdong,1 more so along the road than the railroad (in areas where the railroad became widely separated from the road, the road was followed).

3. Unit: 5 AF 8 TRS (Yokota, JAPAN) -- Concur on unit identification, per annotations on the imagery. As to unit location, there was nothing on the imagery to indicate the unit location.

4. Type of AC / Mission No.: RF-80A, R-337A -- Concur on Mission Number, however there was nothing on the imagery to indicate aircraft type.

5. Type of Photo: Continuous/Perpendicular photo with neg. copy film -- Concur, there were 86 continuous frames of vertical imagery taken with an unknown model of framing camera using a 9 inch x 9 inch film format. NIMA/IA was told by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) photo lab personnel that a third generation Duplicate Negative had been provided to the KIAT.

6. Altitude: 3,500ft -- Concur, as that is the information annotated on the film index.2

IV. Factors for analysis

1. The KIAT report listed the following Factors for Analysis:

• Targets for identification: Unit Facilities, positions, patterns, indication

of possible maneuver by vehicles and/or military forces

• Non military targets : roads, bridges, railroad, stream, crops, etc.
• Factors consistent with operational situation and interview results
• Outer portion of each part of the film that joints adjacent ones

2. The KIAT factors for analysis were consistent with the original NIMA tasking to provide an analysis of two aerial reconnaissance missions, dated 06 August 1950 and 19 September 1950, with two exceptions:

a. NIMA was not provided information about the "operational situation or interview results."

b. NIMA was not initially tasked to examine the "outer portion of each part of the film that joints adjacent ones."

1 Place name spellings from current KAMC Map Series L754, Sheet Number 3318 III, Sheet Name HWANGGAN, Scale 1:50,000.

2 AAFR 95-7 specified that the "average altitude of the various flight lines" be recorded.

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3. During the original study, evidence of splicing or cuts, was noted in the interspace between several frames on the Duplicate Positive (DUPPOS) from which the NIMA imagery analyst (IA) conducted his analysis. The NIMA IA contacted DIA photo lab personnel who told him that the Original Negative (ON) was intact, except for some torn frames, but there were no splices between any frames on the ON. The NIMA IA was then told that working copies of the film were made from a third generation Duplicate Negative (DUPNEG).

4. In support of the current tasking, the NIMA IA visited the DIA Photo Lab with the US Army Inspectors General Investigator and reviewed both the ON and the DUPNEG that DIA was using. The results of this examination will be discussed in detail in Section IV. B. Film Analysis.

V. Results

A. Photo Analysis

1. - Manifold unrecoved patterns identified at the area of YD ~ HG -- NIMA IA understood this to mean that there were multiple unrecovered similar holes found on the imagery between Yongdong (YD) and Hwanggan (HG) -- which is to say that the KIAT probably located and noted several areas of open foxholes or fighting positions. NIMA IA was in agreement; several grouped foxholes/fighting positions were imaged throughout the coverage and all were open (meaning not filled in or recovered). However, several were showing signs of collapse consistent with the effects of local weather conditions and time (Figure 2).

2. - Some destroyed town bldgs next to the road b/w YD ~ HG -- NIMA IA was again in agreement; several buildings in the local towns/villages covered on the imagery showed the effects of damage and destruction by various types of munitions.

3. - No indication of vehicle or forces maneuver nor AA of units at the area along RR and Rt 4 -- Again NIMA IA was in agreement; vehicle tracks and foxholes were noted throughout the imaged area, but we saw nothing to indicate that military forces were active or present at the time of the imaging.

4. - Object possibly used for MG mount located at 50-70 meters north of the tunnels -- What the KIAT referred to as "tunnels," were the two water underpasses or arches under the railroad bridge. As to the direction "north", the KIAT seemed to be referring to the downstream side of the bridges.3 NIMA IA drew an arc (using the center support of the railroad bridge) approximately 70 meters from the support to define the area of interest; several craters were located within this area, all of which gave the appearance of munitions craters rather than fighting positions (or a machine gun (MG) mount) (Figure 3).

5. - Two unidentified objects located at 10m north of the tunnels - On the downstream side of the railroad bridge (again in the general direction of north per the KIAT), at approximately 6 meters west of the southern-most bridge arch and then at about 10 meters west of the northern-most bridge arch, was a

3 The stream that the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge crosses flows generally south to north; at the bridges the streambed curves to the west so that the flow under the bridge is more east to west.

5

possible footbridge -- a linear feature that ran on a diagonal from the southern bank of the stream to the northern bank of the stream. When viewed in stereo and under magnification, there appeared to be some minor height above the water surface and small spaces between the objects that formed this feature, suggesting that it was comprised of rocks (Figure 4). This feature, extending across the stream as it did, would have acted as a barrier, catching debris that would have washed downstream, though no debris was visible here on the 06 August 1950 imagery.

6. - Many craters due to air strike and ground fire identified -- Craters from various types of munitions (probably aerial bombs, rockets, mortars, and artillery) appeared throughout the frames of the 6 August 1950 imagery.

7. - Foot bridge at 8m south of the tunnels identified in the shape of " ¯V¯ " -- The identified "foot bridge" was a build up of sand at the base of the railroad bridge on the upstream side. Foot traffic could have used the sandbar to cross the stream bed, but it is doubtful that it was a man-made feature (Figure 5).

8. - Artificial patterns located at 200m southwest of the tunnels near RR (Estimated not due to air strike) -- NIMA IA had previously identified this as the probable northeastern strafed area (Figure 6).

9. - Bridge and two vehicles destroyed identified at 250m northeast of the tunnels -- This is one of two bridges identified as destroyed/damaged in the original NIMA analysis. There were two possible vehicles in the immediate area, but the vehicle status and type (though the vehicles were probably wheeled, vice tracked, based on an approximate 3:1 length to width ratio4) is unknown (Figure 7).

10. - No corpse or other objects on the railroad -- NIMA IA found no indications of human remains on the imagery. Of particular interest was the area of the railroad bridge; the obliquity of frames 32, 33, and 35 allowed the IA to look approximately 3 meters into the openings of the bridge arches on the upstream side and the area was found to be clear of debris or human remains (Figure 8).

B. Film Analysis

1. - Composed of total parts of negative film (INDEX 1, Continuous 86) -- The 06 August 1950 film was composed of 87 frames; one index frame and 86 frames of imagery.

2. - Indication no. on the INDEX seldom matched those on the CONTINUOUS (as you may understand, INDEX is a map with accurate assessment of the continuous parts of films, for example, showing the dimensions of captured area)

a. The index (Figure 9), in this case, was a photograph of a section of a 1:250,000 scale map, with a line drawn to represent the approximate flight path of the mission aircraft and squares drawn to

4 A standard imagery interpretation method used to distinguish between tracked and wheeled vehicles is to determine the length to width ratio. Tracked vehicles tend to have 2:1 ratios, while wheeled vehicles generally are 3:1 or greater.

6

indicate the approximate coverage of some of the frames of imagery found in the mission.5 The KIAT statement indicates that they believed that for the index to be correct, the boxes drawn to represent the coverage of a particular frame had to be exact (possibly surveyed) points. In actuality, the degree of accuracy of the coverage box is dependant on numerous factors - not the least of which is the skill level of the analyst who drew the trace,6 the technique used to draw the coverage boxes (freehand or template), variations in the aircraft altitude (resulting in some scale variation), and the scale of the base map being used (a plot drawn on a 1:50,000 scale map would be more accurate that one drawn on a 1:250,000 scale map).

b. On the 06 August 1950 imagery, the coverage boxes were uniform in size, indicating that a device such as a plotting template (Figure 10 ), as specified in the referenced regulations and technical manuals was probably used to draw the boxes that represented the image frame coverage. Because the size of a template drawn box was determined using the average altitude for the flight line,7 it was by definition, an imprecise representation of the coverage box.

3. - Found that many portions of film seemed to be cut and rejointed (INDEX 1, CONTINUOUS No. 29-35) -- It would have been strange if the index wasn't spliced into the roll, considering that an analyst would have to refer to the base imagery to draw the index. The process followed was: the mission was flown, film developed, imagery analyzed, and reports written and disseminated; at some later time the index map was drawn up, photographed, and then spliced into the roll of film.8

4. - Shadows identified only on the side of film No, 29 to 35 -- The shadows that were referenced in this statement and the "cut and rejointed" statement in the preceding paragraph referred to the cut lines and tape shadows seen in the interspace between frames 29-35 that appeared in the DUPNEG provided to the KIAT. The Korean team was correct, in that those frames showed evidence of cutting and splicing (shadow of the tape used to rejoin the frames and an irregular line -- probably cut with scissors -- between the frames). However, on the ON in the possession of DIA no such cuts or splices existed. This indicates that at some time a DUPPOS was made from the ON, frames were cut from that DUPPOS (possibly for ease of viewing the frames in stereo), spliced back into the roll and then the DUPPOS was sent back to the photo lab to generate a DUPNEG and additional DUPPOS copies. NIMA IA compared

5 This description is what AAFR 95-7 identified as a "Field Plot", see Appendix B.

6 It has been the experience of this analyst that different analysts plotting the borders of the same frame of imagery will in all likelihood produce different plots - the main features of the image will be within the plotted box, but the exact boundaries of the borders will differ.

7 The standard formula for calculating the size of the square used to represent an individual coverage box is: Template size (in inches) = Image length (inches) x Image scale reciprocal or in this case 9 (inches) x 7000 Map Scale Reciprocal 250000 = .252 inches If a plotting template was used, the plot would not be 100% accurate in ground coverage, rather it would approximate the ground coverage of the indicated frames.

8 As specified in AAFR 95-7 and AFR 95-18, see Appendix B.

7

the ON to the DIA DUPNEG (that is of the same generation as the KIAT DUPNEG); all frames on the DUPNEG were exact duplicates of the frames on the ON. Additional details on NIMA IA's comparison is provided in paragraphs a-c below:

a. NIMA IA verified that the ON consisted of 86 continuous unspliced frames of imagery with a film leader containing mission and coverage data (index frame) spliced into the roll. At some point in time, damage to the Original Negative had occurred; tears -- repaired with transparent tape -- were found on frames 41, 51, 52, 53, 58 and 59. The film was somewhat brittle; the tears probably occurred during some previous reproduction process, though the repairs with transparent tape appeared to be recent (tape was unyellowed and flexible).

b. The DUPNEG was then compared by NIMA IA frame by frame to the ON. Images of cuts and the shadows of tape were noted between frames 28-29, 29-30, 30-31, 31-32, 32-33, 33-34, 34-35 indicating that a second generation DUPPOS had been cut and spliced back together before a third generation DUPNEG was produced (Figure 11 depicts both uncut frames interspace and spliced frames interspace). However, the content and order of all the frames of the DUPNEG matched exactly the frames of the ON. Shadows of the tears and taped repairs appeared on frames 41, 51, 52, 53, 58 and 59 of the DUPNEG.

c. Based on lab orders stored with the film and conversations with photo lab personnel from DIA, the following scenario developed. It appeared that a DUPPOS was produced from the ON for use in the No Gun-Ri investigation. The ON had been torn (when the ON was torn could not be determined, but it was before the second generation DUPPOS was produced; most of the tape covering the tears appeared relatively new (unyellowed) and flexible indicating that the tears and repairs were recent). The DUPPOS was used for the initial analytical work (conducted by the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)), during which the NGIC analyst probably cut several frames (frames 29-34) from the roll. At a later date, additional copies of the entire mission were required, but a decision was made that further use of the ON for reproduction carried a high risk of additional damage or destruction. To prevent further damage to the ON the NGIC analyst was asked to return the DUPPOS to the lab so that a DUPNEG could be generated. The analyst taped the frames back into the roll , in the proper order and sent the film back to the lab for reproduction. The resulting DUPNEG contained evidence of the tears and repairs on the ON and splices made on the DUPPOS.

5. - CONTINUOUS No. 34 & 35 mislabeled each other --Frames 34 and 35 were not mislabeled, as discussed above there was no indications of cuts in the ON, and a comparison of frames 34 and 35 between the ON and the DUPNEG showed that the DUPNEG was an exact duplication.

a. What was not indicated on the index, but should have been indicated on the pilots mission debriefing (if a record copy of it still exists) was that there were actually two separate flight lines. It appeared that the pilot turned the camera off after taking frame 34, circled, realigned his flight path, and turned the camera system back on for frames 35-86.

b. This was determined by using two methods:

8

(1). First, by overlapping frames 32, 33, and 34 (aligning common points on the frames), a progressive overlap in coverage of approximately 50 percent per frame was evident. However, frame 35, instead of overlapping 50 percent of frame 34, provided an area of coverage that was approximately 50 percent of frame 33 and 50 percent of frame 34, and the flight line had turned approximately 30° to the southeast. (Figure 12 )

(2). The second method was by viewing the imagery in stereo.9 Common points were aligned and could be viewed in stereo on frames 32 and 33 and frames 33 and 34. But when frames 34 and 35 were placed in order (frame 34 on the left, frame 35 on the right), the stereo "reversed", meaning that objects that were inverted instead showed height. In an expected imaging sequence, the nadir10 of each successive frame will be to the right of the nadir of the frame preceding it. The progression of the nadir together with frame overlap allows the imagery analyst to view images in stereo; if the images are in the proper sequence then the analyst will perceive height and depth in their proper locations. Because nadir on frame 35 is to the "left" of frame 34, viewing the images in sequence (frame 34 on the left, frame 35 on the right) results in a perception of height where depth should be. The lack of evidence of a cut and splice in the interspace between frames 34 and 35 indicates that a second flight line caused that stereo reversal rather than the images being improperly resequenced or coming from another, separate reconnaissance mission.

6. - Handwriting on outer portion of INDEX is different from those of others -- Without knowing what the unit procedures of the 5th AF, 8th TRS were in 1950, it would be impossible to know exactly how many personnel may have been involved in the handling of the 06 August 1950 imagery. It was conceivable that several different personnel were involved in the film development, imagery analysis, individual frame labeling and the production of the index. As previously discussed in paragraph IV.B.3. above, there was no accurate way of determining when the index frame was added.

7. - Waters in YD ~ HG area are high, yellow, and run fast whereas those in NGR are low, blue, and stay Rainfall for the area on 1,2,5,6 of Aug 1950 according to records (HQ, 5AF APO 970, Final Recap - Summary of Air Ops, Period 0000K - 2400K, 1-6 Aug 50)

a. NIMA IA felt that the KIAT was indicating that the streams in the No Gun-Ri (NGR) area were intermittent, seasonal streams that only contained water during periods of rain and that the 5th Air Force Final Recapitulation reports showed that there had been rain in the No Gun-Ri area on 01, 02, 05, and 06 August 1950.

b. On the 06 August 1950 imagery, there did not appear to be much, if any, movement of the water in the vicinity of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge. Water appeared to be present on both the upstream and downstream sides of the bridge and wide sandbars were evident in the streambed.

9 In stereo viewing the left hand image is a picture of the left side of an object, while the right hand image is a picture of the right side of an object -- viewing both images simultaneously through special optics results in a three-dimensional effect.

10 Nadir is the point directly (vertically) beneath the aircraft -- usually the center point of a vertical image.

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c. A review of the referenced Headquarters, 5th Air Force, Summaries of Air Operations (Appendix B), weather information did indicate rain on 01, 02, 05, and 06 August 1950.11 However, the weather references appeared to be generic for the theater of operations and not for specific points within the theater. If there was rainfall in the No Gun-Ri area and the area of the various feeder streams, then the stream flow was only minimally affected; buildups of sand appear to block the streambed at several points along the upstream side of the bridges. Other stream beds in the immediate area were examined on the imagery, all appeared dry, indicating a lack of standing or running water. At the time of imaging, the sky was probably clear; no cloud shadows were noted on any of the frames of the 06 August 1950 imagery.

VI. Tentative assessment

1. Some objects were identifiable not withstanding the low resolution of the film. The photo was estimated to be taken for the time frame when there were neither ground forces nor vehicles activities present between YD ~ HG. Manifold patterns as well as evidences showing force maneuvers were identified.

a. From the index frame, it was determined that the mission camera had a focal length of 152mm (6 inches) and was flown at an altitude of 3500 feet. The scale of the resulting imagery was calculated by NIMA IA at 1:7000;12 resolution13 was such that individual railroad ties could be distinguished under magnification. A subjective classification of the film resolution as low was made by the KIAT, yet the KIAT seemed to be equating resolution with image quality and by extension interpretability. Currently imagery is classified in terms of interpretability using the National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS).14 In the case of the 06 August 1950 imagery, the ability of the IA to distinguish individual railroad ties -- even on a fourth generation DUPPOS -- indicated that at a

11 NIMA IA requested and received copies of the referenced documents, extracted weather information has been reproduced as Appendix C. A review of the documents indicated that air operations were not seriously hampered or affected by the weather, there were several specific references to airstrikes occurring in the Hwanggan and Yongdong area during the period 01-06 August 1950.

12 Scale was determined using the following formulas: Photo Scale Reciprocal (PSR) = Altitude (height) in Feet times 12 divided by focal length in inches (F) or H x 12 = PSR; Scale (S) = 1 divided by PSR or S = 1 (or it can be expressed P PSR as S = 1 : PSR).

13 Resolution is the ability of an entire photographic system, including lens, exposure, processing, and other factors, to render a sharply defined image. Objectively, resolution is expressed in terms of lines per millimeter recorded by a particular film under specified conditions.

14 While NIIRS ratings are subjective in nature, they are based on the ability an imagery analyst to distinguish certain objects on the imagery. Resolution (a mathematical expression, as defined in footnote 12), is a factor in a NIIRS determination, as is image quality (as defined by an imagery analyst), but the final rating is a numerical expression for the imagery's information potential for intelligence purpose or interpretability. A NIIRS rating of 7 was assigned to the 06 August 1950 imagery.

10

minimum, the film was classified as excellent for interpretability, and as such had either ground forces or human remains been imaged, they would have been discernible. b. On the 06 August 1950 imagery there were no active ground forces visible in the No Gun-Ri area. Two possible unidentified vehicle (operational status unknown) were noted approximately 250 meters northeast of the No Gun-Ri bridges in the vicinity of a destroyed road bridge. Numerous vehicle tracks and individual fighting positions (foxholes) were seen in the area.

2. It is doubtful that the INDEX and CONTINUOUS are from one identical film because INDEX doesn't match CONTINUOUS accordingly, and it found that outer portions of many parts seemed to have been cut and rejointed. It is regarded that these does not originated from a single role of films because only the films No. 29 to 35 have shadows on the side.

a. The KIAT position was that the index is required to be an exact representation of the flight path and specific area of coverage of frames annotated along the flight path, when in actuality the index was nothing more than a general representation of both the flight path and area of coverage.

b. Several of the frames on the DUPNEG provided to the KIAT probably did show evidence of cutting and splicing (rejoining), particularly frames 29 to 35. But the determination of whether the referenced frames are from a single roll of imagery or not, comes not from the DUPNEG in the possession of the KIAT, but from the ON in the possession of DIA. The Original Negative is 86 continuous uncut frames of imagery. Comparison of the Original Negative and the DUPNEG in the possession of DIA (that DUPNEG was the same generation as the KIAT DUPNEG) indicates that the frames are exact copies; no frames from another mission were spliced into either the ON or the DIA DUPNEG.

3. Therefore it is deemed inappropriate to adopt the imagery dated 8 Aug 1950 (sic) as a reference for cross-examination with the victims accounts. Please review and check whether relevant films were mistakenly not provided.

a. The 06 August 1950 coverage is the earliest known and located imagery of the No Gun-Ri area post-incident (presuming an incident date of from 26 to 29 July 1950).

b. The DUPNEG provided to KIAT was the same generation as the DUPNEG in the possession of DIA, which has been verified as an exact duplicate of the ON.

VII. NIMA conclusions

1. The Original Negative of the 5th Air Force, 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, Mission Number R-337A, flown on 06 August 1950 (in the possession of the Defense Intelligence Agency) contains 86 continuous, uncut frames of imagery and an index frame containing a field plot spliced onto the beginning of the mission. The individual frame markings and the field plot were consistent with the requirements found in an Army Air Force Regulation dated 1946 and Air Force Regulations dated 1954 and 1958.

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2. The INDEX is a field plot that is sufficiently accurate to provide imagery analysts reviewing the imagery a guide to the area covered. It is not an exact plot of the indicated frames precise ground coverage. The uniformity of size for the coverage boxes along the flight line indicates that a template was used in producing the index.

3. That the index frame and individual frame identification data appeared to have been prepared in accordance with the standards of regulations that were dated in 1946, 1954, and 1958, and technical manuals dated 1954, suggests that the 1950 regulations and procedures would have followed these same standards.

4. The imagery covered an area that had been the site of military action -- munitions (aerial bombs, rockets, mortars, and artillery) craters were seen throughout the images. Several areas of fighting positions (foxholes) were located. Vehicle tracks were noted around the imaged countryside. Several buildings within the villages/towns imaged had been damaged or destroyed. No active forces (personnel or equipment) were imaged. Two possible wheeled vehicles were seen in the vicinity of a destroyed bridge, but their operational status could not be determined.

5. A second generation DUPPOS was produced from the ON by the DIA photo lab for the initial No Gun-Ri investigation. Several frames from the DUPPOS had been cut from the roll of imagery and then taped back into the roll in the proper sequence. Images of the cuts and tape on several frames between frames 29 and 35 were visible on the subsequent third generation DUPNEG and fourth generation DUPPOS.

6. The previously discussed cuts and splices notwithstanding, a comparison of the DUPNEG with the ON, particularly frames 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35, indicates that the DUPNEG that DIA was using to make copies was accurate and complete. All frames matched up -- in order and in content -- between the ON and the DUPNEG.

7. At least two flight lines are represented in the ON and DUPNEG; frames 1-34 comprised one flight line, while frames 35-86 made up the second flight line. This was most evident by the areas overlapped by frames 33 and 34 when they are overlaid by frame 35.

8. Streams in the No Gun-Ri area were examined and many appeared dry. The lack of standing or running water in the streambed would indicate that either there was little to no rainfall in the immediate area in the days preceding the imaging (unless the soil making up those stream beds was extremely dry and absorbent, or the area experienced a very fast run off). Furthermore, the vehicle tracks in the sand of the streambed between the No Gun-Ri railroad and road bridges would indicate that there had been no high, fast moving water immediately before the area was imaged.

9. The stream crossed by the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge did have standing water on both the upstream and downstream sides, however, sandbars were noted along the imaged length of the stream and a buildup of sand forming a " ¯V¯ " shape on the upstream side at the base of the bridge. The sand buildup could have been used as a footbridge across the stream. A possible footbridge made of rocks on

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the downstream side of the No Gun-Ri railroad bridge would have acted as a dam, catching debris had it been washed downstream.

10. Because the imagery was of sufficient quality and resolution to discern individual railroad ties along the railbed, it should also be sufficient to detect human remains had they been present at imaging. There were no indications of human remains along the roads, railroad, bridges or streambeds in the No Gun-Ri area on the 06 August 1950 imagery.

VIII. NIMA recommendations.

In any future studies using historic imagery, NIMA/IA recommends that the following procedures be utilized:

1. After locating the film in whatever archives in which it is stored, two DUPPOS copies and at least one DUPNEG should be generated from the ON.

2. A certification process/procedure should be developed that can be used to certify that the resulting copies are exact duplicates of the ON.

3. One DUPPOS copy and the DUPNEG should be designated as the official record copies stored for future reproduction needs. Future copies not should be from the ON so that additional damage does not occur.

4. Analysts should be notified in advance when they receive copies of imagery made from the official record copies and that the copy generation should be stipulated.

5. Upon completion of the study, the ON and the designated official record copies should be returned to the archives with whatever documentation is necessary to preserve the ON and preclude its future reproduction.

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Appendix A - "Analysis on overhead imagary" prepared by the Image analysis team, Aerial IMINT Squadron, 39th Tactical Reconnaissance Group (TRG), Republic of Korea (ROK)

NOTE: Appendix A is a Republic of Korea document and will not be reproduced for the final report. Requests for release of this document should be submitted to the Korean government.

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Appendix B - Extracted statements from 1946, 1954, and 1958 regulations and 1956 technical manuals

1. Army Air Force Regulation 95-7, PHOTOGRAPHY, MAPS, AND CHARTS, Titling and identification of AAF Still Photographic Negatives, dated 18 July 1946.

Section IV PLOT MAPS AND PHOTO INDICES

Paragraph 12.a. Field Plot. A field plot will be prepared, on a map 1:250,000 scale, immediately after each flight. Where such a map series does not exist, the 1:1,000,000 aeronautical chart will be used. For small island areas a map larger than 1:250,000 scale will be used when necessary in the interests of clarity and completeness of detail. Approximately each fifth photograph will be plotted by use of a template; these will be connected by a flight line. A photographic negative of this plot equal in width to the width of the original film, will be prepared and stripped on to the original roll of film to precede exposure No. 1 for the flight. A print of this plot will accompany each set of prints or duplicate negatives.

2. Air Force Regulation 95-18, PHOTOGRAPHY, USAF Standard Plotting System for Aerial and Radar Scope Photography, dated 30 June 1954.

1. Purpose and Scope. This regulation establishes a standardized procedure for plotting and transmitting film and information on both aerial and radar scope photography. It applies to all Air Force activities engaged in the accomplishment of aerial photography except motion picture photography.

2. Policy:

a. To gain maximum return from the Air Force aerial photographic effort and to improve the Air Force ability to utilize all accomplished photography, the USAF Standard Plotting System for index Air Force photography, as described herein, will be used.

c. During combat conditions total compliance with the provisions of this Regulation may unduly burden the facilities of a unit or units. Under these conditions, commanders of major air commands may exempt certain reconnaissance photography of specific areas which are subject to excessive repetitious cover. However when these conditions exist, coverage which indicates significant intelligence changes will be processed in accordance with this Regulation.

3. Procedure:

a. Aerial photography will be plotted to the USAF Standard Plotting System. Attachment 1 to AFR 95-18, USAF STANDARD PLOTTING SYSTEM FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

1. GENERAL:

a. In order to record, orient, and locate aerial photography with respect to the actual ground photographed, a plot will be prepared on all types of aerial photography.

b. Photography will be plotted to a Standard Plotting scale of 1:250,000 and final inking of plots will be accomplished on 20" x 22" transparent acetate sheets which will cover 1° or possibly 2° quadrangles of the base chart used.

c. USAF Aeronautical Approach Charts (scale of 1:250,000) will be used as base charts whenever possible.

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d. After the acetate plot is completed, all field duplicating requirements will be accomplished and a copy negative of the acetate and map base reduced to the film width will be attached to the original roll.

2. PROCEDURES:

a. Aerial photography will be plotted by use of a template system, each template so adjusted that the chart detail falling within the template outline coincides with the topographic detail appearing in the photography. Template size must be verified, however, by visually comparing chart or map detail to the photograph, since the true altitude over terrain may be different than that indicated on the film.

d. Aerial photography will be separated into three main categories when plotting to the USAF Standard Plotting System:

(1) Mapping Photography:

(a) Mapping photography will be plotted starting with exposure number 1, and then plotting approximately each fifth consecutive exposure. If the plot of every fifth exposure would overlap, it is permissible to skip more exposures between plots.

(e) Each plotted exposure within a run will be connected by a flight line.

(3) Reconnaissance Photography

(a) Reconnaissance photography will be indexed in the same manner prescribed for mapping photography, with the following exceptions:

3. Sufficient exposures must be plotted to portray correctly all major changes of flight direction.

3. Air Force Regulation 95-7, PHOTOGRAPHY, Titling, Identification and Disposition of USAF Aerial Photographic Negatives, dated 1 April 1958.

Paragraph 9. Procedure for Preparing Plot Maps:

a. The organization accomplishing aerial mapping or charting photography will prepare plot maps of the actual ground areas photographed by the vertical camera to permanently record, orient, and locate the photography.

b. Photography will be plotted to a map or to an overlay of appropriate scale immediately after each flight. The map should be of a scale that allows complete plotting for each sortie or roll of film whichever is appropriate.

c. The first and the last photograph of each unbroken straight flight line will be plotted by use of a template. The plots will then be connected by a straight line.

d. Whenever a straight flight line is broken by camera malfunction or for any other reason, the last photograph before the break and the first photo after the break will be plotted.

e. Whenever a curved or crooked flight line is flown which deviated more than 3 degrees from a straight line drawn from the first to the last photo taken, every fifth photograph will be plotted for that portion of the flight line that deviates. Paragraph 10. Preparing Index Plots. The organization accomplishing aerial photography will prepare index plots of all mapping, charting, and reconnaissance photography, including radarscope and radar image photography, as outlined in AFR 95-18.

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4. Department of the Army Technical Manual TM 30-245 / Department of the Navy NAVAER 10-35-610 / Department of the Air Force Manual AFM 200-50, Photographic Interpretation Handbook, dated 1 April 1954.

Section V. Plotting

Paragraph 30501. The plot of an aerial photograph is the permanent record on a map (or overlay keyed to a map) of the area covered by the photograph. Plot maps are essential for rapid identification and location of aerial photographs. For this reason, service regulations require that the flying organization prepare plot maps on all aerial photography. Titling of negatives is required to insure proper identification and the availability of basic working information. Plotting and titling instructions for Army and Air Force are contained in AFR 95-7; for the Navy in OPNAV 3150.6.

Paragraph 30502.c. Reconnaissance photography is aerial photography of any camera focal length, used primarily for intelligence. Plot maps for reconnaissance photography, like those for mapping photography, are known as "field plots" and are prepared at a map scale of 1:250,000, unless a larger scale is necessary in the interest of clarity.

Preparation of field-plot types

Paragraph 30510. The fundamental principle in preparing field plots is to show the precise position of enough frames (usually at least one out of five) to establish all characteristics of the flight line and to permit identification of individual prints showing any specific point. Army and Air Force personnel should consult AFR 95-7 for details of this type of plotting. While personnel preparing reconnaissance plots are not required to adhere to this regulation, it is desirable to follow a standard where possible.

Preparation of plots for orientation

Paragraph 30511. Where it is more important to show the relationship of various geographic features over relatively large areas than it is to give precise location of individual photos, time-saving short cuts may be taken in plotting.

General plotting procedure

Equipment Required

Paragraph 30512. The basic equipment required is a plotting template, a suitable map, and a large, well-lighted work table. Particular care should be used to select a map of satisfactory scale and type.

Plotting Vertical Photographs

Paragraph 30514. The plotting template can be adjusted by eye to form a rectangle of the correct size if a relatively large- scale map with good detail is used. Otherwise the proper length of a side on the template may be obtained using the formula:

Photo length (inches) X Photo scale reciprocal

Template size (inches) = Map scale reciprocal

For example, to determine the template size for plotting a 9" x 9" photo of scale 1/10,000 on a 1/250,000 map: 9 X 10,000

Template size = 250,000 = 0.36 inch.

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Appendix C - Extracted weather assessment from 5th Air Force 1-6 August 1950

1. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 1 Aug 50

A. Weather

Rain with low cloud cover throughout the target area hampered operations during the day and night.

2. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 2 Aug 50

A. Weather

Low cloud cover with restricted visibilities in rain hampered operations throughout the day.

3. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 3 Aug 50

A. Weather

Visibilities restricted in fog and haze. Southeast coastal area until noon, remaining target scattered to broken low clouds, permitting operations to continue.

4. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 4 Aug 50

A. Weather

Thunderstorms and heavy rain in central area, remainder of target area broken low and middle clouds with good visibilities. Northern portion of target area were clear. Operations continued as planned.

5. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 5 Aug 50

A. Weather

Southern area scattered to broken low and middle clouds, visibilities good except occasionally restricted in haze. Operations continued as planned

6. Final recapitulation - summary of air operations period: 0001/K - 2400/K, 6 Aug 50

A. Weather

Target area broken low and middle clouds, numerous thunderstorms and scattered rain showers, restricted operations throughout the day.

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(Nine aerial photos)(One plotting map)(One figure)

Appendix D - Joint coordination

I. Introduction

The seriousness of the allegations and the importance of the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea prompted the Secretary of Defense to establish two groups in addition to the U.S. Review Team (mentioned in Chapter 1). The two groups established by the Secretary Defense were a Department of Defense-level Steering Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and a group of distinguished American citizens as Outside Experts. The mission of these groups was to provide guidance, oversight and professional advice to the U.S. Review Team. In addition to meeting with the U.S. Review Team, these groups would meet with their Republic of Korea counterparts in both the United States and the Republic of Korea during the review process. Most interactions and contacts were between the U.S. Review Team and the ROK Review Team. These two teams met at regular intervals and had at least weekly contact exchanging information, documents and views.

II. Joint meetings

The first ROK-U.S. Working Group (i.e. Action Officer-level) meeting was held in the Republic of Korea on October 29, 1999. A series of meetings followed (Tab 1). The first meeting laid the framework for the review, established the relevant questions to be answered, and set timelines and milestones. During this visit, the apparatus to exchange information was established and the type of information to be exchanged was discussed. One coordination meeting held in the United States, in addition to normal discussions, was devoted to demonstrating the methods used by the U.S. Research Team. During the visit, senior members of the ROK Review Team accompanied by some United States Outside Experts visited the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. While there, they met and spoke with members of the U.S. Research Team. The ROK Review Team saw first hand both the amount and type of information that was being gathered by the U.S. Review Team. In addition to meeting with the Research Team, the group participated in a tour given by a Senior Archivist and received a tutorial on how every American citizen could access the records in the Archives.

Meetings held in the Republic of Korea focused on information exchange, analysis and progress reports. U.S. representatives also visited the No Gun Ri bridge site and met with survivors group representatives. U.S. Review Team members never saw the national archives in the Republic of Korea.

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Follow-on meetings between the two working groups discussed the specifics of the events that were alleged to have occurred and reviewed the information that had been gathered by both teams. Analytical discussions were conducted during each meeting. The primary effort for each meeting was clarifying and understanding the facts surrounding the events that occurred during the period.

III. Document exchanges

The Teams exchanged documents throughout the review period. These documents fell into three categories.

1. Archival information. The information included unit war diaries, operation orders, overlays and other relevant military documents. A list of documents provided by the U.S. Review Team to the ROK Review Team is listed in Tab 2. Documents not included in this list were also given to the ROK Review Team during Working Group meetings.

2. U.S. and Korean Witness Statements.

3. General Information. Information in this category included information papers, briefings, overhead reconnaissance film and other documents.

IV. Information exchange

U.S. information requests critical to the review were forwarded through formal channels over the signature of the Inspector General or the Chief of Inspections Division, Department of the Army Inspector General. For the most part, requests for information were coordinated between the two working groups. In many cases, the U.S. Review Team provided archival information, within days of a request to the ROK Review Team if it existed and was available. Every effort was made to provide the ROK Review Team with primary source information. The U.S. Review Team did not receive archival primary source information from its counterpart despite requests for the material.

The U.S. Review Team ensured that the ROK Review Team had access to information available in the archives. A historian from the ROK Review Team visited the National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, Maryland, on two separate occasions. He had access to the U.S. Research Team documents developed by the Research Team, and all documents maintained by NARA II. One visit was for a two-week period.

There were differences in the quality and nature of the materials provided by the ROK Review Team during the exchange. The U.S. Review Team

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received summaries of information without citations to sources, descriptions of ROK investigative methods, conclusions without supporting information or analysis and some photographs and diagrams of reconstructions of the event. The U.S. Review Team did, on occasion, request clarification of ROK Review Team methods and conclusions. Despite the turn around time on these requests due to research time and translation requirements, the responses still did not meet the standards and rigor used by the U.S. Review Team in their work.

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Tab 1 - Review coordination

Oct 29, 99: ROK-U.S. Review Team Working Group meeting in ROK: bilateral discussions; site visit; meet survivors group representatives

Nov 12, 99 Survivors group representatives visit U. S. and meet Department of Defense officials

Dec 14, 99 Inspector General Review Team visit to ROK; bilateral discussions

Jan 10-14, 00 Secretary of Army, Office Secretary of Defense Steering Group, Outside Experts visit ROK; meet with survivors group representatives

Feb 23, 00 ROK-U.S. Bilateral Coordinating Group meeting in Washington, D.C.

Apr 16-20, 00 Inspector General Review Team trip to ROK; bilateral discussions; information exchange; site visit; meet with survivors group representatives

May 2-3, 00 ROK-U.S. Outside Experts' bilateral meetings in Washington, D.C.

Jul 31, 00 ROK-U.S. Working Group meeting in ROK on "joint core facts"

Aug 10, 00 United States Outside Experts Meeting on "joint core facts"

Sep 27-29, 00 ROK-U.S. Review Team meeting in Washington, D.C. on Statement of Mutual Understandings

Oct 17, 00 U.S. Outside Experts Meeting on Statement of Mutual Understandings

Nov 3, 00 ROK-U.S. Review Team meeting in Washington, D.C. on Statement of Mutual Understandings

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Nov 6, 00 ROK-U.S. Bilateral Coordinating Group meeting in Washington, D.C.

Dec 6 and 7, 00 Steering Group Meeting in ROK

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Tab 2 - Documents provided to the ROK review team1

U.S. Official History of the Korean War

Eighth U. S. Army Combat Info Bulletin, No. 1

Eighth U. S. Army Korea War Diary (20 Jul - 30 Aug 50)

Eighth U. S. Army Periodic Intelligence Report #8, 20 Jul 50

Eighth U. S. Army Korea Procedures Order, subject: Control and Movement of Refugees

Eighth U. S. Army Korea G-2 Instructions, subject: Control and Movement of Refugees

1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 25 Jun ­ 31 Jul 50

1st Cavalry Division G-2 Activities Report, Jul 50

1st Cavalry Division G-3 Activities Report, Jul 50

1st Cavalry Division Table of Organization (TOE)

1st Cavalry Division Periodic Intelligence Reports

1st Cavalry Division G-2 Monthly Narrative, 25 Jun - 31 Jul 50

1st Cavalry Division Headquarters Activities Report, Jul 50

1st Cavalry Division, Letter of Instruction, subject: Control and Movement of Refugees

1st Cavalry Division memorandum, 10 Aug 50, subject: Shooting of Prisoners of War by South Koreans

History of 1st Cavalry Division

5th Cavalry War Diary, 1-31 Jul 50

5th Cavalry Summary, 1-31 Jul 50

5th Cavalry Battalions Journals, 23-30 Jul 50

7th Cavalry War Diaries

7th Cavalry Regiment Battalions' War Diaries

7th Cavalry Regiment Battalion Journals

8th Cavalry War Diaries

8th Cavalry Regiment Battalions' War Diaries

8th Cavalry Regiment Battalion Journals

15th Medical Battalion War Diary

24th Infantry Division War Diaries

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25th Infantry Division In Action Report, Jul 50

25th Infantry Division War Diaries

27th Regiment (25th Infantry Division Activities Report, Jul 50

Messages and Memos of 25th Infantry Division

Summary of 24th Infantry Division War Diary, 23 Jul ­ 25 Aug 50

27th Infantry S-2 Activities Report, Jul 50

H Company, 2-7th Infantry Christmas dinner menus

Infantry Battalion Table of Organization (7-15 N, 16 Apr 48)

Infantry Regiment Table of Organization (7-11N, 21 Apr 48)

Regiment Organization, 1950

U.S. Air Force - Final Recapitulation of Report/Summary of Air Operations for 26 July 1950 - 30 July 1950

5th Air Force Mission Report Summaries 25 - 31 Jul 50

3d Bomb Group Mission Reports 11, 25, 26, 28, 29 Jul 50

39th Fighter Squadron Mission Reports 9 - 31 Jul 50

8th Fighter Squadron Mission Reports

9th Fighter Squadron Mission Reports 11, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31 Jul 50

U.S. Map Series 6722, 1:50,000 (I, II)

U.S. Map Series 6822, 1:50,000 (III, IV)

Records regarding duties of Korean National Police

Translated Republic of Korea Political Reports

Periodic status of documentary research

Site Photos

Endnotes

1 This is not an all-inclusive list. Additional documents were provided by the U.S. Review Team to the ROK Review Team during working group meetings, during the time spent by the ROK Review Team researcher at NARA II examining U. S. Team documents; and other materials as requested (i.e. unit morning reports).

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Appendix E - Supporting documents

This appendix contains maps, organizational charts and U.S. Air Force mission information for July 26, 1950.

Enclosed:

Tab 1. Tactical maps (not reproduced here)

Tab 2. 1st Cavalry Division organizational charts (not reproduced here)

Tab 3. U.S. Air Force mission diagram and charts (not reproduced here)

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