THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE 1979 REVOLUTION IN IRAN
Moojan Momen
The intensity of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the suddenness with which it appeared "out of
the blue" surprised many people both in Iran itself and in the rest of the world. In this
presentation, I hope to examine some of the factors that contributed to that revolution. There
were, of course, many and varied factors and we are probably still too close to the event to be
able to make any meaningful assessment of their relative importance, but I think we can at least
begin to list these and discuss them.
In this presentation, I am not going to deal with the economic factors that led to the Revolution.
There is undoubtedly an important economic background to the Revolution. The large amount of
money flowing into the country following the oil price rise led to a boom, which eventually
rebounded with ensuing hyper-inflation and unemployment. The results included much corruption
in the upper echelons of society and a sense of disappointment and frustration among the people
at the non-appearance of the prosperity that had been promised them. I am also not going to deal
with the political factors leading to the Revolution. The suppression of protest and even of
political discussion in the country, the activities of foreign powers within the country, and the
organization of the opposition forces are among factors that should be looked at in any full
analysis of the background of the 1979 Revolution. I am not even going to examine in this
presentation what may be called the general religious and cultural factors that form an important
background to the Iranian Revolution. What I mean by this are general factors that apply in many
societies of the Middle East (and elsewhere) and are not specific to Iran. For example, it should
be noted that the movement towards religious fundamentalism is not confined to the Iranian or
Shi`i world alone. We can detect it occurring in all parts of the Muslim world (and elsewhere
also). Therefore it must represent a response to factors that are affecting a wider area than just
Iran. There appears to be a widespread perception that the adoption of the practices and standards
of Western civilization has not only failed to bring about improvement, it has led to a deterioration
in moral standards, causing a loss of sexual morality and a rise in the taking of alcohol and drugs.
In Islamic societies, there is also the humiliation of seeing the Muslim world subservient,
economically and militarily, to the countries of the West, together with the associated factor of
the creation of the state of Israel. These may be considered to be the general religious and cultural
factors contributing to the Revolution.
What I will be doing in this presentation is to look at factors that were specific to the religious
environment of Iran, factors in Shi`ism that contributed to the intensity and pattern of the Iranian
Revolution when it broke out in 1978-9. In this presentation I want to look at a number of threads
running through Twelver Shi`i Islam which culminated in the 1979 Revolution in Iran. Although
the threads may appear to be disparate when described individually, it was the coming together to
these and other factors that gave such intensity to the 1979 Revolution.
A. The Role of the Ulama in Society
The active role of the Shi`i religious scholars (the ulama) in the Revolution has been noted by
almost everyone who has commented on this episode. How then did it come about that the ulama,
who in the rest of the Islamic world tend to maintain a low profile in social and political matters,
were able to take such a prominent part in the 1979 Iranian Revolution?
The early history of Shi`i Islam was that of being a persecuted minority within the Islamic
community. Since those in authority were inimical to the Shi`is, it was only natural that the
leadership of the Shi`i community fell to their religious scholars. It is therefore part of Shi`ism's
history and ethos that the ulama have been seen as leaders, spokesmen of and intercessors for the
Shi`i community. When Shi`i states did eventually arise, the role of the ulama nevertheless
continued as upholders of individual and community rights in the face of any tyranny from the
authorities.
The theoretical basis for this role of the ulama was through the evolution of the na'ib al-`amm
(collective or general vicegerency) concept. The history of this concept goes back to the earliest
period of Twelver Shi`i history. With the occultation of the Imam, all of his functions, including
the giving of judgements on points of religious law, the collection of religious taxes, the leading of
the Friday prayers, etc. were at first considered to have lapsed. However, as time went by and the
Imam did not reappear, the theoretical absence of all religious authority became a doctrine that
was increasingly difficult to maintain. Therefore the ulama began gradually to argue that they, as
a body, had been designated the deputy of the Imam. The basis of this assertion was the existence
of a number of traditions that appear to give the ulama the authority to act on behalf of the Imam.
These traditions relate to specific circumstances, and not all of them are considered reliable; but
those who wished to advance the scope of the activities of the ulama argued that these traditions
gave them the authority to act as the deputies of the Hidden Imam. Using this argument, the
ulama began gradually to assume more and more of the functions of the Imam in the religious
sphere: the giving of judgements on religious law, the collection of religious taxes, the leading of
the Friday prayers, etc.
There was, however in Shi`i history, an ongoing tension between those who pressed forward the
social role of the ulama and those who held back. There have been at various times in Shi`i history
different issues over which this unresolved tension has played out. In the earliest period, Shi`i
ulama such as Kulayni (d. 940 C.E.) and Ibn Babuya (d. 991 C.E.), felt themselves to be primarily
transmitters of the Traditions (hadith) of the Imams. They decried the Sunni used of analogical
reasoning (qiyas) and innovative exegesis (ijtihad). In the later Buyid period, the balance swung
towards those ulama, such as Shaykhu't-Ta'ifa al-Tusi (d. 1067 C.E.) who wanted to be able to
give judgements in an increasingly wide range of social matters. This was accompanied by a move
towards Mu'tazilite rationality and increased social involvement of the ulama in directing the
affairs of the community. The same conflict between different attitudes of the ulama can be seen in
the conflict between the Akhbari and Usuli schools of jurisprudence. This disagreement, which
had undoubtedly been brewing for some centuries, emerged during the Safavid era (16th -
17thcentury C.E.). The Akhbaris were conservative in giving legal judgements. They confined
themselves to those areas in which they felt there was clear, unambiguous guidance from the
Qur'an and Traditions and were content to leave other matters to secular courts. They tended
towards piety, mysticism and mystical philosophy. The Usulis were prepared to use the tool of
ijtihad to deliver legal judgements (fatwas) on almost any social or personal issue. They were
therefore able to extend the social role of the ulama. This conflict was eventually won by the
Usulis at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
The Usulis were faced with two major challenges in the 19th Century. The first was the Shaykhi
movement, which through its emphasis on piety and mysticism, was again an attempt to move
Shi`ism away from its social involvement. The ulama moved against the Shaykhis and succeeded
in eliminating this threat. A more significant threat emerged in the form of the Babi movement in
the middle of the 19th century. The Bab claimed to be the author of a new revelation, superceding
Islam; he claimed his message was a new teaching from God and his writings a new holy book,
superceding the Qur'an. This claim, together with the denunciations of the ulama that the Bab
made, was a direct challenge to the ulama. While they had succeeded in dealing with the challenge
of the Akhbaris and Shaykhis largely through debate, they were not successful in halting the Babi
movement in this way. Eventually they resorted to violence and succeeded in inciting the Iranian
government to launch a campaign which succeeded in driving the Babis underground. Eventually
the Babi movement transformed into the Baha'i movement and has gone on to become a
world-wide religion. But its persecution in Iran has always prevented it from being a threat to the
position of the ulama.
Although in formal terms the Usulis won over their adversaries, the tension between greater and
lesser degrees of involvement of the ulama in social affairs has remained. In general one can say
that three courses of action have been open to the ulama in their social and political role:
1. Political Aloofness. This attitude stems from the belief that the ulama should concern themselves only with the shari'a. The secular authorities have the obligation to ensure that conditions are suitable for the carrying out of the shari'a. As long as they do this, then the ulama do not concern themselves with political matters. This has traditionally been the attitude of the majority of the leading ulama from the time of the Qajar dynasty until recent years. Many of the most important figures in Shi`ism from this period exemplify this attitude, for example: Shaykh Murtada al-Ansari (d. 1864) and Ayatollah Burujirdi (d. 1962).
2. Support for the Government. Those that advocated this position argued that the shari'a can only be promulgated in conditions of political stability and social order. Therefore it is the duty of the ulama to support the Government in the execution of its duties. This view seems to have predominated during the Safavid period when the interests of the ulama the state were more or less identical. The foremost ulama of the period - such figures as Shaykh Baha' al-Din Amili (Shaykh-i Baha'i, d. 1622 or 1623) and Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1699 or 1700) - accepted state positions (both of them held the post of Shaykh al-Islam in Isfahan), and were incorporated into the state apparatus. During the Qajar period, a few of the ulama remained supporters of the state. Not surprisingly, the majority of these were those whose positions depended on state appointment, for example the successive Imam-Jum`ihs of Tehran.
3. Opposition to the Government. This position was buttressed by the theoretical illegitimacy of all temporal authority in the absence of the Hidden Imam. In practice this position was adopted whenever the ulama felt their position threatened either directly, through secularizing reforms, or indirectly, when their main financial supporters, the merchants of the bazaar, were threatened. Some of the ulama were more prone to adopt this position than others, for example Shaykh Mahdi al-Khalisi (d. 1925) in Iraq, and Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani (d. 1962) in Iran.
It should not be imagined, however, that these three positions represent three different schools of
political thought, and that Shi`is would choose one position to follow. Rather they represent three
options to be exercised by Shi`is according to circumstances. Thus it is common to find individual
ulama who moved backwards and forwards between these three positions, according to
circumstances. For example Mirza Hasan Shirazi (Mirza-yi Shirazi, d. 1895), the leading Shi`i
scholar of the late nineteenth century, is usually remembered by most historians as the person who
issued a fatwa forbidding the consumption of tobacco, [1] and thus brought about the collapse of
the Tobacco Regie in 1891. He is therefore usually thought of as having been a revolutionary
figure. In fact, for almost all of his life, following the example of his teacher Shaykh Murtada
al-Ansari, he studiously avoided any interference in political affairs. Then in the matter of the
Tobacco Regie he decided to abandon this policy and become actively involved. A few months
later, when the issue was over, he reverted to his former position. Conversely, Shaykh
Muhammad Husayn Na'ini was politically active for some twenty years, at first opposing the Shah
as one of the most active supporters of the Constitutionalists, and later opposing British rule in
Iraq. And yet after he was expelled from Iraq in 1923 for his political agitation, he played no
further political role even though he returned to Iraq in 1924 and lived until 1936.
The majority of the ulama were flexible in their social and political attitudes, being fully able to
vary their approach according to what they perceived to be their best interests. Prior to
Khomeini, we can find almost no figure in Shi`i history who was opposed to the existing
government in the sense that he advocated its complete overthrow and replacement with a clerical
government. [2]
The most that Shi`i ulama have demanded in the past has been that the government of the day
make its policies conform more closely to the shari'a, which in practical terms has meant that the
government should make its policies conform with what the ulama perceived to be their own best
interests. It is really only with Khomeini, and then only in his later years, that opposition to the
Government became a fixed and unnegotiable position based on a political theory that made the
very existence of the government illegitimate.
One factor that has helped the ulama whenever they have wished to take an active social role is
the fact that, in contrast to the Sunni ulama, they have a financial base that is independent of the
state. Shi`i law states that the religious taxes of khums and zakat should be paid to the Imam. In
the absence of the Imam, the ulama have asserted that they were the rightful recipients of these
taxes. The income derived therefrom gives the ulama an independent financial base which makes it
much easier for them to oppose the government if they should choose to do so.
As economic conditions in Iran in the 1970s deteriorated, political repression became more
pronounced, and Western influence increasingly penetrated Iranian society, the people
increasingly turned to the ulama in their traditional role as the spokesmen of and intercessors for
the masses. While most of the ulama contented themselves with their traditional aloof attitude
towards social and political questions, a few under the leadership of Khomeini began to take a
more active stance.
B. Political Authority in Twelver Shi`ism
Among the questions that must be asked is: how did a sect that at its outset in early Islamic
history was regarded as the most least aggressive and most accommodating of the Shi`i sects
become transformed into a revolutionary force that was able to sweep away what had been
regarded as one of the most stable regimes in the Middle East?
Shi`ism was, of course, the expression of support for the claims of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law
of Muhammad, and his descendants to leadership of the Islamic community. Three main sects of
Shi`ism have survived from the earliest period of Islam to the present day. Historically, the first of
these to come to prominence was Zaydi Shi`ism. Politically, this sect believed that authority
belonged to any descendent of Ali who rose to claim it, and was able to achieve it. A large
number of revolts during the Ummayad and early Abbasid periods were Zaydi in origin, but apart
from some limited success in Yemen and Tabaristan in Iran, the Zaydis were never able to achieve
much political power. The second of these Shi`i sects to come to prominence was Isma`ili
Shi`ism. It held that political authority belonged to its line of Imams, who were descendants of
Ali. This Shi`i grouping arose in revolt in North Africa, and was able to establish its line of Imams
as the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt from 909 to 1171 C.E. However, these two sects today
represent only a minority of the world's Shi`is.
By far the largest grouping of Shi`is today are the Ithna-`Asharis (Twelvers), which is the group
that we are concerned with in this presentation. They believe in a succession of twelve infallible
religious leaders called Imams, the first of whom was Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the
Prophet, and the twelfth of whom is believed to have gone into occultation in 874 C.E. Since
Twelver Shi`ism cannot be said to have come into existence until this latter date, it was the last of
these three Shi`i sects to be established. But it differed from the other two Shi`i sects in a radical
way. Zaydi and Isma`ili Shi`ism were revolutionary, and never really succeeded in establishing
themselves in any appreciable numbers in the Islamic heartlands, where their revolts were crushed
and they were persecuted relentlessly. They were always a phenomenon of the fringes of the
Islamic world. The Twelvers on the other hand, from the very start, existed primarily in the
Islamic heartlands. Their main centre was for many years in the Abbasid capital at Kufa and, later,
Baghdad. Many of their most prominent figures were leading statesmen in the Abbasid power
structure; the al-Furat and Nawbakhti families, for example who held the highest positions in the
Abbasid administration.
For these Shi`is at the centre of Abbasid power, the Shi`i tradition of revolt and opposition was
clearly undesirable and unwanted, as it made them suspect in the eyes of their Abbasid patrons.
The resolution to this problem was found among the influential circle in Baghdad that included the
Nawbakhti family. Politically this involved the declaration that the Imam had gone into hiding
(occultation). This mystic removal of the Imam from the eyes of men served two purposes.
Firstly, it effectively removed the Imam from being a focal point for opposition. For no-one could
raise a rebellion in favour of an Imam who was not there. The second consequence of the
occultation was that, since the Imam was still alive, although occulted, no one else could claim to
be the Imam (and there had been numerous claimants to the Imamate in Shi`i history). The
Imamate, which for the other Shi`i sects was a political institution, a rival for the caliphate, had
been depoliticized by the Twelvers and transformed into a focus for theological elaboration and
eschatological expectation. It was no longer a threat to the political establishment and so the
Twelvers could be seen as loyal citizens within the Abbasid power structure.
It may be thought that if the Twelver Shi`is were not militant and revolutionary in their early
history, then this tendency arose within the sect prior to the Safavid conquest of Iran in 1501 and
the establishment of Twelver Shi`ism as the state religion. But in fact, the Safavid assumption of
power in Iran had little to do with Shi`i militancy. The Safavids were primarily a Sufi order that
became increasingly militaristic and Shi`i in orientation. This Shi`ism was not however of the
Twelver kind, but of the kind that is generally referred to as ghulat (extremist). This designation
refers to various doctrines held by these groups which were considered, by orthodox Shi`is and
Sunnis alike, to make them heretics and outside the pale of Islam. Thus, for example, Isma`il the
first Safavid ruler of Iran, wrote poetry in which he equated himself with the Divinity. It was this
mixture of 'extremist' Shi`ism and militaristic Sufism that gave the Safavid order the fervour and
dynamism to rise against the established order in Iran, and take over the country in a very short
period of time. However, once the conquest was achieved and the new state established, Isma`il
proclaimed Twelver Shi`ism as the state religion. Part of his thinking was no doubt that Twelver
Shi`ism would be a more quietist, and therefore more stable, religious basis for the new state than
the extremist Shi`i/Sufi admixture of his Safavid supporters. Once again, we find Twelver Shi`ism
being identified with stability and quietism, rather than with revolution and militancy.
There was, however, at the heart of Twelver Shi`ism a certain tension. Over against this history
of quietism and political accommodation, there was the doctrine that all political and religious
authority belonged by right to the Hidden Twelfth Imam and anyone who held power was
therefore a usurper of the rights of the Imam. There was thus a contradiction between what the
Shi`i texts said and what in practice the Shi`is themselves did. The difference was bridged, in part,
through the doctrine of taqiyya, the Shi`i doctrine of pious dissimulation. This doctrine held that a
Shi`i could deny their faith or assert a different position from that which the Shi`is believe in order
to protect themselves from danger. The difference was also in part accounted for by other
teachings which stated that since it was necessary for there to be social order for the Shari`a to be
implemented, it was necessary to obey a just ruler.
It cannot be said that Shi`ism in its early history developed any coherent political theory, in the
same way that Sunni Islam did. With a Hidden Imam, all political questions were frozen. No-one
had the authority to replace the Imam, but equally no Shi`i could claim religious authority for
trying to overthrow the existing regime. Those Shi`i writers of the early period who do mention
the question of opposition and rebellion were of the opinion that revolt and rebellion against the
established ruler, even if he be unjust, were not permissible as the overthrowing of oppression and
wrong, and the establishment of justice, constituted one of the tasks that the Hidden Imam would
perform on his return.
Typical of early Shi`i expressions of opinion is the following passage from the Buyid scholar,
al-Shaykh al-Mufid. Writing about the return of the Hidden Imam, he states:
'His fathers [i.e. the preceding Imams] on the other hand allowed [their followers] to practise dissimulation before their enemies, engage in social intercourse with them and be present at their assemblies. In fact they forbade [their followers] to draw the sword against them and warned against inciting anyone to do so.' [3]
Very few of the Shi`i ulama have written political treatises. Those that have been written date
mainly from Qajar times up to the present. Several treatises were written in the early Qajar period
by eminent ulama who were supporters of the state. The Qajars, having established themselves by
force and not having a supposed descent from the Imams which the Safavids claimed, were in
need of a basis of legitimacy to act as a buttress for their authority. In these treatises, the principle
was enunciated that the political rulers were the agents of God, and of the Hidden Imam, in
establishing social order and thus promoting the Holy Law.[4]
In a later period, some of the ulama wrote treatises in favour of the Constitutional
Movement.[5]Although modern scholars have sought out and brought these political treatises into
prominence, in their own time they were not held to be of any great importance, and were among
the more obscure of the writings of their authors.
When Imam Ruhullah Khomeini (1902-1989) began to write on political matters, therefore, he
was going outside the tradition of the major Shi`i ulama. In order to understand the revolution in
Shi`i political thought that he brought about, it is necessary to review briefly the background of
the basis of the authority of the ulama. The authority of the Sunni ulama is based on their
appointment to a particular office by the State. Thus the authority on the basis of which a Mufti
gives judgement is by virtue of his appointment as Mufti. The theoretical basis for the authority of
the ulama in Shi`i Islam is quite different. Their authority is based on the concept that they are
collectively the deputies of the Hidden Imam (na'ib al-Imam al-'amm, see above). Thus,
according to the most authoritative texts, even if they are appointed by the government to a
position such as judge in a court, their authority to give judgements is still by virtue of the na'ib
al-'amm concept.
Until the advent of Khomeini, however, none of the leading ulama formally laid claim to the right
to deputize for the political authority of the Imam. This political authority was either held to have
lapsed with the occultation of the Imam or, as described above, the ulama would sometimes
advance arguments to justify the interim derivative legitimacy of the secular political authorities.
Khomeini was the first to outline a theoretical position which involved an uncompromising
assertion that only a government by experts in religious jurisprudence (vilayat-i faqih) is an accept
able form of Islamic government. This was not always Khomeini's position. His earliest writings
only insisted that the Shah's government should conform to Islamic norms as defined by himself. It
was only after his exile to Iraq in 1964 that he began, in his lectures to the religious students at
Najaf, to call for the vilayat-i faqih. His position was that an Islamic ruler needs to rule in
accordance with the Holy Law (the shari'a), and only an Islamic scholar, an expert in
jurisprudence (the faqih), can have a sufficient knowledge of the shari'a. Therefore leadership in
an Islamic country belongs by right only to a faqih.[6]
There is however nothing illogical in Khomeini's extension of the na'ib al-'amm concept to
include the political authority of the Hidden Imam. The distinction between church and state
which exists in the West is meaningless in Islam. Islam is not just a religion, but a religio-political
entity in which all religious and social matters come under the purview of the shari'a. And if the
ulama are the general vicegerents of the Hidden Imam in all religious matters, why not in the
political sphere also?
Although Imam Khomeini's concept of the ulama's right to supervise political affairs (vilayat-i
faqih) can thus be seen as a logical extension of the na'ib al-'amm concept, it is nevertheless a
radical break with the Shi`i tradition that the leading ulama concern themselves in political matters
only very rarely; and then only when issues of major importance arise. This had certainly been the
attitude of the major ulama right up to and including Ayatollah Burujirdi (d. 1962), the last
Ayatollah who could claim to be sole marja al-taqlid.[7] Even now, despite Khomeini's prestige,
the concept is not universally accepted among Shi`is. In Iran itself, opposition to the vilayat-i
faqih concept was led by a group calling itself the Hujjatiyyih. Outside Iran, the major marja
al-taqlid, several important ayatollahs have voiced reservations about it (in particular the late
Ayatollah Khu'i).
C. The Karbala Paradigm
Much of the power and intensity of the 1979 Revolution came from the willingness of ordinary
people to go out onto the streets and court death by confronting armed troops. What was it that
inspired ordinary people to risk their lives, to move from a pattern of ordinary every-day life into
the mould of heroism and self-sacrifice?
In traditional societies (and even in modern societies to large extent), people are inspired by and
try to live their lives in accordance with certain mythic paradigms. In the telling and retelling of
the myths of the society, the psychological and ethical norms of the society are built up, the role
models by which people live their lives are inculcated and the general ethos of a society is created.
In Shi`i Islam, as indeed with most religions, popular religious activities play a major role in the
life of the individual by creating the myths by which the individual lives. In Shi`i Islam, centre
place in popular religion is taken by the various re-enactments of the Karbala episode. From early
childhood, most Shi`is have been immersed in a culture in which the martyrdom of the Imam
Husayn plays a very prominent role. The martyrdom of the third of the Shi`i Imams, Husayn, at
the hands of the Umayyad armies of the caliph Yazid at Karbala in AD 680, is undoubtedly one of
the most important and emotive episodes in Shi`i history. The first ten days of the month of
Muharram are completely given over to commemorating the martyrdom, culminating on the tenth
day, `Ashura, the day of the martyrdom of the Imam. This forms the most important religious
event of the year, far outweighing any of the commemorations associated with the Prophet
Muhammad, or any other of the Imams. The commemorations take the form of orations
recounting the episode, plays depicting the events, and ritualized processions of mourning at
which it is usual to see people whipping themselves, and cutting themselves in a state of frenzied
mourning for the martyred Imam. For the rest of the year also, it is not uncommon to hold
meetings at which narrations of the Karbala episode are given, and at which expressions of grief
abound. Thus the Karbala episode is not an event in distant history, but rather a powerful symbol
kept alive among the Shi`i masses by frequent emotive rituals and ceremonies.
In the rest of the year, there are numerous commemorations of the other Shi`i Imams who were
persecuted and martyred by their enemies in the first three centuries of the history of Islam. The
other ten Imams of Twelver Shi`ism did not, however, rise up in rebellion to assert the leadership
that they believed had wrongfully been taken from them. They lived quiet lives of prayer and
piety, restraining their followers from any active opposition to the Sunni caliphate and ordering
them to practice taqiyya (pious dissimulation, see above).
Here again we can observe some degree of polarity and tension between two opposite paradigms.
The Husayn/Karbala paradigm of qiyamat (uprising) is one of taking an active role, rising up
against injustice and tyranny; its opposite paradigm, mazlumiyyat (patient endurance of tyranny) is
one of political quietism and was espoused by the other Shi`i Imams. Both are available to Shi`is.
Both can inspire paths of social and political action.
Conclusion
In this presentation, I have examined three themes that are specific to Shi`i Islam. The leadership
role of the Shi`i ulama, the question of political authority in Shi`ism, and the role of the Karbala
paradigm in the popular religion. I have shown how each of these three themes had their origins in
the earliest days of Islam and how they culminated by playing a major role in the 1979 Revolution.
But I have also tried to show that each of these three powerful motivating impulses for the Iranian
Revolution were in fact only one pole of opposing tensions within Shi`i Islam: the tension within
the leadership role of the ulama between political activism and quietism; the tension within Shi`i
political theory between obedience to the government and the concept that all government is an
unjust usurpation of the authority of the Hidden Imam; and the tension between the
qiyamatparadigm of Husayn rising up against tyranny and the mazlumiyyat paradigm of the other
Imams patiently enduring the tyranny of others.
In the history of Shi`ism and Iran, these tensions within Shi`ism have at times pulled in one
direction and at other times in the other, particular in the last two centuries. It was perhaps the
misfortune of the late Shah of Iran to experience the effects of a point in time when all three
factors were moving powerfully in the direction of social action and against his government.
Notes
1. 2 3 4 5 6 7