For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
May 17, 2002
Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer
The James S. Brady Briefing Room
12:19 P.M. EDT
MR. FLEISCHER: Good afternoon. Let me give you a report on the
President's day, and then I also have the week ahead. The President
this morning had his usual round of briefings. And then he met with
the Prime Minister of Slovenia, where they discussed bilateral issues
between the United States and Slovenia. They discussed the upcoming
Prague Summit about NATO expansion, as well as the broader regional
issues involving Bosnia, Serbia, and bringing peace and stability to
the region.
Then the President, as you know, presented the Commander-in-Chief's
Trophy to the United States Air Force Academy. Later this afternoon,
the President will deliver what he considers very important remarks on
the importance of helping senior citizens get prescription drug
coverage as part of Medicare. The President is determined to help
strengthen our nation's Medicare system for our seniors while getting
them prescription drugs and affording seniors more options and more
choices as part of their Medicare plans.
And then the President will make remarks on Asia Pacific American
Heritage Month in the East Room, and then he will depart the White
House for Camp David, where he will be for the weekend.
With that, I'm happy to take your questions. Randy?
Q Ari, I'm wondering, how can you and other White House people
cry foul or accuse the Democrats of playing politics with this issue
when on Tuesday you were up here defending the Republicans' right to
sell a photograph of Bush on 9/11 as a fundraising tool, and when Karl
Rove in January said Republicans should use the President's handling of
the war on terrorism to their political advantage.
MR. FLEISCHER: Number one, that's not what Mr. Rove said. Number
two, the administration -- and, I think, the American people
recognize that that photo represented the President doing his job on
behalf of the country. The President did not criticize the opposition
party. The President did not intimate or hint that the opposition
party had prior knowledge of the attack on September 11th, and then try
to say that the opposition party had information that they should have
done something about. It's a totally different measure, Randy.
Q No, but it intimates that his performance has been masterful.
MR. FLEISCHER: That's a different question.
Q Two questions. First, Dr. Rice laid out yesterday what the
administration was hearing and concluding about threats to U.S. and
U.S. interests overseas during the course of last summer, and it seems
there was a lot of urgency within the administration. Granted that
hindsight is 20/20, does the President believe that he and his
administration communicated to the American public effectively enough
the kind of urgency that Dr. Rice described was in the administration
during the weeks leading up to September 11th?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me draw your attention to a series of things
that the President said publicly, and actions that the President took.
In fact, you can begin by going back to the President's speech as a
candidate, at the Citadel on February 23rd, 1999. If you recall,
that's a speech that the White House handed out to you in the aftermath
of September 11th, because in many ways, it showed the priority that
this President was bringing to office about the need to fight
terrorism. And he said in that speech at the Citadel, "And there is
more to be done preparing here at home. I will put a high priority on
detecting and responding to terrorism on our soil."
In March, on March 4th, 2001, when the President went to
participate in the christening of the Ronald Reagan, in Newport News,
Virginia, the President said, "Our present dangers are less
concentrated, and more varied. They come from rogue nations, from
terrorism." And he went on.
And finally, the President on May 8th, in a statement that you all
have, issued a statement about domestic preparedness against weapons of
mass destruction. And that was a warning from the President about
protecting America's homeland and citizens from the threats of weapons
of mass destruction, as one of our nation's most important national
security challenges.
Beyond that, Terry, in the realm of action, this is why -- one of
the reasons why once our nation was hit in this attack on September
11th, we were able to respond so quickly. In the events leading up to
September 11th, and over the course of the first year, or the first
nine months of this President's administration, the President came to
Washington determined to do something more fundamental about terrorism,
because of the threats that it poses to our interests abroad, as well
as to Americans here at home.
And as a result of a process that involved the CIA, the Department
of Defense, the Department of State, the National Security Council, a
national security presidential directive was developed and prepared
throughout 2001, that was approved by what's called the principals
committee, which is essentially Cabinet level officers involved in
national security, on September 4th, 2001.
That document was then finalized on September 10th. It had not yet
gone to the President. That national security presidential directive
was a comprehensive, multifront plan to dismantle the al Qaeda. It
involved a direction to the Pentagon to develop military options for
the dismantling of al Qaeda. It involved action on the financial front
to dry up their resources. And it also involved working with our --
with the Northern Alliance, in an attempt to dismantle the al Qaeda.
The President was aware that bin Laden, of course, as previous
administrations it's been well-known that bin Laden was determined to
strike the United States. In fact, the label on the President's --
the PDB was, "bin Laden determined to strike the United States." And
in another piece of this, it was just something that has been
well-known to you all, is that the creation of the Office of Homeland
Security was something that was planned even before September 11th, as
Senator Feinstein has reminded her colleagues.
Helen.
Q Why has the White House persistently tried to delay any major
investigation, so that the American people and everyone else can get to
the bottom of what the cause was? It will be Monday morning
quarterbacking, fair enough. But at least we'll know what the truth
is.
MR. FLEISCHER: With all due respect, that's two out of three
mischaracterizations of what the President has said.
Q You have tried to stall it, haven't you? You don't deny that,
do you? Surely. Daschle has said repeatedly that he's been asked --
he's been asked repeatedly to not go ahead with an investigation.
MR. FLEISCHER: Helen, let me remind you of the words of the Vice
President, what he said last night, because --
Q Last night is a different story.
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me tell you what the Vice President said --
Q This story broke --
MR. FLEISCHER: Helen, we all know you have opinions on these
matters.
Q That isn't -- I don't think that's very fair. I know your
opinion, too, okay?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm entitled to have opinions.
Q And so am I.
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, Helen, let me answer your opinionated
question. The Vice President said last night in his speech up in New
York that, "We believe that a thorough investigation of the events that
led up to September 11th is entirely appropriate, and at the
President's direction I've worked with the leaders of the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees to ensure that they get the necessary
cooperation from the Executive Branch.
There was some discussion earlier this year, at the time that the
Congress was wrestling with how to begin an investigation into what
took place on September 11th. Congress itself debated in what form
this investigation should take place. That's not a surprise. Any
issue involving jurisdiction on Capitol Hill, in terms of who gets to
investigate what, is typically one of the most contentious issues
within the members of Congress themselves.
There were a variety of different viewpoints expressed by Democrats
and Republicans on the Hill. Some wanted a blue-ribbon commission that
involved people who are not serving in the Congress. Others wanted a
broad investigation which would have created a super-committee that
would allow people off the Intelligence Committees to investigate. And
others wanted to keep it limited to the Intelligence Committees, which
have an expertise in working with the very issues presented.
The final determination made by the Congress, supported by the
administration as we talked with them earlier this year, was precisely
what's happening now, that the Vice President expressed our support
for.
Q Are you denying that the administration -- are you saying
the administration did not try to delay any investigation?
MR. FLEISCHER: The administration made it clear to the Congress
that we supported an investigation so long as it was done in a
responsible way by people who had the expertise to know how to handle
it. The administration made clear to the Congress that we are a nation
at war, and that the key participants from the Central Intelligence
Agency, from the FBI, and from the military have vital ongoing missions
to protect our country, and we wanted to make certain that those who
are doing the investigation were expert enough and cognizant of the
fact of the current war-fighting duties of the personnel involved, so
that this did not become a fishing expedition or another endless waste
of taxpayer money in an open-ended congressional investigation. And we
worked --
Q And you did try to delay it?
MR. FLEISCHER: Helen, we work together to get a satisfactory
result.
Q Ari, in fact, Senator Daschle did say yesterday that on
several occasions, on more than two occasions, that the Vice President
asked him to delay or block any congressional investigation. He said
on one occasion that the President asked him to do that, at a breakfast
meeting. Are you now saying that they weren't asking to block an
investigation, they were just specifying what kinds of investigation
they wanted? And if so, how many times did they make that request?
MR. FLEISCHER: What I made clear is that there were discussions
with Congress about the need to make certain, particularly in the early
stages of the war, that the people who were engaged -- 100-percent
attention needed to be on fighting the war -- that their efforts
would not be distracted at that point, at that moment in an
investigation that could take them away from their immediate duties.
We made it clear that we support an investigation so long as it's done
by the responsible people and done in the manner that would be --
allow for the experts to have access to the information.
Q How do you feel about a blue-ribbon commission?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, we'll always work with Congress. We're going
to continue to work with Congress on what they are working on. And the
method that the Congress has set up right now we believe is the
appropriate method and we're working very well with them.
But, Bob, I think it's fair to say Congress doesn't know how it
feels about all these matters. Congress is still grappling with it;
there are difference of opinions in the Congress. Again, I spent a lot
of years working on the Hill; one of the most controversial issues for
members of Congress, themselves, to face is who gets to sit on what
forum because they all want to sit on the forums, and it's a
jurisdictional issue where they typically will disagree with each
other. And that's why the Intelligence Committees are working
productively, and that probably is the best way to ascertain the
information that the American people are entitled to.
Ron.
Q Are you willing to work with Congress enough to turn over the
FBI memo from the Phoenix office --
MR. FLEISCHER: We're aware of the request from Congress; we'll
continue to talk with them about it. And I anticipate that talk will
continue.
Q You can't say yes or no to that --
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I say I anticipate talk about those things will
continue.
Q And to follow up on this memo, this presidential directive,
granted it was only the ninth month in office, but if that memo and
that plan had been able to be carried out a month sooner, two months
sooner, could it have potentially prevented 9/11? And in the same
token, if the attack had taken place in October or November, instead of
September, and the plan had been put in place, could it have stopped
it?
MR. FLEISCHER: Ron, that's a hypothetical, there's no way I can
give you an accurate answer to a question like that. I wish I could.
It's a hypothetical. I think everybody wishes the attack could have
been stopped, prevented, and the lives could have been saved.
Everybody in both parties.
Q In hindsight, if it had been possible to have that plan in
place a month, two months --
MR. FLEISCHER: Ron, it's a hypothetical. And the fact of the
matter is, the administration moved very quickly and thoroughly, in a
very full way, involving the military to dismantle the al Qaeda, which
was a fundamental change, the issue of dismantling al Qaeda.
Q Without suggesting that it could have been prevented, but we
are talking about things that may have fallen through the cracks. And
I believe you were asked about this this morning; I wanted to follow
up -- a study that was done by the Library of Congress -- are you
familiar with what I'm talking about?
MR. FLEISCHER: I was made aware of it about two hours ago.
Q Okay, it was at the request of some government agency, but
there's a very clear sentence here where it talks about al Qaeda's
retaliation to Cruise missile attacks against training camps in
Afghanistan, and it says, "Suicide bombers belonging to al Qaeda's
martyrdom battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high
explosives into the Pentagon, CIA Headquarters, or the White House."
MR. FLEISCHER: Okay. What Campbell is referring to, which came to
my attention and to the White House's attention just two hours ago, or
so -- is a September 1999 psychological and sociological evaluation of
terrorism. It's an unclassified document that's been available on the
web for years, apparently been available on the web -- at least it
was prepared years ago, and it's available on the web. And it gets
into how terrorists think. I don't think it's a surprise to anybody
that terrorists think in evil ways, in unimaginable ways, and it
describes several of the ways. It was not -- the way this document
--
Q -- what happened.
MR. FLEISCHER: -- this document was described, it is not piece
of intelligence information suggesting that we have information about a
specific plan, or that they are going to. It describes -- the title
of the report, if I recall, is, "The Psychology and the Sociology of
Terrorists." So it describes their evil -- their thinking. It was
--
Q Who requested --
MR. FLEISCHER: I don't know who requested it. I know it's a
Library of Congress report, so, obviously, this is --
Q -- requested by a government agency.
Q -- person who wrote it?
MR. FLEISCHER: I don't know who requested it, but the point I was
going to get to is I think this is -- over the last two days, we've
seen increasing signs of how much information was available to members
of Congress. It's a Library of Congress report from --
Q But it's also available to the White House.
MR. FLEISCHER: -- in 1999 -- that's exactly right.
Q But, Ari, Campbell's point -- there's a broader point here,
no matter who this document -- the document is based on, if you look
at the footnotes and the attachments to it, on existing government
documents, existing government testimony, public records about what is
known about these organizations. You have, from the podium, and Dr.
Rice yesterday quite forcefully from the podium, said hijacking before
September 11th meant a different thing than hijacking after September
11th. But if there is public record from investigations overseas,
investigations in the United States, analysis including this one by
government employees that people knew -- and Dr. Rice, herself, said
these people were training to hijacking airplanes and the United States
government knew that. No one around -- people find it incredulous
that no one around the President, when the word, "hijacking" appears in
an analysis report, said, I wish we knew more, because these lunatics
have talked about flying planes into buildings. And you say no one
brought that up.
MR. FLEISCHER: John, I think you're, again, applying in the
post-9/11 world the reality --
Q This is 1999, and they're predicting exactly what happened.
Q No, this is pre-9/11 material. Nobody -- nobody -- either
in the President's CIA briefings or in a principal committee said, you
know what, these lunatics have talked about flying planes into
buildings.
MR. FLEISCHER: Campbell's point is exactly right -- this report,
in 1999, about the thinking of the --
Q -- report is based upon --
MR. FLEISCHER: Wait a minute, let me get to the point I'm making.
Campbell's making a very valid point here, that this report from 1999
about the thinking, the psychology of terrorism, was available in 1999
to members of Congress, the previous administration, it existed in some
form which did not come to the attention of this administration when we
took office on January 20th. And I think what it shows, Campbell, is
this information that was out there did not raise enough alarms with
anybody; that it suggested, because it was not intelligence
information, it was their thinking, a sociology/psychology; that the
people in 1999 didn't see this and bring it to anybody's attention,
people on the Hill didn't. And John, as I indicated, the White House
didn't.
Q -- not just thinking and psychology. It is testimony in
criminal cases, brought by the United States government, and brought by
other governments, against suspected terrorists. My point is not, was
this specific report brought to the attention of the President. Your
position is that no one in any period of time before September 11th, in
any discussion of al Qaeda, said, you know, there's a lot of evidence
out there that these people have talked about flying planes into
buildings.
MR. FLEISCHER: This is absolutely right. I have not heard anybody
indicate that to me, and you've heard that from the President,
himself.
Q Just on that, wasn't there a widely-read book, I forget the
name of the novel, which described just such a thing? Had nobody in
the White House read that book? (Laughter.) Is the President at least
concerned or disappointed that nobody could have thought of such an
idea?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think Democrats and Republicans and everybody
around the world is saddened and disappointed that we were unable to
prevent an attack that took place in our country. Nobody can dispute
that, Keith. But as the President said today, that if he had specific
information that terrorists were planning to use those airplanes to
attack our country, he would have taken the same action that any
Democrat or Republican in the White House would have taken. Those are
the facts.
Q If I could follow up on what Helen said --
MR. FLEISCHER: Keith, and then we'll --
Q I get a follow-up.
Q Do you know what he thinks, too?
Q You're indicating that you're welcoming an investigation. Yet
the President today talked about this being a town of second-guessers.
Vice President Cheney last night apparently said that some Democratic
criticism was thoroughly irresponsible in a time of war, and we're
going to be in a time of war for quite some time. Aren't you
simultaneously trying to chill an investigation at the same time you
say that you welcome it?
MR. FLEISCHER: Absolutely not. But there are relevant points to
be made about the professional manner in which the investigation should
be conducted. And on that point, I want to bring something to your
attention that illustrates some of the language and the statements that
were used or the suggestions by members of Congress yesterday that the
administration might possibly have had information that it did not use
or the President did not use.
And this is something -- there have been several responsible --
many responsible things said by Democrats. Senator Bob Graham of the
Intelligence Committee, Senator Lieberman, Senator Feinstein. Senator
Feinstein, in July of 2001, on CNN, on Wolf Blitzer's program, said,
and I quote -- "Intelligence staff have told me that there is a major
probability of a terrorist incident within the next three months." She
continued, "The Vice President, when he spoke to the Democrat Caucus,
mentioned that the administration was going to be working on the issue
of homeland defense around that particular issue -- the point being
the administration, prior to September 11th, as shared with the
Democrats, was already moving on the homeland security front.
But the point I'm making vis-a-vis the statements by these
Democrats yesterday that the President may not have acted on
information that he had -- clearly, if Senator Feinstein, a Democrat
on the Intelligence Committee, was aware of this, the question arises,
what did the Democrats know and why weren't they talking to each
other?
Q Who said these things? Who are you talking about on the
Hill? Who acted in a manner, as Vice President Cheney said last night,
"unworthy of national leaders in a time of war"? Who are you talking
about?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think that anybody who made insinuations or
suggestions that this President had information that could have
prevented the attacks and did not act on them is asking questions in
such a way as to create an impression that the President could have and
should have done something that he didn't do.
Q -- who did that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think it's fair to say that individuals in
the Democrat leadership -- and let me also bring your attention to
something that should be reflected on when it comes to the politics of
this. And you can draw contrasts by how leaders act and leaders
respond to something like this. When there was a suggestion that Bush
knew about this in print, Bush knew about 9/11, Mayor Bloomberg of New
York said that suggestion was ridiculous. He contacted the White
House, he listened, heard what information the White House had. He
called it ridiculous. He united New York City, and he led.
I have to say, with disappointment, that Mrs. Clinton, having seen
that same headline, did not call the White House, did not ask if it was
accurate or not. Instead, she immediately went to the floor of the
Senate, and I'm sorry to say that she followed that headline and
divided.
Q Ari, what's the mood of the President right now about all
this? It sounds like he's angry.
MR. FLEISCHER: I think it's fair to say that the President
understands that in Washington, D.C., second-guessing is second-nature
to a lot of politicians. The President also understands that there are
a lot of responsible people in the United States Congress -- I've
just cited many of them -- and the President is going to continue his
efforts to unite this nation to work in a bipartisan way, because
that's what the American people expect from their leaders in
Washington. He has a war to fight, and he's going to continue to fight
it in a way that brings people together.
Q -- the mood this morning in the Oval Office, in early
meetings?
MR. FLEISCHER: His mood?
Q Yes.
MR. FLEISCHER: He's focused on his business. As I indicated, he
has an important speech just after this about giving prescription drugs
to senior citizens.
Goyal?
Q Ari, the President of Sri Lanka in New York at the United
Nations, and her country is also fighting terrorism, a group which has
been banned by President Bush. And for the last two years, last year
and this year, she has been trying to meet President Bush or come to
the White House, since we had so many Prime Ministers and Presidents
here. But she was told twice that it's too late.
MR. FLEISCHER: Who are you referring to?
Q The President of Sri Lanka. And she said that this year also
she called, that she wanted to stop by the White House, but she was
told that too late. And last year also, same thing. And -- what I'm
saying is really that she's also fighting against terrorism, and she is
part of the coalition against terrorism, and President Bush banned the
group --
MR. FLEISCHER: This is the first I've heard of that. I'll be
happy to look into it.
Q And second question, then, following that, the Indian
Ambassador here in Washington in the U.S. is a little upset at the
number of few congressmen, like -- and Congressman Dan Burton, that
they're inserting misinformation about India in the Congressional
Record on a regular basis. And this time is the first time that the
Washington Times and the India Globe reported that they have taken the
step, because this issue has become, in the Indian Parliament and also
across America. If the President is aware of this information, how can
one stop that, while he's calling on everybody that --
MR. FLEISCHER: Goyal, I can only describe to you what the
President has done here. And as you know, the President called the
Prime Minister of India to express his condolences about the recent
attacks. They have a very good relationship. I cannot speak about
anything involving members of Congress in this regard.
Jacobo.
Q Yes, Ari, I have two questions for you. The first one has to
do with the Office of Homeland Security. You have said it from the
podium, Dr. Rice said it yesterday, it's one of the positive steps the
White House has taken after September 11th to combat terrorists. My
question is, is the President going to do something to reinforce the
role of Governor Ridge? I know he sits in at all the major meetings
and he's involved, but there's also -- this is a city of turf
battles. Is the President going to create a Cabinet job for Mr. Ridge,
or what is the President going to do to give him more power?
MR. FLEISCHER: Number one, the President is very pleased with the
job that Governor Ridge is doing. He has a very difficult job
involving the coordination of the various agencies. And he believes
he's doing it very, very well. Congress has some different ideas about
the possibility of creating a Cabinet post, and we're looking at those
ideas.
Regardless of whether a Cabinet post of homeland security is
created, Congress will get itself right back into the same issues,
about what entities will get removed from what existing agencies, and
moved to a Cabinet-level homeland security. And I predict to you, that
will be no easy matter for the Congress to wrestle with, because
they'll find how difficult it is to move an entity from one place to
another, particularly given the jurisdiction of the Appropriations
Committees on the Hill, where they don't like to give things up.
But we'll work with Congress to try to get that matter explored, to
protect the country. But you raise -- go ahead, ask your question.
Q Go ahead, finish your point.
MR. FLEISCHER: When you talked about Governor Ridge, I was
thinking about the issue that has come up in some time here, about the
question of alerts. And as you know, we remain a nation on an elevated
alert status, because there are terrorists, including al Qaeda, who are
still determined to hit us, if they possibly can.
It's been asked here earlier, why didn't the administration put out
some type of alert prior to 9/11. And as a sign of just how difficult
it is to wrestle with these notions of alerts, particularly in the case
of this August information, which you now understand was generalized
information -- actually the May information, the August summary --
was generalized information about hijacking and any number of other
things. I want to draw your attention to the bipartisan difficulty
that everybody in this town has deciding exactly when do you put out an
alert, because it can help deter an attack and it can get the security
people on higher guard, and when does it no longer serve a fruitful
purpose?
Here are some of the statements that were made by members of
Congress, again, in both parties, wrestling with this, after alerts
went out in the last several months. "I would -- this is October 12,
2001. "I would not have warned the American people of a general threat
of an attack. I don't think that does anybody any good." That was
Senator Biden on CNN.
This is Senator Shelby, on October 31st, as alerts went out in the
post-9/11 atmosphere. Senator Shelby said, "The administration has to
make a judgment call" -- his words -- "about what to do with
intelligence that it received." But he asked, "How many times can you
cry wolf if nothing happens?" And Senator Dodd, also October 31st,
also expressed frustration over the alert. "It's crazy to make these
kinds of statements. Imaginations run wild."
And this is in regard to when the administration received
information that we shared with the country, we shared with the
public. You remember the alert about suspension bridges on the West
Coast. These are very difficult judgment calls to make. And I think
it's fair to say that on a bipartisan basis, people are wrestling with
them. Even in the post 9/11 environment, even when we had more
specific, at least, information then that generalized notion of
hijacking back in the summer period of 2001.
Q My second question --
MR. FLEISCHER: You had it -- oh, no, you didn't.
Q The Phoenix report -- yesterday we asked Dr. Rice. She said
she was going to look into it. When will we find out when the White
House received the report of the FBI agent --
MR. FLEISCHER: Once I have an update, I will share it.
David.
Q Ari, back to the Library of Congress report for a second. You
said a little while ago that the information that was out there in this
report and others didn't raise enough alarms. What steps has the
President taken or ordered to make sure that intelligence agencies that
do come across these kinds of things raise the proper alarms from here
on out? You know, bring it to his attention or to someone's attention
that --
MR. FLEISCHER: Everything has changed since September 11th. The
fact of the matter is we were a nation that was a peace nation, that
was on a peacetime footing, and that was reflected in the very briefing
which the President has in the morning, which was a CIA briefing. And
as a result of the attack that took place on our country, we are now on
a war footing.
And as a result of that, in addition to creation of the Office of
Homeland Security, as you know, the President now, at his morning
briefings, is joined by the Director of the FBI as well as the head of
the
CIA. And the Director of the FBI, who only assumed his post some
week or two before the attacks -- the Director of the FBI is working
very hard to change and strengthen the FBI. And the President sees the
excellent job that he is doing bringing those changes to the FBI, to
make it more proactive on preventing the country from being attacked,
while the previous mission was much more oriented on arresting people
who have committed domestic crimes such as kidnapping.
The very fact that Congress itself recognized a weakness in the
intelligence agencies' ability to fight terrorism was reflected by
their action in passing the Patriot Act, which gave the intelligence
agencies more power. Congress deserves credit for that. These are all
the changes that have taken place since September 11th, reflecting the
fact we're a nation that's shifted to a war footing.
Q So if a report similar to this one came out today, the
President is confident that the proper alarm bells would be sounded?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think it's fair to say that everybody is much
more focused on the mission of fighting terrorism than they were prior
to September 11th. As I indicated, the mission of the FBI was a
different mission prior to September 11th.
Mark.
Q Ari, can you help me with a definition? When does a
legitimate question about what the administration, what the President
knew, become an "incendiary or irresponsible suggestion"?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think that anytime anybody suggests or implies to
the American people that this President had specific information that
could have prevented the attacks on our country on September 11th, that
crosses the lines. I don't think that's a fair thing to say. And I
think that the American people will be very weary of any politician who
seeks to turn the sorrow of victims into their own political gain.
Q Well, you're implying that there's no way that any President
of the United States -- not just this one, but that any President of
the United States, is capable of making an error in judgment, or that
his administration -- or her administration -- is incapable of
making an error and not funneling information up. That it's improper
to look back and say, hey, can we learn from that mistake?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's exactly why there's a congressional
investigation that we are working with the Intelligence Committees of
the Congress, so that they can pursue it.
Q -- you just laid out, a congressional inquiry is
second-guessing a President, and implying --
MR. FLEISCHER: A congressional inquiry is a gathering of all the
information; is the exact forum that Congress has set up for itself to
answer the very questions that the American people deserve answers to.
But when Congress has already got an entity that it created, to
answer those questions, and then members of Congress say, we need
answers to the questions, we have created the very entity to answer
those questions -- they understand, they have done that. And that
entity is working on a thorough and complete investigation. And we
await its report.
I'm sorry, Ed, and then Russell. Did you have your hand up?
Q Ari, can the American people be confident that this President,
who prides himself on being plainspoken and direct, to ever admit a
mistake if he felt he had made one?
MR. FLEISCHER: Ed, I think the American people know that this
President is determined to protect this country, and this President is
determined to find out everything that can be found out, so that this
country has the full protections. And that's why we're working with
the Congress.
Q Hindsight is 20/20, but has the President himself expressed
some level of frustration or anger -- if only that report had moved
to my desk much more quickly, if only --
MR. FLEISCHER: Which report?
Q The one that was sitting on Condi's desk for final sign-off.
If only this information had been presented to me in a way that perhaps
said this is a much bigger threat -- is he saying any level of
frustration --
MR. FLEISCHER: This President is a realist. He deals with events
as they are.
Q You've said that for the most part, the threat -- or the
information that the President got was very general. But the FAA did
issue eight separate warnings to the airlines last summer. So why
weren't the airlines giving any more specific directions or
instructions on how they should react?
MR. FLEISCHER: And those notifications to the airlines reflected
all the information about the nature of what was known, which was
generalized information.
Q So are you saying it's the fault of the airlines that no
specific steps were taken? Because the airlines say that, you know,
the warnings that they got were of no particular substance.
MR. FLEISCHER: The airlines are stating that the information they
got is exactly as Dr. Rice described it yesterday, generalized
information about hijackings, which of course is nothing new. The fact
that there are terrorist who seek to hijack airlines in the pre 9/11
traditional sense is not new. We had --
Q -- there a breakdown there?
MR. FLEISCHER: You're asking the exact question about if the
information was so general, how could the United States government, and
the President, have possibly known the September 11th attack was going
to take place? Your statement is valid. The information available to
the government was general. That general information was shared with
the carriers.
Q But is that normal to issue eight warnings? Does that really
suggest that it was really a general threat, if you have eight warnings
over --
MR. FLEISCHER: As general information is made available, the law
enforcement community makes notification, and has done so for years, to
the relevant entities, in the private sector, in this case, the
carriers.
Ken.
Q Ari, a question about the draft presidential directive that
landed on Dr. Rice's desk on September 10th. Who specifically
requested that that directive be drafted? What specifically prompted
the drafting of that directive, and did it have any connection with the
threats throughout the summer of 2001 that you and Dr. Rice --
MR. FLEISCHER: This was driven by the President's determination,
as a candidate for office, to do more about terrorism. If you recall,
you've heard the President say that it appeared as if we were swatting
at flies, and he wanted to dismantle al Qaeda because of the threat it
posed. The work on this actually began during the transition. It's a
reflection of the President's desire to take more fundamental steps
against terrorism.
Q So it predated even his tenure in office?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, that's why I gave you the Citadel speech in
1999 as the first example of where the President put his finger on the
growing threat the United States faced as a result of terrorism.
Q -- specific task to draft a directive, an action plan to go
after al Qaeda actually predated his administration?
MR. FLEISCHER: A plan on what to do about terrorism began in its
earliest stage during the transition. And as -- after January 20,
2001, it went through the normal National Security Council process,
which begins with deputies and other people at the working levels of
the agencies, and makes its way up through the more higher-level
officials in the approval process.
Q At what point did it focus on al Qaeda? At what point was the
decision made to focus this directive on al Qaeda?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think it was focused on al Qaeda from the very
earliest days.
Q Ari, what was it that was -- we know there were some
previous presidential decision directives on terrorism -- for
instance, one in 1998 that even authorized the United States to go
after and kill, if necessary, Osama bin Laden. What was it that this
particular directive did or addressed that was not addressed in
previous presidential --
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I can't speak to the previous ones. I'm not
familiar enough with their details. But as I indicated, this
presidential directive would have directed the Pentagon to come up with
military options, which could have included boots on the ground, to
take action on the financial front, to work with the Northern
Alliance. Its purpose was to dismantle al Qaeda.
Q Can I just follow up on that? What is it -- how long would
this have taken? In other words, there's some attention here to the
fact that it was ready, but not signed by the President, not put into
effect. How long would it have taken to implement this plan?
MR. FLEISCHER: That really would have depended on the military
options that the Pentagon came up with, so it's an indeterminate period
of time.
Q You're suggesting it's clearly something that would have taken
months to implement, if you're talking about military options on the
ground?
MR. FLEISCHER: The direction to the Pentagon was to develop
military options for the purpose of dismantling al Qaeda, not for the
purpose of, as the President put it, swatting at flies. That would
suggest a time period of some length, an indeterminate one.
Q Ari, you said, as we all still know, we're still under
threat. Intelligence is very important at this point. Is it
appropriate then that CIA Director Tenet is so involved in the Middle
East at this point, given the burden of responsibility he has within
his own organization?
MR. FLEISCHER: They're all important, and they both are involved
in successfully winning the war against terrorism. There are terrorist
threats in the Middle East. The prospects for eliminating terrorism
worldwide would be enhanced as a result of bringing peace to the Middle
East. The prospects for creating peace in the Middle East will be
enhanced as a result of a worldwide effort to dismantle terrorism. The
two go together, and Director Tenet's involvement has been very, very
successful and helpful.
Q A few minutes ago, Ari, you mentioned the sorrow of victims.
Yesterday, several of the -- not all, certainly -- but several of
the family members of victims said critical things about the
President. And assuming you don't ascribe partisan motivation to them,
can you say how much concern that caused? And has anybody at the White
House made any effort to talk to any of the family members?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'll have to find out about if anybody has talked.
It's a big --
Q Ari?
MR. FLEISCHER: Can I answer his question? It's a big White
House. But, you know, I think that for the families of what took
place, if anybody were to suggest to them that this administration had
information that could have prevented it, well, of course they're going
to feel that way. That's totally understandable. But the
administration, the President did not have that information. And so I
think -- as they hear and realize -- and many of them have not said
those statements -- but as they understand the exact facts as you now
know them, I think they recognize that we are all in this as one
nation, in it together, and that we are a nation of Republicans and
Democrats who shares their sorrow.
Bob.
Q Ari, what consideration was given over the past eight months
to proactively putting this information out to the public?
MR. FLEISCHER: What information?
Q What's come out in the last 24 hours.
MR. FLEISCHER: Can you be more specific?
Q Specifically, the information Dr. Rice gave us yesterday about
the analytic and what -- the general nature of the threat, how it was
assessed, how it was processed, how the decisions were made.
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, the administration will share information on
a regular basis that helps keep the country informed about events that
took place. It's always a balance between information that is
classified, information that deals with sources and methods. And I
think we've been -- leaned as strong as we can in the direction of
getting information out about our administration's efforts to fight
terrorism.
Q But, I mean, the information that came out specifically
yesterday. In other words, what consideration was given over the last
eight months to saying, let's put the National Security Advisor out to
tell the American people what we did know -- however general, however
nonspecific -- and how we processed it?
MR. FLEISCHER: Rewind the tape to the other night, when a leaked
document was selectively provided to a news organization that covered
one snapshot in a misleading way, that left out other information such
as the information that was shared with security officials at carriers
alerting them, notifying them of the generalized notion of hijacking.
In the wake of a select leak of classified information that was
misrepresentative of what the President was doing, what the
administration was doing, we made the decision, as I indicated
yesterday, to provide you with the answers to all your questions. So
that's the --
Q -- there was not a consideration made or a decision made or
a discussion had previous to that?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think the American people know that this
administration has a lot of meetings that take place at classified
levels where intelligence information is reviewed, where threats are
-- the President himself talks every morning, talks often about what
he sees every morning involving the threat matrix. I think the
American people understand. And that's why every morning I say to you
the President had his CIA briefing and FBI briefing. I'm not at
liberty to discuss every morning what is in his CIA briefing or FBI
briefing, but I think the American people have a general sense of the
process the President uses to obtain the information he needs to
protect our country.
Q Just to ask one final --
MR. FLEISCHER: Bob, and then we'll come back. Bob.
Q Can I just ask, what level of concern has been expressed
around here in the last 24 hours, at the staff level or by the
President himself, that the President may have in some way been damaged
by the way that this has been handled, by the way that it's come out?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think the real damage that can get done in
something like this, when somebody selectively leaks a misleading piece
of information without providing all relevant information, is it sends
a terrible signal at a time when we should be a united nation. And
that's the damage done by selective leaks of classified information
that are not representative of a full story and a full picture. And
that's where I think that it's a very difficult issue for you all to
cover, because you recognize that you're getting a selective piece of
information, not a full story.
Q -- do that, right?
Q I just want to ask you, did Mr. Clarke, as quoted in The
Washington Post today, of the NSC, say in July that "something really
spectacular is going to happen here"? Is that accurate?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'd have to ask him. And if you're --
Q Well, it was in a major paper today.
MR. FLEISCHER: I know, but I don't ask --
Q -- get a briefing on that?
MR. FLEISCHER: I do not receive a daily briefing on his verbatim
quotes.
Q Well, I mean, you must have anticipated you would be asked
about that.
MR. FLEISCHER: No, as Dr. Rice indicated yesterday, and as the
President said in his interview with The Washington Post, that the
reporting that we had over the summer, in the early moments of the
summer, did show that there was something building, mostly focused on
somewhere foreign.
Q Well, according to the same story, George Tenet had been
"nearly frantic", is the quote, with concern since June 22nd. I don't
recall that kind of thing being -- know anything.
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me just walk you through the facts of what Dr.
Rice briefed yesterday in terms of the timetable.
Q -- don't need to. I heard it. (Laughter.)
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm not in a position to tell you whether
somebody's verbatim quote like that.
Q I'm trying to get at what the mind-set was in July and June.
You didn't --
MR. FLEISCHER: Obviously people were taking these threats
seriously.
Q Well, can I just follow up on the presidential directive, and
Clarke's role, actually, because based on what Condi told us yesterday,
he was very much involved in these working groups and sort of bringing
all the pieces together --
MR. FLEISCHER: Correct.
Q -- that presumably led to the directive winding up on her
desk. But he was also part of the Clinton administration's
counterterrorism team. He was there at the end of that
administration. They had also been working on a plan for dealing with
bin Laden and al Qaeda. So would it be fair to say that -- I'm
assuming, when there was the transition, that he would have said to Dr.
Rice, look, here's the deal, here's the plan we've been working on,
this is serious, we need to pay attention to this. Was there a delay,
because of a changeover in administration where she said, wait a
minute, we're going to have to take our time here, we're new at all
this, and figure out what's a priority and what's not?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think just the opposite. As I indicated, the
planning began during the transition period. And the goal shifted to
the dismantling of al Qaeda.
Q Ari, was there any indication that al Qaeda may have gotten
wind of this process, this directive, and that may have played a roll
in the assassination of --
MR. FLEISCHER: Nothing that I've heard. I don't know.
John.
Q Can I return to this issue of the notifications over the
spring and summer to the airlines -- through FAA to the airlines and
the airports? We talk a lot in here about lessons learned since
September 11th. Is there any concern, and have there been reforms in
that process? Because, even though, as you say, the information was
very general, I assume you don't put out these warnings to have
nothing -- these alerts or notifications, whatever you call them, to
have nothing happen. You don't just send them out, so the airlines go,
that's nice, and not do anything. Now, they say it was so general,
they didn't know what to do. You say, you only had general
information, you were doing the best you could in putting them on some
notice. The effect is, nothing happened. They got these, they read
them, and they said, oh, and based on anything you say to ask the
airlines, no increased security, no notification of the pilots and
flight attendants, apparently -- is there any reform in that process,
to make sure that even if it says, we don't know what, do something?
MR. FLEISCHER: There was a major reform. It was a new law. It
was the security act that Congress passed that the President signed
that fundamentally revamped and had a federal takeover of security at
airports.
Q Security on the perimeter.
MR. FLEISCHER: More than the perimeter. It's the creation of new
security officials, security managers at every airport, the
federalization of the work force. As you know, the changes made on
board airplanes, the reinforcement of cockpit doors, the changes in
what you can carry, as anybody who has traveled since September 11th
will tell you, there has been an entire revamping of what they go
through when they walk through the metal detectors.
Q But if they received this same document tomorrow, that said
the administration has some general information that this might happen,
we don't have anything else --
MR. FLEISCHER: John, general information is general information.
When the United States government has specific information, we share
those specifics, as you know.
Q I'm not -- I'm saying, if they got a notification tomorrow,
just like then, are they now required under this new law to do
something?
MR. FLEISCHER: It's idiosyncratic. It depends on the nature of
the information. If the information lends itself to simple and direct
actions, you could expect that simple and direct actions will be
taken. If it's generalized information, then it's generalized. And
that is what makes it harder for people to react to.
Q -- in the system --
MR. FLEISCHER: What the system is, is provide information about
generalized threats. And that was done.
Q But they don't have to do anything.
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, the changes that were made are what's been
done.
Q A quick question on a different subject. Chairman Arafat has
said he will run for office, he will hold elections, perhaps within six
months. Palestinian officials say, however, it would be very difficult
to achieve this, which is something the administration wants, unless
Israel lets up some, and allows for the free movement of peoples.
What's the administration's reaction to Arafat's --
MR. FLEISCHER: Reform of the Palestinian Authority should be done
because it's the right thing to give hope to the Palestinian people.
This should not be contingent on any other matters; it should be done
because the Palestinian people deserve a better future with economic
opportunity. It's the right thing to do in any case. And the
President will be focused more on the result and less on the process.
He wants to see that they reform.
Q Ari, can I ask you on another subject, too -- President Bush
will be making a major statement on a Cuba policy on Monday. Will the
trip that ex-President Jimmy Carter took to Havana play any role in his
statement on Monday?
MR. FLEISCHER: I would urge you to listen carefully to the
President's speech on Monday, and you will be the judge.
Q Thank you.
MR. FLEISCHER: Thank you.
THE PRESS: Week ahead?
MR. FLEISCHER: Oh, I'm sorry, thank you. Thank you for continuing
the pain. (Laughter.)
*** will make remarks on democracy and freedom in Cuba. That
afternoon, the President will travel to Miami, Florida, to make remarks
on Cuban Independence Day. The President will also attend a Republican
Party of Florida dinner before he returns to the White House that
evening.
On Tuesday, the President will participate in a photo opportunity
with the NCAA champions on the South Lawn of the White House.
On Wednesday morning, the President and Mrs. Bush will travel to
Europe, where he will visit Germany, Russia, France, and Italy to mark
the new era with Russia, and to talk with our allies in Germany and
France about the exciting future that lies ahead between our nation and
the European continent. We will provide you more detailed information
on the exact schedule and itinerary of the Europe trip later this
afternoon.
Q NCAA champs -- basketball?
MR. FLEISCHER: Multiple sports.
Q Men and women?
MR. FLEISCHER: Multiple sports. We'll get that information to
you.
END 1:06 P.M. EDT
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