Hizbullah
Vanguard and Liberator
“Israel
which has both nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the
region, is weaker than a spider’s web.”1
- Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General
“The
evil Zionist regime could be defeated by the strong wills and
concrete faiths of the Mujahedeen of Islam.”2
- Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s Supreme Leader
|
Lebanese
and Palestinian prisoners awaiting release
|
The
long-awaited prisoner exchange between Israel and Lebanon’s
Hizbullah organization was finally completed, in the midst of
complex security measures. The German-brokered exchange came after
years of intense negotiations and involved the release of Sheikh
Abdel Karim Ebeid and Mustafa Dirani, two high-profile Lebanese
leaders held by Israel, as well as 28 other detainees.
The
Israelis also released around 400 Palestinians and handed over the
bodies of 59 Lebanese to Red Cross officials on the Israeli-Lebanese
borders. In return, Israel was handed caskets containing the bodies
of three Israeli soldiers, transported from Beirut on a German
military aircraft. Also on board was Elhanan Tennenbaum, an Israeli
businessman kidnapped by Hizbullah after being lured into Beirut
three years ago with promises of a profitable business deal.3
The
prisoner exchange indicated that Hizbullah’s leader, Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah, was able to gain important concessions from Israel, given
that his movement secured the release of Lebanese leaders and a
large number of Palestinian detainees in return for the bodies of
only three Israeli soldiers and a debt-ridden Israeli businessman.
The exchange also highlighted Israeli intelligence’s continued
failure to secure information about its missing air force navigator
Ron Arad, missing since his aircraft was shot down over Lebanon’s
Bekaa valley in 1986. Israeli commandos had kidnapped Ebeid and
Dirani on the assumption that they could be used to win Arad’s
release. The details of the recent deal between Hizbullah and Israel
offered conclusive evidence that this Israeli strategy had failed.4
With
the completed swap, both sides are expected to launch a second stage
of negotiations, with Israel to receive concrete information on Arad
within three months, in exchange for which Israel would release
Samir al-Qantar, a Lebanese militant imprisoned in Israel since 1979
for killing three Israelis.5
Hizbullah’s
message of defiance discredited the Palestinian Authority. |
|
Following
the prisoner exchange, both Israel and Hizbullah engaged in a war of
words. In a massive rally of tens of thousands of Hizbullah
supporters, Nasrallah warned that his organization would if
necessary kidnap more Israelis to use as bargaining chips to secure
the release of Lebanese prisoners. Turning to a huge poster of the
guerilla ambush in which three Israeli soldiers were captured in
October 2000, Nasrallah declared: “This is a choice.” Sharon
meanwhile, speaking at a memorial service for the dead Israeli
soldiers, said: “Israel will not allow any enemy or terror group
to turn kidnapping and ransom into a system. There are means we have
not yet used. If, heaven forbid, the circumstances are changed, we
will not hesitate to use them.”6
The
prisoner exchange represents an important political victory for
Hizbullah that has far-reaching strategic repercussions that go
beyond the traditional scope of the military and political
confrontation between Israel and the Lebanese militia. In fact, the
mere willingness on the part of Israel to negotiate an exchange of
prisoners is a de facto recognition of Hizbullah’s political
weight. Moreover, the way in which the prisoner swap was conducted,
the costs incurred by both sides and the strategic consequences of
the swap indicate that Hizbullah’s calculations, strategy, tactics
and mode of operation have reached a remarkable degree of political
astuteness and strategic sophistication. It is therefore
unsurprising that the prisoner exchange prompted “a day of
national celebration” in Lebanon and a “somber” mood in
Israel, as the New York Times put it. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon is also known to have described the situation in Israel in
light of the prisoner exchange as “not a time of happiness.”7
A
Powerful Non-State Actor
Among
the clearest signs of Arab weakness in today’s Middle East are the
occupations of Iraq and the Palestinian territories by the United
States and Israel, respectively. Both the US and Israel find
themselves acting without much official resistance from other
regional actors or from the international community. The result has
been a system of perpetual insecurity imposed on the Arabs, in which
loss of life and property has been met with international silence
and complacency. An example of this trend is that no official
organization or institution has attempted to estimate the number of
Iraqi casualties caused by the US invasion, despite the fact that
unofficial estimates put the dead at about 6,000 civilians and
10,000 military personnel, with another 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers
and civilians gravely wounded.8
Furthermore, Israel continues its brutal policies in the Occupied
Territories without fear of any form of regional or international
retribution for its brutal activities.
|
Sheikh
Abdel Karim Ebeid leaving an Israel prison
|
Another
important characteristic of the region is the failure of the
official Arab system to produce a stable regional order, dedicated
to Arab interests, accepted by its citizens, and able to keep
external enemies at bay.9 In
essence, the Arab regional order suffers from a high degree of
political fragmentation and polarization, and, as a result, has
become dominated and exploited by stronger regional and
international actors seeking to establish a permanent foothold in
this vital area of the world. After all, Arab states have thus far
failed to create a credible deterrent capacity or even a balance of
power vis-ŕ-vis their enemies. Given the present-day impotence of
Arab armies, non-state actors, such as Hizbullah, Hamas, Islamic
Jihad and a variety of Islamist and/or Arab nationalist movements,
have taken the lead in defending Arab-Islamic interests and have
taken it upon themselves to avenge the daily killings committed by
occupation forces in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and elsewhere in the
Islamic World.
Since
its inception in the early 1980s, Hizbullah has worked against
foreign presence in Lebanon and has fought the Israeli military for
almost two decades. It gained notoriety for its spectacular
operations against US, French, and Israeli military facilities in
Lebanon in October 1983, and with the almost simultaneous bombings
of the US Marine barracks in Beirut and a building housing French
troops, killing 241 US servicemen and 59 French paratroopers.10
Ten days later, the Israeli military intelligence headquarters in
Tyre was demolished by another bomb, killing almost 30 Israeli
troops.
In
May 2000, as the Israeli army completed its withdrawal from southern
Lebanon, it became a self-evident reality that Hizbullah’s
military activities had borne fruit, and that for the first time in
the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel had pulled out
unconditionally from Arab land - without a peace treaty, without a
cease-fire agreement, without even a tacit understanding that quiet
would prevail on its border with Lebanon.11
In fact, both Lebanon and Syria made it clear to Israel that its
withdrawal would not guarantee a peaceful situation, and Hizbullah
asserted that armed struggle would continue.
Since
then, Hizbullah has made impressive military and strategic gains. In
fact, it has established total control over southern Lebanon,
transforming the area into a reconnaissance and surveillance base
for anti-Israeli military activities. In addition, the militia
succeeded in building impressive military capabilities, including
thousands of Katyusha and other more advanced rockets that cover
Israel as far south as Hadera (between Haifa and Tel Aviv). In fact,
some estimates indicate that Hizbullah’s current threat to the
Israeli population is greater than that of some neighboring Arab
states.12
The
hostage-taking may have a “demonstration effect,”
reverberating internationally. |
|
As
a result of all this, Hizbullah managed to establish a certain level
of deterrence against Israeli attacks and dictate the “rules of
the game.” Even when Israel tried to change those rules and strike
Syrian outposts in July 2001, Hizbullah immediately retaliated by
launching offensives on Israeli posts in Shib’a farms and Mt.
Hermon, sending a message that the organization will retaliate
immediately for any Israeli attack on Lebanon or Syria, deterring
further Israeli aggression.
Some
analysts suggest that “Hizbullah emerged from the tit-for-tat in
mid-2001 as the defender of the Syrians in Lebanon, alongside its
acknowledged role of defender of Lebanon and the Lebanese against
Israeli attacks.”13 In the
latter capacity, recent weeks saw Hizbullah guerillas fire an
anti-tank missile at an Israeli military tractor as it crossed the
Lebanese-Israeli border, killing one soldier and wounding another.
Israel only responded by a few air strikes in central and western
areas of southern Lebanon, and did not resort to massive assaults on
Lebanon’s infrastructure, as it had in the past. In essence,
Hizbullah’s deterrence strategy managed to limit Israel’s scope
of retaliatory measures and contain its expansionist plans.
More
importantly, Hizbullah eventually became a key strategic partner for
the Palestinians in the current Intifada against Israel. As the
Palestinian uprising escalated, Hizbullah began increasing its
attacks on Israeli outposts in Shiba’a Farms, and some evidence
points to Hizbullah’s involvement in attacks near northern Israeli
towns. Other reports indicate that Hizbullah is working to recruit
militants from the Israeli Arab community, to conduct operations
against Israel from inside the country.14
The Arabs who make up almost 20 percent of Israel’s population
have suffered discriminatory treatment by successive Israeli
governments, and some have been radicalized by the ongoing Israeli
carnage in the Occupied Territories.
The
Significance of the Prisoner Exchange
In
many ways, the strategic repercussions of the exchange are no less
significant than the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May
2000. More importantly, the prisoner swap threw into sharp relief
the futility of all “peacemaking” efforts in the region, and the
importance of resistance and steadfastness. It is interesting to
note that neither the short-lived government of Mahmoud Abbas, nor
Ahmed Qurei’s current administration - with all their regional and
international connections - managed to negotiate large scale
prisoner releases or secure any meaningful compromises from Israel.
|
Hassan
Nasrallah: Hostage-taking remains an option
|
Hizbullah’s
message of defiance not only discredited the Palestinian Authority
(PA), but also showcased the fact that the path of resistance,
rather than wholesale compromise, is capable of achieving results on
the ground. Furthermore, Hizbullah’s ability to force Israel’s
hand through hostage-taking and military preparedness seems to be
emboldening other Palestinian factions to follow suit: Hamas’
leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, declared that his group is making every
effort to seize Israeli soldiers.15
Moreover, the compromises that have been forced upon Israel due to
Hizbullah’s successful hostage-taking strategy could have a
“demonstration effect,” reverberating internationally with other
Islamist groups fighting occupation elsewhere in the world.
Hizbullah
highlighted one of the thorniest issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict
- the need to free prisoners held in Israeli jails and to find a
solution for the horrendous abuses that they have endured. There are
still as many as 7,500 Palestinian prisoners languishing in Israeli
jails and detention centers on charges of resisting Israeli
occupation.16 In addition, some
2,200 minors have been imprisoned since the start of the Intifada.17
Palestinian or Arab prisoners in Israeli jails are usually stripped
naked, blindfolded, beaten, tortured and subjected to long periods
of solitary confinement; some are raped.18
Some
news reports point to the existence of an Israeli secret prison by
the name of Facility 1391, dubbed as “Israel’s Guantanamo,”
where Palestinian and other Arab detainees are subjected to abuses
on a par with those endured by prisoners in some of the worst
totalitarian regimes in the Third World.19
Both Sheikh Abdel Karim Ebeid and Mustafa Dirani are known to have
been tortured in Facility 1391.
Conclusions
The
strategic gains that Hizbullah has made over the decades are indeed
remarkable. The organization has secured a position of immense
respect, not only among the Shi’ite community in Lebanon and in
Lebanese parliamentary politics, but throughout the Muslim world.
Hizbullah’s ability to drag Israel into a long-term war of
attrition, and more recently its success in dictating the rules of
engagement vis-ŕ-vis the dual use of deterrence and pinpoint
military strikes have made the organization a role model for other
resistance groups seeking independence.
Estimates
suggest Hizbullah’s threat to Israel is greater than some
neighboring Arab states. |
|
Shortly
after September 11 a group of leading scholars and former government
officials, including William Kristol and Richard Perle, declared in
an open letter to President Bush that “any war on terrorism must
target Hizbullah.” Even Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
noted that “Hizbullah may be the A team of terrorists,” while
“al-Qaeda is actually the B team.”20
Despite
constant US threats, Hizbullah has managed to weather the US tide by
posing a complex political and strategic dilemma for decision-makers
in Washington. Over the years Hizbullah has tied its activities to
two regional powers, Syria and Iran, and has diversified its
international relations to the extent that officials in France,
Canada, and other Western nations have acknowledged the value of the
organization’s social and political projects. Moreover, Hizbullah
realizes that the US’ occupation of Iraq is already an immense
burden, and that opening up a new front in the Bekaa Valley, a
Hezbollah stronghold, would only make matters worse.21
By opting for resistance, Hizbullah has illustrated its unique role
as vanguard and liberator, a lesson Arab regimes would do well to
learn.
Kareem
M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo,
Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in
security studies, decision- making, nuclear politics, Middle East
politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the
Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.
1-
Eyal Zisser, “The Return of Hizbullah,” Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2002
2-
Daniel Pipes, “Hizbullah’s Victory, Israel’s Decline,” Jewish
World Review February 3rd, 2003
3-
Christopher Slaney, “Israeli
Prisoner Swap Success,” Middle East Times
4-
Ibid.
5-
“Hamas
Threatens to Kidnap Israeli Soldiers,” Newsweek January
30th, 2004
6-
Ibid.
7-
Daniel Pipes, “Hizbullah’s Victory, Israel’s Decline,”
Jewish World Review February 3rd, 2003
8-
Patrick Seale, “A Eulogy for the Arab State System,” Daily
Star October 6th, 2003
9-
Ibid.
10-
Marc Sirois, “The History of Hizbullah,” Yellow
Times October 24th, 2002
11-
Eyal Zisser, “The Return of Hizbullah,” Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2002
12-
Ibid.
13-
Ibid.
14-
Laurie Copans, “Hezbollah Influence Grows in the Middle East,” Associated
Press February 8th, 2004
15-
“Hamas
Threatens to Kidnap Israeli Soldiers,” Newsweek January
30th, 2004
16-
Khalid Amayreh, “Prisoner Swap Gives Palestinians Joy,” Al-Jazeera
(English) January 29th, 2004
17-
Leila el-Haddad, “The Child Prisoners of Israel,” Al-Jazeera (English)
January 25th, 2004
18-
Chris McGreal, “’Facility
1391: Israels Secret Prison,” Jihad Unspun
19-
Ibid.
20-
Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs
November/December 2003
21-
Ibid.
|