Online papers on consciousness, part 2: Other Philosophy
of Mind
Compiled by David Chalmers
Part 2 of Online papers on consciousness
TABLE OF CONTENTS [1071 papers]
Language and Thought
- Murat Aydede, The language of thought hypothesis (see also here)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Language and thinking about thoughts
- Jose Luis Bermudez, The limits of thinking without words
- Darragh Byrne, Three notions of tacit knowledge
- Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor in the mind
- Peter Carruthers, Thinking in language?: Evolution and a modularist possibility
- Peter Carruthers, The cognitive functions of language (and reply to commentators)
- Peter Carruthers, Distinctively human thinking
- David Chalmers, Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language
- Andrew Chrucky, Sellars on language and thought
- Andy Clark, Magic words: How language augments human computation
- David Cole, Pinker on the thinker: Against mentalese monopoly
- David Cole, Hearing yourself think: Natural language, inner speech, and thought
- Robert Cummins, Systematicity
- Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth, Georg Schwarz, Systematicity and the cognition of structured domains
- Martin Davies, Architecturalism and the language of thought
- Martin Davies, Aunty's argument and armchair knowledge
- Martin Davies, In the armchair, down and out (and lectures two and three)
- Martin Davies, Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five percent difference matter?
- Daniel Dennett, Verbal language as a communicative system
- Daniel Dennett, The role of language in intelligence
- Daniel Dennett, Making tools for thinking
- Daniel Dennett, Reflections on language and mind
- Michael Devitt, Linguistics is not psychology
- Richard DeWitt, Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought
- Jerry Fodor, Review of Bermudez's Thinking without Words
- Christopher Gauker, Language and thought
- Lila Gleitman & Anna Papafragou, Language and thought
- Steven Gross, Can one sincerely say what one doesn't believe?
- Larry Hauser and Barbara Abbott, Natural language and thought
- Henry Jackman, Expression, thought, and language
- Frank Jackson, Locke-ing onto content
- Larry Kaye, The language of thought
- Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Number and natural language
- Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Regress arguments against the language of thought
- Kirk Ludwig, Direct reference in thought and speech
- Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Semantics, cross-cultural style
- Ruth Millikan, The language-thought partnership: A bird's eye view
- Ruth Millikan, Essential indeterminacies between semantics and pragmatics
- Phillip Robbins, What domain integration could not be
- Daniel Rothschild & Stephan Leuenberger, Descriptivism and the philosophy of mind
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Difficulties in Davidson's arguments against belief without language
- Brent Silby, Revealing the language of thought
- Aaron Sloman, The primacy of non-communicative language
- Jeff Speaks, Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?: Stalnaker on intentionality
- Jeff Speaks, Three Views of Language and the Mind
- Dan Sperber, Understanding verbal understanding
- Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, The mapping between the mental and the public lexicon
- Tony Stone & Martin Davies, Chomsky among the philosophers
Propositional Attitudes
- Kent Bach, A puzzle about belief reports
- Kent Bach, Do belief reports report beliefs?
- George Bealer, Propositions
- Joao Branquinho, The problem of cognitive dynamics
- David Braun, Russellianism and psychological generalizations (and explanation and prediction)
- David Braun, Understanding belief reports
- David Braun, Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions
- Curtis Brown, Direct and indirect belief
- Curtis Brown, What is a belief state?
- Cheryl Chen, Why
perception matters: The case of the global clairvoyant
- Austen Clark, Beliefs and desires incorporated
- Martin Davies, Explicit and implicit knowledge: Philosophical aspects
- Martin Davies and Max Coltheart, Pathologies of belief
- Daniel Dennett, Do animals have beliefs?
- Pascal Engel, Believing, accepting, and holding true
- Pascal Engel, Free believers?
- Eric Funkhouser, Willing belief and the norm of truth
- Christopher Gauker, Attitudes without psychology
- Christopher Gauker, The belief-desire law
- Heimir Geirsson, True belief reports and the sharing of beliefs
- Delia Graff, Desires, scope, and tense
- Mitchell Green, Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement
- Mitchell Green, Moore's many paradoxes
- P.M.S. Hacker, On the ontology of belief
- Pamela Hieronymi, Controlling attitudes
- Terry Horgan & David Henderson, What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism
- Henry Jackman, Truth, rationality, and humanity
- Pierre Jacob, Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor
- Pierre Jacob, Frege's puzzle and belief ascriptions
- Kit Fine, Kripke's puzzle about belief
- Jesper Kallestrup, Paradoxes about belief
- Joe Lau, Possible worlds semantics for belief sentences
- Peter Ludlow, Logical form and the hidden-indexical theory: A reply to Schiffer (and further reply)
- Michael McKinsey, The grammar of belief
- Michael McKinsey, The semantics of belief ascriptions
- Marc Moffett, Knowing facts and believing propositions: A solution to the problem of doxastic shift
- Daniel Nolan, Selfless desires
- Lucy O'Brien, Imagination and the motivational role of belief
- Carole Penco, Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief
- John Perry, Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition
- John Perry, Rip Van Winkle and other characters
- Francois Recanati, Can we believe what we do not understand
- Francois Recanati, Opacity and the attitudes
- Geoffrey Sayre-McCord & Michael Smith, Desires and beliefs of one's own
- Stephen Schiffer, A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports (plus replies by Braun and Salmon)
- Stephen Schiffer, Propositional content
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief
- Eric Schwitzgebel, In-between believing
- Eric Schwitzgebel, A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Acting contrary to our (professed) beliefs
- Jeff Speaks, Explaining the disquotational principle
- Cara Spencer, Is there a problem of the essential indexical?
- Dan Sperber, Intuitive and reflective beliefs
- Roger Sperry, The cognitive role of belief: Implications of the new mentalism
- Robert Stainton, Robust belief states and the right/wrong dichotomy
- Kenneth Taylor, Singular beliefs and their ascriptions
Causal Theories of Content
- Fred Adams, Fodor's asymetrical causal dependency theory of meaning
- Jason Bridges, Does informational semantics commit Euthyphro's fallacy
- Jonathan Cohen, An objective counterfactual theory of information
- Jonathan Cohen, Information and content
- David Cole, Natural language and natural meaning
- Robert Cummins, The LOT of the causal theory of mental content
- Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee, Martin Roth, Representation and unexploited content
- Robert Cummins & Pierre Poirier, Representation and indication
- Crawford Elder, What sensory signals are about
- Crawford Elder, What vs. how in naturally selected representation
- Erik Myin, Some problems for Fodor's theory of content
- Robert Rupert, Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content
- Robert Rupert, Dispositions indisposed: Semantic atomism and Fodor's theory of content
- Robert Rupert, On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought
- Robert Rupert, The best test theory of extension
- Paul Skokowski, Information, belief, and causal role
Teleological Theories of Content
- Louise Antony, Equal rights for swampersons
- Jason Bridges, Teleofunctionalism and psychological explanation
- Daniel Dennett, Evolution, error, and intentionality
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics
- Pierre Jacob, Can selection explain content?
- Brendan Lalor, Swampman, etiology, and content
- Angus Menuge, A critique of Dennett's evolutionary account of intentionality
- Ruth Millikan, Theories of mental content
- Ruth Millikan, Naturalizing intentionality
- Ruth Millikan, On swampkinds
- Ruth Millikan, Reading Mother Nature's mind
- Ruth Millikan, What has natural information have to do with intentional representation?
- Karen Neander, Teleological theories of mental content
- Paul Pietroski, Intentionality and teleological error
- Mark Rowlands, Teleosemantics
- Robert Rupert, Mental representation and Millikan's theory of intentional content
Theories of Content (Misc)
- Ned Block, Conceptual role semantics
- Alex Byrne, Interpretivism
- Adrian Cussins, Content, embodiment, and objectivity
- Daniel Dennett, Intentional systems
- Daniel Dennett, Intentionality
- Daniel Dennett, The interpretation of texts, people, and other artifacts
- Chris Eliasmith, How neurons mean: A neurocomputational theory of representational content
- Hartry Field, Deflationist views of meaning and content (and postscript)
- Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, On folk psychology and mental representation
- Mark Greenberg, A new map of theories of mental content
- Gilbert Harman & Mark Greenberg, Conceptual role semantics
- Gilbert Harman, (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics
- Steven Horst, Goldilocks searches for a conceptual semantics
- Henry Jackman, Conventionalism, objectivity, and constitution
- Mark Kalderon, Reasoning and representing
- Barry Loewer, A guide to naturalizing semantics
- Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, Notes towards a structuralist theory of mental representation
- Colin McGinn, Intentionality and
intentional objects
- Dan Ryder, On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective
- Dan Ryder, Neurosemantics: A theory
- Dan Ryder, SINBAD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation
- Dan Ryder, The brain as a model-making machine
- Kenneth Taylor, Toward a naturalistic theory of rational intentionality
- Nigel Thomas, A non-symbolic theory of conscious content: Imagery and activity
Internalism and Externalism
- Michael Antony, Social relations and the individuation of thought
- Jason Bridges, Davidson's transcendental externalism
- David Buller, Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of 'narrow' functions)
- John Campbell, Is sense transparent?
- Andrew Carpenter, Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error
- Martin Davies, Externalist dependence thesis
- Michael Devitt, Meanings just ain't in the head
- Katalin Farkas, Does Twin Earth rest on a mistake?
- Katalin Farkas, What is externalism?
- Justin Fisher, Why nothing mental is just in the head
- Bryan Frances, Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks
- Bryan Frances, Twin Earth thought experiments
- John Hawthorne, Why Humeans are out of their minds
- Henry Jackman, Individualism and interpretation
- Henry Jackman, Semantic norms and temporal externalism
- Henry Jackman, Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices
- Henry Jackman, We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior
- Pierre Jacob, Can mental content explain behavior?
- Brendan Lalor, It is what you think: Intentional potency & anti-individualism
- Joe Lau, Externalism about mental content
- Peter Ludlow, Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions
- Kirk Ludwig, Externalism, naturalism, and method
- Kirk Ludwig, The myth of social content
- Helge Malmgren, The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind
- Ron McClamrock, Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry
- Michael McKinsey, Curing folk psychology of 'arthritis'
- Michael McKinsey, Individuating beliefs
- Ruth Millikan, Existence proof for a viable externalism
- Ruth Millikan, On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame
- Karen Neander, The narrow and the normative
- Anthony Newman, The good, the bad, and the irrational: Three views about mental content
- Anthony Newman, Two grades of internalism (pass and fail)
- Derk Pereboom, Conceptual structure and the individuation of content
- John Perry, Broadening the mind
- David Pitt, Nativism and the theory of content
- Laura Schroeter, Why be an anti-individualist?
- Alberto Voltolini, Internalism and externalism
- Alberto Voltolini, The metaphysics of internalism and externalism
- Robert Wilson, Meaning making and the mind of the externalism
- Robert Wilson, Recent work on indivualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences
- Wayne Wright, Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
- Paul Boghossian, What the externalist can know a priori
- Bill Brewer, Externalism and a priori knowledge of empirical facts
- Bill Brewer, Self-knowledge and externalism
- Jessica Brown, The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access
- Darragh Byrne, The appearance-transparency of sense
- Martin Davies, Externalism and armchair knowledge
- Martin Davies, Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant
- Martin Davies, Externalism, self-knowledge, and transmission of warrant
- Martin Davies, The problem of armchair knowledge
- Jordi Fernandez, Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions
- Brie Gertler, Externalism and
privileged access: A new approach
- John Gibbons, Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes
- John Gibbons, Externalism and knowledge of content
- Jussi Haukioja, Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach
- Henry Jackman, Deference and self-knowledge
- Pierre Jacob, Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?
- William Larkin, Burge on our privileged access to the external world
- William Larkin, Content skepticism
- Willian Larkin, The non-apriority of concept width
- William Larkin, Twin Earth, Dry Earth, and knowing the width of water
- Peter Ludlow, Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow switching
- Peter Ludlow, Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory
- Peter Ludlow, Social externalism and memory: A problem
- Peter Ludlow, On the relevance of slow switching
- Peter Ludlow, First-person authority and memory
- Cynthia MacDonald, Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge
- Luca Malatesti, Externalism and the knowledge of mental states
- Michael McKinsey, Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent
- Michael McKinsey, Forms of externalism and privileged access
- Michael McKinsey, The semantic basis of externalism
- Michael McKinsey, Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority
- Brian McLaughlin and Michael Tye, Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access?
- Paul Noordhof, Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown argument (and reply to Brueckner)
- Sarah Sawyer, An externalist account of introspective knowledge
- Sarah Sawyer, Privileged access to the world
- Michael Tye, Externalism and memory
- Stephen Yablo, Self-knowledge and semantic luck
Narrow Content
- Louise Antony, What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought
- Kent Bach, Content: Wide vs. narrow
- Curtis Brown, Belief states and narrow content
- David Buller, "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction
- Alex Byrne, Chalmers on epistemic content
- Alex Byrne and James Pryor, Bad intensions
- David Chalmers, The components of content
- Nick Georgalis, First-person
intentionality
- Ulrike Haas-Spohn, Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics
- Frank Jackson, Narrow content and representation -- or Twin Earth revisited
- Frank Jackson, Why we need A-intensions
- Uriah Kriegel, The primacy of narrow content
- Joe Lau, Three motivations for narrow content
- Kirk Ludwig, Duplicating thoughts
- Kirk Ludwig, Singular thought and the Cartesian theory of mind
- James Pryor, Varieties of two-dimensionalism
- Stephen Schiffer, Mental content and epistemic two-dimensional semantics
- Laura Schroeter, The rationalist foundations of Chalmers’ 2-D semantics
The Extended Mind
- Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition
- Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Defending non-derived content
- Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Defending the bounds of cognition
- Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Why the mind is still in the head
- Ken Aizawa, Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong
- Andy Clark, Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended
- Andy Clark & David Chalmers, The extended mind
- Joseph Fulda, "The extended mind"--extended
- Brie Gertler, The narrow mind
- Susan Hurley, Active perception and vehicle externalism
- Susan Hurley, Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism
- Robert Rupert, Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition
- Robert Rupert, Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?
- Kim Sterelny, Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind
- Daniel Weiskopf, Patrolling the mind's boundaries
- Robert Wilson, Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis
Concepts
- Murat Aydede, Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzles
- Kent Bach, Review of Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Naturalism and conceptual norms
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual mental content
- Robert Brandom, Overcoming a
duality of concepts and causes: A unifying thread in Empiricism and
the Philosophy of Mind
- Harold Brown, Sellars, concepts, and conceptual change
- Harold Brown, Conceptual comparison and conceptual innovation
- Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, chapter 1 (also chapter 2 and chapter 3)
- Andy Clark and Jesse Prinz, Putting concepts to work: Some thoughts for the twenty-first century
- David DeMoss, Hunting fat gnu: How to identify a proxytype
- Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
- Jerry Fodor, There are no recognitional concepts, not even RED (and part 2)
- Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes
- Christopher Gauker, On the evidence for prelinguistic concepts
- Ulrike Haas-Spohn & Wolfgang Spohn, Concepts are beliefs about essences
- Larry Hauser, Doing without mentalese
- Pierre Jacob, Can semantic properties be noncausal? (comment on Fodor)
- Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Concepts and conceptual analysis
- Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Radical concept nativism
- Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Concepts
- Edouard Machery, Concept empiricism: A methodological critique
- Edouard Machery, ,
One hundred years of psychology of concepts: Theoretical notions and
their operationalization
- Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data
- Ruth Millikan, A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse (and response to critics)
- Ruth Millikan, How we make our ideas clear: Empiricist epistemology for empirical concepts
- Ruth Millikan, A more plausible kind of "recognitional concept"
- Ruth Millikan, On Clear and Confused Ideas, chapter 1 (also chapter 2, chapter 3, and chapter 6)
- Christopher Peacocke, Interrelations: Concepts, knowledge, reference, and structure
- Christopher Peacocke, Rationale and maxims in the study of concepts
- Jesse Prinz, The return of concept empiricism
- Francois Recanati, The Fodorian fallacy
- Dan Ryder, Empiricism regained (comments on Prinz's Furnishing the Mind)
- Dan Ryder, Concept acquisition: How to get something from nothing
- Stephen Schiffer, Meanings and concepts
- Laura Schroeter, The limits of conceptual analysis
- Eric Schwitzgebel, On containers and content, with a cautionary note to philosophers of mind
- Gabriel Segal, Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns
- Stephen Stich, Jackson's empirical assumptions
- Michael Strevens, The myth of the final criterion
- Neil Tennant, The emperor's new concepts
- Paul Thagard, Coherent and creative conceptual combinations
- Gerald Vision, Flash! Fodor splits the atom
- Daniel Weiskopf & William Bechtel, Remarks on Fodor on having concepts
- Daniel Weiskopf, The plurality of concepts
- Edward Zalta, Fregean senses, modes of presentation, and concepts
- Edward Zalta, A (Leibnizian) theory of concepts
Holism and Normativity
- Ned Block, An argument for holism
- Ned Block, Mental and semantic holism
- Pascal Engel, The norms of thought: Are they social?
- Pascal Engel, Wherein lies the normative dimension in mental content?
- Jakob Hohwy, A reductio of Kripke-Wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning
- Jakob Hohwy, Semantic primitivism and normativity
- Susan Hurley, Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving
- Henry Jackman, Holism, relevance, and thought content
- Henry Jackman, Moderate holism and the instability thesis
- Henry Jackman, Holism, context, and content
- Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning holist (and appendix)
- Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning atomist
- Kirk Ludwig, Is content holism incoherent?
- Nick Zangwill, The normativity of the mental
Mental Content, (Misc.)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of nonconceptual content
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Syntax, semantics, and levels of explanation
- Alex Byrne, Intentionality
- Tim Crane, Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence
- Tim Crane, Intentionality as the mark of the mental
- Adrian Cussins, Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought
- Daniel Dennett, Things about things
- Michael Devitt, Why Fodor can't have it both ways
- Michael Devitt, Transcendentalism about content
- Michael Devitt and Georges Rey, Transcending transcendentalism
- Hartry Field, Remarks on content and its role in explanation
- Jerry Fodor, Hume's program (and ours)
- Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepoe, All at sea in semantic space: Churchland on meaning similarity
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, Model-based science and the representational theory of mind
- Rick Grush, Skill and spatial content
- Ulrike Haas-Spohn, Hidden indexicality and subjective meaning
- P.M.S. Hacker, An orrery of intentionality
- David Hilbert, Content, intention, and explanation
- Steven Horst, Notions of 'representation' in philosophy and empirical research
- Steven Horst, Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind
- Henry Jackman, James' pragmatic account of intentionality and truth
- Pierre Jacob, Intentionality
- Anne Jacobson, The uninviting room: Representations without contents
- Sean Kelly, Grasping at straws: Motor intentionality and the cognitive science of skillful action
- Ruth Millikan, The myth of mental indexicals
- Ruth Millikan, Pushmi-pullyu representations
- John Perry, Intentionality and its puzzles
- John Perry and David Israel, Fodor and psychological explanation
- James Pryor, An epistemic theory of acquaintance (and commentary by Susanna Siegel)
- Matthias Scheutz, The ontological status of representations
- Stephen Schiffer, A paradox of meaning
- Stephen Schiffer, An introduction to content and its role in explanation
- John Searle, Explaining
cognition
- Gabriel Segal, Intentionality
- Paul Skokowski, Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief
- Aaron Sloman, Toward a general theory of representations
- Robert Stalnaker, What might nonconceptual content be?
- Daniel Stoljar, Nominalism and intentionality
- Andrew Ward, The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism
Reduction
- Louise Antony, Who's afraid of disjunctive properties?
- William Bechtel, The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research
- William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, Multiple realizability revisited
- John Bickle, Concepts of intertheoretic reduction in contemporary philosophy of mind
- Ned Block, Anti-reductionism slaps back
- Joao Fonseca, On Bickle's failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum
- Eric Funkhouser, A liberal conception of multiple realizability
- William Hasker, How not to be a reductivist
- John Heil, Multiply realized properties
- Pierre Jacob, Some problems for reductive physicalism
- Brian Keeley, Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization
- Paul Mainwood, How is non-reductive physicalism possible
- Ron McClamrock, Emergence unscathed: Kim on multiple realizability and causal types
- Ruth Millikan, Historical kinds and the special sciences
- Derk Pereboom, Robust nonreductive materialism
- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith, The metaphysics of irreducibility
- Thomas Polger, Realization and the metaphysics of mind
- Thomas Polger, Neural machinery and realization
- John Post, Breakwater: The new wave, supervenience and individualism
- Alex Rosenberg, How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about biology
- Lawrence Shapiro, Multiple realizations
- Lawrence Shapiro, The metaphysics of multiple realizability: It's like apples and oranges
- Lawrence Shapiro, Neural plasticity and multiple realizability
- Robert Wilson and Carl Craver, Realization
- Francis Zucker, Three counter strategies to reductionism in science
Emergence
- Nils Baas & Claus Emmeche, On emergence and explanation
- Mark Bedau, Weak emergence
- Mark Bickhard & Donald Campbell, Emergence
- Mark Bickhard, The dynamic emergence of representation
- Richard Campbell & Mark Bickhard, Physicalism, emergence, and downward causation
- Tim Crane, The significance of emergence
- Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe, Frederick Stjernfelt, Explaining emergence: Toward an ontology of levels
- Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe, Frederick Stjernfelt, Levels, emergence, and three versions of downward causation
- Michael Huemer, The philosophical complaint against emergence
- Paul Meehl & Wilfrid Sellars, The concept of emergence
- Timothy O'Connor, Emergent properties
- Timothy O'Connor, Groundwork for an emergentist account of the mental
- Timothy O’Connor & Jon Jacobs, Emergent individuals
- Timothy O’Connor & Hong Yu Wong, The metaphysics of emergence
- Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong, Emergent properties
- Stephen Pepper, Emergence
- William Seager, Emergence and efficacy
- William Seager, Emergence and supervenience
- Warren Shrader, John Stuart Mill and the development of British emergentism
- Michael Silberstein & John McGeever, The search for ontological emergence
- Roger Sperry, In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction
Functionalism and Behaviorism
- Murat Aydede, Syntax, content, and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind
- Ned Block, What is functionalism?
- Alex Byrne, Behaviourism
- Paul Churchland, Functionalism at forty
- Daniel Dennett, Reintroducing The Concept of Mind (plus letter from Ryle)
- Brie Gertler, Functionalism's methodological predicament
- George Graham, Behaviorism
- Colin Klein, Aristotle on functionalism
- Robert Koons, Functionalism without physicalism: Outline of an emergentist program
- Kirk Ludwig, Functionalism, causation and causal relevance
- Pete Mandik, Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism
- Marc Moffett, Against a posteriori functionalism
- Thomas Polger, Against the argument from functional explanation
- Thomas Polger, Escaping the epiphenomenal trap
- Alexander Pruss, Functionalism and the number of minds
- Hilary Putnam, The nature of mental states
- Robert Rupert, Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects
- Matthias Scheutz, Ethology and functionalism: Behavioral descriptions as the link between physical and functional descriptions
- Rowland Stout, What you know when you know how someone behaves
- Julia Tanney, Rethinking Ryle
Identity theories (including anomalous monism)
- Michael Antony, Davidson's argument for monism
- Bill Brewer, Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: A difficulty for the token identity theory
- Neil Campbell, Anomalous monism
- Ted Honderich, Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and the champion of mauve
- Ted Honderich, Functionalism, identity theories, the union theory
- Dan Hutto, Davidson's identity crisis
- Henry Jackman, Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws
- William Lycan, A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism
- U.T. Place, Identity theories
- David Rosenthal, The identity theory
- J.J.C. Smart, The identity theory of mind
- Tim van Gelder, Monism, dualism, pluralism
- Steven Yalowitz, Anomalous monism
Physicalism
- Janice Dowell, The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical
- Andrew Chrucky, Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' materialism
- Crawford Elder, Physicalism and the fallacy of composition
- Jennifer Hornsby, Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith
- Barbara Montero, What is the physical?
- Barbara Montero, Physicalism
- Barbara Montero, Physicalism in an infinitely decomposable world
- Barbara Montero, The body problem
- Barbara Montero, Post-physicalism
- Barbara Montero, What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism?
- Barbara Montero, A defense of the via negativa argument for physicalism
- Barbara Montero, Varieties of causal closure
- Christian Nimtz & Michael Schuette, On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism
- David Papineau, The rise of physicalism
- Howard Robinson, Materialism in the philosophy of mind
- Warren Shrader, Does physicalism require a supervenience thesis?
- Elliott Sober, Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view
- Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism
- Jessica Wilson, How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?
- Jessica Wilson, Nonreductive physicalism and degrees of freedom
- Jessica Wilson, Supervenience-based formulations of physicalism
Dualism
- John Beloff, What are minds for?
- John Beloff, The mind-brain problem
- John Beloff, Parapsychology and radical dualism
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Locke, property dualism and metaphysical dualism
- Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
- Karl Popper, Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism
- Karl Popper, A note on the body-mind problem
- Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen, Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge
- William Robinson, Epiphenomenalism
- Howard Robinson, Dualism
- Wilfrid Sellars, A note on Popper's argument for dualism
Mental Causation
- Karen Bennett, Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it
- Karen Bennett, Exclusion again
- Henk bij de Weg, Dretske and the causality of reasons
- Ned Block, Do causal powers drain away?
- Bill Brewer, Mental causation: Compulsion by reason
- John Campbell, An interventionist approach to causation in psychology
- Tim Crane, The mental causation debate
- Carl Craver and William Bechtel, Explaining top-down causation (away)
- Crawford Elder, Mental causation vs. physical causation: No contest
- Eric Funkhouser, Three varieties of causal overdetermination
- John Gibbons, Mental causation without downward causation
- Jakob Hohwy, The experience of mental causation
- Terry Horgan, Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem
- Jesper Kallestrup, The causal exclusion argument
- Kirk Ludwig, Causal relevance and thought content
- Kirk Ludwig, Dretske on explaining behavior
- Eric Marcus, Mental causation in a phyical world
- Eric Marcus, Mental causation: Unnaturalized but not unnatural
- Peter Menzies, Mental causation for event dualists
- Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, Beyond program explanation
- Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, How to be psychologically relevant?
- Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, The metaphysics of mental causation
- Peter Menzies, The causal efficacy of mental states
- Paul Raymont, Are mental properties causally relevant? (plus reply to Sullivan)
- Paul Raymont, Kim on overdetermination, exclusion, and nonreductive physicalism
- William Seager, Generalized epiphenomenalism
- Gabriel Segal, Content and causation
- Micah Sparacio, Mental realism: Rejecting the causal closure thesis and expanding our physical ontology
- Roger Sperry, Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function
- Julia Tanney, Why reasons may not be causes
- Sven Walter, Program explanations and the causal relevance of mental properties
- Stephen Yablo, Causal relevance
- Stephen Yablo, Seven habits of highly effective thinkers
Metaphysics of Mind
- James Barham, Thoughts on thinking matter
- Karen Bennett, Global supervenience and dependence
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Personal and subpersonal: A difference without a distinction
- Mark Bickhard, Mind as process
- Robert Bishop, The hidden premise in the causal argument for physicalism
- Daniel Dennett, Real patterns
- Daniel Dennett, Two black boxes: A fable
- Daniel Dennett, The case for rorts
- Brie Gertler, Metaphysics of mind
- John Heil & David Robb, Mental properties
- John Heil, Metaphysics of mind
- Steven Horst, Mind and the World of Nature
- William Lycan, Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis
- Eric Marcus, Defending naive realism about mental properties
- Eric Marcus, Events, sortals, and the mind-body problem
- Eric Marcus, Why there are no token states
- Ruth Millikan, What is behavior?
- Jeanne Peijnenburg, Are there mental entities? Some lessons from Hans Reichenbach
- Randall Dipert, Two unjustly neglected aspects of C.S. Peirce's philosophy of mind
- Huw Price, Psychology in perspective
- William Seager, Real patterns and surface metaphysics
- Roger Sperry, The riddle of consciousness and the changing scientific worldview
- Roger Sperry, A mentalist view of consciousness
- Roger Sperry, Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no
- Roger Sperry, An objective approach to subjective experience: Further explanation of a hypothesis
- Roger Sperry, Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view
- Stephen Stich, Deconstructing the mind
- Stephen Stich and Stephen Laurence, Intentionality and naturalism
- Tim van Gelder, Beyond the mind-body problem
- Tim van Gelder, The distinction between mind and cognition
- Megan Wallace, Mental fictionalism
The Self and Personal Identity
- Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels, Epistemicism and the combined-spectrum argument
- Richard Baron, The self is unreal
- Lynne Rudder Baker, Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (amd discussion
- John Barresi, On becoming a person
- Tim Bayne, Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder
- Tim Bayne, The inclusion model of the Incarnation: Problems and prospects (plus reply to Sturch)
- Jose Luis Bermudez, Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self
- Henk bij de Weg, Can a person break a world record
- Stephen Braude, Multiple personality and moral responsibility (and replies)
- John Campbell, What is it to know what 'I' refers to?
- Andy Clark, I am John's brain
- Stephen Clark, Minds, memes, and multiples (and replies)
- Tom Clark, Death, nothingness, and subjectivity (and replies)
- Arthur Deikman, 'I' = Awareness
- Daniel Dennett, The self as a center of narrative gravity
- Daniel Dennett, The origins of selves
- Daniel Dennett, Where am I?
- Daniel Dennett, In Darwin's wake, where am I?
- Matti Eklund, Personal identity, concerns, and indeterminacy
- Shaun Gallagher, Philosophical conceptions of the self
- Tamar Gendler, Exceptional persons: On the limits of imaginary cases
- Tamar Gendler, Personal identity and thought-experiments
- Tamar Gendler, Critical notice of Rovane's The Bounds of Agency
- Grant Gillett, A discursive account of multiple personality disorder (and Stephen Braude's reply)
- Dan Hutto, Composing our "selves": Aristotelian and fictional personhood
- Dan Hutto, The story of the self
- Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel Dennett, Speaking for our selves
- Ralph Kennedy and George Graham, Extreme self-denial
- Amy Kind, The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future
- William Larkin, Persons, animals, and bodies
- Chris Lindsay, Subjects as objects: Living in a material world
- John Locke, Of identity and diversity
- E.J. Lowe, Self, agency, and mental causation
- Neil McKinnon & John Bigelow, Parfit, causation, and survival
- Max More, The diachronic self
- John Perry, The self
- Roland Puccetti, Dennett on the split brain (and replies)
- David Rosenthal, Emotions and the self
- David Rosenthal, Persons, minds, and consciousness
- David Sanford, Where was I?
- William Seager, The constructed and the secret self
- Ted Sider, Criteria of personal identity and the limits of conceptual analysis
- Roger Sperry, Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain
- Galen Strawson, The self
- Joe Strout, Mind uploading
- Peter Suber, Self-determination and selfhood in recent legal cases
- Peter Unger, The survival of the sentient
- Peter Unger, The mental problems of the many
- David Velleman, Self to self
- David Velleman, So it goes
- Robert Wilson, Persons, social agency, and constitution
Free Will
- Torin Alter & Russell Daw, Free acts and robot cats (and reply to Heller)
- Tim Bayne and Neil Levy, The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agency
- Tim Bayne, Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will
- Tim Bayne, Putting the experience of acting in its place
- Joseph Keim Campbell, Compatibilist alternatives
- Mario De Caro, Is freedom really a mystery?
- Daniel Dennett, Symposium on Freedom Evolves: comments by John Fischer, Al Mele, Timothy O'Connor, Manuel Vargas, and Dennett's reply
- John Dupré, The solution to the problem of the freedom of the will
- Bruce Edmonds, Implementing free will
- Peter Ells, Naturalistic, libertarian free will
- John Martin Fischer, Free will and moral responsibility
- John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Morally responsible people without freedom
- Harry Frankfurt, Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility
- John Fulda, Partially
resolving the tension between omniscience and free will: A mathematical argument
- Patricia Greenspan, Free will and genetic determinism: Locating the problem(s)
- Patricia Greenspan, Genes, electrotransmitters, and free will
- Thomas Hobbes, Causation, determinism, and their compatibility with freedom
- Ted Honderich, Free will, determinism, and moral responsibility: The whole thing in brief
- Ted Honderich, Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the smart aleck
- Ted Honderich, Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem
- Ted Honderich, Mind the guff
- Ted Honderich, After compatibilism and incompatibilism
- Ted Honderich, Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now
- Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The phenomenology of embodied agency
- David Hume, The obviousness of the truth of determinism
- David Hume, Our freedom reconciled with determinism
- Michael Huemer, A proof of free will
- Michael Huemer, The objectivist theory of free will
- Robert Kane, Reflections on free will, determinism, and indeterminism
- Immanuel Kant, For determinism and indeterminism
- Tomis Kapitan, Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will
- Tomis Kapitan, Autonomy and manipulated freedom
- Tomis Kapitan, Agency and omniscience
- Tomis Kapitan, Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives
- Arthur Koestler, Charles Hartshorne, & Bernhard Rensch, Free will in a hierarchic context
- Jeremy Koons, Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism?
- William Lycan, Free will and the
burden of proof
- Tibor Machan, A brief defense of free will
- Matteo Mameli, On Dennett and the natural sciences of free will
- Ned Markosian, A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation
- Al Mele, Free will and luck
- Thomas Nagel, Fredom and the view from nowhere
- Eddy Nahmias, Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities
- Eddy Nahmias, The phenomenology of free will
- Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, & Jason Turner, Is incompatibilism intuitive?
- Shaun Nichols, The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts
- Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions
- Timothy O'Connor, Agent causation
- Timothy O'Connor, Causality, mind, and free will
- Timothy O'Connor, Dualist and agent-causal theories
- Timothy O'Connor, Why agent causation?
- Timothy O'Connor, Alternative possibilities and responsibility
- Timothy O'Connor, Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views
- Timothy O'Connor, Free will
- Robert Pendleton, Time and free will
- Derk Pereboom, Determinism al dente
- Derk Pereboom, Is our concept of agent-causation coherent?
- Derk Pereboom, Meaning in life without free will
- Derk Pereboom, Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities
- John Perry, Is there hope for compatibilism?
- Paul Russell, Compatibilist fatalism
- Paul Russell, Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the new compatibilism
- Aaron Sloman, How to dispose of the free will issue
- Saul Smilansky, Free will: Two radical proposals
- Roger Sperry, Changing concepts of consciousness and free will
- Roger Sperry, Consciousness, free will and personal identity
- Ulrich Steinvorth, A third concept of freedom of the will
- Peter Strawson, Freedom and resentment
- Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett, Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities
- Peter Unger, Free will and scientiphicalism
- Peter van Inwagen, The mystery of metaphysical freedom
- J. David Velleman, Freedom (from Practical Reflection)
- Peter Westen, Getting the fly out of the bottle: The false problem of free will and determinism
- Jing Zhu, Is conscious will an illusion?
Philosophy of Mind (Misc.)
- Colin Allen, Philosophy of cognitive ethology
- Anthony Atkinson, Persons, systems, and subsystems
- David Braddon-Mitchell, Folk theories of the third kind
- Andrew Carpenter, Kant's philosophy of mind
- David Chalmers, The Matrix as metaphysics
- Andy Clark, The twisted matrix: Dream, simulation or hybrid?
- Martin Davies, Persons and their underpinnings
- Daniel Dennett, Back from the drawing board (reply to critics)
- Daniel Dennett, Get real (reply to critics)
- Daniel Dennett, Memes and the exploitation of imagination
- Daniel Dennett, Granny's campaign for safe science
- Daniel Dennett, Memes: Myths, misunderstandings, and misgivings
- Rick Grush, Manifolds, co-ordinations, imagination, objectivity
- Susan Hurley, Making sense of animals
- Susan Hurley, Perception and action: Alternative views
- Sean Kelly & Joshua Knobe, Can one act for a reason without acting intentionally?
- Joshua Knobe & Gabriel Mendlow, The good, the bad and the blameworthy: Understanding the role of evaluative reasoning in folk psychology
- Colin McGinn, The problem of philosophy
- Alva Noe, Anti-intellectualism
- Philip Pettit, Groups with minds of their own
- Teed Rockwell, Eliminative materialism
- Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
- Galen Strawson, 'Mental'
- Crispin Wright, What could anti-realism about ordinary psychology possibly be?
The Turing Test
- Ned Block, Psychologism and behaviorism
- Selmer Bringsjord, Animals, zombanimals, and the total Turing test: The essence of artificial intelligence
- Selmer Bringsjord, Paul Bello, & David Ferrucci, Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test
- Bruce Edmonds, The constructability of artificial intelligence (as defined by the Turing test)
- Robert French, Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test
- Robert French, Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A reply to Jacquette
- Stevan Harnad, The Turing test is not a trick
- Stevan Harnad, Minds, machines, and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables
- Stevan Harnad, Other bodies, other minds (and Larry Hauser's reply)
- William Rapaport, How to pass a Turing test: Syntactic semantics, natural-language understanding, and first-person cognition
- James Sennett, The ice man cometh: Lt. Commander Data and the Turing test
- Stuart Shieber, Lessons from a restricted Turing test (and Hugh Loebner's reply)
- Alan Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence
- Peter Turney, Answering subcognitive Turing Test questions: A reply to French
- Stuart Watt, Naive psychology and the inverted Turing test (and comments)
- Blay Whitby, Why the Turing test is AI's biggest blind alley
The Chinese room
- Selmer Bringsjord, Real robots and the missing thought-experiment in the Chinese-room dialectic
- Steven Brown, Peirce and formalization of thought: The Chinese room argument
- David Cole, The Chinese room argument
- Jack Copeland, The curious case of the Chinese gym
- Stevan Harnad, Minds, machines, and Searle
- Stevan Harnad, What's wrong and right about Searle's Chinese room argument?
- David Harrison, Connectionism hits the Chinese gym
- Larry Hauser, The Chinese room argument
- Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence
- Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese box: Debunking the Chinese room argument
- Larry Hauser, Nixin' goes to China
- Pat Hayes/Stevan Harnad/Don Perlis/Ned Block, Virtual symposium on virtual mind
- Diane Law, Searle, subsymbolic functionalism, and synthetic intelligence
- William Rapaport, Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition
- John Searle, Minds, brains, and programs
- John Searle, Is the brain a digital computer?
- Mark Sprevak, Algorithms and the chinese room
Gödel's theorem and AI
- Paul Benacerraf, God, the Devil, and Godel
- Damjan Bojadziev, Gödel's theorem for minds and computers
- Selmer Bringsjord, A refutation of Penrose's new Gödelian case against the computational conception of mind
- David Chalmers, Minds, machines, and mathematics
- David Coder, Godel's theorem and mechanism (and Lucas's reply)
- Jack Copeland, Turing's O-machines, Searle, Penrose, and the brain
- Daniel Dennett, Review of The Emperor's New Mind
- Solomon Feferman, Penrose's Gödelian argument
- I.J. Good, Human and machine logic (and Lucas's reply)
- Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland, Gaps in Penrose's toilings
- Anthony Hutton, This Godel is killing me (and Lucas's reply)
- Geoffrey Laforte, Pat Hayes, & Ken Ford, Why Godel's theorem cannot refute computationalism: A reply to Penrose
- David Lewis, Lucas against mechanism (and Lucas's reply)
- J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines, and Gödel
- J. R. Lucas, Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf
- J. R. Lucas, The Gödelian argument: Turn over the page
- J. R. Lucas, The implications of Gödel's theorem
- Tim Maudlin, Between the motion and the act...
- Daryl McCullough, Can humans escape Gödel?
- Drew McDermott, [STAR] Penrose is wrong
- Roger Penrose, Beyond the doubting of a shadow (reply to commentaries on Shadows of the Mind)
- Hilary Putnam, Review of Shadows of the Mind
- William Seager, Yesterday's algorithm: Penrose and the Godel argument
- Aaron Sloman, The emperor's real mind
Philosophy of Connectionism
- Murat Aydede, Language of thought: The connectionist contribution
- Murat Aydede, Connectionism and the language of thought
- William Bechtel, What should a connectionist philosophy of science look like?
- William Bechtel, Natural deduction in connectionist systems
- István Berkeley, What the #$*%! is a subsymbol?
- István Berkeley, Some myths of connectionism
- István Berkeley, A revisionist history of connectionism
- James Blackmon, David Byrd, Robert Cummins, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth, Atomistic learning in non-modular systems
- David Chalmers, Syntactic transformations on distributed representations
- David Chalmers, Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn were wrong
- David Chalmers, The evolution of learning: An experiment in genetic connectionism
- Andy Clark & Chris Eliasmith, Philosophical issues in brain theory and connectionism
- Jack Copeland, On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism
- Martin Davies, Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought
- Martin Davies, Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge
- Daniel Dennett, Mother nature vs the walking encyclopedia
- Chris Eliasmith, Structure without symbols: Providing a distributed account of high-level cognition
- Malcolm Forster, Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology: A reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon
- Eric Lormand, Classical and connectionist models
- Eric Lormand, Connectionist languages of thought
- Eric Lormand, Connectionist content
- L. Niklasson & T. van Gelder, Can connectionist models exhibit non-classical structure sensitivity?
- Gerard O'Brien, Is connectionism common sense?
- Gerard O'Brien, The role of implementation in connectionist explanation
- Gerard O'Brien, Connectionism, analogicity and mental content.
- Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, Radical connectionism: Thinking with (not in) language
- Paul Skokowski, Belief in networks
- Tim van Gelder & L. Niklasson, On being systematically connectionist
- Tim van Gelder, Connectionism and the mind-body problem: Exposing the distinction between mind and cognition
- Tim van Gelder, Why distributed representation is inherently non-symbolic
- Jonathan Waskan, A critique of connectionist semantics
- Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel, Directions in connectionist research: Tractable computations without syntactically structured representations
Computationalism
- Mark Bickhard, The biological foundations of cognitive science
- Ned Block, The mind as the software of the brain
- Selmer Bringsjord, Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility
- Selmer Bringsjord, The modal argument for hypercomputing minds
- Curtis Brown, Implementation and indeterminacy
- David Buller, Confirmation and the computational paradigm (or: Why do you think they call it artifical intelligence?)
- David Chalmers, A computational foundation for the study of cognition
- David Chalmers, Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?
- Christopher Cherniak, Undebuggability and cognitive science
- Austen Clark, Seeing and summing: Implications of computational theories of vision
- Jack Copeland, Super Turing-machines
- Jack Copeland, Beyond the universal Turing machine
- Jack Copeland, The broad conception of computation
- Jack Copeland, Turing, Wittgenstein, and the science of the mind
- Jack Copeland, What is computation?
- Eric Dietrich, Cognitive science and the mechanistic forces of darkness
- Hubert Dreyfus, From Socrates to expert systems: The limits and dangers of calculative rationality
- Chris Eliasmith, Is the brain analog or digital?: The solution and its consequences for cognitive science
- Chris Eliasmith, The myth of the Turing machine: The failings of functionalism and related theses
- Jordi Fernandez, Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive science
- Christopher Green, Is AI the right method for cognitive science? (and commentaries)
- Stevan Harnad, The symbol grounding problem
- Stevan Harnad, Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; Cognition isn't
- Steven Horst, Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind
- Steven Horst, The computational theory of mind
- Colin Klein, Maudlin on computation
- William Rapaport, How minds can be computational systems
- Matthias Scheutz, Computational vs. causal complexity
- Matthias Scheutz, Computationalism: The next generation
- Matthias Scheutz, Implementation: Computationalism's weak spot
- Matthias Scheutz, New computationalism
- Matthias Scheutz and Markus Peschl, Some thoughts on computation and simulation in cognitive science
- Matthias Scheutz, The cognitive computational story
- Matthias Scheutz, When physical systems realize functions
- Aaron Sloman, What are virtual machines? Are they real?
- Aaron Sloman, Architecture-based conceptions of mind
- Aaron Sloman, What sort of architecture is required for a human-like agent?
- Tim van Gelder, Computers and computation in cognitive science
- Robert Wilson, What computers (still, still) can't do: Jerry Fodor on computation and modularity
Philosophy of AI, Misc
- John Beloff, Minds or machines
- Nick Bostrom, How long before superintelligence?
- Nick Bostrom, The transhumanist FAQ
- Selmer Bringsjord, Precis of What Robots Can and Can't Be (and (commentaries)
- Andy Clark, Artificial intelligence and the many faces of reason
- Andy Clark, Global abductive inference and authoritative sources, or, how search engines can save cognitive science
- Daniel Dennett, Can machines think?
- Daniel Dennett, Cog as a thought experiment
- Daniel Dennett, Did HAL committ murder?
- Eric Drexler, Thinking machines
- Matthew Elton, Robots and rights: The ethical demands of artificial agents
- Rick Grush, Towards a cognitive robotics
- Larry Hauser, Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?
- Brian Keeley, Against the global replacement: On the application of the philosophy of artificial intelligence to artificial life
- Jaron Lanier, Agents of alienation
- Jaron Lanier, Mindless thought experiments (a critique of machine intelligence)
- Eric Lormand, The frame problem
- Eric Lormand, The holorobophobe's dilemma
- John McCarthy, Ascribing mental qualities to machines
- John McCarthy, What is artificial intelligence?
- John McCarthy & Patrick Hayes, Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
- Drew McDermott, How intelligent is Deep Blue?
- Marvin Minsky, Why people think computers can't
- Aaron Sloman, The Computer Revolution in Philosophy
- Aaron Sloman, The irrelevance of Turing machines to AI
- Paul Skokowski, Can computers carry content inexplicitly
- Stanford Humanities Review, Constructions of the mind: Artificial intelligence and the humanities
- Tim van Gelder, Into the Deep Blue yonder
- Vernor Vinge, The technological singularity
- Mitchell Waldrop, Can computers think?
- Eliezer Yudkowsky, Creating friendly AI
- Eliezer Yudkowsky, General intelligence and seed AI
- Eliezer Yudkowsky, Staring into the singularity
Philosophy of Neuroscience
- William Bechtel, Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important?
- William Bechtel, Decomposing the brain: A long term pursuit
- William Bechtel & Robert N. McCauley, Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience
- William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function
- William Bechtel and Robert Stufflebeam, PET: Exploring the myth and the method
- John Bickle & Pete Mandik, The philosophy of neuroscience
- Christopher Cherniak, The bounded brain: Toward quantitative neuroanatomy
- Christopher Cherniak, Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy
- Christopher Cherniak, Neural component placement
- Max Coltheart and Martin Davies, Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology
- Carl Craver, Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory
- Carl Craver, Dissociable realization and kind splitting
- Carl Craver, Functions and mechanisms in contemporary neuroscience
- Carl Craver, Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory
- Carl Craver, The making of a memory mechanism
- Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and Nora Breen, Monothematic delusions: Toward a two-factor account
- Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies, and Max Coltheart, Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions
- Chris Eliasmith, Computational neuroscience
- Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy, Rationality and schizophrenic delusion
- Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar, A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience (and commentary by Byrne and Hilbert, John Sutton)
- Rick Grush, In defense of some 'Cartesian' assumptions concerning the brain and its operation
- Rick Grush, The semantic challenge to cognitive neuroscience
- Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland, Computation and the brain
- Jakob Hohwy, Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation
- Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg, Unusual experiences, reality testing, and delusions of alien control
- Brian Keeley, Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception
- Brian Keeley, Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science
- Brian Keeley, Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization
- Dan Lloyd, Terra Cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind
- Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, & Carl Craver, Thinking about mechanisms
- Adina Roskies, Neuroethics for the new millenium
- Adina Roskies, The binding problem
- Dan Ryder & Oleg Favorov, The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of th cerebral cortex
- Tony Stone and Martin Davies, Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind
- Paul Thagard, How molecules matter to mental computation
Dynamics and Embodiment
- William Bechtel, Dynamics and decomposition: Are they compatible?
- William Bechtel, Representations and cognitive explanations: Assessing the dynamicist challenge in cognitive science
- Mark Bickhard, How does the environment affect the person?
- Mark Bickhard, Interactivism: A manifesto
- William Clancey, How situated cognition is different from situated robotics
- Andy Clark, Forces, fields, and the role of knowledge in action
- Andy Clark, Beyond the flesh: Some lessons from a mole cricket
- Andy Clark and Pete Mandik, Selective representing and world-making
- Andy Clark, Author's reply to symposium on Natural-Born Cyborgs
- Andy Clark, Minds, brains and tools
- Chris Eliasmith, Computation and dynamic models of the mind
- Chris Eliasmith, The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition
- Chris Eliasmith, Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is
- Chris Eliasmith, Attractive and in-discrete: A critique of two putative virtues of the dynamicist theory of mind
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, Untangling the evolution of mental representation
- Jesse Prinz, Emotions embodied
- Tim van Gelder, The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science (and responseto commentators)
- Tim van Gelder, Defending the dynamic hypothesis
- Tim van Gelder, Revisiting the dynamic hypothesis
- Daniel Weiskopf, The place of time in cognition
- Robert Wilson and Andy Clark, How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course
Theory of Mind
- Angela Arkway, The simulation theory and explanations that "make sense of behavior"
- Angela Arkway, Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws
- Allison Barnes & Paul Thagard, Empathy and analogy
- Jose Luis Bermudez, The domain of folk psychology
- Henk bij de Weg, The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory
- John Campbell, Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process
- John Campbell, Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion
- Peter Carruthers, Autism as mindblindness: an elaboration and partial defence
- Peter Carruthers, Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of theory-theory
- Peter Carruthers, Pretend play
- Joe Cruz, Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture
- Joe Cruz, Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy
- Martin Davies, The mental simulation debate
- Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Folk psychology and mental simulation
- Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse
- Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Psychological understanding and social skills
- Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Simulation theory
- Justin Fisher, Does simulation theory really involve simulation?
- Shaun Gallagher, The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or primary interaction?
- Tamar Gendler, On the relation between pretense and belief
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, Folk psychology as a model
- Alvin Goldman, The psychology of folk psychology
- Alvin Goldman, Folk psychology and mental concepts
- Robert Gordon, Sellars's Ryleans revisited
- Robert Gordon & John Barker, Autism and the "theory of mind" debate
- Robert Gordon, Developing commonsense psychology: Experimental data and philosophical data
- Robert Gordon, Reason explanations and counterfactuals
- Robert Gordon & Joe Cruz, Simulation theory
- Robert Gordon, Representing minds
- David Henderson & Terry Horgan, Simulation and epistemic competence
- Frank Jackson, All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate
- Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies, and Max Coltheart, Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia
- Matteo Mameli, Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution
- Shaun Nichols, Folk psychology
- Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, & Alan Leslie, Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation
- Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Alan Leslie & David Klein, Varieties of off-line simulation
- Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, Rethinking co-cognition
- Gerard O'Brien, A conflation of folk psychologies
- Gloria Origgi, Theories of theories of mind
- Anna Papafragou, Mindreading and verbal communication
- Eric Schwitzgebel, A difficulty for simulation theory due to the close connection of pretense and action in early childhood
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Children's theories and the drive to explain
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Gradual belief change in children
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Words about young minds: The concepts of theory, representation, and belief in philosophy and developmental psychology
- Eric Schwitzgebel, Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research
- Kim Sterelny, The triumph of a reasonable man: Stich, mindreading, and nativism
- Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory?
- Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Second thoughts on simulation
- Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Theory theory to the max
- Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation
- Tony Stone and Martin Davies, The mental simulation debate: A progress report
- Thomas Suddendorf & Claire Fletcher-Flinn, Theory of mind and the origins of divergent thinking
- Julia Tanney, Ordinary language and commonsense psychology
- Nigel Thomas, Attitude and image, or, What will simulation theory let us eliminate?
- Daniel Weiskopf, Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions
Evolution and Innateness
- Andre Ariew, Innateness and canalization
- William Bechtel, What knowledge must be in the head in order to acquire language
- David Buller, DeFreuding evolutionary psychology: Adapation and human motivation
- David Buller, Evolutionary psychology
- David Buller, Evolutionary psychology: The emperor's new paradigm
- Peter Carruthers, Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?
- John Collins, Cowie on the poverty of the stimulus
- Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Evolutionary psychology: A primer
- Stephen Crain & Paul Pietroski, Nature, nurture, and universal grammar
- Stephen Crain & Paul Pietroski, Why language acquisition is a snap
- Denise Cummins, Robert Cummins, and Pierre Poirier, Cognitive evolutionary psychology without representational nativism
- Simon Fitzpatrick, Nativism, empiricism and Ockham’s razor
- Jerry Fodor, Doing without What's Within (and Fiona Cowie's response; see also these)
- Malcolm Forster & Larry Shapiro, Prediction and accommodation in evolutionary psychology
- Mark Greenberg, Goals versus memes: Explanation in the theory of cultural evolution
- Paul Griffiths, Evo-devo meets the mind: Toward a developmental evolutionary psychology
- Marc Krellenstein, What have we learned from evolutionary psychology?
- Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis, The poverty of stimulus argument
- Ronald Mallon & Stephen Stich, The odd couple: The compatibility of social construction and evolutionary psychology
- Paul Pietroski & Stephen Crain, Innate ideas
- Jesse Prinz, Against moral nativism
- Geoffrey Pullum, Empirical assessment of stimulus poverty arguments (and reply by Legate and Yang)
- Geoffrey Pullum, Learnability, hyperlearning, and the poverty of the stimulus
- Robert Richards, Darwin's metaphysics of mind
- Robert Rupert, Nativism and empiricism
- Gabriel Segal, Poverty of stimulus arguments concerning language and folk psychology
- Kim Sterelny, The evolution and evolvability of culture
Modularity
- David Buller, Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity
- Peter Carruthers, Simple heuristics meet massive modularity
- Peter Carruthers, The case for massively modular models of mind
- Peter Carruthers, On Fodor's problem
- Peter Carruthers, Practical reasoning in a modular mind
- Peter Carruthers, Moderately massive modularity
- Jesse Prinz, Is the mind really modular?
- Dan Sperber, In defense of massive modularity
- Dan Sperber, Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive
- Kim Sterelny, Language, modularity, and evolution
Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Misc)
- Tim Bayne and Elizabeth Pacherie, Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions (and reply to commentators)
- Mark Bickhard, Psychopathology
- Mark Bickhard, An integration of motivation and cognition
- Mark Bickhard, Mind as process
- Mark Bickhard, The biological foundations of cognitive science
- Peter Carruthers, Human creativity
- Peter Carruthers, The roots of scientific reasoning
- Robert Cummins, Functional analysis
- Robert Cummins, "How does it work" versus "What are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation
- Martin Davies, An approach to the philosophy of cognitive science
- Martin Davies, Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of description
- Ronald de Sousa, Rational animals: What the bravest lion won't risk
- Philip Gerrans, Delusions as performance failures
- Philip Gerrans, Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion
- Philip Gerrans, The norms of cognitive development
- Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel, Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology
- Rick Grush, Emulation and cognition
- Rick Grush, The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception
- Rick Grush, The philosophy of cognitive science
- Rick Grush, The architecture of representation
- Rick Grush, Blending in language, conceptual structure, and the cerebral cortex
- Stephen Laurence, Is linguistics a branch of psychology?
- Ron McClamrock, Functional analysis and etiology
- Ron McClamrock, Marr's three levels: A re-evaluation
- Ron McClamrock, Holism without tears: Local and global effects in cognitive processes
- Ruth Millikan, In defense of public language
- Matthias Scheutz and Markus Peschl, Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition
- Roger Sperry, The impact and promise of the cognitive revolution
- Kim Sterelny, Folk logic and animal rationality
- Kim Sterelny, Cognitive load and human decision
- John Sutton, Memory
- John Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism
- John Sutton, Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory
- John Sutton, Cognitive conceptions of language and the development of autobiographical memory
- John Sutton, Porous memory and the cognitive life of things
- Jonathan Waskan, Intrinsic cognitive models
- Daniel Weiskopf, On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way
- Robert Wilson, Philosophy of psychology
Go to: