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Neither War nor Peace: Youth in Armed Violence
Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of
Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence
KEY FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
From the favelas of Rio de Janeiro to the townships of Cape Town; the housing projects of Chicago to the rural provinces of the Philippines, more and more children and youth are dying in increasing numbers due to gun violence. While some die in gang disputes, some in organised crime, and others in direct conflict with state security forces, increasing firearms-related mortality reflects the growing involvement of young people in organised armed groups that function outside of traditionally defined war zones.
- What are the similarities between these groups? What are the differences?
- Why do some young people get involved while others do not?
- Can community-level interventions be successful in preventing children and youth from joining such groups, or reintegrating those wanting to leave?
- What government policies exist which deal with these groups and are these policies successful in treating the problem? Could other policies be more effective?
Neither War nor Peace by the Rio-based project COAV (Children in Organized Armed Violence) seeks to answer these questions, building on the conclusions of the publication Children of the Drug Trade: a case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro (Dowdney 2003). Contextual comparisons of organised armed groups, and the involvement of children and youth within them, are presented from ten countries across four continents. By comparing the history, structure and functioning of the investigated armed groups, as well as the motivations, desires and day-to-day reality of their child and youth members, this publication is a starting point for the much needed discussion of a situation that is too often addressed by state force and repression.
The shocking reality presented here challenges the traditional parameters of definitions such as armed conflict, crime and delinquency; a reality that for many young people who live it daily is Neither War nor Peace.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The study was coordinated by Viva Rio, IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) and ISER (Instituto de Estudos da Religao). Local research partners included:
Colombia: Ivan Ramirez / Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (Coalición Contra la Vinculación de Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes al Conflicto Armado en Colombia).
El Salvador: Marlon Carranza / Universidad Centroamericana José
Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUOP).
Ecuador: Primary Researcher: Kleber Loor / Ser Paz; Assistant Researchers: Lidice Aldas / Ser Paz and Fernando Lòpez / DNI (Defensa de los Niños Internacional).
Honduras: Ernesto Bardales / Casa Alianza / Jha-Ja: Jóvenes Hondureños Adelante, Juntos Avancemos.
Jamaica: Primary Researcher and author: Michael Mogensen / Viva Rio; Assistant Researchers: Sharene McKenzie / Craig Town Youth Organisation; Kenneth Wilson / August Town Sports and Community Development Foundation; and Steadman Noble / University of the West Indies, Mona.
Nigeria: Mohammed Ibrahim / Centre for Democracy and Development.
Northern Ireland: Marie Smyth and Patricia Campbell / Institute for Conflict Reseacrh and Breen Smyth Consultants.
Philippines: Agnes Zenaida V. Camacho / University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Psychosocial Trauma and Human Rights Program.
South Africa: Ted Leggett / Institute for Security Studies.
United States: John M. Hagedorn / University of Illinois-Chicago, Great Cities Institute.
* The study was funded by Save the Children Sweden, Ford Foundation, DFID (UK government); and World Vision.
* Primary and secondary data was collected locally for the study between September 2003 - August 2004. This included in-depth interviews with a total of 120 armed child and youth members (111 male and 9 female) from the following groups:
Brazil - Territorially defined drug factions which dominate poor communities, or favelas, in Rio de Janeiro. The main drug factions being the Comando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Comando (TC), Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA).
Colombia - Territorial criminal groups that operate in poor communities, or comunas, in the city of Medellin known as bandas delincuentes, that work with or are subordinate to urban-based paramilitary organisations, such as the Bloques Cacique Nutibara (BCN) and Bloque Metro, or drug dealing groups referred to as narcotraficantes. The study addresses the synergies between these three distinct yet mutually involved groups, interviewing children from both the urban paramilitaries and the bandas delincuentes.
Ecuador - Informally organised and local territorial urban youth gangs referred to as pandillas, and hierarchical and highly organised youth gangs which exist at the national level known as naciones.
El Salvador and Honduras - Organised territorial youth gangs, known as maras or pandillas, that originated in Los Angeles amongst the El Salvadorian immigrant population, but have since become established in urban centres within these two countries (and others in Central America and elsewhere). The two pandillas focused on were: Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS) and Barrio 18.
Jamaica - Community-based territorial groups in poor areas of Kingston and Spanish Town, known as area gangs, which have their roots in the political patronage and political violence that characterised Jamaican electoral politics in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, but have increasingly become involved in criminal activity. Child and youth involvement in corner gangs, less organised and smaller armed groupings often involved in street crime, is also investigated.
Nigeria - Armed vigilante groups, such as the Bakassi Boys, and ethnic-militias, such as the Egbesu Boys and the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). These groups have emerged in geographically and ethnically distinct areas of the country, most notably since the implementation of democratic rule in May 1999, and exist as an expression of local or ethnic autonomy from state forces.
Philippines - Civilian vigilante groups, known as Civilian Volunteer Organisations (CVOs), legally established in the 1980s as self-help community protection groups. The study focuses on those CVOs which have been armed and are being used as private armies by local politicians and powerful traditional leaders in Maguindanao province.
South Africa - Coloured criminal street gangs in the Cape Flats (Cape Town) that have been a feature of coloured communities there for over fifty years, and are aligned to prison gangs, known as the numbers. The study focuses on the Americans, aligned to the 26s prison gang, and the Hard Livings, aligned to the 28s prison gang.
USA - Institutionalised street gangs in Chicago that have been present in poor black and Hispanic urban communities for over fifty years. These include: The Conservative Vice Lord Nation (CVLN); The Black Gangster Disciples; The Black P. Stone Nation; and The Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation (ALKQN).
KEY FINDINGS
SETTINGS
* Organised armed groups in urban areas do not affect entire cities in a uniform manner. Groups are territorial and generally active only in defined areas. These areas are distinct from the cities that surround them, often distinguished by names such as favelas, comunas, colonias, townships or ghettos.Credit: www.coav.org.br Caption: Armed gangs often have a highly-developed command structure
* Areas dominated by armed groups tend to be relatively poor, underdeveloped and distanced from the state by differentiated public policies such as the absences or limited presence of state security forces, or the inadequate provision of public services. These areas may have a high population density and almost always have disproportionately high levels of unemployment and low levels of formal education amongst youth.
BACKGROUND
* The majority of groups investigated have a medium to long-term history and do not have criminal origins. In six of the investigated countries, groups originated in the 1970s or before. In a further three countries, groups originated in the 1980s.
* All groups have transformed over time to become armed or more armed, violent or more violent, and involved or more involved in criminal enterprise. This transformation has been due to growing involvement in the illicit drug trade, increased access to small arms and persistent and often violent state repression.
STRUCTURE
* Three types of command structure were prevalent within the investigated groups: a military hierarchy with a ranking system; a formally organised or corporate structure; and an informal horizontal structure that may have decentralised local branches. The type of command structures utilised does not reflect the levels of violence in which groups are involved. However, military hierarchies tend to be used by the more militarised groups that are more frequently in confrontation with state security forces, such as the drug factions of Rio de Janeiro and the CVOs in the Philippines.
* All investigated groups are organised at the local / neighbourhood level. Four are organised at the city level through the affiliation of neighbourhood groups. Five are organised nationally and two internationally.
* Most groups have structural links to imprisoned members; often leaders, in all groups use physical punishments, including death, to discipline members.
* Estimates of the number of members in all investigated armed groups are limited; however, it is believed to run into the tens of thousands within each of the countries covered by this study. Joining armed groups is an adolescent experience for many and the majority of group members in all case studies are youths.
COMMUNITY DOMINATION
* Although openly using firearms when necessary, groups in six countries (USA, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, South Africa) are not a constant and openly armed presence within their communities. These groups tend not to control the activities of local residents, such as restricting their movements, or protect them from crime. These groups also tend to be located in areas where state security forces are present, however sporadically.
* Groups in four countries (Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria and the Philippines) are an openly armed presence in the community. These groups tend to have a monopoly on 'social ordering', often through the maintenance of parallel laws and the provision of justice. They may restrict the activities and movements of local residents, and tend to be located in areas with a very limited presence or complete absence or state security forces.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE
* The state has a direct or indirect role in the activities of all investigated groups. In the majority of cases this is an indirect relationship through the involvement of corrupt low-level state representatives, such as policemen, via the sale of firearms, reception of bribes and/or participation in illegal drug dealing.
* In three case studies (Nigeria, Philippines, Jamaica) groups were working directly with state security forces, being funded by government representatives or had been known to receive political patronage in return for guaranteeing votes from local residents.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
* All groups are involved in criminal activities and territorial domination is their base for financial gain.
* Groups in all countries but one (Nigeria) are involved in the drug trade through cultivation, domestic transportation or street sales.
* Half of the groups investigated pay fixed salaries (Medellin, Rio de Janeiro, South Africa, Philipinnes, Nigeria), primarily for armed services. Other groups pay through commission-based drug sales or logistical support for members' involvement in profitable criminal activities.
ARMED VIOLENCE
* Groups are involved in armed confrontations with other armed groups on a varying scale mostly over control of territory (primarily for economic reasons and the control of illicit markets) and rivalry (related to self-definition, ideals, ethnicity, clan-alliances or beliefs). All groups are involved in armed violence because of their participation in crime, and often due to internal disputes.
* Groups from four localities (Medellin, Rio de Janeiro, Nigeria, Philippines) come into conflict with state forces for a number of reasons, including in reaction to police or military actions.
TYPOLOGY OF GROUPS INVESTIGATED
* Utilising the criteria established by the working definition of organised armed violence and combining Categorical Judgement and Comparative Judgement techniques, three types of armed groups are identified.
Type 1 groups are a 'quasi-military' and openly armed presence, exert high levels of control over the local population, dominate both licit and illicit local resources, fight directly with state forces if necessary and use war-grade weapons. Type 1 groups are found in Medellin, Rio de Janeiro, Nigeria and Philippines.
Type 3 groups have less militarised characteristics and are not an openly armed force, have less control over local populations within the areas they dominate, control illicit local resources only, avoid direct confrontations with the state and are more representative of traditional notions of 'youth' or 'street' gangs. Type 3 groups are found in Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, USA, and South Africa.
Type 2 groups are those that share characteristics of both Type 1 and Type 3 groups. These are found in Medellin and Jamaica.
* The level of violence in which groups are involved is not related to their type. However, type 1 groups are more detrimental to the socio-economic development of the areas they dominate due to: 1) the prolonged and militarised types of violence in which they participate; and 2) the high levels of domination over population, territory and resources that they exert, usually in place of the state.
STRUCTURAL RISK FACTORS
* The following external risk factors are identified as causal and/or contributory to the establishment and continued local dominance of the armed groups investigated:
1) The existence of urban enclaves of poverty;
2) A high percentage of youth in the local population that suffer disproportionately low levels of education and disproportionately high levels of unemployment;
3) A limited or differentiated state presence in certain areas;
4) State representatives being open to corruption;
5) Government reliance upon repressive and violent state apparatus against group members and non-involved residents of the communities in which they are active;
6) Group access to illicit economies such as drug trafficking;
7) Group access to small arms.
* There appears to be a correlation between the degree to which a specific area suffers these risk factors and the type of group that emerges; Type 1 groups are more typically present in areas that suffer these structural risk factors to the greatest degree, especially when state security forces are absent.
PERSONAL HISTORIES
* A significant number of child and youth respondents reported coming from single parent families (typically matriarchal), overcrowded homes, having poor relations with other family members including parents and suffering from domestic violence.
* Almost all respondents were school dropouts who had failed to finish primary/secondary level education due to poverty, not seeing school as worthwhile, being expelled for poor and often violent behaviour or leaving because of a greater presence of rival group members within their school. Failing to finish school is seen as a cyclical problem, as many respondents reported that their parents had attained equally low levels of education.
PROCESS OF INVOLVEMENT
* The average age at which respondents from all countries involved in this study joined armed groups was 13 years and six months.
* The age that young people are joining appears to have been decreasing in all countries since the 1980s. This is due to the increasing involvement of almost all groups in the drug trade and the consequent openings in street-level jobs for local adolescents. It is also due to the fact that children have been increasingly born into communities in which armed groups have already established a dominant presence.
* Joining an armed group is not a one-off event but rather a gradual process that may take months or even years to complete. The following five stages are identified for this process in all case studies, although some stages may be missed out in some cases, or take place in a different order in others:
1) Exposure to the group by setting (association by neighbourhood);
2) Introduction by family or friends;
3) Transitional phase ('hanging out' and doing favours or being given small jobs or apprenticeships);
4) Full membership (considered as trustworthy, may have right of passage);
5) Armed (given a firearm).
* An abundance of young adolescent males seeking to join their local armed group means that an active recruitment policy is unnecessary in most cases; only in two case studies were investigated groups found to actively recruit (the ethnic-militias of Nigeria and the street gangs in Chicago).
WHY DO CHILDREN JOIN ARMED GROUPS?
* Joining an armed group gives a young person the ability to actively respond to a number of risk factors that were found to be common to all areas where groups were investigated. Risk factors and responsed by youth include:
1) Poverty and the inequality of wealth
Response: Youth join armed group to get money or consumer goods;
2) A lack of economic alternatives due to poor levels of education and high unemployment
Response: Youth join armed group to get a job / access to money / social ascension / guns as economic tool;
3) Social marginalisation (racism / prejudice)
Response: Youth join armed group for social recognition, strong identity, status power
4) Violence from state forces or other armed groups
Response: Youth join armed group for protection, revenge, access to guns for protection
5) Problems in the home
Response: Youth join armed group for friendship, surrogate family, mutual support
6) A lack of leisure facilities
Response: Youth join armed group for access to drugs, parties, group and peer culture
* A number of influences that play an important role in young people's decision to join an armed group were also found to be common to all situations. These are:
1) Involvement of family;
2) Involvement of friends;
3) Exposure to armed group in the street;
4) Armed group as a strong, dominant and accepted presence in the community;
5) In-group sub-culture recognised and admired by peers;
6) Violence as a tool for dispute resolution or social recognition common or culturally acceptable.
* Although these risk factors and influences are common to all young people living in high-risk environments, the majority of children and youths in such areas do not join an armed group. 'Choosing' to join an armed group depends on personal context, which is made up of the types of influences and options an individual has access to.
* Children and youths in high-risk environments are more vulnerable to joining local armed groups when their personal contexts offer few options to respond to risk factors, and are susceptible to influences that encourage them to join. Children and youths are more resilient to joining local armed groups when their personal contexts offer varied options to respond to risk factors, and they are less susceptible to influences that encourage them to join, usually due to the presence of stronger and more supportive influences.
* Local diagnosis that charts prevalent local risk factors and influences may help design specific interventions that affect young people's personal contexts in order to boost resilience amongst them.
WORKING FUNCTIONS
* In all groups, children and youths are subordinate to adults or older youths.
* All groups have a system of rules for internal discipline, working functions and/or having a clear and defined identity. All groups maintain rules through punishment including physical beatings and death (the latter in all but one case study - Ecuadorian pandillas).
* In all case studies notions of entering adulthood are not based on a numerical age, but rather on the ability to carry out working functions, ability to use a firearm or adherence to local cultural beliefs.
* Non-armed functions carried out by children and youths within armed groups include:
Lookouts: Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, USA, and the Philippines
Informants and spies: El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Nigeria, and the Philippines
Carrying, cleaning and guarding guns: Brazil, Colombia, USA, Nigeria, and the Philippines
* Armed functions carried out by children and youths within armed groups include:
Bodyguard/protective escort: Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, and the Philippines
Guarding territory and property: All case studies
Armed patrols: Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria, and the Philippines
Manning tolls and check points: Colombia, Nigeria, and the Philippines
Drug dealing and crime: All case studies
Assassinations : Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Jamaica, USA, Nigeria, South Africa, and the Philippines
Participation in armed confrontations: All case studies
Payment of Services
* In all cases except commission-based drug dealing child and youth workers are paid less than their adult counterparts. Child and youth workers may be paid by a fixed salary, on commission, per criminal act, with token gifts or by logistical support to carry out profitable criminal activity.
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND ARMED VIOLENCE
* Within the context of territorial and other disputes, carrying out criminal activities and upholding internal discipline in the group or social order within the community, all armed groups provide firearms to minors.
* All respondents talked of being armed by 12 to 14 years old except in Nigeria and Jamaica where respondents tended to be armed at 16 years and above.
* Most groups have a cache of arms under the control higher-ranking members. The level of training given to members greatly varies between groups although in most cases respondents were already familiar with firearms from growing up in communities with high levels of gun violence and seeing firearms in the street or with family and/or friends.
* Two respondents interviewed for this study were shot and killed before fieldwork was completed. Rudy, a respondent and member of a Civilian Volunteer Organisation (CVO) was killed in a shoot-out between his CVO, government forces and the MILF in Maguindanao province, Philippines, on December 16, 2003. Sandra Sewell, a member of Jungle 12 and a university student and social activist was apparently shot in the back by the Jamaican Defence Force in Kingston on September 19, 2004.
* It was a common for respondents to have witnessed family, friends or fellow group members being shot and/or killed. Many interviewees had been shot at or hit by gunfire. For example, all but one of the eight respondents in South Africa had been shot at least once; one respondent had been shot on three separate occasions and another twice by the time they were 17 years of age.
* Minors and youths in all armed groups investigated shoot at and murder other people. For example, in El Salvador six of the 12 pandilleros interviewed admitted to having killed on at least one occasion. Only one of these 12 respondents was over eighteen years of age.
* When comparing available public health statistics such as fire-arms related mortality rates between investigated countries since 1979, we find that:
1) Minors have been consistently more affected by injury as a cause of death than the general population, and this has increased disproportionately amongst this group over time;
2) Firearms-related deaths as a percentage of all deaths by external causes has increased disproportionately more amongst minors than for the total population in all localities compared ;
3) In all cases gun deaths most affect young males between 15 and 24 years of age.
GENDER CONSIDERATIONS
* The majority of respondents (92%) from organised armed groups were male. It is possible that groups may have deliberately denied or overlooked access to female members, however, in most cases within investigated groups female members appear to be in the minority or are not present at all.
* Like boys, girls that do join armed groups come from poor communities and face many of the same socio-economic disadvantages as their male counterparts, are school dropouts and may join for similar reasons, such as for protection.
* In the majority of armed groups, female members do not use firearms or they use them to a lesser degree than male members, tending instead to rely on other weapons such as knives. This differential usage of firearms means that girls are much less affected by gun death in all countries covered by this study (where homicide rates were available).
* Because gun usage, as well as joining an armed group, is associated with notions of 'manhood' in many of the communities where investigated armed groups exist, adolescent males are more prone to join an armed group and use a firearm.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
* In all cases leaving an armed group can be dangerous and potentially lethal. However, if done in the correct manner it is possible.
* Respondents were not unanimous in their desire to leave their groups. Some did not want to leave because of feelings of belonging and excitement. Others had a fatalistic acceptance of their situation, claiming to have no choice. Those that wanted to leave said they would only do so if they got jobs or if the state/society/community helped them.
* Almost all respondents stated that they did not want their younger siblings involved. To guarantee this the following suggestions were made: more job opportunities, alternatives policies to treat group members instead of focusing only on repression, gun control and investments in sports and cultural activities.
* Most had a negative view of their lifestyles and regardless of whether they wanted to leave or not, the majority were hopeless about their futures.
CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC POLICY
* In all countries covered by this study governments are focusing on repressive tactics to deal with children and youth in organised armed violence. Government repression may be via:
1) Legislation that singles out youth groups or their members;
2) Repressive and increasingly militarised policing policies,
3) Detention and imprisonment of group members or their summary execution.
* State prevention and rehabilitation programmes in most countries were limited, under-funded or non-existent.
* A focus solely on repression tend to be ineffective, namely because:
1) Violent force does not deal with the root causes of the problem;
2) The juvenile justice and penal systems can be inadequate and often worsen the problem;
3) Armed groups tend to become more organised and increasingly violent when faced only with repressive tactics.
* Although fundamental to dealing with the problem of organised armed violence, eradicating the macro risk factors identified here is a lengthy and difficult process. Local level interventions that boost resilience amongst children and youth in affected areas are more effective for the short-term.
LOCAL LEVEL INTERVENTIONS
* Projects that will be successful at boosting resilience amongst children and young people in high-risk environments to joining an armed group are considered to be those that offer children and young people the chance to respond to the risk factors they face within those environments. The most successful of these projects offer beneficiaries sufficient options and supportive influences necessary to respond to all or most of the risk factors in their environment, rather than just one or two, thus affecting their personal context. Other factors for success include:
1) Being community based;
2) Responding to locally-identified risk factors and influences;
3) Designing integrated and personalised projects;
4) Working with family members;
5) Integrating involved and non-involved young people in local projects;
6) Involving the target group in the design, coordination and evaluation of the project.
* Psychological support for young people that have participated in and experienced high levels of armed violence is necessary and beneficial to reintegration programmes working with children and youth that have already participated in organised armed violence. This was found to be lacking in most cases.
STRATEGIC APPROACHES
* In order to stop organised armed violence rather than merely geographically displacing it, integrated, localised and personalised projects that build resilience amongst children and youth should be part of municipal or regional prevention and rehabilitation strategies. Strategies should be based on local analysis and coordinated jointly by stakeholders such as the government, the police and civil society groups and should include:
1) A network of locally-based interventions;
2) Integration with macro-level programmes working to treat structural risk factors;
3) The involvement of the juvenile justice system and adult prisons;
4) Conflict resolution between groups and protection programmes for members leaving under threat;
5) The building of local, national and international advocacy and networking mechanisms.
* Children and youth in organised armed violence are not child soldiers and should not be referred to as such. However, due to a number of similarities in causality, function and experience shared by CAAC and COAV there is much to gain from exchanging knowledge of good practice for the treatment of both distinct yet similar situations. This will aid in the advancement of sound methodological practice and the design, development and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DDR) that could be applied to urban non-war situations of organised armed violence, as well as making DDR programmes in armed or post-conflict settings more effective.
Recommendations
1. Recognition: The growing involvement of children and youth in organised armed groups outside of situations of war is a distinct problem that needs to be recognised by both international child protection agencies and national governments
2. Specific and integrated municipal/regional policies based on local diagnosis: Although they share numerous commonalities, organised armed groups are distinct entities in different environments. Specific policies for specific manifestations of this problem are needed within areas most critically affected by organised armed violence.
3. Treatment of structural risk factors: Structural risk factors that are causal and/or contributory to the establishment and continued dominance of local armed groups must be addressed. These may be different in each setting. However, a number of structural risk factors that were found to be common in all or most case studies are presented by the study. Dealing with such macro-level problems that are related to organised armed violence may include:
* Socio-economic inclusion of populations within distinct poor urban areas affected by the problem;
* Fast track educational inclusion and job opportunities for all youth in affected areas;
* Establishing a constant police presence within affected areas via community policing programmes;
* Deal with corruption and impunity of state representatives that has greatly aided armed groups;
* Deal with abuse of authority by state security forces which often encourages local populations to support armed groups;
* Gun control: establishing control of firearms manufacture and trade is crucial to lowering group access to small arms;
* Drug policy reform: current drug policy has not been affective. New strategies to deal with the illegal drug trade need to be identified.
4. Build resilience through a network of community-based prevention and rehabilitation interventions: Integrated networks of community based prevention and rehabilitation interventions should be established at the municipal/regional level. Rehabilitation programmes in the community should be integrated with state rehabilitation programmes within closed facilities in order that young people can continue to be rehabilitated after leaving detention.
6. Reform the juvenile justice system: Youth detention facilities are in need of drastic reforms in order to stop the maltreatment of inmates and offer the necessary educational, job training and rehabilitation programmes.
7. Focus on inclusion rather than just repression: The application of the law by the police is necessary to deal with organised armed violence. However, government dependence upon solely repressive legislative, military, policing and incarceration policies for the treatment of organised armed violence has failed to treat the root causes of the problem. Government reliance on solely repressive tactics must be replaced by integrated security policies that include a focus on prevention and rehabilitation in order to offer involved children and youths the necessary support to opt for alternatives to armed group membership.
8. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategies are applicable to both situations of war and organised armed violence. Knowledge of good practice examples of prevention, rehabilitation and DDR interventions in both situations should be exchanged and compared for the advancement of sound methodological practice and the design, development and implementation of 'ddr' programmes in urban non-war situations.
9. Engage groups in dialogue wherever possible: Wherever possible, group leaders should be contacted and encouraged to assist in the design of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes for their members.
10. Monitoring legally recognised armed groups: Some ethnic-militia and vigilante groups in Nigeria and the Civilian Volunteer Organisations in the Philippines are legally recognised. In addition to DDR programmes for child members, these groups need to be closely monitored by government to ensure they are not armed, do not act outside of the law and do not use child labour.
11. Need for better and more specific violence-related data: An independent and unified global data bank that records comparable violence-related data is needed if the levels of violence in which armed groups are involved are to be recorded and monitored.
The COAV Programme
The COAV programme seeks to promote the national and international recognition of the plight of children and youth in organised armed violence, identifying areas where children and youth are at most risk and working to reduce the problem through pilot projects and public policy.
* To read a copy of the COAV book online click here.
* To read about AP Partner Viva Rio and the COAV project, click here.
* For further information and interviews, contact: Luke Dowdney email: luke@vivario.org.br website:
http://www.coav.org.br/
* To contact John Hagedorn, co-writer of the US case study in Chicago, email: huk@uic.edu or visit
http://gangresearch.net/
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