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Abu Sayyaf History

Abu Sayyaf leader Khadafi Janjalani, second from left, with Philippine militants, July 2000.
Abu Sayyaf leader Khadafi Janjalani, second from left, with Philippine militants, July 2000.
(AP Photo/STR )

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March 5, 2002

Abu Sayyaf, "Bearer of the Sword," is a cross between a chilling gang of bandits, kidnapping for money and hijacking religion itself to gain local support, and a franchise operation of al Qaeda. Since the early 1990s, it has terrorized the southern Philippines with kidnappings, bombs, and outright massacres; it has also been linked to several international terrorist plots and militants.

Abu Sayyaf was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani, an Islamic scholar and mujahedin in the Afghan-Soviet war, after he, like the contemporaries that formed his initial recruiting crop, returned from studies in Saudi Arabia and Libya determined to fulfill the Muslim ideal of an Islamic state. The group first mobilized in August 1991, with the bombing of a ship in Zamboanga harbor and a grenade attack on a performance by Christian missionaries. Attacks on Catholic congregations — hand grenades thrown into churches — attacks on ethnic Chinese and abduction of priests, nuns, and teachers in the Catholic community soon followed.

Abu Sayyaf's activities were domestic in scope and remained relatively unknown until it blasted out of obscurity with the April 23, 2000, kidnapping at Sipadan. The hostages included several foreigners, and as international journalists flocked to the area, Abu Sayyaf held groups of reporters against their will and demanded ransom. Suddenly, its agenda was thrust onto the world media stage. From then on, it operated as an organization with global reach, focusing not only the creation of an independent Muslim state but the founding of a commission to improve the plight of ethnic Filipinos in Malaysia and, eventually, the release of incarcerated World Trade Center bomber Ramsey Yousef, a group ally who trained them in explosives.

In its inchoate stages and while under Janjalani's leadership, Abu Sayyaf was plugged into the international network of Islamic militants that received the support of Osama bin Laden. Abu Sayyaf-al Qaeda links are strong. Many of its fighters claim to have trained in Afghanistan, including as many as 20 who were in the graduating class of a Mazar-e Sharif camp in 2001; the titular group leader, Janjalani's brother, refined his terrorist skills in Libya. Zamboanga City, a Mindanao Islamic hotbed, was frequented by members of al Qaeda. Yet the best indicator of al Qaeda's influence is the relationship Janjalani forged with Saudi Arabian businessman Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden's brother-in-law. Khalifa's network of Islamic charities and university in Zamboanga were both used to bankroll extremists. His main organization, the International Islamic Relief Organization, has an office in Zamboanga, as does a bin Laden foundation. Abu Sayyaf received training and money funneled through Khalifa's network. It was during this time of close association with Khalifa and the al Qaeda network that Abu Sayyaf began plotting its two biggest endeavors -- assassination of the Pope during a visit to the Catholic Philippines, and a plan to hijack and blow up 12 U.S. civilian airliners in a single day. After these plans were foiled (by an accidental fire in Ramsey Yousef's apartment), authorities began to see Abu Sayyaf as a major threat to security in the Philippines -- and as a true threat to international security.

After Janjalani's death during a police confrontation in 1998, the glue of Islamic fundamentalism with which he held the organization together dissolved, and Abu Sayyaf split into three less-focused splinter groups and turned mainly to increasingly brutal murders and kidnappings. After receiving an estimated $25 million ransom from Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi to free hostages kidnapped in March 2000 — priests, teachers, and children from a Basilan school — the militants' "work" to create a Muslim homeland was thoroughly corrupted by the financial rewards of ransom. The $25 million was ostensibly a goodwill gesture to release the hostages, but served only to finance the group's arms procurement and recruitment. It is also alleged that some Philippine officials involved in approving the payment may have received a kickback from the sum. Speedboats used in other kidnappings were allegedly bought with the money, as was a rocket launcher that killed an army captain in pursuit of the fugitives.

Since kidnapping has proven profitable, Abu Sayyaf has been a group motivated not by ideology but by money. The character of the group has changed as well — ad hoc strategies and activities are determined by the mood swings of individual leaders, many with eccentric nicknames reflecting bizarre bandit camaraderie. Discipline is haphazard, and some are addicted to drugs. Still, about 140 hostages have been taken during their last two years of violent kidnapping sprees (the number held for short terms and for smaller ransoms are not included here; Abu Sayyaf terrorizes the local population with startling regularity) and 16 people have been killed over that time. More than 300 Filipino soldiers have died in the fight to eliminate Abu Sayyaf.

It was estimated at one point that Abu Sayyaf had several hundred active freedom fighters based on Basilan and the two smaller neighboring islands of Sulu and Tawi Tawi. After the sudden influx of Libyan kidnap ransom, the number probably swelled to around 1,200 young men, lured mainly by the attractive salary and armaments. The current strength is widely disputed because of the group's fragmented state. One faction may only have as many as 80 committed fighters remaining, but the strength of both groups together — as well as a fluid support network — is significantly greater. There are even allegations that the network's allure may have infiltrated the military, who, although tasked with eradication of the group, might have benefited from allowing escapes and narrow misses.

American military advisors may increase the effectiveness of what were previously largely unsuccessful military operations against the group. Eradication, though, is difficult — Agu Sayyaf's central base is well hidden in the jungle on Basilan's Mohajid mountain. Measuring only 20 x 40 miles, it is accessible only by ferry from the port city of Zamboanga on Mindanao island. Red Cross workers who have been to this base camp, one of nine camps in the jungle, say that, surrounded by heavy forest, it is virtually impenetrable. Group members are undoubtedly intent to inflict casualties on the American troops to embarrass the anti-terrorism operation and inspire other terrorist organizations. Several Abu Sayyaf group members are accomplished marksmen who can hit targets over long ranges and through varied weather conditions.

The group still holds captive Filipino nurse Ediborah Yap and American missionary couple Martin and Gracia Burnham.


By Emily Clark
Source

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