Final Rapport
CONCERNING THE ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1989 IN THE TENERE DESERT (NIGER) TO DC-10-30 REGISTERED N54629
APPENDICES
TRANSCRIPTION OF RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN N'DJAMENA AND THE DC- 10
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
12.00 | UT 772 | N'Djamena UTA 772 |
NDJ | UTA 772 N'Djamena | |
UT 772 | Yes, we are ready to start-up to Paris. | |
NDJ | Roger, start up, temperature 33, dew point 22, Fox Echo 9. 7.5. and QNH 1010, the 23, report to taxi. | |
UT 772 | Yes, starting up, call you back to taxi UT 772. We'll take the 05 if possible. | |
NDJ | OK for 05, report to taxi. | |
UT 772 | Willdo. | |
N24RM | N'Djamena N 24 RM evelling at 095. | |
NDJ | 124RM report TMA out. | |
N24RM | .... | |
12.02 | UT 772 | Last wind for UT 772. |
NDJ | 220 240 6 to 8 knots. | |
12.08 | UT 772 | N'Djamena UT 772 we are ready to taxi. |
NDJ | 772 taxi mid-taxiway, enter and back track. | |
UT 772 | So, we taxi via mid-taxiway and back track 05. | |
NDJ | OK for 05. | |
12.10 | NDJ | 772, clearance. |
UT 772 | Go ahead Sir. | |
NDJ | Left turn after take-off, initial climb to 280 by BOSSO. | |
UT 772 | Roger left turn after take-off and climb to 280 initially BOSSO UTA 772. | |
NDJ | Correct and report lined up to take-off. | |
UT 772 | I call you lined up. | |
... | ||
... | ||
12.12 | UT 772 | N'Djamena UTA 772 to take off. |
NDJ | 772 Clear to line up and take off 240,6 knots. | |
UT 772 | 772 taking off runway 05. | |
12.16 | NDJ | UTA 772 take-off at 13 call back for estimates. |
UT 772 | Roger. | |
12.17 | UT 772 | Ready for estimates ? |
NDJ | Go ahead. | |
UT 772 | Well BOSSO at 12.35 hrs FIR flying out at 13.10 hrs arrival at Paris Charles de Gaulle at 17.19 hrs one seven one nine, we pass level 70 climbing to 280 initially. | |
NDJ | Roger 772 report passing 240 to climb. | |
UT 772 | Affirm report passing 240 to 280. | |
12.22 | UT 772 | N'Djamena UTA 772 approaching 240 to 280 |
FREQUENCY 128.1 | ||
12.23 | UT 772 | N'Djamena Info UT 772 good day approaching 240 to 280 initially. |
NDJ | UTA 722 good day report 280. | |
UT 772 | Roger. Request higher. | |
NDJ | Yes. Giving you a traffic information, Air Zaire 002 flying from Kinshasa to Brussels is at level 310 and ENBUT point estimated at one two two five at 12.25 hrs, INISA at 12.57 hrs, it is a DC-10, you report approaching 280 for higher. | |
UT 772 | Ok thank you. | |
NDJ | You estimate BOSS at 35 correct? | |
UT 772 | BOSSO at 34. | |
NDJ | 34 Roger. For the time I have no contact, report approaching 280. | | |
UT 772 | Roger. | |
NDJ | Zaire 002 N'Djamena | |
AZR 002 | Right N'Djamena we are checking ENBUT at level 310 . | |
NDJ | Roger report INISA. | |
AZR 002 | Read you 002. | |
NDJ | UTA 772 N'Djamena | |
UT 772 | Yes Sir, go ahead | |
NDJ | Report crossing 300 to 350. | |
UT 772 | Roger report crossing 310 to 350. | |
12.27 | NDJ | 002 checking ENBUT at 25 to INISA. |
UT 772 | Roger contact with it. OK report three one zero to three five zero. | |
AZR 002 | Yes, for your information Air Zaire maintaining 310. | |
NDJ | Wilko, thank you. | |
NDJ | UTA 772 N'Djamena | |
UT 772 | Yes I read you. | |
12.28 | NDJ | Did you check KANO FIR boundary inbound point? |
UT 772 | Affirmative. | |
NDJ | At what time ? | |
UT 772 | At 25. | |
NDJ | 25 thank you. | |
UT 772 | UTA 772 crossing 310 to 350. | |
12.29 | NDJ | UTA 772 report leveling 350. |
UT 772 | OK, report 350 steady . | |
12.32 | UT 772 | UTA 772 steady level 350 BOSSO within 2 minutes. |
NDJ | Roger, report passing FIR. | |
UT 772 | Roger. | |
NDJ | UTA 772 N'Djamena | |
NDJ | UTA 772 N'Djamena | |
12.34 | UT 772 | N'Dgamena UTA 772 |
NDJ | 772 I request coordinates of the outbound point on FIR boundary N'Djamena | |
UT 772 | Confirm ? | |
NDJ | Coordinate of FIR outbound points. | |
UT 772 | All right, that will be 18.07 north 11.30 east. | |
NDJ | Roger report passing the FIR on 8903. | |
UT 772 | Wilko. Making a relay for you. | |
NDJ | OK, transmit thank you. | |
UT 772 | Well it's S.A.Z. 01 flying Zurich-N'Djamena level 410. Checked TUMMO at 7 and estimates N'Djamena at time 13.42. | |
NDJ | Read well read thank you very much. | |
NDJ | He call me back DIRKOU. | |
UT 772 | DIRKOU ? | |
UT 772 | Sierra Alpha Zulu | |
N24RM | N'Djamena 24 Romeo Mike. | |
NDJ | 24 Romeo Mike N'Djamena. | |
N24RM | 24 RM we'd like descend from flight level 095 to 3,500 feet. | |
NDJ | Roger call maintaining 3,500 feet. | |
N24RM | OK 24 RM. |
Curves 1 (208 Kb!) Curves 2 (195 Kb!)
ANALYSIS OF THE ABNORMAL VALUES (PEAKS) NOTED FOR SOME PARAMETERS OF THE DFDR
A detailed study of the DFDR read-out shows that these peaks
were not due to variation of the actual values during the flight
but rather to de-synchronisations of the signal during read-out.
1. How a DFDR works
To explain this de-synchronisation phenomenon, it is
necessary to review DFDR data acquisition and read-out. Sensors
on board the aircraft enable to get various data. The data is
transmitted to computers that deduce the value of a number of
parameters which are characteristic of the flight.
Those parameters (in analogic form) are then coded,
digitised and multiplexed by a job-oriented computer, the Flight
Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) and transmitted to the recorder
itself as a sine wave form signal.
Multiplexing consists in presenting one after the other (in
the form of a continuous signal) various parameters which are
obtained simultaneously.
As far as the DFDR is concerned, all parameters are given
in frame format, each parameter being repeated at the same place
(or same "word") in each frame. The frame used by the FDAU of the
DFDR is a four-second one, each frame being itself divided into
four one-second sub-frames. Each sub-frame must contain 768 bits
(0 or 1), i.e. sixty-four 12-bit words, and must begin by a
specific word called "synch word".
At DFDR read-out, a series of computers decode the data in
the reverse way they were recorded. So, after the signal is read,
a computer cut it and convert it into bits and words. Then those
words are demultiplexed so as to be finally translated by one
more computer into actual values (the flight parameters).
During the demultiplexing operation, there is a verification
of the binary signal: the demultiplexing computer searches for
all the synch words (as defined above) and verifies that the
number of bits between them is correct. If, for any reason,
(damaged tape, bad reading, etc...) a synch word is not to be
found at the right place, the computer will warn that there was
de-synchronisation when that sub-cycle was concerned; in such a
case, the conversion of the binary signal into actual values will
be altered and the listings and graphics obtained subsequently
will show abnormal values. There will be synchronisation again
as soon as the computer detects two synch words that define two
consecutive sub-frames, separated by the right number of bits.
2. Analysis of the de-synchronisations
Let (tf) be the last recorded second of the flight; a first
de-synchronisation is noted at (tf-14 seconds). A more accurate
analysis of the binary signal read at that second makes it clear
that 2 bits are missing in the sub-frame (766 instead of 768
bits) and that these bits were lost at the beginning of the
sub-frame (starting from the fifth word). All actual values
calculated later on are therefore distorted (more than 90% of the
data contained in that second are lost).
A second de-synchronisation occurs at times (tf-11s) and
(tf-10s). These two seconds are de-synchronised because the
computer has not found the synch word which is between the two
sub-frames. Nevertheless, the analysis proves that the first 46
words (out of 64) at second (tf-11s) are consistent; so are the
last 60 words at second (tf-10s). Therefore something wrong
happened between the forty-seventh word of time (tf-11) and the
fourth word of time (tf-10).
Finally, a last de-synchronisation occurs at time (tf-5s).
During that sub-frame, the computer counted 770 bits (i.e. two
additional bits). As early as the sixth word of that frame, there
is inconsistent information (one additional bit at that moment).
If we make the assumption that it is one bit too many, consistent
data is to be found again, through manual calculation, until word
'9, and then there are again abnormal values.
In this way we note that, several times along the fourteen
seconds before the end of the recording, the binary signal calculated
by the DFDR shows alterations that bring about a translation
in actual values that is utterly wrong and in no case representative
of the actions of the aircraft at these moments.
Another reading of the DFDR was made with a different
tension of the tape on the playback heads. It was then noted that
two out of the three de-synchronisations of the tape end had
disappeared (those at times tf-14s and tf-5s). The parameters
recovered for those two seconds were perfectly consistent with
the rest of the flight.
De-synchronisations on one listing, partial recovery of
consistent data on another ones are the proof, if needed, that
these problems are due to the bad condition of the tape.
3 . Explanation of these de-synchronisations
The DFDR recovered after the accident was particularly
damaged (impact evidence, rounded sides,etc). When it was opened,
BEA specialists noted that the thermal insulation was damaged
and, furthermore, that the outer loop of tape was severed, that
it showed folds and that is had come out of the roller transport
guides. We may suppose that that section of the tape was cut at
the ground impact, because it was less protected, and that the
tape slackened suddenly and hit mechanical parts (rollers,
playback head, etc...) The signal on the tape may have then be
damaged; this deterioration of the sinusoidal signal may have led
to a defective binary transcription.
This DFDR works in such a way that the last recorded seconds
are precisely located between one of the erasing heads and the
corresponding far left roller. Between those two points, the tape
Ad about 30 cm long. Since the tape recording speed is 0.43 in./s
the last twenty-seven seconds, or so, are on this section.
To investigate that problem, BEA carried out an extensive
analysis of the end of the original tape . The use of a detector
material on that tape section made the following apparent :
The beginning of the detected blank space precisely corresponds
to the end of the flight recording . 5.2 cm before, ( i .e .
a 4. 7 s. recording), an important folding enables an explanation
of the de-synchronisation found at time ( tf-5s ) on the first
listing. Then, 11.1 cm before the end of the flight (i.e. a 10.2s
recording),, the tape was cut, which is an indubitable explanation
to the de-synchronisation between times (tf-10s) and (tf-11s).
Lastly, 15 cm before the end of the flight (13.7s), the fact that
the tape was slightly creased also explains the de-synchronisation
at time (tf-14s) in the first listing.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAJOR PARTS OF MAIN WRECKAGE
APPENDIX 3
APPENDIX 4
Model showing aircraft detachment
APPENDIX 5
Distribution map of the debris
APPENDIX 6
Distribution map of the major parts of main wreckage (Referenced C Appendix 4)
1 | Lower fuselage skin |
2 | No 3 engine turbine compressor and cowl parts |
3 | Lower fuselage, fuel components |
4 | Drip No 9 |
5 | Upside down right wing |
6 | Drip No 7 |
7 | Engine cowls and pod |
8 | Slat part |
9 | Not engine component |
10 | Not engine drive |
11 | Fuel indicator |
12 | Main landing gear part |
13 | Cowls |
14 | Gear truck |
15 | Central landing gear door |
16 | Fuel tank |
17 | No 3 engine case and fan |
18 | Electric generator |
19 | No 3 engine component |
20 | Central landing gear door |
21 | No 1 engine turbine and combustion chamber |
22 | Wheels |
23 | Slat part |
24 | Main landing gear part |
25 | Gear truck |
26 | Landing gear box |
27 | Landing gear part |
28 | No l engine fan and compressor |
29 | Left wing tip |
30 | Upside down left wing |
31 | Landing gear doors |
32 | DFDR |
33 | CVR |
34 | Part of aft fuselage from cargo hold level |
35 | Stabilizer component |
36 | Part of fuselage, tail cone, APU |
37 | Aft cargo hold floor |
38 | Stabilizer: central section and left part |
39 | Hydraulic tank |
APPENDIX 7
Position of the containers inside the forward cargo hold
APPENDIX 8
a. Reconstruction of the fuselage section
(Reference B Appendix 4)
b-A. Reconstruction of the fuselage section
(Reference B Appendix 4)
b-B. Reconstruction of the fuselage section
(Reference B Appendix 4)
c-A. Belly aperture
(Reference B Appendix 4)
c-B. Belly aperture
(Reference B Appendix 4)
d-A. Reconstruction of container 7044 RK
(Reference B Appendix 4)
d-B. Location of container 7044 RK floor on cargo hold floor
(Reference B Appendix 4)
APPENDIX 9
GLOSSARY OF THE ABBREVIATIONS
APU | Auxiliary Power Unit |
BEA | Bureau Enquetes-Accidents |
CEAT | Centre d'essais aéronautique de Toulouse (Toulouse Aeronautic Test Center). |
CSS | Certificat de sécurité sauvetage (Safety and rescue certificate) |
CVR | Cockpit Voice Recorder |
DFDR | Digital Flight Data Recorder |
DGAC | Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (Directorate General for Civil Aviation) |
DNA | Direction de la navigation aérienne (Air Navigation Directorate) |
FAA | Federal Aviation Administration |
FDAU | Flight Data Acquisition Unit |
FIR | Flight Information Region |
ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
KSSU | KLM-Swissair-SAS-UTA Group |
NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board |
RK | Air Afrique designator |
SIGMET | Significant Meteorological chart |
SELCAL | Selective Calling |
UT | UTA designator |
UTC | Universal Time Coordinated |
APPENDIX 10
1. Forward section (Appendix 4, referenced A)
2. Reassembled elements of fragmented section (Appendix 4, referenced B)
3. Main wreckage fire area (Appendix 4, referenced C)
4. Scattered elements Right stabilizer (Appendix 4, referenced D)
4. Scattered elements No.2 engine: air intake central section with fin (Appendix 4, referenced D)
5. Scattered elements No.1 engine air intake (Appendix 4, referenced D)
6. Evidences Metallic impact in wooden box cover
7. Evidences Torn clothes with holes
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