The United States on April 14, 1986, launched Operation
El Dorado Canyon, a controversial but highly successful
mission that hit Col. Muammar Qaddafi squarely between
the eyes. Working with carrier aircraft of the US Sixth
Fleet, Air Force F-111s of the 48th Tactical Fighter
Wing flew what turned out to be the longest fighter
combat mission in history. The crushing strikes caused
a remarkable reduction in Libyansponsored terrorist
activity.
In the mid-1980s, the F-111s of the 48th TFW, stationed
at RAF Lakenheath in Britain, formed a key element
of NATO power. If war came, the Aardvark's long range
and night, low-level bombing capability would have
been vital in defeating a Soviet attack. To the south,
in the Mediterranean, the Sixth Fleet engaged Soviet
warships in a constant game of mutual surveillance
and stayed in more or less permanent readiness for
hostilities.
Fate would dictate that the 48th TFW and Sixth Fleet
carriers would be teamed in a totally unexpected quarter
against a very different kind of enemy. They would
strike not in or around Europe but on the North African
littoral. They would go into action not against Soviet
conventional forces but against an Arab state bent
on sponsoring deadly terrorist acts.
Western nations had long been alarmed by state-sponsored
terrorism. The number of attacks had risen from about
300 in 1970 to more than 3,000 in 1985. In that 15-year
period, a new intensity had come to characterize the
attacks, which ranged from simple assaults to attacks
with heavy casualties such as the Oct. 23, 1983, truck
bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut.
Qaddafi, who seized power in a 1969 coup, had long
been an American antagonist. Each year, Libya trained
8,000 terrorists, providing false passports, transport
on Libyan airliners, and access to safe houses across
Europe. Libyan support for terrorist operations exceeded
all nations except Iran. It disbursed $100 million
to Palestinian terrorists eager to strike Israel.
The April 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque
frequented by American servicemen helped convince
President Reagan that it was time for the US
to take action against Libyansponsored terrorism.
(Photo via Denis Giangreco)
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"Heroic" Actions
Qaddafi joined forces with one of the most notorious
terrorists of the time, Abu Nidal. In November 1985,
Abu Nidal's operatives hijacked an EgyptAir transport;
60 passengers were killed, many in the rescue attempt
staged by an Egyptian commando team. On Dec. 27, 1985,
Abu Nidal terrorists launched simultaneous attacks
on airports at Rome and Vienna; 20 passengers and four
terrorists were killed in these events. Qaddafi publicly
praised the terrorists, called them martyrs, and applauded
what he described as "heroic" actions.
President Ronald Reagan at about this time gave his
approval to National Security Decision Directive 207,
setting forth a new US policy against terrorism. He
had decided that the US needed to mount a military
response to Qaddafi and his brethren, but first he
wanted to obtain cooperation from the Western Allies
and allow time for the removal of US citizens working
in Libya.
Meantime, the Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean
Sea, began a series of maneuvers designed to keep pressure
on Libya. Two and sometimes three aircraft carriers
(Saratoga, America, and Coral Sea) conducted "freedom
of navigation" operations that would take US warships
up to and then southward across a line at 32 degrees
30 minutes north latitude. This was Qaddafi's self-proclaimed "Line
of Death."
The Line of Death defined the northernmost edge of
the Gulf of Sidra and demarcated it-in Qaddafi's mind,
at least-from the rest of the Mediterranean. The Libyan
leader had warned foreign vessels that the Gulf belonged
to Libya and was not international waters. The message
was that they entered at their own risk and were subject
to attack by Libyan forces. Thus Qaddafi, by drawing
the Line, unilaterally sought to exclude US ships and
aircraft from a vast, 3,200-square-mile area of the
Med which always had been considered international.
The skirmishing soon began. On March 24, 1986, Libyan
air defense operators fired SA-5 missiles at two F-14s.
The Tomcats had intercepted an intruding MiG-25 that
came a bit too close to a battle group. The next day,
a Navy A-7E aircraft struck the SAM site with AGM-88A
HARM missiles. At least two of the five threatening
Libyan naval attack vessels were also sunk.
Tension further increased on April 2, 1986, when a
terrorist's bomb exploded on TWA Flight 840 flying
above Greece. Four Americans were killed. Three days
later, a bomb exploded in Berlin's La Belle Discotheque,
a well-known after-hours hangout for US military personnel.
Killed in the blast were two American servicemen, and
79 other Americans were injured. Three terrorist groups
claimed responsibility for the bomb, but the United
States and West Germany independently announced "incontrovertible" evidence
that Libyans were responsible for the bombing.
Inside a shelter at RAF Lakenheath, this F-111F,
call sign Lujac 23, receives a thorough checkout.
The Aardvark's long range and nighttime, low-level
bombing capability made it a key element of NATO
airpower in the mid-1980s. (USAF photo via Craig
Brown.)
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It's Time
President Reagan decided that it was time for the
US to act.
In the months leading up to the Berlin bombing, planners
at USAF's 48th TFW had developed more than 30 plans
for delivering a punitive blow against Libya. Most
were variations on a theme-six or so Air Force F-111
fighter-bombers would fly through French airspace and
strike selected military targets in Libya. Planners
assumed that the attack would have the benefit of surprise;
the small number of F-111s made it probable that the
bombers would be in and out before the Libyan defenses
were alerted.
Later, when detailed speculation in the Western media
lessened the probability of surprise, attack plans
were changed to include support packages that would
carry out suppression of enemy air defenses. These
packages were to comprise Air Force EF-111 electronic
warfare aircraft as well as Navy A-7 and EA-6B aircraft.
This was the start of an Air Force-Navy liaison that
would prove essential in the actual mission.
However, all the 48th's plans had been rendered obsolete
by April 1986. Continuous media coverage, apparently
fueled by leaks from very senior and knowledgeable
sources in the White House, had rendered surprise almost
impossible. Moreover, the US was having serious trouble
with its Allies. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher approved US use of British bases to launch
the attack. However, Washington's other Allies lost
their nerve. The fear of reprisals and loss of business
caused France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to refuse
to cooperate in a strike.
The faintheartedness of these countries forced the
US to prepare a radically different attack plan. USAF
F-111s would now navigate around France and Spain,
thread the needle through the airspace over the narrow
Strait of Gibraltar, and then plunge on eastward over
the Mediterranean until in a position to attack.
It would prove to be a grueling round-trip flight
of 6,400 miles that spanned 13 hours, requiring eight
to 12 in-flight refuelings for each aircraft. Inasmuch
as a standard NATO F-111 sortie was about two hours,
the El Dorado Canyon mission placed a tremendous strain
on crews and complex avionic systems at the heart of
the aircraft.
US authorities crafted a joint operation of the Air
Force and Navy against five major Libyan targets. Of
these, two were in Benghazi: a terrorist training camp
and the military airfield. The other three were in
Tripoli: a terrorist naval training base; the former
Wheelus AFB; and the Azziziyah Barracks compound, which
housed the command center for Libyan intelligence and
contained one of five residences that Qaddafi used.
Eighteen F-111s were assigned to strike the three
Tripoli targets, while Navy aircraft were to hit the
two Benghazi sites. Navy aircraft also were to provide
air defense suppression for both phases of the operation.
US authorities gave overall command to Vice Adm. Frank
B. Kelso II, commander of the Sixth Fleet.
Enter the Air Force
The composition of the El Dorado Canyon force has
stirred controversy. In his 1988 book, Command of the
Seas, former Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. said
the entire raid could have been executed by aircraft
from America and Coral Sea. This claim cropped up again
in 1997; in a letter to Foreign Affairs, Marine Maj.
Gen. John H. Admire, an operations planner in US European
Command at the time, said, "Sufficient naval forces
were available to execute the attacks." Both attributed
USAF's participation to a bureaucratic need to placate
the Air Force.
The fact of the matter, however, is the Air Force
had long been preparing for such a raid. When Washington
decreed that there would be only one attack, it became
absolutely necessary to mount a joint operation because
only the inclusion of heavy USAF attack aircraft could
provide the firepower needed to ensure that the operation
would be more than a pinprick attack.
The Navy had only America and Coral Sea on station.
According to Air Force officials involved in the plans,
these two carriers did not have sufficient aircraft
for effective attacks against all five targets in both
Tripoli and Benghazi. At least one more carrier, and
perhaps two, would have been required, said these officers.
The act of calling in a third or even a fourth carrier
to handle both targets would have caused a delay and
given away any remaining element of surprise. This
fact was pointed out to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe Jr. Crowe himself recognized
that F-111s were needed if both Tripoli and Benghazi
were to be struck at more or less the same time. They
would also add an element of surprise and a new axis
of attack.
For these reasons, the JCS Chairman recommended to
Reagan and the National Security Council that the United
States use both Air Force and Navy aircraft in the
raids.
The F-111Fs of the 48th were special birds, equipped
with two Pratt & Whitney TF-30 P-100 turbofan engines
of 25,100 pounds of thrust each and a highly classified
AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack bombing system. Pave Tack consisted
of an infrared camera and laser designator. It enabled
the F-111 crew to see the target in the dark or through
light fog or dust obscurations (not heavy dust and
smoke). When the target was seen, it was designated
by the energy of a laser beam. The 2,000-pound GBU-10
Paveway II laser-guided bomb tracked the laser to the
illuminated target. Pave Tack imparted to the F-111s
a limited standoff capability, achieved by lobbing
the bombs at the target. As events unfolded, the Pave
Tack equipment would be crucial to the mission's success.
On April 14, at 17:36 Greenwich Mean Time, 24 Aardvarks
departed Lakenheath with the intent that six would
return after the first refueling about 90 minutes out.
Also launched were five EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft.
This marked the start of the first US bomber attack
from the UK since World War II. The tanker force was
launched at roughly the same time as the F-111s, four
of which joined up on their respective "mother
tankers" in radio silence, flying such a tight
formation that radar controllers would see only the
tanker signatures on their screens. At the first refueling,
six F-111Fs and one EF-111A broke off and returned
to base. Beyond Lands End, UK, the aircraft would be
beyond the control of any international authority,
operating at 26,000 feet and speeds up to 450 knots.
To save time and ease navigation, tankers were to
accompany the fighters to and from the target area.
KC-10 tankers, called in from Barksdale AFB, La., March
AFB, Calif., and Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., were refueled
in turn by KC-135s, assigned to the 300th Strategic
Wing, RAF Mildenhall, and the 11th Strategic Group,
RAF Fairford, UK.
With only the UK offering use of its bases,
US aircraft faced a long flight to Libya. The
round trip required eight to 12 in-flight refuelings
for each airplane-this one, from Karma Flight,
armed with 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs. (Photo
via Jim Rotramel)
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Drastic Changes
What had been drafted as a small, top secret mission
had changed drastically. The force now included 18
USAF strike aircraft and four EF-111F electronic warfare
aircraft from the 42d Electronic Combat Squadron, RAF
Upper Heyford, UK. The lead KC-10 controlled the F-111s.
The size of the attack force went against the judgment
of the 48th's leadership, including that of its commander,
Col. Sam W. Westbrook III. With the possibility of
surprise gone, the 48th felt that the extra aircraft
meant there would be too much time over target, particularly
for the nine aircraft assigned to strike the Azziziyah
Barracks. Libyan defenses, already on alert, would
have time to concentrate on the later waves of attackers.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, however, was
an advocate of a larger strike, and he was supported
in this by Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, Gen. Charles L. Donnelly Jr., commander
of United States Air Forces in Europe, and Maj. Gen.
David W. Forgan, Donnelly's operations deputy.
The three USAF officers believed the large force increased
the possibility of doing substantial damage to the
targets.
On the Navy side, the Sixth Fleet was to attack with
the forces arrayed on two carriers. Coral Sea launched
eight A-6E medium bombers for the attack and six F/A-18C
Hornets for strike support. America launched six A-6Es
for the attack and six A-7Es and an EA-6B for strike
support. F-14s protected the fleet and aircraft.
A high alert status characterized Soviet vessels in
the Mediterranean monitoring ship and aircraft movement.
Libya's vast air defense system was sophisticated,
and its operators were acutely aware that an attack
was coming. In the wake of the raid, the US compared
the Libyan network with target complexes in the Soviet
Union and its satellites. Only three were found to
have had stronger defenses than the Libyan cities.
The difficulties of the mission were great. Most of
the crews had never seen combat. Most had never refueled
from a KC-10, and none had done so at night in radio
silence. The strike force did benefit from the presence
of highly experienced flight leaders, many of them
Vietnam combat veterans. They were flying the longest
and most demanding combat mission in history against
alerted defenses--and doing it in coordination with
a naval force more than 3,000 miles distant.
Timing was absolutely critical, and the long route
and multiple refuelings increased the danger of a disastrous
error. The Air Force and Navy attacks had to be simultaneous
to maximize any remaining element of surprise and to
get strike aircraft in and out as quickly as possible.
Rules of Engagement
Mission difficulty was compounded by rigorous Rules
of Engagement. These ROE stipulated that, before an
attack could go forward, the target had to be identified
through multiple sources and all mission-critical F-111
systems had to be operating well. Any critical system
failure required an immediate abort, even if an F-111
was in the last seconds of its bomb run.
At about midnight GMT, six flights of three F-111Fs
each bore down on Tripoli. Fatigue of the long mission
was forgotten as the pilots monitored their terrain-following
equipment. The weapon system officers prepared for
the attack, checking the navigation, looking for targets
and offset aiming points, and, most important of all,
checking equipment status.
The first three attacking elements, code-named Remit,
Elton, and Karma, were tasked to hit Qaddafi's headquarters
at the Azziziyah Barracks. This target included a command
and control center but not the Libyan leader's nearby
residence and the Bedouin-style tent he often used.
Westbrook proved to be prescient in his belief that
nine aircraft were too many to be put against the Azziziyah
Barracks, as only two of the nine aircraft dropped
their bombs. These, however, would prove to be tremendously
important strikes.
One element, Jewel, struck the Sidi Balal terrorist
training camp where there was a main complex, a secondary
academy, a Palestinian training camp, and a maritime
academy under construction. Jewel's attack was successful,
taking out the area where naval commandos trained.
Two elements, Puffy and Lujac, were armed with Mk
82 Snakeye parachute-retarded 500- pound bombs, and
they struck the Tripoli airport, destroying three Ilyushin
IL-76 transports and damaging three others as well
as destroying a Boeing 727 and a Fiat G. 222.
Flying in support of the F-111 attacks were EF-111As
and Navy A-7s, A-6Es, and an EA-6B, using HARM and
Shrike anti-radar missiles. Similar defense suppression
support, including F/A-18s, was provided across the
Gulf of Sidra, where Navy A-6E aircraft were to attack
the Al Jumahiriya Barracks at Benghazi, and to the
east, the Benina airfield. The Navy's Intruders destroyed
four MiG-23s, two Fokker F-27s, and two Mil Mi-8 helicopters.
The Air Force F-111Fs would spend only 11 minutes
in the target area, with what at first appeared to
be mixed results. Anti-aircraft and SAM opposition
from the very first confirmed that the Libyans were
ready. News of the raid was broadcast while it was
in progress. One aircraft, Karma 52, was lost, almost
certainly due to a SAM, as it was reported to be on
fire in flight. Capt. Fernando L. Ribas-Dominicci and
Capt. Paul F. Lorence were killed. Only Ribas-Dominicci's
body was recovered; his remains were returned to the
US three years later.
Puffy and Lujac attack elements, armed with
Mk 82 Snakeye parachute-retarded 500-pound bombs
like these, struck the Tripoli airport. The operation
led to F-111 changes that would make the aircraft
invaluable in the Gulf War.
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Adrenaline Rush
As each F-111 aircraft exited the target area, they
gave a coded transmission, with "Tranquil Tiger" indicating
success and "Frostee Freezer" indicating
that the target was not hit. Then the crews, flushed
with adrenaline from the attack, faced a long flight
home, with more in-flight refuelings, the knowledge
that one aircraft was down, and the incredible realization
that the raid's results were already being broadcast
on Armed Forces Radio. The news included comments from
Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz.
One F-111F had to divert to Rota AB, Spain, because
of an engine overheat. The mission crew was returned
to Lakenheath within two hours.
Early and fragmentary USAF poststrike analysis raised
some questions about the performance of the F-111s.
Even though all three targets had been successfully
struck, only four of the 18 F-111s dropped successfully.
Six were forced to abort due to aircraft difficulties
or stringencies of the Rules of Engagement. Seven missed
their targets and one was lost. There had been collateral
damage, with one bomb landing near the French Embassy.
The combined Air Force-Navy raid resulted in 130 civilian
casualties with 37 killed, including, it was claimed,
the adopted daughter of Qaddafi.
Yet events were soon to prove that the raid had been
a genuine success, and as time passed, its beneficial
effects would be recognized. It quickly become obvious
that Qaddafi, who had exultantly backed the bombing
of others, was terribly shaken when the bombs fell
near him. His house had been damaged and flying debris
had reportedly injured his shoulder. He disappeared
from the scene for 24 hours, inspiring some speculation
that he had been killed. When he did reappear-on a
television broadcast-he was obviously deeply disturbed,
lacking his usual arrogance.
Libya protested but received only muted support from
Arab nations. In its comments, Moscow was curiously
nonjudgmental and withheld a strong endorsement of
Qaddafi. More importantly, the following months would
see a dramatic decrease in the number of Libyan-sponsored,
anti-American terrorist events. The Red Army Faction,
one of the groups that had claimed responsibility for
the La Belle disco bombing, reduced its activities.
Other Libyan-sponsored groups followed suit.
Slight Praise
It became evident that the F-111s and the carrier
attack aircraft, ably assisted by Air Force and Navy
support units, had achieved a signal success. Ironically,
that success was not to receive much formal recognition.
There was slight praise for the aircrews. The Air Force
declined a nomination for a Presidential Unit Citation,
although the Navy awarded its forces a Meritorious
Unit Citation. This situation, with an excellent description
of the attack, is covered in Robert E. Venkus' book,
Raid on Qaddafi.
Operation El Dorado Canyon was carried out in the
finest tradition of the Air Force. Its crews and aircraft
were pushed to the absolute limits of their capability.
Yet they prevailed, destroying key targets and shocking
Qaddafi as a raid on Benghazi alone would never have
done. More important, the effect of El Dorado Canyon
went far beyond Libya, registering with the entire
terrorist world.
Moreover, the raid demonstrated that the United States
had the capability, using fighters and large numbers
of land-based tankers, to make precision strikes from
land bases at very great distances.
Perhaps as important, F-111 problems surfaced during
El Dorado Canyon and the Air Force set about fixing
them. This was to pay great dividends five years later
when, during Operation Desert Storm, the F-111F Pave
Tack system flew more missions and destroyed more targets
than any other aircraft in that war.
Walter J. Boyne, former director of the National
Air and Space Museum in Washington, is a retired
Air Force colonel and author. He has written more
than 400 articles about aviation topics and 29 books,
the most recent of which is Beyond the Horizons:
The Lockheed Story. His most recent article for Air
Force Magazine, "Stuart
Symington," appeared in the February 1999
issue.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rightsreserved.
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