Dagestan (Daghestan): Comprehensive Report
1. INTRODUCTION
Dagestan is a republic located between Caspian
sea and Caucasus mountain ranges and counting approximately two million
inhabitants (2,186,000 - 1996).
It is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world, counting
30 ethnic groups and 80-odd nationalities.1
Dagestan shares the same problems that are felt all over
the former Soviet Union: the development of an complex balance of political,
economical, ethnic and criminal interest groups, lack of investment, a legacy
of distorted economies that serve local needs inadequately, corruption at
all levels of society, a failing judicial system, acute shortage of administrative
and political skills, a spectacular rise of organized crime, lack of employment,
and easy access to arms.
The main factor dividing ethnic groups in Dagestan is the
distribution of power, wealth and land along ethnic lines. The feeling that
security can only be found within the ethnic group and under a system of
self-government dominated political developments in 1989-1991. The political
elite has succeeded, however, in keeping nationalist ambitions in check.
They were helped by the fact that the mountainous and ethnically diverse
nature of Dagestan renders irrelevant any idea of an independent state based
on the concept of a single nation. In addition, local and national leaders
act with great restraint out of fear of possible inter-ethnic violence.
2. SOME BASIC FACTS
2.1 Geography
Dagestan is situated in the North-East of the Caucasus
mountain range. It borders the Caspian Sea in the East, the Chechen Republic
and Stavropol Territory in the West, the Kalmukya Republic in the North,
and Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South. The republic measures 50,300 square
km and had 37.5 inhabitants per square km in 1989.2
The Dagestani landscape changes from high mountains in
the South to flat steppe land in the North. Because there is no easily accessible
pass over the Caucasian mountains, the coastal plain of Dagestan, bordering
the Caspian Sea, is an important North-South passage. The mountainous areas
are still extremely isolated, notably in winter.3
2.2 Population
In 1989, according to the USSR census, Dagestan had 1,802,188
inhabitants. At present, the population is estimated at 2 million.4 By far the largest ethnic group, the Avars, make
up just over 25 per cent of the population.
|
1989 census |
1993 estimates 5 |
Dagestani nationalities6 |
Avars |
495,721 |
524,000 |
Aguls |
13,791 |
18,000 |
Dargins |
280,431 |
314,000 |
Kumyks |
231,805 |
249,000 |
Laks |
91,682 |
98,000 |
Lezgins |
204,370 |
231,000 |
Nogai |
28,294 |
32,000 |
Rutuls |
14,955 |
19,000 |
Tabasarans |
78,196 |
94,000 |
Tsakhurs |
5,194 |
7,000 |
Other North Caucasians |
Chechens |
57,877 |
62,000 |
Osetians |
1,195 |
2,000 |
Mountains Jews |
3,649 |
? |
Tats |
12,937 |
11,000 |
Slavs |
Russians |
165,940 |
? |
Ukrainians |
8,079 |
9,000 |
Others |
|
|
Azeris |
75,463 |
84,000 |
Jews |
9,390 |
? |
Tatars |
5,473 |
6,000 |
The above table mentions only ten out of two dozen Dagestani
ethnic-linguistic groups that were considered nationalities by the Soviet
Union. Still other groups were considered ethnographic groups, although
some of them have retained their linguistic, social and cultural specificity.7
Except for the Kumyks and Nogai, the Dagestani peoples
are indigenous and traditionally mountain dwellers. They speak Caucasian
languages and are related to other Caucasian peoples like the Chechens,
Cherkessians, Kabardins, Adyghe and Abkhaz. The Kumyks and Nogai originate
from the Central Asian plains. They traditionally live in the steppe regions
and speak Turkic languages.
Each Caucasian ethnic group is divided into tribes, clans,
sub-clans and village communities. The basic unit in rural areas is the
village community, corresponding to one or several clans divided into sub-clans,
usually counting approximately 100 people descending from the same ancestor.
A council of elders regulates relations between the clans and sub-clans.
Loyalty to the sub-group is stronger than to the nationality as a whole.8
This contributes to a sitution whereby the peoples of Dagestan
live ethnically segregated from each other, particularly in the rural areas.
Daughters are generally not allowed to marry outside their own ethnic group.
Mountain people who have settled in the plains tend to stick together. Even
sovkhozes (state agricultural farms) are often de facto divided
between the different ethnic communities that are employed.9
Between 1979 and 1989, the natural population growth in
Dagestan as a whole was 10 per cent, while the mountain peoples increased
by 14 per cent. By comparison, the Russian population decreased by 12 per
cent between 1979 and 1989, mainly through emigration.10
In 1989, there was a 628,000-strong Dagestani diaspora
registered in the former Soviet Union outside Dagestan.11
All Caucasian peoples are part of a wider diaspora, both because of labour
migration and as a result of the deportations of the late 19th century and
in 1944. Because of the economic crisis in the Soviet successor states,
many members of the diaspora have returned to Dagestan over the past years.
There are, however, no reliable figures available on this migration.
2.3 Economy
The traditional economy in the mountainous regions of Dagestan
was based on sheep-breeding. In summer, the flocks grazed the alpine meadows,
and in autumn they were brought to winter pastures in the northern territories
of the Caspian lowlands. Small terraces in the valleys provided grain and
other crops. The northern lowlands were mainly used for cattle-breeding.
Dagestan shares in the general decline of the Russian economy.
Additionally, it struggles with the legacy of being one of the poorest regions
of the Russian Federation. Dagestan is badly connected with the outside
world and has no important natural resources, while foreign investment is
negligible and federal investment has declined since 1991. The weak economic
infrastructure can be illustrated by the fact that 56 per cent of the population
live in scattered villages.12 The return
since 1990 of tens of thousands of migrant workers to Dagestan has added
to existing pressures on the labour market.13
Not unlike elsewhere in the Russian Federation, successful
new entrepreneurs are more often found in trade than in manufacturing. Nevertheless,
the new private sector is dynamic and compensates partially for the economic
decline, but lack of statistics makes it impossible to determine its real
importance. The Dagestani industry is mostly defence related and suffers
from acute lack of orders. Industrial contraction does not only affect the
cities, but also mountain villages, where a number of high-tech military
plants are located.
Agriculture suffers from lack of investment, no reliable
transport and trading system, and uncertainty about landownership. There
is a shortage of agricultural land in the mountains, and, except for the
dry steppes in the North, the lowlands offer only limited opportunities.
Only a negligible part of the agricultural acreage is privately owned.14
In 1992, Dagestan was the fifth most heavily subsidized
republic of the Russian Federation, paying 3,742 million rubles in taxes
and receiving 22,939 million rubles in subsidies.15
The 1994 federal budget foresaw a quarterly subsidy "to equalize the
level of social protection for the population" for Dagestan of 146,417
million rubles, the third highest in the Russian Federation, only comparable
to some northern Siberian districts and the overcrowded republics of North
Osetia and Ingushetia.16
2.4 Language
Many of the 1.5 million speakers of Dagestani languages
live in the mountainous areas. Linguists distinguish 29 different languages
in Dagestan, which are mutually unintelligible. The most important is Avar,
with approximately half a million speakers.17
The smallest Dagestani language is Hinukh with only 5,000 speakers in 1994,
half of them living in the village of Hinukh, the other half forming a community
near Makhachkala.18 Nine of Dagestan's
indigenous languages have a literary tradition - Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, Lezgin,
Tabasaran, Nogai, Azeri, Tat and Lak.19
The Russian language serves as the lingua franca
in Dagestan. It is the language of communication in the plains and in the
national administration. Russian is compulsory in primary and secondary
school. Avar also often serves as a lingua franca between different
Dagestani peoples. In order to prevent controversy, the Government of Dagestan
in 1991 declined to make a decision on an official state language.20
"Multi-lingualism is common throughout the Caucasus
but can take formidable proportions in Dagestan, where it has been noted
that denizens of the highest areas usually speak the language of the group
living beneath them, and so on down to the lowlands."21 Because in the mountain villages there are few occasions
to speak Russian or Avar, only those who frequently trade and travel or
have followed higher education have a good command of these languages.22
2.5 Religion
Dagestan has been a centre of Islamic learning since the
late Middle Ages. Eighty-eight per cent of the population of Dagestan belong
to traditionally Muslim peoples. Despite the fact that only a handful of
mosques survived the mass-destruction of the late 1920s and early 1930s,
Islam has retained a central role in social life. In virtually every village
in Dagestan there is a new mosque being built or one just constructed. Classical
Arabic and Koran reading has been taught in schools since 1992.23 Nevertheless, ethnic allegiances are stronger
than the idea of Islamic unity, as is shown by the fact that Islamic organizations
strictly follow ethnic lines.24 The
only sizeable non-Muslim community in Dagestan is that of the Russians.
Among the mountain populations, Islam is of especially
great importance in social life. Virtually all adult males are members of
a wierd, one or other of the secret Sufi brotherhoods. Membership
of the brotherhoods often follows the lines of membership of sub-clans.
The brotherhoods regulate the religious life of their members and take care
of the rituals that accompany important events in life like birth, marriage
and death.25 Religious leaders mediate
between clans and individuals and thus play a crucial role in the on-going
process of palaver and peacemaking that accompanies a complicated society
like that of Dagestan, but religious groups as such do not play an important
role in politics.26
3. A SHORT HISTORY
3.1 Pre-1917 History
From the 5th century B.C. Dagestan was part of Caucasian
Albania. In the 7th century A.D. it came under Arab domination and its population
was converted to Islam. The Arabs were succeeded by Seljuk Turks in the
10th century, followed in the 13th century by the Mongols and the Golden
Horde, of which the Nogai are descendants. The Ottoman Empire came to dominate
the region in the 16th and the Persians in the 18th century.27
Even though nominally subject to foreign rulers, the people
of Dagestan always retained a virtually independent position. Their own
local leaders were extremely powerful, which partially explains the ferocious
resistance that the mountainous peoples put up against the Russian Empire
when it tried to impose effective political dominance.28
After the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire tried to extend its influence
to the Caucasus. The ensuing Caucasian War (1816-1856) is the most celebrated
period in the history of Dagestan, especially of the Avars. Under their
charismatic leader Imam Shamil, the Caucasians resisted the Russian advance
in a bloody and often heroic war. By the end of the 19th century, millions
of Caucasians had either been killed or forced to emigrate to the Ottoman
Empire. The subsequent immigration of Russians and other Christian peoples
radically changed the inter- ethnic balance in most Caucasian regions.29
3.2 The Soviet Era
During the Russian Revolution, the Caucasian peoples of
Dagestan actively supported the Bolsheviks. Vladimir I. Lenin's promises
of autonomy for ethnic minorities appeared more attractive to them than
the Russian nationalism of General Anton Denikin and his mainly Cossack
White Army. The routing of the anti-Bolshvik ("White") forces
in 1919 brought a bloody suppression of Cossacks, in which bands of Chechen,
Avar and other Caucasian fighters sometimes voluntarily assisted the Red
Army Commissars.30 Later, in 1920-1921,
an anti-Bolshevik uprising, mainly supported by Avars, was brutally crushed.31
In 1921, the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
was proclaimed (DASSR). The DASSR was formed out of the former Tsarist Dagestan
plus the Kumyk district of Terskaia region, later subdivided into Khazbekov,
Novolaksky and Khasav Yurt districts. In 1922, the republic was extended
to the north with former Terek-Cossack lands and parts of Stavropol Territory
and Astrakhan Province, now called Kizlar, Tarumovsky and Nogaisky districts.
In 1938, all the land north of the Terek river was returned to the Astrakhan
Province. Lands west of the Kizlar district, formerly belonging to the Grebenovsky
Cossacks, were added to Dagestan in 1923 and attached to Chechnya in 1957.
Under Communist rule, government posts were judiciously
divided according to nationality, often with no regard to professional ability.
Power and resources were distributed according to a complicated system of
ethnic quotas.32
3.3 The Post-Soviet Era
In 1990-1991, a movement for national independence emerged
in Dagestan. This movement reached its peak in April 1991, when 39 out of
54 regional soviets supported a resolution to create a sovereign Dagestan
Republic. The regions that voted against the resolution were those dominated
by national groups that wished to secede from Dagestan, i.e the Kumyks,
the Nogai and the Lezgins.
In 1990, the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the
Caucasus (CMPC) was founded by representatives of most Caucasian nations.
The Confederation considered the actual territorial division of the whole
Caucasus region artificial, constructed by and in the interest of Russian
imperialism. The CMPC considered the unification of the Caucasian peoples
a prerequisite for their survival. The organization received much attention
when, during the Abkhaz-Georgian war in 1992-1993, it channelled sizeable
North Caucasian military assistance to the Abkhaz.33
The ideas of the CMPC are shared by many Caucasians, but its reliance on
the Government of Chechnya as well as its failure to play any role in the
Chechen war has eroded its political relevance.34
4. THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT
Like in most other regions in the Russian Federation, the
current leadership in Dagestan is largely made up of former communist nomenclatura,
supplemented with successful businessmen. The national movements that emerged
during 1989-91 were mostly led by second echelon politicians. They directed
their activities against each other and the Supreme Soviet of Dagestan,
the main forum of the republic's leaders, but never succeeded in challenging
the incumbent elite. If successful in building a strong following, new leaders
were absorbed by the established elite. One of the reasons for the failure
of the national movements to play a leading role in Dagestan politics was
that Dagestan society is characterized by strong bonds of loyalty to local
clanleaders, and interest in national politics is low.35
Another factor is that the old communist party had been infiltrated by the
clan-system. As most present-day national leaders come from the old power
structures, ethnic interests are already represented in the government.36
By the mid 1990s, the nationalist movements that emerged
in the late 1980's have lost much of their political relevance. Election
results in 1990, and most likely, in 1995 too, were manipulated, but this
did not arouse much popular indignation.37
Today, a mixture of old nomenclatura and new businessmen effectively
maintain the internal peace.
Conflicts of interest in Dagestan are generally settled
behind closed doors. The main political conflicts are about the distribution
of power and money, rather than ideological or ethnic issues. The distribution
of federal subsidies is one of the dominant issues in Dagestan politics.
All inter-ethnic controversies in Dagestan are linked to economic issues
like possession of land, distribution of jobs, and housing.38
Nevertheless, the political leadership of Daghestan is
aware of the importance of fair representation of Dagestan's ethnic groups
in local and national politics. The 26 July 1994 constitution was designed
to achieve this. The borders of the constituencies have been drawn in order
to prevent mono-ethnic units and promote cross-nationality voting. Informal
arrangements between national groups should guarantee proportionality. If
this is not achieved, the Electoral Commission can allocate certain seats
to members of one national group.39
The Government can intervene directly if the outcome of
local elections is undesired. In the June 1994 elections for the City Council
of Makhachkala, Avars obtained 50 per cent of the seats while only constituting
20 per cent of the electorate, while the Dargins obtained 30 per cent with
only 10 per cent of the population. Ethnic Russians obtained no seats at
all, although they constitute about 20 per cent of the population. To counter
this imbalance 10 new seats were created in the City Council and no Avars
or Dargins were allowed to stand for these.40
Part of the Dagestan Supreme Soviet is elected by general
suffrage, the remainder is appointed by the districts. The 14 members of
the State Council are elected by the Supreme Soviet. No nationality can
have more than one member on the State Council and in order to be elected
candidate for the State Council, one must be among the three representatives
of one's own ethnic group who has gained the most nominations from the whole
Supreme Soviet. Both at the local and the national level, the need to obtain
votes from other than one's own nationality, keeps radicals and leaders
of national movements away from positions of power.41
Partially as a result of these electoral arrangements,
members of the former Communist Party still dominate politics in Dagestan.
The country has kept its Soviet symbols intact. A bronze statue of Lenin
stands firm in the centre of Makhachkala. Although Communist Party structures
here are weak, members of the party won 50 per cent of the vote during the
all-Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993. Other explanations
for the electoral success of the communists range from fear of economic
change and aversion to the collusion between organized crime and state institutions,
to a conscious choice of an internationalist ideology as an alternative
to the threats of nationalism.42
The importance of informal arrangements in Dagestan politics
fosters the development of an oligarchy. The parliamentary elections of
March 1995 saw the rise to power of a number of successful businessmen,
some of whom are allegedly involved in criminal activities, at the expense
of economically unsuccessful members of the former nomenclatura.43 But they did not bring any fundamental changes
in the composition of the ruling elite.44
The emergence of criminals in Dagestan's national politics
was illustrated by brutal attacks on leading politicians during the summer
of 1995. On 14 August a grenade was fired at the home of Prime Minister
Abdurazak Mirzabekovand on 23 August 1995, State Duma Deputy and candidate
for the post of secretary of the Communist Party, Sergei Reshulsky, was
badly wounded by unknown assailants .45
The emergence of businessmen and clanleaders in national
politics can be viewed in different ways. On the one hand, it may be said
that they do not advance the development of a transparent democracy, and
that they turn the state into a source of personal enrichment. On the other
hand, they have introduced a new type of leadership, which leaves greater
personal freedom to the population, and they are more open to the needs
and complaints of the population than the former nomenclatura.46 However, at the same time it is true that national
movements lacking influential and rich leaders are politically marginalized.
It is generally assumed that an important part of the electorate is guided
by gratitude to a certain candidate for favours rendered, rather than by
political considerations.47
While understanding the need for mutual compromise, the
leaders of the ethnic and business interests groups that dominate Dagestan
politics suppress any trully democratic opposition. In August 1995, a group
of Duma members of different parties, including Russia's Choice, sent an
open letter to President Boris Yeltsin in which they denounced the denigration
and persecution of democrats by local leaders. They noted several cases
of criminal proceedings against democrats who had publicly expressed their
views, as well as cases of dismissal and denial of access to the media.
The letter mentions the Government of Dagestan among the six most oppressive
local regimes within the Russian Federation.48
Relations between the Dagestani and Federal Governments
are mainly good. The Dagestani leadership is generally convinced that it
cannot afford any serious friction with the Federal Government. As Bagaudin
Akhmedov, the vice-chairman of the Dagestani parliament, put it: "Without
Russia, we are unable to survive; 80 per cent of our budget is financed
by Moscow".49
5. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE LAND ISSUE
The mountainous regions have always had a population surplus,
but until the 1950s, migration to the lowlands was limited due to the occurence
of malaria. Since malaria has been brought under control, migration to the
plains has been a dominant feature of Dagestan's social evolution.
In the 19th century, as part of the effort to subdue the
mountain peoples, Tsarist Russian troops destroyed many of the terraces
constructed to make high altitude agriculture possible. This policy was
continued under Soviet rule and in the 1930s a system of collective farming
was imposed, forcing 39,000 families to move to newly formed Kolkhozes
(collective agricultural farms) in the plains. In the years immediately
following 1944, another 17,740 families were forcibly resettled.50
From the early 1960s until the mid 1970s, it was the Government
policy was to resettle mountain peoples in the plains. The resettlements
involved all Caucasian ethnic groups, but the Avars, Chechens and Lak in
particular. This "voluntary" migration was accompanied by an aggressive
propaganda campaign and a virtual end to the financing of public services
in the mountains.51
The migration to the plains has led to the domination of
both urban society and much of the rural lowlands by mountain peoples. Mountain
dwellers settling in the lowlands have introduced intensive cultivation
techniques to areas traditionally inhabited by pastoral peoples.52 The situation of the pastoral peoples has deteriorated
seriously since the beginning of the last century when the Kumyks still
dominated the coastal areas. Some of the current inter-ethnic controversies
result from the fact that the mountain peoples' agricultural practices and
attitudes clash with those of cattle-breeding Nogai and Kumyks.53
Without development of the mountainous areas, there will
be continued migration to the lowlands. The competition over scarce resources
and jobs that accompanies the migration process carries the danger of aggravating
inter-ethnic tensions.
6. PEOPLES OF DAGESTAN
6.1 Avars
The Avars are subdivided into 17 sub-groups, each speaking
their own dialect. They form the largest ethnic group in Dagestan. Their
traditional territories in the mountainous districts of south-west Dagestan
are almost exclusively populated by Avars. The Avar elite, together with
Darghins, are firmly entrenched in the Dagestan state structures.54
The Avar national movement is the People's Front Imam Shamil,
led by Gadzi Makhachev.55 The front
never gained much significance. In 1992, it announced a moratorium on any
activity unless other national movements were to challenge them.56
There are 45,000 Avars in the Belakan and adjoining districts
in Northern Azerbaijan. On several occasions since 1991, local Avar leaders
have expressed their hope that the Avar villages in the north-west of the
district could be joined with Dagestan. The Avars' wish is supported by
dubious Russian historians who claim that Belakan belongs to Russia.57 In June 1995, the press in Azerbaijan accused
unspecified Russian circles of encouraging separatism among the Avars.58
On 11 July 1994, troops of Azerbaijan clashed with armed
locals in the village of Gabakchel in the Belokanskii rayon of northwest
Azerbaijan after the seizure of arms. The armed groups were reportedly linked
with separatist Avars active in the regions bordering Dagestan.59
6.2 Dargins
The Dargins are subdivided into three groups, Dargins,
Kubachins and Kaitags. They live mostly in Central Dagestan. Like the Avars
and the Laks, they are relatively well represented in the Dagestan state
structures. The establishment of the Dargin national movement Tsadesh
(Unity) in 1991 was not aimed at undoing perceived injustices, but at countering
the ambitions of other ethnic groups. Tsadesh has never shown much
activity. According to one observer Dargins "follow everything that
the Laks do".60
6.3 Kumyks
The origin of the Kumyks is not clear, but it seems probable
that they are rooted in an intermingling of indigenous Caucasian elements
with Turkic-speaking tribes who migrated to Dagestan in the 10th century.61 Once dominating the Caspian lowlands, the Kumyks
have become a minority of only 22 per cent in their homelands by the early
1990s, owing to massive migration of mountain peoples, principally Avars,
Laks and Dargins. The wanton destruction of mountain villages and farming
lands by the Soviet authorities has made this migration irreversible.62
The collectivization and the forced resettlement of mountain
peoples to Kumyk territory destroyed the Kumyk's traditional settlement
pattern and deprived them of half of their arable land.63 They have a high proportion of city-dwellers.64
In 1990, the newly formed national movement of the Kumyk,
Tenglik (Equality), led by Salav Aliev, announced its intention to
create a Kumyk national state. Referring to their past as the dominant group
along the Dagestan coast, the advocates of Kumyk independence argued that
only through full cultural sovereignty could the Kumyk language and culture
recover after decades of russification and Soviet culture influence. It
remains unclear what the culturally sovereign Kumyk national state should
look like, considering that the Kumyk form such a tiny proportion of the
population in their traditional territories.65
According to Tenglik, the Kumyk are under-represented
in the state structures and economically underprivileged.66 The organization is opposed to what it consideres
Avar over- representation in leading functions. It became the favourite
target of the Avar national movement, Shamil.67
In November 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies of
the Dagestan Autonomous Republic voted to create a Kumyk republic within
Dagestan, but the Kumyk representatives considered the level of autonomy
envisaged insufficient.68
In October 1991, Tenglik mobilized virtually the
whole of the Kumyk population in protest against the dominant political
position of the Avars in regions with important Kumyk presence, as well
as to express dissatisfaction with the ongoing resettlement of mountain
people in traditional Kumyk territories. The movement subsided when the
Government of Dagestan nominated an ethnic Kumyk as Minister of Justice.
Tenglik has not displayed much activity since.
In 1994, the Kumyk National Congress was formed. It is
less radical than Tenglik, and is believed to be an initiative of
the Government of Dagestan meant to counterbalance the radicals within Tenglik.69
6.4 Lezgins
The Lezgins are predominantly Sunni Muslims living in the
south-east of Dagestan and the north-west of Azerbaijan. 376,000 ethnic
Lezgins were officially registered in 1989, 205,000 in Dagestan and 171,000
in Azerbaijan. The disintegration of the USSR has transformed internal administrative
boundariess into international borders, threatening the unity of the Lezgins.
The Lezgins live mainly in rural areas. Their national
organizations estimate their actual number in Azerbaijan between 600,000
and 700,000, instead of the official 171,000. They explain the disparity
by saying that the majority of Lezgins had registered themselves as Azeris
during the Soviet period, due to social and political pressure.70
The Lezgin national movement Sadval (Unity) was
founded in July 1990 in the town of Derbent in Azerbaijan. It is led by
General Kochimanov and Ruslan Ashuraliev. Sadval is aiming at the
unification of the Lezgin people. In December 1991 the All-national Congress
of Lezgins even called for the creation of a "national-state formation
Lezgistan".71
In 1991, a rival Lezgin national organization, Samur,
was established in Azerbaijan. This organization opposes any revision of
state borders and advocates integration of Lezgins in Azerbaijan. In July
1992, this was followed by the establishment of the Lezgin Democratic Party
of Azerbaijan, which holds similar views. Both organizations are sponsored
by the Government of Azerbaijan to counter the percieved threat posed by
Sadval.72
In April 1995, a new political party, Alpan, was
founded in Dagestan, which has as its main objective the unification of
the Lezgin territories in Azerbaijan with Russia. The secretary of Alpan,
Amiran Babaev, stated in an interview that Azerbaijan continues to suppress
the rights of the Lezgins and other minorities living there. Observers believe
that Russia is using the dissatisfaction of the Lezgin minority to increase
pressure on Azerbaijan.73
6.5 Russians
The Russians in Dagestan consist of two groups. Cossacks,
who settled on the left bank of the Terek river from the 16th century, and
19th and 20th century immigrants, who mainly settled in the cities. The
latter group is by far the largest as a result of the severe repression
that the Cossacks suffered in 1919-1920 and because of the 20th century
immigration of Russians.74
The traditional Cossack territories on the left bank of
the Terek river roughly coincide with the present Kizlar region. In the
1960s, non-Russians still formed a small minority of less than 15 per cent
in this region. Because of their higher birth rate and the migration of
mountain peoples to the plains, non-Russians now make up an estimated 50
per cent of the population in the Kizlar region. Russians are under-represented
in the local administration, e.g. constitute less than 10 per cent of the
region's police corps.75 At least 40,000
people in Stavropol and Dagestan claim to be Terek Cossacks.76 In 1990, the Cossacks formed the Low-Terek Cossack
Association, led by Ataman Alexandr Elson, which strives for the unification
of all Terek Cossacks and the recovery of traditional Cossack territories.
The Association is a member of the Vladikavkaz based Terek-Cossack Host.
Russian-speakers were also organized in the Slav Movement of Russia, led
by Sergei Sinitsin. In July 1994, a new organization, Russian Community
(Russkaia Obshchina), was registered in Makhachkala. It claims to
represent 200,000 Russian speakers and its main declared task is the "protection
of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Dagestan".77 Its establishment is seen by some observers
as an attempt by the Federal Government to increase its influence over Dagestan
internal politics.78
The Cossacks and Russians are politically under-represented
in the higher echelons of the state and believe that they therefore profit
relatively little from the economic reforms and privatization, in which
patronage by powerful politicians is often a prerequisite for success.79
Cossack organizations are trying to revive the tradition
whereby a Cossack line of defence in the northern Caucasus protected southern
Russia. The emigration since 1989 of hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers
from North Caucasian republics, notably Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan,
served as a catalyst for the formation of Cossack defence units, while the
establishment of these armed forces created unrest among the other ethnic
groups.80 The Cossacks do not push their
claims in Dagestan, however, and links with the more radical Vladikavkaz
based mother-organization are often strained.81
6.6 Chechens
In February 1944, within a period of two weeks, the entire
Chechen population of the Caucasus was deported to the deserts of Kazakstan.
An estimated quarter of the deportees died during the first five years of
exile.82 Among the deportees were approximately
30,000 Chechens from Dagestan.83
Subsequently, about 15,000 Laks, who lived in a high mountain
region in the centre of Dagestan, were forced to resettle in traditional
Chechen territories, mainly in the Auskovsky district, which was renamed
Novolaksky district.84
In 1957, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union Nikita Kruchev denounced a number of policies of his predecessor,
Joseph Stalin, and rehabilitated most deported peoples, including the Chechens.85 About 25,000 Chechens returned to Dagestan during
1957-1958, only to find that they had been dispossessed and were forced
to resettle in the Khasav Yurt district, on the border with the newly formed
Chechen-Ingushetia Republic. As a result, most of Dagestan's 62,000-plus
Chechens currently live in the Khazbekov and Khasav Yurt districts.86
In 1991 conflict arose with the Laks and Avars, when the
Chechen National Council of the Republic of Dagestan demanded the recovery
of their former territories and the re- establishment of the pre-1944 Auskhovsky
district.87 The Avars were opposed to
the Chechen demands. They did not accept that a number of mixed Chechen-Avar
villages in Khazbekov district would join the Novolaksky/Auskovsky district.
The Chechens in Dagestan have refrained from active involvement
in the Chechen war. After a December 1994 appeal to all Caucasian peoples
from President Dzokhar Dudayev to start military action against Russian
federal forces in Dagestan, the Chechen National Council of the Republic
of Dagestan adopted a decision to suspend contacts with him. They stressed
that it would be unacceptable for the conflict to flare up in Dagestan.
The separatist Chechen Government failed to obtain any public support from
Chechen organizations in Dagestan.88
6.7 Lak
The Lak traditionally live in the mountainous Koshu region
and use lands in the northern steppe and north of Makhachkala as winter
pastures. They are well represented in the urban centres and there is a
considerable Lak diaspora in Moscow89.
The Lak possess greater cohesion than the other nationalities in Dagestan,
which partially explains their relative importance in society.90 Being the most educated and cosmopolitan of
the people of Dagestan and speaking Russian rather than Lak at home, many
of them fear the disappearance of their ethnic identity.91
The Lak national movement, Tsubars (New Star), was
established in 1990. It mainly focuses on the development of Lak culture
and national identity. Its chairman is Hirytdin Khadziev, at present Minister
of Agriculture. Another important leader of the Lak national movement is
Magomed Khachilaev. The Laks are well integrated in Dagestan's political
elite and are staunch supporters of an undivided Dagestan.92
Beside Tsubars, the Novolak Popular Front was established
in August 1991 in reaction to the activities of the Chechen organization
Vainakh. It has been dormant ever since the 1992 agreement on the
resettlement of the Laks from Novolaksky district. President of the Novolak
Popular Front is Ismailov Dalgat.93
6.8 Nogai
The Nogai descend from the Golden Horde. Their historical
territory, the once huge Nogai steppe, includes the northern part of Dagestan
and the eastern part of Stavropol Territory. Most Nogai live in dispersed
communities on the steppes that form the Nogai, Babaurt, Tarum, and Kizlar
districts of Dagestan, the adjoining Neftekumsky district of Stavropol Province,
and Sholkovsky district in Karachay-Cherkessia. There are also several Nogai
settlements in the north-east of Chechnya.94
Living mainly in the rural areas and forming small minorities
in all these three republics, ethnic Nogai occupied hardly any leading positions
during the Soviet era and their cultural development has been stunted. In
Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria, the Nogai have lost much of their ethnic
cohesion while in Dagestan the Nogai live more compactly and have greater
cultural and political autonomy. They form a 75 percent majority in the
Nogai region of Dagestan, the only place where Nogai language education
is offered in secondary education.95
Other peoples have settled on the Nogai steppe over the
past thirty years, notably Avars, Laks and Darghins. The state supports
these settlements with cheap credit and the distribution of land ownership
rights. The newcomers build villages and compete with the Nogai for good
pasture. Only 20 per cent of the Nogai steppe is still in use by the Nogai
themselves. They rate this development as a kind of annexation. Their grievances
are aggravated by the fact that the newcomers live in permanent houses while
the Nogai consider the steppe collective property and traditionally live
in movable houses, called cutan. It is expected that the Nogai will
be a minority on the steppe by the end of this century, but they lack the
power to counter this process.96
The Nogai national movement Birlik (Unity), led
by K. Balbek and B. Kildasov, has existed as a cultural organization since
1957 and was transformed into a political movement in December 1989, when
it spoke out in favour of an autonomous Nogai republic separate from Dagestan
and which would include include parts of Chechnya. Its main goal was to
undo the breaking up of their territories between three different administrative
entities in which they form insignificant minorities. They considered a
concentration of the remaining Nogai essential for the preservation of the
Nogai people and hoped that such a republic would attract other Nogai from
the North Caucasus.
Birlik never acquired much political muscle. Being dispersed
and traditionally nomadic, the Nogai cannot claim any region as their historic
homeland. Furthermore, the Nogai are lagging behind in education attainment
and lack a powerful elite that would be capable of organizing its people.
It is questionable whether a large proportion of the Nogai is aware of the
programme of Birlik.97
7. ETHNIC CONFLICTS
7.1 Laks and Chechens
After the deportation of Chechens from Auskhovsky district
in 1944, the then Soviet Government forced 15,000 Laks to move into what
was renamed Novolaksky district. They came from traditional high mountain
villages, which the Soviet administration wanted to clear and found the
Chechen villages fully intact. They have lived in Novolaksky district since
and their present prosperity is mostly the fruit of their own labour. Laks
and Chechens generally agree that their quarrels are a result of Soviet
divide-and-rule policies and that they have nothing to blame each other
for.
Chechens are determined to return to their ancestral lands.
In 1992, radicals placed signs along Novolaksky's border, saying "Auskovsky
district". Encouraged by their local committee, thousands of Chechens
moved into Novolaksky district and threatened not only to oust the Laks,
but also to move into two Avar villages. In September 1992, groups of Chechens
clashed with Laks and Avars, martial law was imposed, and special armoured
police units of the Russian OMON (Otriady Militsyy Osobogo Naznacheniya,
attached to the Interior Ministry) were brought into the region. The authorities
of the Chechen Republic expressed their strong support for the Chechen demands,
creating fear of a widening of the conflict.98
However, the crisis was quickly averted. The Government
of Dagestan made a series of concessions to the Chechens, including the
abolition of legislation hampering the registration of Chechens in Novolaksky
district, payment for property that was lost in 1944, and promises that
funds would be made available for the resettlement of Laks.99
The Laks agreed to leave Novolaksky district, provided
they were resettled on equally attractive land and fully compensated. They
accepted resettlement on Kumyk territory in Khazav-Yurt and north of Makhachkala
on condition that significant investment was made to compensate for what
they had to leave behind in Novolaksky district. The Government promised
to make these investments, but only token amounts were actually spent on
the resettlement. No more than a dozen families left Novolaksky district.100
All parties are trying to profit as much as possible from
the agreement. The Chechens claim their ancestral homes, while keeping their
present property in Kasav Yurt. The Laks want spacious houses and an infrastructure
at least as good as that in Novolaksky district. They demand that their
villages are moved as a whole. Individual Laks have until now refused all
houses offered to them on the grounds that they are inferior to the ones
they would leave behind.101
7.2 Laks and Kumyks
The difficulties between Laks and Kumyks are a direct result
of the allocation in 1992 of Kumyk territory to the Laks from Novolaksky
district. Kumyk irritation is intensified because the Laks require large
lots of land, larger than the Kumyks themselves generally dispose of. In
July 1992, when a small group of Laks from Novolaksky district was relocated
in Kumyk territory north of Makhachkala, Kumyks plead armed guards around
the area. The situation was defused after Lak and Kumyk elders and religious
leaders agreed that the first group of Laks would return to Novolaksky district.102
The number of Laks that have left for Kumyk land is negligible
because the Government of Dagestan Government has so far failed to invest
in the Lak resettlement. As long as the implementation of the 1992 agreement
is not seriously pursued, there is no risk of conflict between Laks and
Kumyks.103
7.3 Russians and Avars
Relations between Cossacks and Avars are often tense, and
were especially so in 1990-1991, when Cossacks vehemently opposed proposals
for the loosening of Dagestan's ties with the Russian Federation, an idea
that the Avars in general supported. Instead, Cossacks wanted recognition
as a military caste inside the Russian Federation. They threatened to transfer
their settlements to the Russian Republic in the event that Dagestan should
declare full sovereignty.104 The establishment
of an unofficial Terek Cossack Army in 1990 in Vladikavkaz worried their
neighbours. The Terek Cossack Army, heavily engaged in the war in North
Ossetia in 1991, remained essentially an affair of more western Cossack
communities, and never obtained the support from the Federal Government
of Russia it had hoped for.105
Relations with the Chechens in Dagestan also took a turn
for the worse during this period. Like so many North Caucasians, Chechens
tend to confirm that Cossacks belong to the region's indigenous peoples
when speaking in public, but privately often regard them as intruders.106 Not unlike in Chechnya and Ingushetia, Cossack
cemeteries in Kizlar region were frequently vandalized in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s.107
The proportion of Russians in the total population of Dagestan
is decreasing, both because of low birth rates and because of emigration.
The latter, for which no reliable figures are available but which is believed
to exceed 500 individuals each month from Kizlar region alone, can be explained
by several factors. The Russians are overrepresented in industry, a sector
currently in steep decline, and the Avars and Dargins that dominate the
state structures allegedly favour their own ethnic groups when it comes
to investment, privatization and the issuing of concessions and licenses.
There are no complaints of discrimination against them as state policy.108
A decree of 9 August 1995 signed by Russian President Boris
Yeltsin, ordering the incorporation of 20 Cossack units into the regular
Russian Army and promising restitution of territory to the Cossacks, was
not matched by concessions to peoples - Caucasian and Turkic - to whom the
Cossacks show a hostile attitude.109
7.4 Lezgins and Azeris
While the border between Azerbaijan and Dagestan was only
a nominal one, when the two countries formed part first of the Russian Empire
and later of the Soviet Union, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
it became a frontier separating two sovereign states. Lezgins herd sheep
on both sides of the border and family and trade relations cut across borders.
Border controls would greatly interfere with the Lezgins' way of life.110
The Lezgins have never complained about any cultural or
other repression in Dagestan. On the other hand they accuse the Government
of Azerbaijan of suppression of the Lezgin language and culture.111 They claim that they have been forced to lie
about their ethnic identity for fear of job-discrimination or worse. The
desire to secede from Azerbaijan was intensified when Lezgin men started
to be forcibly recruited for military duty in Nagorno-Karabakh, a war that
the Lezgins consider an Azeri-Armenian conflict that does not concern them.
Another grievance is the resettlement in 1989 of Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan
on Lezgin territory.
Since 1990 the Azerbaijan authorities have been accusing
Russia of stirring up the Lezgin question using it as a leverage against
Azerbaijan.112 In 1992, a working group
within the federal State Committee for Nationalities issued a report on
conditions in the Caucasus. The report concluded that there is a "high
probability" that an armed conflict would take place on the Russian-Azerbaijan
border because of Lezgin activism. Such a situation, the report concluded,
"could seriously destabilize not only Dagestan but the entire North
Caucasus".113
In June 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a
decree on the establishment of an international frontier between Azerbaijan
and the Russian Federation. The Lezhin national movement, Sadval,
organized rallies in both Dagestan and Azerbaijan, which were attended by
tens of thousands of Lezgins.114 In
an effort to defuse the situation, the Russian Federation decided to introduce
customs controls only. Pressure of Dagestan authorities led to special arrangements
for residents of the border regions, which calmed down the situation.115
The Government of Azerbaijan Government has tried to resolve
various Lezgin issues at the Consultative Council of Small Nations which
is headed by a state counsellor to the President of Azerbaijan and which
works closely with the Samur Cultural Centre in Baku. Samur is
a more moderate Lezgin movement, often at odds with Sadval, and its
foundation is generally believed to have been initiated by the Azerbaijan
authorities to counter the separatism of Sadval.116 Samur, whose chairman is Ali Musaev, advocates
integration with Azerbaijan.117
In October 1993, a group of Dagestan elders met with President
Geidar Aliev of Azerbaijan. During the meeting, the President conceded that
the border had only a conditional character because for centuries, Azeris,
Avars, Lezgins, Kumyks and Dargins had mingled across it. He agreed to proposals
to make the border a "zone of security, stability and cooperation",
which de facto created transparent borders.118
Nevertheless the Federal Government decided in December 1993 to temporarily
close the border between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan. The official
explanation was the rise in smuggling, but the closure happened against
a background of deteriorating relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.119
During his visit to Dagestan in April 1994, the Russian
Counterintelligence Service chief, Sergei Stepashin, signed a protocol setting
up border and customs posts on the Azerbaijani-Russian border, thus definitively
nullifying Baku's idea of a stability zone. He had apparently concluded
that Russia could deal with the Lezgins without making any concessions to
them. During his visit, violent clashes broke out in Derbent between Lezgins,
local Azeris and the police, leaving a number of people dead.120
On 14-15 June 1994, Lezgins who protested against the drafting
of Lezgins to fight in Nagorno-Karabagh, clashed with police in the Azerbaijan
region of Gusar. Two people were killed. President Geidar Aliev decided
to form another state commission to investigate relations with the Lezgins.
The commission has not yet issued any public statements. In September 1995,
several hundred young Lezgins crossed into Dagestan to evade service in
the Azerbaijan army.121
Due to the war in Chechnya the border between Azerbaijan
and Dagestan was sealed off in December 1994 to prevent the Chechens from
receiving assistance from Azerbaijan. The closure has only been lifted temporarily
since. Russia is Azerbaijan's main trading partner and it is assumed that
the Russian Federation uses the closure of the border to pressure Azerbaijan
to accept that the future pipeline for Caspian oil will run through Russia.
The closure causes the Lezgins great inconvenience.122
Although the Russian Federation's attack on Chechnya has
quieted the Lezgins for the time being, the closure of the border and the
continuing problems concerning the draft in Azerbaijan have renewed radicalism
among the Lezgins. Only an improvement in the relations between the Russian
Federation and Azerbaijan could create the conditions for a settlement.
7.5 Strategies for Conflict Resolution
The traditional manner of conflict resolution in the Northern
Caucasus requires that if a person has done damage to a member of another
clan, the leaders of the their clans will meet and try to find a resolution
by which the damaged party is compensated and the guilty party's honour
is saved. In the negotiating process, the elders appeal to common values
like hospitality, moderation, manly dignity and generosity. In tackling
inter-ethnic rivalries, Government officials make use of these traditions.
They invite the community leaders and facilitate the negotiating process.
If necessary, they offer compensation to the parties that feel disadvantaged.123 This approach may be successful because the
Government's ethnic policy is sufficiently balanced and no Dagestani ethnic
group profoundly distrusts the Government.
The authorities do not act as neutral peacemakers only,
but take sides when convinced that one of the parties is wrong. The Government's
first priority is to uphold the law and maintain public order. It tends
to favour moderate groups over radical ones. Sometimes, weaker groups are
forced to give in to stronger groups if this seems an effective way to overcome
a crisis.124
However, these attempts by the ruling elite to defuse inter-ethnic
tension in Dagestan can be successful only because the population at large
feels the need to find peaceful rather than violent solutions. Informal
leaders of the communities play a key role in the negotiation process. They
use their personal authority to convince people under their influence of
the necessity to accept compromise.
8. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN CHECHNYA
The war in Chechnya has had little effect on the internal
politics of Dagestan. In December 1994, the transit of Russian troops passing
through Dagestan was interrupted, but further public acts of protest have
been effectively suppressed.
Immediately after the incursion of Russian troops in Chechnya,
the Government of Dagestan expressed its understanding for the offensive
and has been cooperative in suppressing pro- Chechen groups. During the
first months of 1995, the federal and local authorities effectively repressed
individual citizens and organized groups in Dagestan who expressed opposition
to the war. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the Chairman of
the Parliament of the Confederation of the Caucasian Nations, Ali Aliev,
and his deputy, Dengi Hamidov. Publication of the newspaper 'Islam's Way'
was suspended pending criminal proceedings against the editor-in-chief,
Fatulla Jamalov, for publishing President Dzokhar Dudayev's appeals.125
The suppression of pro-Chechen groups was facilitated by
the fact that Dagestanis, although shocked by the brutal Russian intervention,
had suffered from the break-down of law and order in Chechnya. Many Dagestanis
suppose that the Chechens provoked the intervention by their militant separatism.126 Rregular hold-ups of the vital Moscow-Makhachkala
train connection and the spread of armed robberies in the districts bordering
Chechnya have created popular resentment against the Chechen Government.
When in December 1994 President Dzokhar Dudayev appealed to the Dagestanis
"to unite with us at this difficult time for the Chechens and not allow
Russia to strangle freedom in the Caucasus", there was almost no reaction.127
Another factor explaining the absence of open support for
the Chechen struggle is that expressions of open support from the relatively
few Dagestani Chechens would not make any difference in the war, while without
active engagement they are able to deliver supplies and offer refuge to
wounded and exhausted seperatist fighters.128
The large number of refugees from Chechnya that poured
into Dagestan starting December 1994 has put a severe strain on the western
regions of the republic. According to the Federal Migration Service, the
number of registered refugees in May 1995 was 110,000, but the total number
probably exceeded 150,000.129 By September
1995, more than half of the refugees from Chechnya had already left Dagestan,
partially because of increasing pressure from local administrations. The
remaining refugees are expected to stay. The Minister for Nationalities
of Dagestan, Magomedsadykh Gysaev, expressed his concern over this group
of about 70,000 people and declared that his Government wants them to leave
the republic. The Minister complained of a lack of funds for relief operations
and blamed the refugees for an increase in the crime rate.130
9. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
People have become more pragmatic. The re-emergence of
trade and property ownership has made them less inclined to put their life
or even their comfort at risk because of vague collective ideas, so the
role of nationalism is declining in the political life of most of these
new states [in the Caucasus].131
All North Caucasian Republics are extremely dependent on
the centre, and they are fearful of not getting anything from Moscow if
they do not show loyalty.132
These two citations reflect the two main facets of the
situation in Dagestan today. The ethnic conflicts that emerged in Dagestan
in 1990-1991 have lost most of their political relevance by 1995. The national
movements failed to develop programmes to deal with the economic crisis.
Nor have they been successful in obtaining their goals or allowing radical
leaders to penetrate Dagestan's political leadership. The decline of the
national movements has been accelerated by the dramatic decline in economic
security and living standards since 1990. This has made people concentrate
on their individual well-being, rather than on ethnic or political issues.
The war in Chechnya has had surprisingly little impact
on Dagestan. The initial outburst of popular anger quickly gave way to prudence.
Inter-Caucasian solidarity proved to be much weaker than fear of war and
the dangers of internal instability.
The Dagestan political landscape is remarkably stable.
The Head of State, Magomedali Magomedov, a Dargin, has retained his position
since the late 1970s. Only a radical change in the political power balance
in Dagestan could bring ethnic issues to the foreground again. This could
be brought about by radical changes within the leadership of the Russian
Federation or by a collapse of the communist "partocracy" within
Dagestan.
Possibly, the significance of national movements was exagerrated
from the start. In Dagestan, few people care passionately about their own
nationality, and those who do might have gained excessive coverage because
outspoken views generally attract more attention than moderate ones.133 Some observers even contest the view that
the national movements in Dagestan reflect genuine national feelings. They
regard the radicalism in the programmes of organizations like Sadval
and Tenglik merely as a means in the hands of minorities and local
politicians to obtain privileges and subsidies from the central authorities.134
Dagestan's dependence on federal subsidies is expected
to decrease in the coming years. In August 1995, Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Soskovets told the Association of the North Caucasian Republics that
they must develop their economies without expecting much help from Moscow.135 Declining subsidies coincide with declining
taxes paid to the central authorities. This process will lessen the importance
of Dagestan's Government in the economy and increase the role of local leaders.
To compensate for decreasing subsidies, the Federal Government is considering
granting Dagestan the status of a free economic zone.136
Despite the relativily balanced inter-ethnic situation
in Dagestan, outbursts of internal conflict are not to be excluded in the
long run, as existing inter-ethnic and inter-clan feuds are contained rather
than solved. Currently, the unresolved problem of the division of the Lezgins
between Dagestan and Aerbaijan is the most precarious. Future developments
in this question depend largely on the evolution of Russian-Azerbaijan relations.
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___, "Dagestan Wants to Return Chechen Refugees". 26 September
1995, quoting Izvestia [Moscow]. 26 September 1995 (electronic format).
Ormrod, Jane. "North Caucasus: Fragmentation or Federation?".
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 7 (July 1992). pp. 448-476.
Pain, Emil. "The Long Legacy of Ethnic Engineering".
War Report [London], No. 24 (June 1995). p. 25.
Personal interviews with Lak, Chechen and Dargin inhabitants
of Khasav Yurt, July 1995.
Personal interview with Chechen separatist fighters, Makhketi,
July 1995.
Petrushevsky, L. Dzhar-Belakan in the First Part of
XIX Century. Reprint. Moscow, 1995.
Prism [Jamestown]. "An
Ethnic Challenge to International Borders". Vol. 1, No. 6, Part 2.
(2 June 1995) (electronic format).
Russia Briefing [London]. "The
Cossacks: Sabre-Rattling". Vol. 1, No. 2, (27 March 1993). pp. 5-7.
___, "The Terek Cossacks". Vol. 3, No. 5, (29 May 1995). pp. 7-12.
___, "The Regional Terek Diaspora". Vol. 3, No. 5, (29 May 1995).
p. 8.
Smeets, Rieks. "Introduction" in Smeets, Rieks
(ed.). The Indigenous Languages of the Caucasus, North East Caucasian
Languages. New York: Caravan Books, 1995. Vol. 4, Part 2, pp. 7-21.
Smeets, Rieks, Lecturer in Caucasian Languages, University
of Leiden. Personal interview, July 1995.
Soslambekov, Yusup, Speaker of the parliament of the Confederation
of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus. Personal interview, Nunspeet, November
1994.
Stadelbauer, Jrg. "Zeitschichtliche Hintergr¸nde
Aktueller Konflikte III: Die Konflikte im S¸den der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion:
Der Kaukasus". Z¸rcher Beitrge zur Sicherheitspolitik und
Konfliktforschung. Heft No. 31, 1994. pp. 25-64.
Vasileva, Olga and Timur Musaev. Severnyy Kavkaz V Poiskakh
Regionalnoy Ideologyy. Moscow: Progress, 1994.
De Volkskrant [Amsterdam].
Thomas L. Friedman. "Olie Uit Baku Is Wel een Bom Waard". 15 September
1995.
NOTES
1. Scholars do not
all give the same number of ethnic groups, nationalities and languages in
Dagestan as some are more inclined than others to attribute a separate character
to related groups and languages.
2. Nieuwe Rotterdamse
Courant-Handelsblad, "De Regio's van Rusland", 9 October 1993.
3. Shirin Akiner,
Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Keegan
Paul, 1986), p. 123.
4. Robert Chenciner
and Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov, "Dagestan Avoids Violence". Paper
presented at the Conference on the Contemporary North Caucasus, School of
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 22-23 April 1993, pp.
12-13. Paul B. Henze, "The Demography of the Caucasus According to
1989 Soviet Census Data", Central Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No.
1-2, (October 1991), p. 161.
6. Average natural
growth of the Dagestani peoples is 2.5 per cent per year. In order to calculate
the actual population, one must add the tens of thousands of Dagestani workers
who returned due to the economic decline in the former Soviet Union after
1989. In 1993, Moshe Gammer estimated the Avars at 665,000, 87 per cent
of whom lived in Dagestan. His estimates are up to 20 per cent higher than
Robert Chenciner's. See Moshe Gammer, "Unity, Diversity and Conflict
in the Northern Caucasus". Paper presented at the Conference on the
Contemporary North Caucasus, School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London, 22-23 April 1993.
5. Chenciner and Magomedkhanov,
p. 12.
7. Akiner, p. 161.
8. Akiner, pp. 166-7.
9. Jrg Stadelbauer,
"Zeitschichtliche Hintergr¸nde Aktueller Konflikte III: Die Konflikte
im S¸den der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion: Der Kaukasus", Z¸rcher
Beitrge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Heft No. 31 (1994),
p. 30.
10. Henze, p. 161.
11. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 1.
12. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 1.
13. Gadisha T. Omarova,
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. Personal interview, Amsterdam, September 1995.
14. International
Alert, "Dagestan Situation Assessment Report". Unpublished Second
Draft, May 1995, pp. 24-26.
15. The Current
Digest of Post Soviet Press [Columbus], 21 July 1993, quoting Segodnia,
"The Distribution of Subsidies to Russia's Regions is Unfair",
25 June 1993.
16. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "Law on the 1994 Federal Budget", 9 July
1994, quoting Rossiskaia Gazeta [Moscow], 6 July 1994.
17. Rieks Smeets,
"Introduction" in Rieks Smeets (ed.), The Indigenous Languages
of the Caucasus, North East Caucasian Languages (New York: Caravan Books,
1995), Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 9.
18. Helma E. van
den Berg, "The Tsezic Peoples and the Policy of Resettlement (with
Special Reference to the Hunzib)", Annual for the Study of Caucasia
[Chicago], Vol. 4-5 (1992-1993), p. 52.
19. Stadelbauer,
p. 27.
20. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 6.
21. B.G. Hewitt,
"The Caucasus" in The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe
(London: Times Books, 1994) p. 6.
22. Helma E. van
den Berg. Personal interview, University of Leiden, August 1995.
23. Le Monde Diplomatique
[Paris], "Les Mille et Une Guerres du Caucase", Vol. 41, No. 485
(August 1994), p. 20.
24. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 8. Jane Ormrod, "North Caucasus: Fragmentation or
Federation?", Central Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 7, (July 1992),
p. 465.
25. Magomed P. Magomedov,
village elder. Personal interview, Karabulakh, April 1995.
26. Ibid.
27. Akiner, pp. 123-125.
28. Akiner, p. 124.
29. Moshe Gammer,
Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and
Dagestan (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1993), p. 135.
30. Russia Briefing
[London], "The Terek Cossacks", Vol. 3, No. 5 (29 May 1995), p.
8.
31. Marie Benningsen-Broxup,
"The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising" in Marie Benningsen-Broxup
(ed.), The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim
World (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1992).
32. Eastern Europe
Newsletter, "The North Caucasus", Vol. 6, No. 10 (11 May 1992),
p. 4. Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, (London: Zed Books
Ltd, 1995), p. 203.
33. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "Caucasus Confederation Warned not to Interfere
in Chechnya's Internal Affairs", 9 September 1994, quoting ITAR-TASS
News Agency [Moscow], 7 September 1994.
34. Yusup Soslambekov,
Speaker of the parliament of the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of
the Caucasus. Personal interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
35. Rieks Smeets,
Lecturer in Caucasian Languages, University of Leiden. Personal interview,
July 1995.
36. Chenciner and
Magomedov, p. 2.
37. Robert Chenciner,
"The 1990 Elections in Daghestan", Central Asia and Caucasus
Chronicle, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 5.
38. Kasbek Ch. Magomedov,
Editor in Chief of Ekho Kavkaza. Personal interview, Moscow, 5 July
1995.
39. International
Alert, p. 41.
40. Ibid., p. 42.
41. Ibid., pp. 43-45.
42. Le Monde Diplomatique
[Paris], "Les Mille et Une Guerres du Caucase", Vol. 41, No. 485
(August 1994), p. 20.
43. Gadisha T. Omarova,
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. Personal interview, Amsterdam, September 1995.
44. Open Media
Research Institute Daily Digest [Prague], "Mafia Vs. Nomenclatura
in Daghestan", 26 June 1995, quoting Bechernyaia Kazan, 30 May
1995 (electronic format).
45. Open Media
Research Institute Daily Digest [Prague], "Duma Member Attacked
in Dagestan", 24 August 1995, quoting Sovetskaia Rossia [Moscow],
24 August 1995, and Radio Mayak [Moscow], 15 August 1995 (electronic
format).
46. Kazbek Ch. Magomedov,
Editor in Chief of Ekho Kavkaza. Personal interview, Moscow, July
1995.
47. Ibid.
48. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "Reports of Persecution of Democrats in Russia's
Regions", 14 August 1995, quoting Radio Russia [Moscow], 12
August 1995.
49. Le Monde Diplomatique,
p. 20.
50. Stadelbauer,
p. 33.
51. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Helen Krag, and
Lars Funch, The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads, (London:
Minority Rights Group International, 1994), p. 20.
55. Aragil Electronic
News Bulletin [Glendale], Issue 525 (24 November 1994) (electronic format).
56. Stadelbauer,
p. 33.
57. For instance
L. Petrushevsky, Dzhar-Belakan in the First Part of XIX Century,
reprint (Moscow, 1995).
58. Azerbaijan Aydinlig
Association [Berkeley], 12 June 1995, quoting Turan News Agency [Baku],
12 June 1995 (electronic format).
59. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "Reports of Police Clashes with Locals in
Northwest of Republic", 16 July 1994, quoting Turan News Agency [Baku],
13 July 1994.
60. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 7.
61. Akiner, p. 147.
62. International
Alert, p. 22.
63. Krag, p. 22.
64. Alexandre Benningsen
and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire (London: C. Hurst
& Company, 1985), p. 170.
65. Moshe Gammer,
"Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus", p. 8.
66. Ormrod, p. 464.
67. Stadelbauer,
p. 37
68. Ormrod, p. 464.
69. Kasbek Ch. Magomedov,
Editor in Chief of Ekho Kavkaza. Personal interview, Moscow, 5 July
1995.
70. Elizabeth Fuller,
"Caucasus: The Lezgin Campaign for Autonomy", Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 41, (16 October 1992), p. 30.
71. Ormrod, p. 464.
72. Hewitt, p. 8;
Fuller, p. 31.
73. Covcas Bulletin
[Geneva], "Lezkis Demand Unification with Russia", 20 April 1994,
quoting Yergir Daily [Yerevan], 6 April 1994.
74. Ormrod, p. 467.
75. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
76. Russia Briefing,
"The Cossacks: Sabre-Rattling", Vol. 1, No. 2, (27 March 1993),
p. 7.
77. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "New Slavic Organization Set Up in Dagestan",
26 July 1994, quoting ITAR-TASS News Agency [Moscow], 18 July 1994.
78. Kasbek Ch. Magomedov,
Editor in Chief of Ekho Kavkaza. Personal interview, Moscow, July
1995.
79. Yusup Soslambekov,
Speaker of the parliament of the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of
the Caucasus. Personal interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
80. The Current
Digest of Post-Soviet Press [Columbus], "United Cossacks Intend
to Defend Their Comrades in the Republics", 19 July 1993, p. 28, quoting
Izvestia (Moscow), 14 July 1993. p. 4.
81. Russia Briefing,
"The Terek Cossacks", Vol. 3, No. 5 (29 May 1995), pp. 11-12.
82. Helsinki Watch,
"Punished Peoples" of the Soviet Union (Washington, September
1991), p. 23.
83. Svetlana U. Alieva,
Tak Sto Vilo, Nationalnie Repressii V SSSR 1919-1952 Godi, (Moscow:
Rossiisky Megdunarodnii Fond Kulturi "Insan", 1993), Vol. 2, p.
213.
84. Alieva, p. 214.
85. Alieva, p. 227.
86. Svetlana U. Alieva,
Historian. Personal interview, Moscow, July 1995.
87. Ormrod, p. 465.
88. Analytica
Moscow/Politica Weekly Press Summary, "Chechens in Dagestan Refuse
to Side with Dudayev", 30 December 1994, quoting Rossiiskaia Gazeta
[Moscow], 28 December 1994 (electronic format).
89. Benningsen, p.
165.
90. Akiner, pp. 167-168.
91. Personal interview
with Lak residents of Khasav Yurt, July 1995.
92. Chenciner and
Magomedkhanov, p. 7.
93. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
94. Ormrod, p. 466.
95. Ormrod, p.466.
96. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
97. Robert E. Chenciner,
Lecturer in Caucasian Languages. Personal interview, London, March 1995.
98. Olga Vasileva
and Timur Musaev, Severnyy Kavkaz V Poiskakh Regionalnoy Ideologyy,
(Moscow: Progress, 1994), p. 36
99. Vasileva and
Musaev, p. 37.
100. Robert Chenciner,
Lecturer in Caucasian Languages. Personal interview, London, March 1994.
101. Personal interview
with Lak residents of Khasav Yurt, July 1995.
102. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
103. Ibid.
104. Ormrod, p.468.
105. Russia Briefing
[London], "The Terek Cossacks", Vol. 3, No. 5, (29 May 1995),
p. 8.
106. Personal interview
with Chechen residents of Khasav Yurt, July 1995.
107. Russia Briefing
[London], "The Regional Terek Diaspora", Vol. 3, No. 5 (29 May
1995), p. 9.
108. Yuri Kulchik,
Head of the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Personal
interview, Nunspeet, November 1994.
109. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "Russia: More than 20 Cossack Units to be
Formed in Army", 18 August 1995, quoting Interfax News Agency [Moscow],
16 August 1995.
110. Hewitt, p.
8.
111. Ibid.
112. Armen Halatian,
Researcher at the Moscow Institute for Social and Political Studies. Telephone
interview, 6 January 1995.
113. Prism
[Jamestown], "An Ethnic Challenge to International Borders", Vol.
1, No. 6, Part 2, (2 June 1995) (electronic format).
114. Fuller, p.
31.
115. Gammer, "Unity",
p. 9.
116. Foreign
Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Central Eurasia, [Washington],
9 October 1992, quoting Nezavisimaia Gazeta [Moscow], R. Batyrshin,
"The Lezghian Question as Detonator of a Fresh Conflict: Will Azerbaijan
and Russia Be Able to Avoid It?", 15 September 1992.
117. Hewitt, p.
8.
118. Ibid.
119. Prism
[Jamestown], "An Ethnic Challenge to International Borders", Vol.
1, No. 6, Part 2, (2 June 1995) (electronic format)
120. Ibid.
121. Monitor
[Jamestown], "Young Lezgins Said to Cross into Dagestan from Azerbaijan",
13 September 1995, quoting Interfax News Agency [Moscow], 11 September 1995
(electronic format).
122. De Volkskrant
[Amsterdam], Thomas L. Friedman, "Olie Uit Baku Is Wel een Bom Waard",
15 September 1995.
123. Magomed Magomedov,
village elder. Personal interview, Karabulakh, April 1995.
124. International
Alert, p. 61.
125. Azerbaijan
Aydinlig Association [Baku], 8 February 1995, quoting Turan News Agency
[Makhachkala], 8 February 1995 (electronic format).
126. Personal interview
with Lak, Chechen and Dargin inhabitants of Khasav Yurt, July 1995.
127. Covcas Bulletin
[Geneva/Washington], "Russian Bombers Pound Grozny overnight",
Vol. 5 No. 1. (4 January 1995), quoting Reuters, 23 December 1994 (electronic
format).
128. Personal interview
with Chechen separatist fighters, Makhketi, July 1995.
129. BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, "More Than 370,000 People Flee Chechnya Since
Mid-December 1994", 24 May 1995, quoting Interfax News Agency [Moscow],
22 May 1995.
130. Open Media
Research Institute Daily Digest [Prague], "Dagestan Wants to Return
Chechen Refugees", 26 September 1995, quoting Izvestia [Moscow],
26 September 1995 (electronic format).
131. Emil Pain,
"The Long Legacy of Ethnic Engineering", War Report [London],
No. 24, (June 1995) p. 25.
132. President Ruslan
Aushev of Ingushetia, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
"Aushev Urges Yeltsin to Stave Off Caucasus War", 6 February 1995,
quoting Segodnia [Moscow], 4 February 1995.
133. Rieks Smeets,
Lecturer in Caucasian Languages, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden. Personal interview,
September 1995.
134. Kasbek Ch.
Magomedov, Editor in Chief of Ekho Kavkaza. Personal interview, Moscow,
July 1995.
135. Monitor
[Jamestown], "Soskovets Tells North Caucasians Not to Count on Moscow
Aid", 21 August 1995, quoting Russian Television, 19 August
1995 (electronic format).
136. Monitor
[Jamestown], "A Fez for Daghestan", 18 July 1995, quoting Segodnia,
18 July 1995 (electronic format).
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