|
|
|
 |
|
|
 |
|
|
|
Go to chapter: |
Go to Page: |
The Open Book page image presentation framework is not designed to replace printed books, nor emulate HTML. Rather, it is a free, browsable, nonproprietary, fully and deeply searchable version of the publication which we can inexpensively and quickly produce to make the material available worldwide. For a print version, please purchase a copy of this book. Though it is possible to print these browsable pages at fax quality, the result will be unsatisfactory. More information on the Open Book is available. Page display interface copyright 1999, 2000, the Brookings Institution Press.  |
|
|
 The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 797-6000 | Facsimile: (202) 797-6004 | E-mail: Brookings Info Comments on this Site |
|
The first FOUR and last FOUR pages of the UNCORRECTED OCRed text. Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading--exclusively for search engines. OCR for page 147 6 Reconstructing a Conflict Management System in Rhoctesia/ZimbaLwe A strategy. . . entails choices about the use of ir~ducemer~ts by ore partly to the other.... The package of inducements used is critical in the fur~damer~tal aspect of creating the right time to attempt de-escalatiorz. LOUIS KRIESBERG Seven years after Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made a unilat- eral declaration of independence from Great Britain in 1965, it was apparent that Rhodesian government forces were losing a civil war against African nationalist insurgents. However, there was no mutually hurting stalemate to force the insurgents to come to an agreement, and Rhodesian political leaders remained determined to carry on the fight against their opponents. A political solution was needed to halt the country's social and economic deterioration, but few political leaders had the will and the incentive to advocate a mutually agreeable con- flict management system. Both sets of elites were deeply distrustful of their antagonist's purposes and thus viewed proposals to place their fate in the hands of their opponents as the worst possible outcome. Many local observers recognized that a strategy of mutual cooperation was in the long-run interest of the country as a whole; nevertheless, key actors on both sides feared that their adversaries would regard concil- iatory gestures as a sign of weakness and would not reciprocate in kind, so they shunned accommodating overtures and instead mobilized their supporters for war. 147 OCR for page 148 148 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM In this situation, third-party mediation became the only alternative to continued deadly conflict. Third-party intervention held out the hope that the nature of the encounter could be changed by reducing the potential for misperception, using incentives to alter the actors' prefer- ences, and providing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Britain, as the former colonial power with a long history of negotiating with Rhodesian authorities, was viewed as knowledgeable about the issues and in close contact with the main bargaining parties. Thus there were both an intermediary long active on the scene and identifiable bargain- ing parties, both favorable preconditions for a constructive negotiating process. Although a coalition including the United States, South Africa, Commonwealth countries, and neighboring countries Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique also contributed in important ways to the mediatory process, in the end it was the British government, at the behest of its Commonwealth allies, that took the lead in exerting pres- sure at Lancaster House in 1979 for an agreement and a change in Zimbabwe's conflict management system. The central issue to be probed in this chapter is,What combinations of pressures and incentives was the coalition of third-party mediators able to bring to bear to encourage the Rhodesian adversaries to accept new rules for regulating conflict? The fact that external manipulation succeeded in moving the parties toward cooperative forms of behavior will constitute evidence that, at least in certain propitious circum- stances, determined mediators need not passively wait for a ripe moment to emerge. Here, the mediators cultivated ripeness by pointing out the costs of continued civil war and the ways that both sides could benefit from accommodation. The Bargaining Parties The Rhodesian colonial state was comparable to other settler territo- ries in the manner in which it organized a minority-dominated conflict management system that preserved white security and prosperity. By the time the Rhodesian Front (RF) party organization was formed in 1962, many local Europeans, led by a determined element in Rhodesia's white community, exercised a commanding influence over the Rho- desian state and, after the elections in December 1962, held a firm grip on the country's political institutions. The Rhodesian white community of 249,000 people in 1971 was relatively large compared with that in neighboring countries, but it was only 5 percent of Rhodesia's total pop- OCR for page 149 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 149 ulation,which included 5,220,000Africans, 16,900 Coloureds,and 9,300 Asians. The Europeans in Rhodesia were allowed a greater measure of autonomy over domestic matters under the 1923 constitution than was the case in neighboring colonies. The RF used this political power to provide security and to benefit its communal constituency, both economically and socially. An infra- structure was built, taxes were imposed, a security structure developed, pass laws put into effect, marketing boards set up, and the best lands reserved all to ensure the quality of life of the resident European pop- ulation, to overcome their feelings of insecurity because of the low ratio of whites in the total population, and to attract new immigrants from Europe. In line with these objectives, public allocations for health and education greatly favored the minority white community, leaving the African majority highly disadvantaged. Thus the pre-independence Rhodesian state became an effective instrument to promote racial and class interests. Such a harsh and self- interested hegemon inevitably provoked an angry response from the resentful African majority population. Under these circumstances, a re- ciprocal sense of insecurity came to prevail: the African majority feared the prospect of continued social, political, and economic disadvantage; the white minority, fearing a loss of status and privileges in an African- led state, sought political power free from external control. The whites feared the shadow of the future. For them, the logic embedded in the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was that holding onto political power would reduce their vulnerability to the majoritarian will. The politics of ethnicity (as well as personality, tactics, and ideology) were also consequential in colonial Rhodesia. The RF government led by Ian Smith,"playing the ethnic card," emphasized whatever differences existed between the country's two main ethnic groups, the Ndebele and the Shona. For example, the government attempted to create a consti- tutional order by which the Ndebele and Shona chiefs would be equally represented in the Senate and chiefs as well as commoners would gain parity in the House of Assembly. This exacerbated group tensions because the proposal greatly favored the minority Ndebele, who made up less than 20 percent of Rhodesia's population.) In addition, the gov- ernment fomented differences and tensions along ethnic lines between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) insurgent organizations during the struggle for independence. In a divisive form of categorizing, the majority Shona became associated with the ZANU insurgents, and the minority Ndebele OCR for page 150 150 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM were linked with the ZAPU military force.2 This division, as Jeffrey Herbst observes, had "a debilitating effect on the nationalist struggle."3 Shona-Ndebele tensions, of relatively recent origin, were also impor- tant in the run-up to the Lancaster House conference of 1979 and beyond. At the time of an abortive conference in Geneva that followed the Kissinger peace initiative in southern Africa in 1976, ZANU's Robert Mugabe and ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo did manage to temporarily prevail over their factional differences and unite to form a loose Patriotic Front. But this externalization effect proved short-lived. After the Lancaster House negotiations and independence, interpersonal and interethnic differences resurfaced when the Mugabe government forced ZAPU members to resign from their official positions and then used an all- Shona military unit to deal most brutally with dissident elements in Nkomo's predominantly Ndebele heartland area. Nkomo and Mugabe again managed to patch up their differences in 1987 to reach a unity accord, thus easing interethnic tensions as the Ndebele gained signifi- cant representation in the cabinet coalition (see chapter 3~. Although the unity accord made conflict between the main ethnic groups more manageable, other conflicts emerged as points of con- tention. Competition between the Shona subethnic groups the Kalanga, Karanga, Korekore, Manyika, Ndau, and Zezuru developed more slowly than between the Shona and Ndebele, but it surfaced in the 1980s as the transition to majority rule was being consolidated and as the struggle for control of scarce state positions and resources intensi- fied. Mugabe displayed sensitivity to the problem and took care to main- tain a balance between these ethnic subgroups (practicing a form of "hegemonic exchange" within ZANU's party and, in certain periods, its government coalition); disputes between these groups have nonetheless come to the fore. According to one report,"Within ZANU's Shona major- ity, power since independence has rested primarily in the hands of a coalition of the Zezuru and Manyika subgroups, giving the largest sub- group, the Karangas, a lesser position than many of its members feel is their due."4 A process of racial bargaining was evident only in the early stages of the negotiations.5 In the 1974-75 period,fourAfrican political parties ZANU, ZAPU, the African National Council (ANC), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) briefly joined forces to engage in what amounted to racial bargaining with the white-led Rhodesian Front. However, by the time the Lancaster House conference took place, Europeans had no delegation of their own.They were included in the OCR for page 187 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 187 cease-fire was to be implemented. Consequently, only a coalition of mediators would have had the clout to reassure the warring parties during the implementation phase and bring them to a final agreement. In pushing the negotiations ahead, the various mediators made use of multiple incentives to reach a political settlement. In Kissinger's meeting with Ian Smith in Pretoria, he discussed a plan to provide $1.5 billion to reassure whites in case it became necessary for them to leave an independent Zimbabwe. Smith responded favorably to the idea and used it, after his return to Salisbury, to gain support for a retreat from the UDI. The thrust of the Kissinger idea was quickly changed from a "buyout," with its implications of distrust, to an Anglo-American finan- cial assistance program to encourage "a sense of confidence" among white Rhodesians and to promote Zimbabwe's development. Kissinger stated that the African nationalists were "enormously relieved" by the adoption of a more positive orientation.~29 This shift was prudent partly because there was no reason to believe that whites would want to leave an economically healthy and politically stable Zimbabwe or that the U.S. Congress would vote for such a trust fund.~30 Moreover, Kissinger was effective in using coercive incentives, in col- laboration with Vorster, to influence Ian Smith. Kissinger himself had no doubts about the expediency of using muscle in this context. He observed that no dominant community would accept a transition of the sort he proposed without an element of coercion."Pressure" would be maintained, he assured President Nyerere,"to ensure that a real trans- fer takes place."'3~ In his view, the main means of coercion at hand was the closing of the border with South Africa, cutting the indispensable lifeline for Rhodesian exports and imports.Vorster, as promised, did tell Smith that he would shut down locomotive traffic from South Africa to Rhodesia unless Smith agreed to Kissinger's terms.~32 These coercive diplomatic incentives had their intended effect, inducing Smith to con- sent to a new conflict management system. As Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flower wrote later,"The South African political, economic and military arm-twisting, which had been growing steadily more painful, had finally proved too much for Smith, his government and his country to bear."~33 Kissinger's use of pressures and incentives had succeeded in moving the peace process ahead, but in the end the incentives offered to Smith regarding white control of the two security ministries during the transition proved fatal to Kissinger's diplomatic initiative. But although coercive diplomatic incentives were used to bring about a change in Smith's preferences, what incentives explain South Africa's OCR for page 188 188 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM willingness to play the "heavy" in its relations with a white-led regime to the north? In giving this support, Kissinger said, the South Africans obtained what they wanted: an open meeting with the U.S. secretary of state that would give them some legitimacy in the world community, possibly at the price of a momentary setback in the process of trans- forming the minority-dominated conflict management system in South Africa itself.~34 By the time of Lancaster House, the calculus of incentives had changed somewhat.With the two delegations headed by Africans, the racial factor was still present but in a less straightforward manner than it had been in the Kissinger end Anglo-American periods.Whites cer- tainly had misgivings over their loss of political power, but this was more than offset by the ending of the war and by their increased secu- rity regarding their future status.The proposed constitutional arrange- ment left whites in a leading position in the economy, civil service, and military and gave them a disproportionate share of the arable land. For the time being, at least, the whites also retained twenty separately elected seats in the parliament. The Muzorewa delegation also responded in a conciliatory manner to Carrington's proposals, largely reflecting their determination to be supportive of the British effort in order to gain London's backing in case the conference collapsed. Because this potential collapse remained a real possibility to the very end, the British threat of a second-class solu- tion was a substantial one. Robin Renwick insists that the British were serious about their threat to recognize Muzorewa if there was no other option.The effect was to induce Muzorewa, eager to hold on to power, to act in a supportive manner on hurtful issues such as new elections and to remain hopeful that the PF leaders would balk over the terms of the constitution or transition; it also put pressure on the PF leadership, which sought to minimize the destruction of war and to come to power as swiftly as possible. Carrington's primary problems lay not with the Muzorewa delega- tion and its white members but with Mugabe and Nkomo.The PF was in a strong bargaining position as a consequence of its capacity for an extended war. PF leaders recognized that protracted war would be costly in terms of lives, property, and future economic dislocation, but Mugabe at least was prepared to make heavy sacrifices to be able to restructure the colonial system. As long as the frontline presidents con- tinued to support the guerrilla war, Mugabe had little incentive to act in a cooperative manner. Nevertheless, as the conference gained OCR for page 189 RECONSTRUCTING A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 189 momentum and Carrington's frontline and Commonwealth allies became committed to a successful outcome, the PF's maneuverability shrank considerably. Great Britain's exercise of its leverage through cal- culation, bluffs, threats, and deadlines took its toll; moreover, the use of financial incentives was critical for the land issue, enabling the PF to save face on a matter of great symbolic importance to their supporters. Given the high costs of war for all concerned, it was also apparent to the PF leaders (and particularly Nkomo) that they would lose local support if they returned from the negotiations empty-handed.~35 As a result, the combination of pressures and incentives in the hands of various third parties contributed to keeping the negotiating process on track. Given the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate, the leverage of the coalition of mediators proved critical in both negotiating the peace and moving the society toward a majoritarian conflict manage- ment system.This demonstrated again that the use of pressures and incentives to influence the preferences of the conflicting parties is an important component of diplomatic capabilities that must not be under- estimated. OCR for page 190 SOUTH AFRICA · Nylstroom TRANSVAAL Pretoria @> SWAZILAND `.,iohannesburg - Mbabane] Klerksdorp Krnnnstad , ' ' - ~ · ;~ ~ ~ _ _ 1: `,' ~ Bethlehem; Kimberleyr FROEREAsNT6AETE Amp, 'iadysmith ~ : ~ ~ ~ \ CAPE PROVINCE : : : : : : ~ : : : :~ :: : :: :: : ~ ~ : :::: ~ : :: NATAL .Pietern~atitzburg ·Durban ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :: ~ ~ . ~ · · · , \ Victoria West- ·Middelbur9 Umtata. / ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ Queenstown / A TL~fiG ~ ~ ~ Beaufort West . ~ : l i:: ~OGE41`I~ :~ :~: :~ ~ ~ / , ,,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ::: ::: ~ : ~ : ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ Worcester :~Gape lown~3. ~ ~~~PortEiizabith ~~ I::: : : I: ~ : : : : : :::: ::: ::: ::: I:: : : ~ : :: : ~ ~ : : : :~: : : it: I:: :: : : : i:: :: INDIA:N : :~::: :: :~ :~:O~r ::~ ~ ~~ |
