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08 May 2006 - 19 Apr 2012
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The Riksbank Monetary policy Financial stability Market operations Statistics Published Research Notes & coins

Annual inflation
During the history of the Riksbank, from 1668 to today, the annual inflation was on average 2.1-2.3 percent (the exact figure depends on how inflation is measured in relation to the monetary disorder during the second half of the 1710s). This can be compared to the present inflation target of the Riksbank at 2.0 percent.

German mark
In September 1914 the Riksbank selling rate of one German mark was 89 Swedish öre. One billion German marks in September 1914 could buy one fifth of Sweden’s gross domestic product. The 1st of October 1923, the Riksbank selling rate of a billion German marks was 30 Swedish crowns. A month later the rate was 4 Swedish öre. In September 1924, the rate was below one tenth of an öre. One billion German marks could then only buy half a centilitre of Swedish milk. At the end of 1924 a new German mark was introduced, the Reichsmark, which was set equal to one trillion (one million millions) old marks.
Research at Sveriges Riksbank
The objective of economic research at the Riksbank is to provide a strong conceptual and empirical basis for policy-making. High-quality research is critical to ensure that the Riksbank is well prepared to deal with challenges associated with conducting monetary policy and promoting a safe and efficient payment system. An important task of economic research is to provide models, tools and analyses for the fulfillment of the Riksbank’s responsibilities.
The Governance of Central Banks, August 31-September 1, 2006
Governments have granted central banks substantial independence over monetary policy but also as a byproduct over their other important functions.  Typically, central banks have multiple tasks, among others as regulated monopolists, financial industry regulators and deposit insurance agencies. These different roles raise different governance issues that interact in potentially complex ways. The institutional structure and the importance of good corporate governance as a means for central banks to attain their other objectives have received little attention and no generally accepted guidelines on optimal governance for central banks exist yet.

The objective of this conference is to foster debate about general principles that arguably should form the basis for the good governance of central banks and the desirable governance structures for central banks, to discuss the impact of these principles on the institutional structure of a central bank and the formulation of central bank law, and to explore common features and differences between central bank governance and corporate governance.

The conference is organized by Renée Adams , Franklin Allen, Claudio Borio, Lars Frisell, Marco Pagano, Torsten Persson, Kenneth Rogoff, Kasper Roszbach and Giancarlo Spagnolo. Alberto Alesina will give an invited lecture on the political economy and governance of central banks.
”Exploring interactions between real activity and the financial stance”
In a recent article in the Journal of Financial Stability, April 2005, a number of plausible candidates for a measure of financial stability are examined. Aggregated bankruptcies in the entire Swedish business sector are found to be closely related to bank’s aggregated credit losses. Moreover, bankruptcies play a role in explaining the development in macro variables such as GDP, the inflation rate, nominal interest rates, and the real exchange rates. And vice versa, i.e., these macro variables are helpful in predicting aggregate bankruptcy rates in the economy, and can actually account even for extreme outcomes such as the Swedish banking crises in the early 90’s. The article goes on to demonstrate that effects of monetary policy on inflation and bankruptcy rates may well differ in different states of the world.
LAST UPDATED 2/6/2006 

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