International Political Science Review (2006), Vol 27, No. 2, 167–190
Identity, Grievances, and Political Action:
Recent Evidence from the Palestinian Community
in Israel
SHERRY LOWRANCE
ABSTRACT. In ethnically non-neutral states, why do some disadvantaged
minorities protest their status, while others acquiesce? Given the difficult
circumstances in many cases, why do they not protest more than they do,
or turn to violence? This article argues that the key to ethnic protest is
the identity that one holds: state-bound identities weaken the grievance–
protest relationship. The closer one identifies with the state, the less
likely one is to protest, even when significant grievances exist. The case of
Israel and its Arab citizens is used to illustrate this relationship. When
Arabs identify themselves as more “Israeli,” they are less protest-prone
than other Arabs with more anti-establishment identities. This article
provides empirical evidence that fostering state-friendly identities may be
a desirable goal for many ethnically tense states.
K e y w o rd s : • I s r a e l i A r a b s • E t h n i c i t y • I d e n t i t y • I s r a e l •
Palestinians • Protest
The end of the cold war brought expectations of a new liberal era free from
communism, fascism, and totalitarianism (Fukuyama, 1989). However, the
apparent rise in destructive ethnic conflict, most painfully visible in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, dashed the hopes of many optimists that the
post-cold war world would be a peaceful and stable one. It became immediately
obvious that the authoritarian and totalitarian governments of the Soviet bloc had
not eliminated long-standing grievances and identities as effectively as had been
previously thought. Furthermore, with the end of US–Soviet rivalry, no longer
were cold war patrons acting to rein in regional clients in the name of global
security. Thus interstate conflict may have increased as well.
In this global climate, it is worth investigating the role that grievances and
identity play in ethnic conflict. Although the importance of grievances in ethnic
protest and collective action is intuitively well understood, its relative importance
DOI: 10.1177/0192512106061425 © 2006 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
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to other factors has not been well explored. Furthermore, how one’s identity
impacts political activity, particularly in conjunction with grievances, needs further
illumination. State-bound identifications, in particular, have the potential to affect
the grievance–action relationship. When affective bonds between state and
individual exist, minority grievances may not as easily be translated into destabilizing forms of political action.
This article explores the relationship between grievances, identity, and ethnic
protest at the individual level. The case of Israel is used to illustrate this relationship. Israel is an ethnically oriented state which uses state institutions to favor the
Jewish majority over the indigenous Israeli Palestinian population.1 The Israeli
Palestinian minority therefore suffers from discrimination, deprivation, and
dilemmas of identity that have been the subject of some interest in recent years
(Caspi and Weltsch, 1998; Grossman, 1993; Rouhana, 1997; Schnell, 1994). It is
among this minority, who display varying levels of identification with the state, that
we may find evidence to support or refute the claims of this article.
Identity is a complex, evolving, multilayered, and situational relationship
between an individual and a group or number of groups (Baumeister, 1995; Mach,
1993; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). It is a psychological orientation that can evoke
strong emotional reactions (Scheff, 1994), rather than a relatively simple attitude
that may manifest itself as rather neutral. In the context of Arab politics in Israel,
identity is multifaceted and politicized by the highly charged environment. The
main divide is the Jewish–Arab divide, but many others are possible, such as
divisions along a left–right political orientation and the secular–religious and
Christian–Muslim–Druze dimensions. Because of this, “identity” is well suited to
the analysis of Israeli Palestinian political behavior, capturing much (though by no
means all) of this complexity. Empirically, an identity variable has significant
variation, particularly in the Israeli context, which allows for its constructive use as
an independent variable in quantitative analysis.
This article investigates ethnic protest in Israel among Israel’s Arab minority in
order to answer two related questions. Why do Israeli Palestinians protest? Why do
they not protest more than they do, given their difficult circumstances in Israel?
The article argues that the key to ethnic protest is the identity that one holds.
Those who identify as “Israeli,” that is, those Israeli Palestinians who identify with
the Israeli state, are less likely to engage in system-challenging protest activity than
those who do not, irrespective of the level of grievances held. Thus, although
grievances are an important motivator of ethnic political action, their impact can
be weakened by state-bound identities. This link between identity and protest
suggests that identification with the state is an important factor in ethnic stability.
Theoretical Insights
Grievances
The importance of ethnic grievances for collective action and rebellion is at least
intuitively understood, although the purely economic, nonethnic, early
formulation of the “relative deprivation” thesis (Gurr, 1970) has largely been
discredited as a primary cause of collective rebellion (Brush, 1996). Nevertheless,
various forms of discontent have been recognized as important motivators for
ethnic collective action (Gurr, 1993, 2000b), alongside or in combination with
other facilitating factors such as mobilizing resources (Snyder and Tilly, 1972;
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
169
Tilly, 1978; Tilly et al., 1975), expected utility (Muller and Opp, 1986; Muller et al.,
1991), opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam et al., 1996), and various
attitudes and orientations (Kasfir, 1979).
Ethnic grievances can take many forms. Economic discrimination is a common
complaint among ethnic minorities. Housing and employment discrimination,
land misdistribution, and a lack of educational opportunities may result in low
socioeconomic status on the part of ethnic minorities. If economic data are
broken down by ethnic group, economic discontent can easily be measured
through economic differentials in GDP per capita, employment indicators, and
land ownership, for example. In surveys, economic discontent can be measured
through income differentials or perceived economic inequalities.
Other forms of grievance may be harder to measure, but are equally important
to consider. Political discrimination in its various forms is particularly important
for the study of unconventional political participation, because the inability to
affect policies through conventional electoral channels may make direct political
action such as protest appear more attractive to potential activists. Thus, the lack
of minorities in positions of influence, ineffective or inadequate minority voting
blocs, and hostile majorities constitute a set of grievances that may provide a
motivation for action meant to increase their political power.
Similarly, cultural, educational, and civil rights can act as lightning-rod issues
for underprivileged groups in society. Acting to improve these rights can also
instill hope for greater influence in the political system. Winning protection
against discrimination, particularly in education and business, can help level the
playing field among groups of different status in a society. As a result, low-status
groups may be motivated sufficiently by these issues to take political action. If they
feel their likelihood of success in electoral politics is low, they may be more likely
to opt for unconventional, illegal, or even violent means.
Although grievances provide a motivation for unconventional political action,
they do not act alone. Other factors interact with grievances to produce political
outcomes. At the individual level, a person’s expectation of success (Muller and
Opp, 1986; Muller et al., 1991), socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba
et al., 1978), degree of initiative and personal resources (Verba et al., 1995), or
desire to express certain identities (Inglehart, 1990) may influence the final
decision on whether to engage in political activity, even where grievances exist. At
the system level, political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986), group resources
(Tilly, 1978), and the extent of state repression (Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta and
Reiter, 1998) influence the extent to which individuals may find political action
attractive.
Nevertheless, grievances seem to be a necessary condition for political protest
to take place. Without grievances, there would be no reason to engage in most
forms of political action, especially protest. Particularly when one feels shut out of
the political system, unconventional political participation may be used as a means
to change the status quo. Thus, I expect that the more grievances an individual
expresses, the more likely is she or he to protest:
H1:
When grievances are high, individuals are more likely to protest.
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International Political Science Review 27(2)
Identity
At a basic level, everyone has a need for belonging (Horowitz, 1985; Scheff, 1994).
Being a part of something larger than oneself (particularly when the group is able
to provoke positive affect for lofty group goals) and a grandiose vision of the past
and future can be a powerful inducement for group affiliation and even collective
action. Furthermore, some psychological needs can only be fulfilled in a social
setting; people with a need for dominance, for example, will find it rewarding to
be in the company of someone exhibiting a submissive personality (Turner et al.,
1987).
Belonging to a group can fulfill other, more instrumentally oriented, needs.
The categorization of people into groups creates expectations that allow for
predictability of behavior among strangers and can impose normative obligations
on transactions. Thus in a modernizing world, where interaction with strangers in
an impersonal world is imperative, people can know what to expect, even in an
unfamiliar setting (Horowitz, 1985).
The reason why ethnic groups may be preferred over other groups may be
related to the resemblance of ethnicity to family (Horowitz, 1985). In a rapidly
modernizing world, where labor mobility is essential and family relations are
contracting from the extended model to the nuclear model, ethnicity can act as a
substitute for ties of kinship. Ethnicity can provide family-like ties, emotional
support, reciprocal help, and dispute resolution, all traditional needs met by kinship ties. In the modern world, however, the family may be unable to fulfill some
of these roles, which can be taken up by the ethnic group. In other words,
members of an ethnic group need not face the world alone.
The mere existence of ethnic social identities does not ensure that political
mobilization will take place, however. Nevertheless, some aspects of ethnic identity
may facilitate collective action on behalf of group goals. For example, the ability of
social groups (ethnic groups included) to create feelings of solidarity, mutual
cooperation, and unity of values makes the attainment of shared goals more likely
(Turner et al., 1987). Social groups also create norms of behavior: fear of rejection
or criticism by the group can affect individuals’ perceptions and actions (Asch,
1952, 1956; Turner et al., 1987).
It is the ability of groups to impose and enforce social norms that allows groups
to limit the problem of free riding in collective action. Material-selective incentive
solutions (Olson, 1965) have declined in popularity in recent years as explanations of overcoming free riding. As a result, theorists recognize that other kinds
of incentives and conditions may be important in promoting collective action
(Hechter and Okamoto, 2001). For example, a group’s monitoring capacity
through extensive social ties facilitates collective action by discouraging free
riding. Groups may also impose social penalties and provide social rewards
regarding conformity to norms of political action. Ethnic groups can thus
promote collective action through utilizing their extensive kinship-like ties, bonds
of mutual obligation, and the enforcement of social norms.
The ability of ethnic groups to generate intense emotions can also contribute to
collective action. Inasmuch as ethnic ties approximate and potentially substitute
for family ties, perceived threats to the ethnic group can be treated with the same
intense emotions that are usually reserved for the family. This is why “symbolic
politics” (Horowitz, 1985) can have considerable impact on ethnic political
competition. Since the political quest for power determines the status of a group,
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
171
the political arena can become a symbolic battleground between ethnic groups
jockeying for relative advantage.
The state can have a decisive impact on identity formation through its manipulation in ethnic competition. A primary goal of ethnic mobilization is the
capturing of the state and the use of its resources and prestige in an effort to make
positive comparative evaluations. It is through group comparisons that collective
self-esteem is established; power is often seen as conferring status upon the holder,
and winning the state’s favor is thus a coveted ethnic goal.
The dominance of one ethnic group in the state apparatus can impose
distressing identity dilemmas among minority groups. For example, an ethnically
oriented state, such as Brubaker’s (1996) “nationalizing state,” places the interests
of the dominant ethnic group highest among the state’s goals. It represents the
capture of the state by a single ethnic group in an effort to use state institutions to
marginalize minorities and maximize the power and prestige of the dominant
group. Although the dominant group’s collective self-esteem is enhanced through
the state’s use in this way, minority groups suffer from powerlessness, a lack of
collective self-esteem, and identity confusion.
Minority loyalty to the state could suffer as a result, with potentially explosive
outcomes. However, this is not a necessary outcome, since the state has many
nonidentity-based potential sources of legitimacy, such as economic redistribution
or general prosperity (or both) and democratic processes, that could dampen the
tendency toward disloyal conduct and increase affective bonds with the state.
When these conditions exist, minorities may be more likely to acquiesce peacefully
to policies that favor the dominant group.
In general, however, minorities find it difficult to identify with a state that they
see as responsible for their subjugation. If an individual chooses to identify with
the state, that individual may be open to criticism that he or she accepts state
domination of the minority or that he or she rejects their own group. However,
identifying with the state may represent an attempt to assimilate, which may open
the doors to upward social mobility.
Under such circumstances, members of a minority face two main choices
(Brewer and Brown, 1998; Hechter and Okamoto, 2001; Turner et al., 1987;
Wright et al., 1990):
1.
2.
They may seek upward mobility through casting their lot with the state and its
dominant ethnic group, though at the risk of alienating themselves from their
own group.
They may identify with the minority group, despite the group’s low status, and
struggle for the improvement of the group’s position in society. Both choices
represent attempts to resolve the dilemma of identity in a way that preserves
personal and collective self-esteem.
The fact that minorities have choices in personal identification reveals that
identity among minorities is often a variable, not a constant, across individuals.
Although the individuals all belong to the same ethnic group, each individual may
choose whether to identify with the group, and to what extent. Much research on
ethnic conflict assumes a constant identity among groups, but in fact, individual
variation in identity may be an important factor affecting the variation in political
action strategies.
In Israel, Arabs express their degree of identification with their minority group
or the dominant group in part through the kind of self-identification label they
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choose, whether to call themselves “Palestinian Arab” or “Israeli Arab,” or even
“Israeli,” for example. Since those who identify most closely with the minority
group (as “Palestinian”) are apparently choosing the second option above (to
identify with the low-status minority group), they will likely resolve their self-esteem
conflict through struggling to improve the status of their reference group through
political action. Thus, I expect that the closer an individual identifies with a lowstatus group (closer to the “Palestinian” end of the identity scale for Israel’s Arab
citizens), the more likely is it that that individual will engage in protest action:
H2:
The greater the “Palestinian” identity, the greater the probability of engaging in
protest.
It is also important to consider the possibility that grievances and identity could
work in tandem to produce synergistic effects. Could it be that the effect of
grievances on protest is dependent upon the kind of identity one holds? Perhaps
identifying with a low-status group with an anti-establishment identity could
intensify the effect of ethnic grievances for protest. Conversely, identifying with
the dominant group could make one more likely to minimize the importance of
grievances for protest. Thus, it could be argued that identity may condition the
relationship between grievances and protest; that is, that an interaction effect may
be found between identity and grievance:
H3:
The effect of grievances on protest is conditioned by identity.
I will test these hypotheses using Israeli survey data. The main data set I will rely
upon is a survey conducted in Israel from January to May 2001, consisting of 1202
face-to-face interviews in Arabic among Arab citizens. It was based on a name
sample, randomly drawn from Arab localities inside the Green Line (pre-1967
borders) on the population register of the Ministry of Interior. It constitutes a
representative stratified sample of all localities in which Arab citizens live.
The Case of Israel
During the war of 1948 that established the state of Israel, the majority of
Palestinians were expelled or fled. Those remaining comprised about 19 percent
of the population of Israel, most concentrated in Galilee in the north and in some
mixed cities, though scattered populations (mostly Bedouin) existed in the south.
Due to their relatively small numbers, Israeli Palestinians were not considered a
threat to Israeli democracy as long as they were properly managed. They were thus
given Israeli citizenship, but they also lived under harsh military rule until 1966,
which placed severe restrictions on their political and economic rights. After
military rule was lifted, some restrictions remained, but gradually Israeli
Palestinians were able to resume a semblance of normal life.
Despite the lifting of military rule and their official Israeli citizenship, Israeli
Palestinians have nevertheless suffered from discrimination in the dominant
Jewish society and state. Because of Jewish security concerns and the official
Zionist ideology of the state, Israeli Palestinians still face numerous obstacles to
achieving equality. Security concerns prevent them from obtaining employment in
the large Israeli security complex, where many of the most prestigious and wellpaying jobs are found.
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
173
Land ownership and use restrictions, largely inspired by the Zionist ideology of
“redeeming” the land for the Jewish people, prevent equitable distribution of
resources, while the land confiscations of early statehood have reduced the amount
of land in Israeli Palestinian hands to a mere 7 percent of the total. Local budgets,
educational spending, infrastructure development, and state investment in Israeli
Palestinian localities remain strikingly lower than in Jewish localities, helping to perpetuate the large socioeconomic gap between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians.
Inequities such as those described above continue to exist in great part because
of a lack of Israeli Palestinian representation in decision-making bodies. Israeli
Palestinians have the right to vote in Israeli elections, but they are prevented from
translating their potential voting power into effective policy-making because of
internal and external forces. Internally, Israeli Palestinians are fragmented among
several different ideological orientations represented by different parties, and the
leadership is fraught with infighting, both of which diminish their effectiveness as
a parliamentary bloc.
Externally, however, curbs on political expression supported by the Jewish
majority undermine Israeli Palestinian political organization. The Knesset passed
four amendments to the Basic Laws in May 2002 that effectively, though not
explicitly, targeted the ability of Israeli Palestinians to mobilize and express freely
common political ideas. Amending Section 7A of the Basic Law, The Knesset
(Amendment No. 35) – 2002 and The Political Parties (Amendment No. 13) Law
– 2002 allows a Central Elections Committee to disqualify candidates and parties
from running for the Knesset on the basis of supporting the “armed struggle of an
enemy state or of a terrorist organization” against Israel or rejecting Israel’s
identity as a Jewish and democratic state, and requires a positive declaration in
support of these principles (Rouhana and Sultany, 2003; Sultany, 2003). In effect,
Israeli Palestinians must adhere to the Zionist consensus to run for the Knesset,
despite the fact that Zionism is unpopular among them (Stern, 2005).
The most recent elections, in January 2003, witnessed attempts to disqualify
several Palestinian Israeli candidates and parties, as well as some right-wing Jewish
candidates. Although the Central Election Committee voted to disqualify the
nationalist Balad/Tajamu’ party and two Palestinian Israeli candidates, Ahmed
Tibi and Azmi Bishara, the High Court reinstated their candidacies before the
elections (Ha’aretz, 2003). Nevertheless, this development illustrates the precarious situation of Arab parties in Israel and their vulnerability to the demands of
the Jewish majority. They are unable effectively to represent their constituencies
due to the legal limits placed upon their platforms and activities.
In addition to the legal hurdles that they must surmount, Arab parties are also
negatively impacted by informal limits on their coalition participation. Notably, no
Arab party has ever been part of an Israeli government coalition. A powerful
consensus exists among Jewish policymakers and public that Arab parties, as nonZionist or anti-Zionist parties, are too radical for participation in decision-making
in a Jewish state. The most powerful position the Arab parties have ever reached
was as part of a “blocking majority” that kept the rightist Likud party from forming
a government between 1992 and 1996. Despite their status as a blocking force, the
Arab parties could not point to any concrete achievements benefiting Arabs in
Israel (Ghanem, 1997).
Although Israeli Palestinian members of Zionist parties have been included in
coalitions, their influence within the party is quite limited, and they have been
unable or unwilling to express non-Zionist viewpoints. The strong Zionist con-
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sensus among the Jewish public holds that as the self-declared state of the Jewish
people, Israel exists to fulfill Jewish aspirations for self-determination. According
to this strain of thought, then, Jewish political power must be preserved in order
to safeguard Jewish security, and major decisions must be taken without the
influence of non-Jewish actors, such as Israeli Palestinians.
Many Jewish members of the Knesset have therefore opposed participating in
any coalition that includes Arab parties. For their part, some Arab parties reject
the idea of joining governing coalitions, out of fear of appearing to legitimize the
status quo. Nevertheless, those Arab parties amenable to coalition politics are not
invited to participate. As a result, As’ad Ghanem (1997) concluded that “Arabs
have never had any real opportunity to participate in decision-making, whether on
domestic or foreign policy issues.”
Due to the powerlessness of the Israeli Palestinian minority in the political
system, extra-parliamentary tactics such as protest have grown in popularity. Under
the military administration, Israeli Palestinian political activity was severely
circumscribed, but since the 1970s, they have grown more independent and
politically active (Ghanem, 2001; ICG, 2004; Yiftachel, 1996). With the rise of an
Israeli-educated generation more acquainted with the Israeli system, Israeli
Palestinians were able to begin the process of mobilization for equal rights. A
number of nationwide organizations were formed in the 1970s and the first
significant protest demonstrations were held, such as the landmark Land Day
protests, held every year since 1976 on March 30 to commemorate the six people
killed by Israeli police while protesting against land confiscations.
In addition to regularly held days of protest commemorating important events
in their political history, Israeli Palestinians have staged protests and general
strikes since the 1970s on other occasions, such as the demolition of illegal Arab
housing, the expropriation of Arab land, and international Palestinian events such
as the intifada or the invasion of Lebanon. Jewish Israelis generally view
Palestinian protest negatively, considering it to be much more threatening than
Jewish protest and worthy of greater countermobilization. These protests can
involve a degree of direct confrontation and violence, which may be provoked in
part by the mobilization of Israeli forces. Most Palestinian protest, however, occurs
peacefully and legally, passing without major incident.
A notable protest milestone occurred in October 2000 upon the outbreak of
the al-Aqsa Intifada in the occupied territories. Israeli Palestinian demonstrations
in support of the intifada were put down by Israeli forces with lethal violence. The
result was 13 Palestinian Israelis killed. Since then, a hostile climate of fear and
intimidation has dominated the Israeli political scene. Jewish political trends
supportive of the “transfer” of both Palestinians in the territories and Palestinian
Israelis to other Arab countries have grown in power and visibility, and the Jewish
public in general has become less tolerant of dissent, particularly that of
Palestinian Israelis (HRA, 2002; Rouhana and Sultany, 2003; Sultany, 2003).
Although Palestinian Israelis feel as if they are under siege, mobilization into
organizations and demonstrations has not suffered unduly. In fact, some
Palestinian Israeli organizations have been invigorated by an influx of concerned
individuals ready to act in support of minority rights.
In the previous two decades, the available evidence indicates that selfidentification as Palestinian has increased among the Arab minority (Rouhana,
1997), despite the Israeli establishment’s efforts to mold them into “Arab Israelis”
of different religious groups and erase their identity as Palestinians (Copty, 1990;
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
175
Said, 1992). The data on Palestinian Arab identity in Israel are sparse, particularly
before the 1980s. Much of the data that exists are based on small sample sizes and
populations of convenience, such as students. Researchers have asked different
questions using different methods, making comparison difficult between the
studies. Despite these difficulties, a scholarly consensus has emerged that identifies a growing trend toward greater Palestinian identification and lessening Israeli
identification (Lustick, 1980; Mi’ari, 1987; Rouhana, 1997; Smooha, 1992).
There are many possible reasons why Palestinian identity has been increasing in
Israel. First of all, social change in the Palestinian population has involved a
weakening of local identities such as the hamula, as education and other indicators
of social change have increased. Furthermore, the strength of Arab nationalism,
an anti-Zionist form of identification that competes with Palestinian identity,
drastically decreased following the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war with
Israel. After Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in the same war,
Palestinian citizens of Israel renewed contact with Palestinians in the territories,
where a strong sense of Palestinian nationalism already existed and undoubtedly
impacted upon Palestinians in Israel.
Finally, the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 and the al-Aqsa Intifada in
2000 intensified Palestinian nationalism in the territories, while increasing Israeli
Palestinian solidarity with their compatriots over the Green Line. Furthermore, as
discussed above, the loosening of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian expression and
political activity in the past two or three decades has allowed the expression of
Palestinian identity where it may previously have existed, but was prevented from
public expression. The increase in Palestinian identification has occurred at
roughly the same time as the increase in Israeli Palestinian political mobilization,
suggesting that a link between identity and political action may exist.
There are a number of self-identification labels currently in use among
Palestinian Israelis. Seven of the most commonly used were included in the 2001
survey. They range from “Israeli” and “Israeli Arab,” indicating some degree of
identification with Israel, to “Palestinian,” which rejects Israeli affiliation and
wholeheartedly identifies with the Palestinian people. As we shall see, the different
self-identification labels are associated with different orientations toward the
Israeli state and varying levels of criticism of Israeli society.
40
36.2
35
Percent
30
25
21.8
20
17.4
15
9.7
10
6.4
6.0
5
2.5
0
Israeli
Israeli Arab
FIGURE
Arab
Israeli
Palestinian
Palestinian in
Israel
Palestinian
Arab
1. Self-identification among Israeli Palestinians
Palestinian
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International Political Science Review 27(2)
According to the author’s survey, approximately 66 percent of the sample of
Palestinian Israelis identified themselves in whole or in part as Palestinian. The
modal identity is “Palestinian in Israel,” which rejects “Israeli” as a psychological
identification, but accepts it as a descriptive label of geographical location. Those
respondents who did not choose to identify themselves as “Israeli Palestinians”
(the closest alternative), choosing instead “Palestinian in Israel,” appear to be
making a meaningful distinction between these two self-identification labels.
Previous research (Rouhana, 1997) and the author’s field interviews support this
argument.
The establishment-favored “Israeli Arab” is the second-most popular response
in the survey, reflecting its dominance in Israeli social discourse. About 37 percent
of respondents identified themselves in some way as Israeli, double-counting the
“Israeli Palestinian” category as both “Israeli” and “Palestinian.” Although much
smaller than the percentage identifying themselves as Palestinian, a nevertheless
considerable number include “Israeli” as part of their identity, despite the hardships placed upon them by the Israeli state.
According to Rouhana (1997), Palestinians in Israel lack an integrated
collective identity, one that successfully integrates various dimensions (sociocultural, political, and formal-legal) with affective axes of attachment. Israeli
identity dominates only the formal-legal dimension, but Palestinian identity
dominates the political dimension and, most significantly, the affective axes. In
other words, Israeli identity has not been internalized by Palestinian Arabs as a
national identity with affective attachment; instead, it merely describes the civic
and geographical affiliation of Palestinians in Israel.
Rouhana’s hypothesis may accurately describe those who identify themselves as
“Palestinian” and reject Israeli identities, but not all Palestinian Israelis identify
themselves this way, as Figure 1 shows. However, his argument does suggest that
Palestinian identity is substantively different from Israeli identity. He argues that
affective attachment is not directed toward Israel, but toward the Palestinian
people. This finding suggests that the extent of affective attachment to one’s state
may have important consequences for political action strategies chosen.
For example, if the dominant majority exhibits a high level of attachment to the
state, as it does in most cases, one can expect that the logical outcome will be supportive political action, such as participation in electoral politics and considerable
support for policies supporting the majority’s dominant position. A minority,
however, which exhibits a high level of attachment to the state may behave in a
similar, though not identical, fashion. Though they may not wholeheartedly
support policies that strengthen the majority’s dominant position, they may in fact
acquiesce to those policies out of practical considerations or a confusion of the
state’s identity with that of the dominant majority. On the other hand, a minority
that has low attachment to the state may be less likely to acquiesce to those policies
and to participate in politics in the same way as the high-attachment minority. This
minority (or part thereof) may instead be in a position to challenge unpopular
policies and to use confrontational political tactics in their negotiations with the
state. In Israel, we can expect that Israeli Palestinians who feel close to the state
will participate in politics differently, possibly more passively, than Israeli
Palestinians who have a low sense of attachment to the state.
Thus it is significant that these different self-identification labels are not
distributed randomly among the Israeli Palestinian public. Rather, they are
grouped among individuals who share similar political ideas and perceptions and
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
177
may employ similar political action strategies. The seven different labels used in
the survey each appear to have different meanings consistently interpreted across
the Palestinian Israeli public. This fact becomes clear when examining the differences of means among groups identifying differently across attitudinal indexes.
Three scales were constructed using factor analysis: a grievance and discrimination scale measuring the extent of perceived discrimination against Palestinian
Israelis, an Arab-power scale measuring the extent of perceived Palestinian Israeli
influence in the political system, and a regime-evaluation scale measuring individual
evaluations of democratic performance regarding the Palestinian Israeli minority
(see Appendix for details). For each index, Israeli identities scored lower (that is,
perceiving less discrimination, more power for Palestinian Israelis, and a more
positive regime evaluation) than for those identifying themselves as “Palestinian.”
18
Mean of Grievance Scale
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
Israeli
Israeli Arab
Arab
Israeli
Palestinian Palestinian Palestinian
Palestinian in Israel
Arab
Identity
2. Identity
and Grievances
FIGURE
Mean Arab-Power Scale
6.4
6.2
6.0
5.8
5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0
Israeli
Israeli
Arab
Arab
Israeli
Palestinian Palestinian Palestinian
Palestinian in Israel
Arab
Identity
3. Identity
and Perceptions of
Arab Power
FIGURE
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International Political Science Review 27(2)
Mean of Regime Evaluations
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
Israeli
Israeli Arab
Arab
Israeli
Palestinian
Palestinian
in Israel
Palestinian
Arab
Palestinian
Identity
FIGURE
4. Identity and Regime Evaluations
For grievance and discrimination (see Figure 2), the difference of means increases
monotonically from the identity scale (the seven self-identity labels being arranged
from most “Israeli” to most “Palestinian”). As identity becomes more distinctly
Palestinian and less Israeli, respondents report more perceived grievances. For
Arab power (see Figure 3) and regime evaluation (see Figure 4), the increase is
nearly monotonic. In short, Israeli identifiers are qualitatively different in outlook
from Palestinian identifiers. Those in between the two extremes differ from the
Israeli and Palestinian identifiers to a lesser degree. Thus, the seven identities can
be arrayed on an identity scale that is ordinal in nature.
These identities appear to indicate one’s general political orientation toward
Israeli politics. In particular, one’s degree of accommodation of Israel’s dominant
ideology, Zionism, seems to be a key ingredient in one’s identity choice. Those
who identify themselves at the high end of the identity scale, as “Palestinian,” are
more likely to disagree that “Israel can be a democracy and a Jewish-Zionist state at
the same time” and that “Israel has the right to exist as a Zionist-Jewish state.”
Conversely, “Israeli” identifiers are more likely to agree with those statements.
Thus one’s identity choice reflects one’s degree of identification with the state and
its Zionist goals. Furthermore, the identity choices also seem to suggest a degree of
affective identification with the state. “Palestinian” identifiers are more likely to
agree that “I am a citizen of Israel but for me it is like a foreign country” (see Table
1 for bivariate correlations).
TABLE
1. Correlations
Israel can be a democracy
Israel has the right
Israel is like a
and a Jewish state
to exist as a Jewish state foreign country
(Palestinian) Identity
–.30
–.31
.26
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
179
60
52
Percent Protest
50
42
40
37
30
31
32
28
20
17
10
0
Israeli
Israeli Arab
Arab
Israeli
Palestinian Palestinian Palestinian
Palestinian
in Israel
Arab
Identity
FIGURE
5. Identity and Protest
The consistency noted above also is found for political action, specifically for
protest activity. As the Palestinian identity grows stronger and the Israeli identity
weaker across the identity scale, actual protest activity increases (see Figure 5).
The increase is roughly monotonic, with the interesting deviation from fully
monotonic in that Israeli identifiers report more protest than Israeli Arab identifiers. However paradoxical this may sound, Israeli identifiers may in fact feel
greater integration into Israeli society and their protest may not be of a systemchallenging nature.
The data indicate that on a bivariate level, Palestinian identifiers protest more
than Israeli identifiers. This finding is consistent with Palestinian history. The
common identity of Palestinians is based on a history of perceived victimization at
the hands of the Zionist project. It is therefore understandable that identification
with the Palestinian heritage would be associated with greater criticism of Israeli
society. Greater criticism of the dominant ideology, Zionism, and the society that
supports it may predispose individuals toward system-challenging protest activity.
Israel has been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian people,
and it has discouraged the formation of a Palestinian identity among the Israeli
Palestinian population. To identify oneself as Palestinian, then, represents a
profound rejection of Israeli political and social imperatives.
The Model
A bivariate statistical relationship does not completely illuminate the nature of
these identities and how they could predispose one to protest, however. It could be
that Palestinian identifiers are more educated or have some other characteristic
that facilitates collective action. A multivariate analysis can illuminate the effect of
identity independent of other factors that may also facilitate protest. The model is
as follows:
180
International Political Science Review 27(2)
Protest = α + β1Age + β2Income + β3Education + β4Gender + β5Muslim +
β6Christian + β7PID + β8Party member + β9Recruitment + β10Engagement +
β11Mistrust + β12Identity + β13Grievance + β14ID×Griev + ε
The multivariate analysis consists of a logit regression with the binary dependent
variable of protest action, coded 1 if the respondent reports engaging in protest
actions in the previous 5 years, and 0 if not. I draw upon the political participation
and protest literatures to determine which variables to include in my model and to
construct expectations for their impact on the dependent variable. Many of the
independent variables included in the model represent standard expectations in
the literature, so my treatment of these will be brief in order to allow more indepth treatment of those variables most relevant to the overall argument of the
article. (See Appendix for survey questions and scale-construction details.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Demographics. Education and income are expected to be positively associated
with protest. Although some protest literature argues that those on lower
incomes and the less educated (the deprived) are more likely to protest (Gurr,
1970), individual-level analyses in many countries indicate that protest is a
high-initiative activity that is facilitated by resources such as education and
income (Jennings and Van Deth, 1990; Verba et al., 1995). Males are more
likely to protest than females, particularly in traditional societies, and being
Muslim (seen in Israel as being more radical than the Christians or Druze)
may make one more likely to protest.
Political engagement. Being interested in politics and reading more newspapers is likely to increase one’s probability of protesting, since one’s interest
or engagement with politics can act as incentive to take action in the political
arena (Verba et al., 1978, 1995).
Partisan engagement. In the Israeli proportional-representation electoral
system, interest groups are weak, while political parties carry out much of the
political mobilization that goes on. Therefore, party membership (irrespective
of which party) may positively impact on protest through its mobilization
structures. For partisan affinity, however, feeling close to an Arab party is more
likely to contribute to protest than feeling close to Zionist parties among the
Israeli Palestinian population.
Recruitment. Being asked to protest can be expected to raise one’s probability
of actually engaging in protest (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al.,
1995).
Grievances. As discussed above, having grievances may make one more likely
to protest, particularly if one perceives an ethnic bias in the political system or
feels politically powerless (Gurr, 1993). The grievance variable measures the
extent to which the respondent believes that the Israeli political system and
society favors Jewish Israelis over Palestinian Israelis.
Identity. Given its anti-establishment nature, the Palestinian identity may positively impact on the probability of protesting, while Israeli identity may reduce
that probability. The identity variable measures the extent of Palestinian
identity expressed by the respondent. “Israeli” is coded 1 and “Palestinian” is
coded 7, corresponding with the order indicated in the above analysis.
Interaction. Identity × Grievance (ID×Griev). It is conceivable that the impact of
regime attitudes may differ depending on the particular identity one has. If
one identifies oneself as Israeli, for example, one’s attitude toward the regime
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
181
may not matter as much for protest activity compared to Palestinian identifiers. Therefore, an interaction term of Identity × Grievance was included in
the model to test for moderated relationships between these two variables.
Results
Since the nonlinear logit-model coefficients are not directly interpretable in terms
of magnitude of effect, I have included a “first differences” column in Table 2.
First differences report the magnitude of effect in terms of the change in the
probability of protesting when varying a single independent variable from its
minimum to its maximum, holding all other independent variables constant at
their means. Take the independent variable gender, for example. Since it is coded
1 for male and 0 for female, according to the results, being male increases one’s
probability of protesting by 10 percent over being female. Being a party member
increases the probability of protesting by 25 percent, while being asked to protest
increases the likelihood of protesting by 28 percent and being engaged in politics
by 26 percent.
It is a little-known fact that in a logit model involving interaction terms, the sign
of a variable’s coefficient may not correspond to the sign of the effect reported in
the first-differences column (Luskin and Globetti, 2002). Thus, it is important to
report the magnitude of the effect rather than simply relying upon the sign and
significance of the coefficients, which can be misleading in cases such as these. My
results reflect this apparent paradox. The coefficient of the self-identity variable
(Israeli coded 1 and Palestinian coded 7) is negative and statistically significant,
TABLE
2. Predicting Protest Action
Logit regression Dependent variable = protest action
Variable
Age
Income
Education
Gender (M)
Muslim
Christian
PID
Party member
Recruitment
Engagement
Mistrust
Identity
Grievance
IDxGriev
Constant
Coefficient
Standard error
–.009
–.073
.015
.522*
.210
.140
–.016
1.10*
1.24*
.684*
–.055
–.600*
–.243
.170*
–1.38
.006
.076
.064
.169
.383
.427
.065
.249
.228
.177
.095
.237
.229
.052
.973
First differences
–.11
–.05
.02
.10
.03
.03
–.01
.25
.28
.26
–.05
.19
.37
Notes: * significant at the p ≤ .05 level or better
Pseudo R squared = .1745
Logit model estimation conducted using STATA 8. First differences estimated by Clarify 2.0
(King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2001)
182
International Political Science Review 27(2)
TABLE
3. Interaction Effects
Change in the probability of protest: first differences
First differences identity
Low grievances
High grievances
–.27
.53*
First differences attitudes
–.11
.69*
Israeli
Palestinian
Note: * significant at the p ≤ .05 level or better
while the first difference is positive and barely misses statistical significance.
Likewise, holding significant grievances increases the probability of protest by a
statistically significant 37 percent, according to the first differences, although this
variable’s coefficient is negative and not statistically significant. In short, the first
differences column in Table 2 indicates that grievances, recruitment, political
engagement, and party membership significantly increase the likelihood of
protesting, while it is unclear if Palestinian identity does likewise. Thus, Hypothesis
1 appears to be supported by the evidence, whereas Hypothesis 2 thus far is not.
It is instructive to look at a table of interaction effects (see Table 3) in order to
sort out the effects, particularly for the interaction between identity and grievance.
Examining the first differences at different levels of each variable helps illuminate
when the variables have the greatest impact and thus sheds light on our third
hypothesis. The right-hand column of Table 3 shows differing magnitudes of effect
depending on the value of the identity variable. When the identity variable is held
at “Israeli,” the change in the probability of protest is relatively small when varying
the grievance variable from its minimum to its maximum. Israeli identifiers are
not very likely to protest, irrespective of whether they hold negative opinions of
the Israeli political system.
However, when the identity variable is held at “Palestinian,” the change in
probability is 69 percent. It matters a great deal to Palestinian identifiers how
aggrieved they are for their protest activity. If they have fewer grievances, they are
much less likely to protest than if they have more grievances. In short, identifying
oneself as “Israeli,” makes one much less likely to protest no matter how aggrieved,
while identifying oneself as “Palestinian” makes the grievances matter much more.
Thus, the Israeli identity (that is, identifying with the state) can act as a suppressor
of potentially destabilizing activities such as protest in the volatile environment
found in Israel. Thus, the third hypothesis finds support in the evidence.
The policy implications of this research suggest there are two main avenues that
Israel could take to improve its chances for long-term domestic tranquility. It
could address the grievance variable by reducing the discrimination that Israeli
Palestinians face and the social, economic, and political gap between Israeli
Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, and thus directly impact upon protest activity.
Alternatively, it could address the identity variable by decreasing the exclusively
Jewish nature of the state to include Israeli Palestinians in the definition of the
state and its goals. With this second option, Israel would decrease the importance
of ethnic grievances, an important point since there will always remain some
ethnic grievances, no matter how zealously Israel attacks ethnic discrimination.
These two avenues are not mutually exclusive, however. In fact, it could be
argued that in some ways they both must work together. However, they potentially
could be separated, and if so, my research indicates that a relatively costless (in
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
183
budgetary terms) symbolic move to include Israeli Palestinians in state goals and
definitions could go very far to dampen the impetus toward ethnic protest and
potential violence. In fact, the participation of a very small number of Israeli
Palestinians in terrorist activities in the past two years suggests the importance of
identity and symbolic inclusion for Israel’s future (Schiff, 2003). Although such
terrorist activities have been motivated by external concerns (Palestinian
independence in the West Bank and Gaza), such actions are undoubtedly made
possible by the lack of affective Israeli identity and affective loyalty to the state.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis above suggests that identifying with the state among oppressed
minorities may be difficult, but where it exists, it can act as a stabilizing factor in
ethnic conflict. By most indications, ethnic inclusion is likely to increase
identification with the state. When the state espouses a theory of equality and
attempts to carry it out, however imperfectly, minorities can identify with the goals
of the state and develop an affective attachment that may be lacking when the
state is overtly ethnic in nature. Discrimination at the hands of state institutions
makes identification with the state difficult, while institutional equality facilitates
it. Studies in organizational identity and behavior indicate that similar processes
may be at work on a smaller scale in the business and nonprofit arenas (Tompkins
and Cheney, 1985; Whetten and Godfrey, 1998).
Gurr’s (2000a, 2000b) studies indicate that ethnic conflict worldwide is
decreasing because of greater global acceptance of an ideology of ethnic
inclusion. This article has presented individual-level evidence consistent with his
conclusion. Although Israel is a single case study, there are many ethnically based
regimes worldwide that may apply the results found here. With the global
diffusion of liberal ethnic ideology making ethnic domination more unacceptable
today than ever before, it is increasingly difficult to sustain ethnic “control”
regimes (Lustick, 1979) and the inequality they create. The results shown in this
article suggest that ethnic domination may contain the seeds of its own undoing.
Appendix
Survey Questions and Variables
The Arabic survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews in Arabic during the
months of January–May 2001 by the Givat Haviva Center for Peace Research. It was
based on a name sample, randomly drawn from the population register of the
Ministry of Interior. Included in the sample were the residents of 44 villages and
towns inside the Green Line, which constitutes a representative stratified sample
of all localities in which Palestinian citizens live. The resulting data set consists of
1202 respondents.
V1 To what degree do you have trust in government?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
184
International Political Science Review 27(2)
Arab-Power Scale
V5 To what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Arab
citizens’ opinions in its decision-making?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
V14 To what degree, in your opinion, do Arab citizens have influence on state
affairs?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Too much influence.
Sufficient influence.
Little influence.
No influence at all.
The Arab-power scale consists of factor scores*(V5 + V14) = .745*V5 + .826*V14.
Grievance and Discrimination Scale
V16 To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Arab
citizens in Israel?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
The scale of V16 was reversed for continuity in analysis.
V18 To what degree have you personally been hurt by discrimination against Arabs?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
The scale of V18 was reversed for continuity in analysis.
V20 To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Arab
citizens and Jews?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
The scale of V20 was reversed for continuity in analysis.
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
185
V22 To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for
the gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To a very large degree.
To a large degree.
To a moderate degree.
To a small degree.
Not at all.
The scale of V22 was reversed for continuity in analysis.
The grievance and discrimination scale consists of V16 + V18 + V20 + V22 in a
linear, additive index.
Protest Action
V26 In how many legal protest actions such as demonstrations and marches have
you participated in the past five years?
The actual number was coded 0–100.
Recoded to a binary variable: coded 1 for one or more reported protest acts and 0
for none.
Recruitment
V37 Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to participate in a protest
action such as a demonstration, a march, or a petition in the past five years?
1.
2.
Yes.
No.
V37 was recoded to a binary variable: coded 1 if a request to protest was reported,
and 0 if no requests were received.
Regime Evaluations
V40
1.
2.
3.
4.
Israel can be a democracy and a Zionist-Jewish state at the same time.
Strongly agree.
Agree.
Disagree.
Strongly disagree.
V43 Voting in elections is one of the most efficient ways to achieve equality for
Arabs in Israel.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Strongly agree.
Agree.
Disagree.
Strongly disagree.
186
V45
1.
2.
3.
4.
International Political Science Review 27(2)
Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state.
Strongly agree.
Agree.
Disagree.
Strongly disagree.
The regime-evaluation scale consists of factor scores*(V40 + V43 + V45) =
.607*V40 + .742*V43 + .717*V45.
Self-Identification
V49
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
How would you identify yourself if you had to choose one of the following:
Arab.
Palestinian Arab.
Israeli Arab.
Israeli.
Israeli Palestinian.
Palestinian in Israel or Palestinian Arab in Israel.
Palestinian.
Recoded to a new order, reflecting the analysis of Figures 2–4:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Israeli.
Israeli Arab.
Arab.
Israeli Palestinian.
Palestinian in Israel or Palestinian Arab in Israel.
Palestinian Arab.
Palestinian.
Political Engagement
V50
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
To which of the following parties do you feel closest?
The United Arab List.
The Front (Hadash/Rakah – communist).
Democratic Alliance (Tajamu’/Balad – headed by Bishara).
The Arab Renewal Party (Ta’al – headed by Tibi).
Jewish parties such as Labor, Meretz, and HarMerkaz.
Jewish parties such as Likud, Mafdal, and Shas.
Recoded to a binary variable: Jewish parties coded as 0 and Arab parties (1–4)
coded as 1.
V56
1.
2.
Are you a member of a political party?
Yes.
No.
V56 was recoded to a binary variable: 0 if not a party member and 1 if a party
member.
The political-engagement variable consists of a linear, additive index of the two
binary variables.
LOWRANCE: Identity, Grievances, and Political Action
187
Religion
V58
1.
2.
3.
What is your religion?
Muslim.
Christian.
Druze.
Recoded to binary dummy variables. The reference category was Druze.
Age
V62
How old are you?
Age in number of years.
Education
V64
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
What is the last class you attended in school?
No schooling.
Incomplete primary.
Complete primary.
Incomplete secondary.
Complete secondary.
Post-secondary, incomplete.
Bachelor’s degree.
Master’s degree.
Doctoral degree.
Income
V67 The average net monthly income of an Arab family in Israel is about
NIS6500. In comparison, the income of your family is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Much above the average.
A bit above the average.
About the average.
A bit below the average.
Much below the average.
Gender
V69
1.
2.
Gender (completed by the interviewer).
Male.
Female.
Recoded to female = 0 and male = 1.
Regime attitudes consist of V1 + V5 + V16 + V20 + V22 + V40, each variable linearly
projected to a 0–1 scale and combined to a linear, additive index.
188
International Political Science Review 27(2)
Note
1. Israeli Palestinians are citizens of Israel, descendants of the Palestinians who remained
in Israel after the 1948 war that created Israel. There are many terms in use to describe
this population, the most widespread of which is “Israeli Arab,” used in the media and,
to a lesser extent, in academia. I have chosen to use the term that seems most appropriately descriptive and least politically charged, though it is impossible completely to
avoid charges of bias.
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Biographical Note
SHERRY LOWRANCE is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs in the School of
Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. Her research
interests include Middle Eastern politics, religious and ethnic identity, and Islamic
politics. Her scholarly articles have been published in Middle Eastern Studies,
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and Critique: Critical
Middle Eastern Studies. ADDRESS: 323 Candler Hall, Department of International
Affairs, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA [email: slowranc@
uga.edu].