For all those who thought that Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were merely land campaigns fought by opposing forces, the author provides a detailed view of the important role amphibious planning and operations played in bottling up the forces under Saddam Hussein.

Joint amphibious doctrine in 1990 (Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3–07(JCS 3–07), Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, JCS, Washington, DC, November 1986 (Change 5, September 1988)) recognized the following four types of amphibious operations:

(1) Assaults. Landings from the sea to make forcible entry onto a hostile shore.
(2) Raids. Surprise attacks from the sea of limited duration with limited objectives.
(3) Withdrawals. The removal of friendly forces from a hostile shore.
(4) Demonstrations. Actions to deceive the enemy using a seaborne show of force.

(The Navy-Marine Team has developed proficiency in two “other” amphibious operations: noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) and seabased humanitarian relief operations).

Operation DESERT SHIELD
Following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s armed forces on 2 August 1990, in consultation with the Government of Saudi Arabia, the President of the United States ordered U.S. forces to deploy to Saudi Arabia. Lead elements were from the 82d Airborne Division and the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (7th MEB). The 7th MEB began deployment on 8 August 1990. The command element and initial ground and air units, loaded in U.S. Air Force C–141 and C–5 aircraft and Marine Corps KC–130 aircraft, landed at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Marines would later be offloaded at Al Jubail Naval Air Base.

The 7th MEB was soon followed by the 1st MEB from Hawaii, with equipment from additional maritime prepositioned shipping. Camp Lejeune’s 4th MEB had been ordered to embark in amphibious shipping and deploy to the Gulf of Arabia.

On 2 September the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) assumed operational control of all Marine Corps forces ashore in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO). 7th MEB and 1st MEB were composited into the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv), and by 6 September the major subordinate commands of I MEF, 1st MarDiv, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force Service Support Group were combat ready.

The first amphibious force to arrive in the Arabian Sea, joining the Navy carrier strike groups already in the area, was the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (13th MEU(SOC)) aboard the five-ship flotilla of Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group Alpha on 7 September 1990.

There were three potential avenues of Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia from Kuwait. The most likely axis of advance was straight down the coastal highway from Kuwait City all the way to Dhahran. A super highway runs north and south, which leads to the industrial and commercial ports of Al Jubail and then on to the industrial complex at Dhahran. Two alternate attack routes were farther inland.

By the first week in September, the Marine forces in-country included more than 30,000 personnel. Offshore the 4th MEB and 13th MEU(SOC) had 12,737 embarked in amphibious ships.

At no time during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM did embarked Marines come under the operational control of I MEF. However, all planning was done in support of I MEF/Marine Central Command (MarCent). The forces afloat came under the amphibious task force (ATF) commander and ultimately the Seventh Fleet/Navy Central Command.

There was no three-star Marine Corps presence in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for the Commander, Central Command (CentCom) to articulate the coordination of Marine forces ashore or embarked, and their contribution to tactical or operational maneuver by CentCom. The senior Marine in the KTO kept dual-hatted as Commanding General (CG), I MEF and Commander, MarCent. The CG, I MEF/MarCent was most often located at his forward headquarters in Al Jubail and left his Deputy Commander, MarCent (two-star) to act as liaison between I MEF/MarCent and CentCom. This was not the best of organizational and operational principles.

Initially the Navy-Marine Team established a plan that outlined two amphibious assaults, a series of raids, and an administrative offload. Amphibious assaults were planned to attack behind Iraqi forces that came into Saudi Arabia to interdict Iraqi supply lines or raids that would draw Iraqi attention away from the multinational axis of advance.

The first of three scheduled exercises of embarked Marines was called SEA SOLDIER I, conducted with the Omanis on 29 September to 5 October. It included both 4th MEB and 13th MEU(SOC). The first major joint/combined training exercise was called IMMINENT THUNDER. It fully integrated multinational air, ground, and naval forces into a single exercise. IMMINENT THUNDER was an amphibious rehearsal to test KTO-wide fire support plans. The international news media closely watched this exercise and may have led to later accusations that GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf made them an unwilling partner in what became one of the most successful deceptions in history.

On 13 October, the 5th MEB, Camp Pendleton, was notified to deploy to the Arabian Gulf.

Maritime Interdiction Operations
United Nations Resolution 661, 5 August 1990, placed a trade embargo on Iraq, and coalition naval forces formed a maritime interdiction force (MIF). The MIF mission was to challenge, stop, and search Iraqi ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The MIF defined a new concept in the “other”category of amphibious operations.

The 13th MEU(SOC) Maritime Special Purpose Force with Navy SEALs, in support of the MIF, first tested the Iraqi ships Al Wastti and Tadmur. Both refused to slow or allow inspection teams to board. Helicopter insertions were conducted to gain control of the ships.

In another case, the AH–1W Sea Cobras of Marine Light/Attack Squadron 267 (HML/A–267) drew Iraqi seamen’s attention as they hovered close to the ship, pointing their machineguns and rockets at the bridge. While the Iraqis were focused on the gunships, a CH–46 Sea Knight from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 146 (HMM–146) delivered the boarding party.

Operation EASTERN EXIT
While CentCom planners were focused on the KTO, a second regional crisis began when the Ambassador to Somalia requested that the Embassy staff and other international Embassy personnel be removed from Mogadishu, Somalia. Marine CH–53E Sea Stallion helicopters would fly the 900 miles to Mogadishu, conduct the NEO and then fly them back to the ATF. The operation required four evolutions of aerial refueling and a flight time of over 16 hours.

The CH–53Es took off from the Embassy compound at 0700 with 61 civilians for a return flight of 400 miles with multiple in-flight refuelings. A second flight was scheduled to return to Mogadishu. The official report described the reason to scrub the second flight as crew fatigue and stabilization of the situation in Mogadishu. The facts may have been something different. The CH–46 crew had not had its chance at the rescue mission. CH–46s did not have a refueling probe and had to wait until the ATF was within range to launch. After the last CH–46 landed on the USS Guam (LPH 9), the NEO was declared over. The evacuees came from 31 countries and totaled 281 people, but the number was raised to 282 when a baby was delivered aboard the Guam.

Operation DESERT STORM
For Operation DESERT STORM, one amphibious assault after another had been in various stages of planning. One assigned the Marines to land on the heavily defended beaches of Kuwait, another at Bubiyan Island, another at Faylakah Island, and another at Iraq’s Al Faw Peninsula. Over 620,000 U.S. forces including 94,000 Marines and 82,000 naval personnel would be in place for the commencement of hostilities.

Intelligence reported that the northern Gulf had been seeded with a mixture of deepwater, near-shore, and in-shore mines. Also, intelligence estimates reported that approximately 550,000 Iraqi troops were located in southern Iraq or Kuwait, with the remainder of Saddam’s armed forces (1.2 million) available to back them up.

The amphibious assault-initiating directive of 14 January 1991 directed the ATF to seize the Ash Shuaybah port south of Kuwait City in order to maintain a steady flow of logistics for I MEF/MarCent and U.S. Army Central Command forces. The I MEF Operations Order 91–0001 envisaged a linkup by I MEF attacking from the south and the amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. The Navy reported that it would take 1 to 2 weeks to have 80 percent assurance of sea mine clearance, and this left no mention of surf zone to beach exit mines.

After months of unsuccessful diplomatic maneuvering, President George H.W. Bush directed GEN Schwarzkopf to commence offensive operations on 16 January. Marine Corps air attacks commenced at 0400 on 17 January in a coordinated night attack against strategic targets in southern Iraq. This would prove to be the largest air attack flown by Marines since World War II.

The first major ground combat action occurred on 29 January, when Iraqi armored and mechanized forces attacked into Saudi Arabia at four locations. An Iraqi brigade attacked the coastal city of Al Khafji; however, the main engagement involving Marines was 80 kilometers to the west. There were three attacks into the MarCent positions. The primary attack was a brigade-sized force against a general outpost for I MEF, TF Shepherd, consisting of a battalion-sized unit of infantry with light armored vehicles. Also on 29 January, the 13th MEU(SOC) conducted Operation DESERT STING, an amphibious raid on the Iraqi-occupied Kuwait island of Maradim. Unfortunately, the enemy action at Al Khafji overshadowed the Marines’ amphibious operation.

The ATF commander issued a warning order to begin planning for an amphibious raid on Faylakah Island. The admiral issued an execute order on 11 February that caused much consternation and misunderstanding at CentCom headquarters. The order was actually—in naval terms—a movement order directing the start of mine clearing operations. GEN Schwarzkopf and his staff misunderstood the message and sent a flash message directing the ATF commander to cease and desist.

On 18 February, ATF Operations Order 1–91 was issued for Regimental Landing Team 2 (Minus) (RLT–2 (-)) to conduct a simultaneous surface and heliborne assault east of Ras Al Qulayhah, just north of the Kuwait/Saudi border. Unfortunately, an explosion blew a 20-foot hole in the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), an amphibious assault ship, and later that same morning an Aegis cruiser, the USS Princeton (CG 59), was disabled by a sea bottom laying influence mine. In less than 4 hours the coalition mine clearing operations had become a disaster, effectively halting the Faylakan Island raid and depriving the ATF of an amphibious assault ship.

I MEF decided to scrap the linkup plan and opted to move the two Marine divisions to the Kuwait “elbow,” conduct the breach, capture Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, and then attack north to seize the road junctions leading out of Kuwait City. The liberation of Kuwait City was left to Arab coalition forces. The amphibious assault into Kuwait began to look unnecessary to the I MEF scheme of maneuver.

GEN Schwarzkopf directed the execution of the ground offensive at 0400 on 24 February. The I MEF mission, as described by CentCom, was a supporting attack to destroy Iraqi forces in zone and secure key objectives to prevent Iraqi forces from hindering the main attack by the U.S. Army.

On 24 February, 13th MEU(SOC) was tasked to conduct a deception operation in the vicinity of Ash Shuaybah, Kuwait, to hold Iraqi defenders in position. The operation began at 0300 on 25 February, and once the helicopters reached their turnaround point, they climbed to higher altitude to be illuminated by Iraqi radars. It was all over within an hour. Helicopters from Marine Aircraft Group 40 (MAG–40) and HMM–164, 13th MEU(SOC), played a major role in the amphibious demonstrations. The helicopters conducted airborne deception operations on G-day through G+2 and helped to tie up around 40,000 Iraqis in useless defensive positions along the beaches, awaiting a surface amphibious assault that never came.

The deception of the amphibious feint at Ash Shuaybah had been so successful that another deception operation was directed at Bubiyan Island. The Iraqis took the bait, and the southern end of the island was lit up with radar, flares, and antiaircraft fire. An attack on Faylakah Island actually involved Marine attack AH–1Ns from HML/A–269, with rockets firing at Iraqi positions. Major combat operations ended on 28 February.

The 5th MEB was the only major Marine unit afloat to participate in both the amphibious demonstrations and ground operations during Operation DESERT STORM. RLT–5 came ashore by helilift on G-day to screen the I MEF right flank and protect the extended supply lines. MAG–50 moved ashore and added combat aviation support. Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, 5th MEB, engaged Iraqi forces in the Al Wafrah Forest, and then moved north to join 2d MarDiv.

Summary
During the Gulf War, as part of the deception/demonstration operations, an impressive amphibious assault TF was stationed conspicuously off the coast of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This ATF was composed of 40 amphibious assault ships, the largest such force to be assembled since Inchon, Korea. The object was to fix the six Iraqi divisions deployed along the Kuwaiti coast, and this goal was most decidedly achieved. Iraqi commanders made no early effort to withdraw or reposition their forces from coastal defenses. The resulting consequences were that the Marines maneuvered through the Iraq defense of southern Kuwait and outflanked the Iraqi coastal defense forces.

>LtCol Hayden is a frequent contributor to MCG. He fought in the Gulf War, serving as the CO of Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSSG and as the CO, Rear Area Security, I MEF. He currently writes columns for two web sites and various national news media outlets. He is writing a book on counterinsurgency.

>>Editor’s Note: The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions from U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1999, 9 volumes, and Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 1992, History and Museums Division, Washington, DC, 1992–99.