The Ideological And Historical Roots Of Kurdist Movements In Turkey: Ethnicity Demography, Politics
Sedat LACINER and Ihsan BAL
Friday , 15 October 2004
Abstract
The PKK terror has cost about 30,000 live and billions of dollars to Turkey. In 20 years the organisation made all the efforts to create a Kurdish nation and to establish a separate state. However the lack of popular support forced the PKK to shift its policies.In fact the PKK movement is no exception. All Kurdist movements in Turkey's history failed. This article looks at the reasons of this ‘failure'. According to the authors the ethnic origin, history and demography did not provide a suitable environment for Kurdish nationalism, particularly in the Anatolian territories. The study focuses on the ethnic origin of the Kurds, their current perceptions, sociaological and cultural descriptions of the Kurds, demography and their impact on Kurdish uprisings and separatism.
Abstract
The PKK terror has cost about 30,000 live and billions of dollars to Turkey. In 20 years the organisation made all the efforts to create a Kurdish nation and to establish a separate state. However the lack of popular support forced the PKK to shift its policies.In fact the PKK movement is no exception. All Kurdist movements in Turkey's history failed. This article looks at the reasons of this ‘failure'. According to the authors the ethnic origin, history and demography did not provide a suitable environment for Kurdish nationalism, particularly in the Anatolian territories. The study focuses on the ethnic origin of the Kurds, their current perceptions, sociaological and cultural descriptions of the Kurds, demography and their impact on Kurdish uprisings and separatism.
IntroductionIntroduction The ‘Kurdish issue', or the ‘south-east Anatolian issue' as it is widely known in Turkey, has been a phenomenon of major significance in the country since the late 1960s. The roots of the problem in the Southeast of Turkey go back as far as the nineteenth century when it was known as the ‘Eastern Question'.[1] Both the area, and the issue itself, have developed and changed in many ways throughout this period in terms of the people, the geography, the political thoughts of the region's intellectuals, and the parties, which have been involved with the issue both nationally and internationally. In order to make contribution to understand the essence of present-day political debate concerning Kurdish issues, this article examines the history of Kurdish groups within Turkey on the ground that ‘the present situation of the Kurdish people can only be understood in its historical context, notably in the light of the events of the last hundred years'.[2] In another word, in order to understand the Kurdist separatist movements in Turkey and the rise of terrorism associated with the Partia Karkare Kurdistan (PKK), one needs an appreciation of the historical development of the Kurdish people, their experiences, ideas and expectations, and their grievances and demands. It is also necessary to clarify a number of issues concerning the Kurds. Who are they and where are they located? What is their language and religion? How have they developed politically, and what were the reasons for the Kurdish uprisings that have taken place? What is their socio-political position as an ethnic group in Turkey? What is the rationale behind the terrorist activity associated with the Kurds? In this context the study focuses on the origin and history of the Kurds in Turkey. The study makes all the efforts to provide a wide spectrum of the ideas since the area is under attack of ideological manipulations.
The study aims to show the connections between the weaknessess of the Kurdish separatism and the demographic and historical problems of the Kurdish nationalism. One may claim that institutional and economic factors, relations with other ethnic groups etc. Are also essential in understanding the Kurdish nationalism. It is true, but all these factors are out of the scope of this study. This article's main questions are slihtly simple ones: Who are the Kurds? How do they describe their ethnic identity? How their feelings regarding their roots reflect on the political arena? In this context the article should be seen as an introduction study. The other dimesions of Kurdish nationalism will be examined in the coming studies.
The Origin and History of the Kurds Research into the Kurdish people is hampered by the lack of modern academic studies concerning their ethnic and cultural origins. Moreover, much of the research, which has been carried out cannot be considered accurate, because of racial or cultural biases for or against the Kurdish ethnic group. Also some governments in the region tried to use history to justify their policies. Johon and Harwey[3] state that "there is no definitive answer to the question of their origins", except to say that an identifiable Kurdish people have inhabited the mountainous regions north of Mesopotamia for a period of between two and four thousand years. The first historical reference to the forefathers of the Kurds appears in Xenophon's Anabasis, which sets out a contemporary account of the epic journey of the Greeks as they headed north from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea.
"After twenty-four centuries the identity of these ancient barbarians may still be obscure - but their name and their location - north of modern-day Mosul - connects them to today's Kurds, as does their attitude to central authority."[4]
Much of this evidence is disputed, although Johon and Harwey observed an historic link between the Carduchis of twenty-four centuries ago and today's Kurds. Even Xenophon tells us little about the Carduchi beyond their war-like qualities combined with their skill with the bow[5], which is also very much a part of the Turkish tradition and culture. The investigations seem unable to establish the actual origins of the Kurdish people, but it is suggested that the name ‘Carduchi' may relate to the word ‘Kurd'.
Some researchers have suggested that there is a possibility that some Kurdish tribes could have moved from Europe to Mesopotamia four thousand years ago[6]. However the view of Kurds as being of Indo-European origin, gives little consideration to their culture, religion, language and other ethnic attributes.[7]
In the 8th century BC, the Assyrians were conquered by the Medes, who overran a large part of the territory now occupied by modern Kurds. Around 550 BC it was the Persians who conquered the region, which was previously held by the Medes. Andrews[8]claims the success of these two nations living peacefully together can be found in the nature of the Kurds who share the same linguistic origin as the Persians. This strongly suggests they have Persian origin, but this argument, must be considered doubtful in the light of other historical data, and the conquests of Mesopotamia by many nations such as the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Seljukis and Ottomans makes uncertain this seemingly tangible piece of evidence.[9]In spite of some commentators' claims it is impossible to determine with any certainty the closeness of the relationship between today's Kurds and the ‘successors' to the Medes and Persians. In the 7th century Arabia, during the Caliphate of Omar Al Khattab, a campaign against the Persians was waged, culminating in the conquest of Persia and Mesopotamia. It has been assumed that the Kurds converted to Islam following this conquest.[10] It is very difficult, however, for any historian to make any definitive statement as to the Kurdish identity, as historical documents make no mention of the Kurds as a people. While historical accounts do make reference to various peoples going to war with each other, such as the Greeks, Turks, Persians and Arabs, the records are silent about the Kurdish people.
The modern studies about the Kurdish people increased during the decline period of the Ottoman Empire. The main motive in this trend was to weaken the Ottomans in the imperial struggle. The number of the Russian researchers among them is significant as the Moscow encouraged the Russian scholars and researchers to study the minorities in the Ottoman Empire. Most of the Russian studies underscored the differences between the Turkish and Kurdish races and argued that these two were different nations. Furthermore some Western researchers claimed that the Kurds were a European nation while the Turks originated from the Asiatic races. As a known fact not all of the Kurds are dark skin and there are many Kurds with blue eyes and blonde hair, and these researchers used the physical similarities in order to prove their argument. Their second ‘proof' is the Kurdish language. The Kurdish language belongs to the Indian-European language group like many European languages and Persian. Even some researchers, including the Kurdish separatists, claimed that Kurdish and English are ‘relative' languages.[11]
Table 1.
The ‘Common' or ‘Similar' Words in Kurdish and English[12]
Kurdish English
Gama Game
Mara Marry
Stara/Ster Star[13]
Rubar River
Dol Dale
Bra Brother
Mong Moon
Snoy Snow
Firo Free (of charge)
Standin to stand
Sur Sure
The separatist PKK and other separatist Kurdish groups enthusiastically support this argument because it shows that Turks and Kurds are different nations. They even argue that the Kurds are the first owners of the Anatolian territory and many other nations followed the Kurds in these territories. The recent PKK documents and other Kurdist publications for instance argue that the Greek, Hittite, Lydia, Assyrian and many other Anatolian and Mesopotamia civilations were originally Kurdish.[14] For Ekrem Cemil Paşa the history of Kurdish people is 3000-years old and older than the Persians and Turkish peoples' history in Anatolia. As a matter of fact that the author does not provide any proof for his argument but the common and similar about a hundred words.[15] It is clear that the ideological motives shape the modern arguments on the roots of the Kurds. The PKK similar to the earlier nation-building processes makes efforts to create a nation by using history for its political ends. Thus, it creates legacies and extraordinary Kurdish victories. The Kurdist groups tries to show that the Kurdish race is better and superior than the other races. In this late nation-building process not the historical truth but the ideological aims are more important. Similar to the Kurdist group the regional states which worry for Kurdish separatist movements argue that the Kurds are part of their nation. The Arabs for instance claim that the Kurds are Arab while the Turkish and Persians argue the Kurds are from a branch of their nation.
Other accounts in Turkey argue that the Kurdish people originate from the Central Asia. They suggest that the Kurds might have been a sect of the Turani peoples from Central Asia, where the Anatolian and Mesopotamian Turkish people originally came from. This argument has been advanced by several authors of Kurdish studies such as Yıldız[16], Çay[17], Aydın[18] and Kodaman[19], and was used as official policy by some of the Turkish governments.[20]
Çay suggested that when one investigates the origins of the Kurds there is a need to look at a variety of sources.[21] He raises a number of possibilities and reasons for the origin of the word ‘Kurd'. In the 6th century AD, the ruler of the then Turkish Empire in the Central Asia was Oguz Khan, whose ambassador to the Islamic Prophet Mohammed was a person known to be Kurdish. Such evidence, whilst remote, nevertheless has to be considered. Secondly, in his research into the origin of the Kurdish language, Çay observed that there were certain similarities between Kurdish and the language of the Ural Altay area of Central Asia. This area can also be identified as the origin of the Turkish language, and there are certain similarities between them.[22] However, Çay suggested that the unique characteristics of Kurdish culture, language, art and literature make them closer to the Turani people than any other race in the world.[23]
Another author who shares similar views is Aydın. In his research, Aydın stated that he did not believe the Kurds were descendants of the Medes, nor did he believe they were of Iranian, Arab or Indo-European origin. He considered that although the people known as the Kurds resided in seven different countries, they appeared to have more in common with Turkish culture than any other.[24] Another researcher into Kurdish identity was Yıldız[25], who suggested that the area of the Middle East called Kurdistan in the 20th century had never previously existed in an ethnic geographical sense. After the First World War, all this area of Asia was divided into countries, according to the preferences of the compatriots. Yıldız stated that until the 8th century this region had been ruled by Rome, Armenia, Persia, Arabia and the Byzantium. Subsequently, this area was populated until the eleventh century by a group that could have been the Turani Central Asian Turkish tribes, although they were known by various tribal names such as Saltuklular, Artukogullari, Cubukogullari, Sokmenliler and Mengucukler.[26] In the eleventh century, the area was conquered by the Seljukis who ruled until the fourteenth century, when the area was conquered by the Ottoman. Yıldız pointed out that no person could in truth call themselves Kurdish in a proven ethnic sense.[27]
Another Turkish researcher Önder argues that the Kurds are one of the Turkish tribes originated from the Central Asia. He, similar to the other scholars, uses the language in order to prove his argument and says that there are many commons and similar words in Kurdish and old Turkish languages. Önder also argues that the word ‘Kurd' was used in the Yenisey Stones in 732 B.C. In the stones one of the Turkish tribe leaders (khan) was saying "I am Kurt-el-khan....".[28]
Table 2.
The ‘Common' and Similar Words in Turkish and Kurdish[29]
(Z: Zaza, K: Kirmanch Kurdish)
Table 2.
The ‘Common' and Similar Words in Turkish and Kurdish[29]
(Z: Zaza, K: Kirmanch Kurdish)
Kurdish Old Turkish (Göktürk/Uygur Turkish) English
Apo Apa Uncle
Bug(e) Buge Bride
Ka Ko Ka Elder, Father
Geç, Gacık Egiç Girl
Kutni Kutay Bright silk
Mı Mın I
Bak Baga Frog
Kon/yom Kon/go Place to stop
Gund / Gend Kent City, town,
village
Balduz Baltuz wife's sister
Sister-in-law
Beşik Beşik cradle
Altun (Z) Altun gold
Boğe (Z) Buka/Boğa bull
Ecü (Z) Eçü grandmother
Gol (K) Göl lake
Ki (K) Kim who
Hen (K) Kan khan
Apo Apa Uncle
Bug(e) Buge Bride
Ka Ko Ka Elder, Father
Geç, Gacık Egiç Girl
Kutni Kutay Bright silk
Mı Mın I
Bak Baga Frog
Kon/yom Kon/go Place to stop
Gund / Gend Kent City, town,
village
Balduz Baltuz wife's sister
Sister-in-law
Beşik Beşik cradle
Altun (Z) Altun gold
Boğe (Z) Buka/Boğa bull
Ecü (Z) Eçü grandmother
Gol (K) Göl lake
Ki (K) Kim who
Hen (K) Kan khan
Those who defend that the Kurds are Turkish are mostly Turkish scolars. According to them the Kurds are one of the Turkish tribes who lived in the mountanies areas. Önder and Seferoglu claims that there is only one language which have ‘Kurd' word and this word means ‘snow' or ‘snowy things' in the Turkish dialects. These scholars argue that the Kurds were named as ‘Kurds' because they were living in the snowy places, mountains. Therefore some of the Turkish scholars call the Kurds as ‘mountain Turks'.[30]
Arguments over national identity can be pursued throughout the world, because many races have no clearly definable root. However, as Winrow and Kirisci[31] pointed out, this does not prevent people identifying with a particular nationality as the Welsh, Irish and Scots do within the British Isles, and an analogy can be drawn here with the Kurdish people.
The arguments put forward by Yıldız do appear to have historical substance, and the people of this area do appear to be of mixed origin. However, what cannot be disputed is that the people within this area of Asia today call themselves ‘Kurd' and identify themselves with the particular area now called Kurdistan. Also, if a people feel themselves to be of a different race, nation or language group, one cannot claim that the cause of this group is not valid. In another word, what the Kurdish peoples identify should be respected.
Those who defend that the Kurds are Turkish are mostly Turkish scolars. According to them the Kurds are one of the Turkish tribes who lived in the mountanies areas. Önder and Seferoglu claims that there is only one language which have ‘Kurd' word and this word means ‘snow' or ‘snowy things' in the Turkish dialects. These scholars argue that the Kurds were named as ‘Kurds' because they were living in the snowy places, mountains. Therefore some of the Turkish scholars call the Kurds as ‘mountain Turks'.[30]
Arguments over national identity can be pursued throughout the world, because many races have no clearly definable root. However, as Winrow and Kirisci[31] pointed out, this does not prevent people identifying with a particular nationality as the Welsh, Irish and Scots do within the British Isles, and an analogy can be drawn here with the Kurdish people.
The arguments put forward by Yıldız do appear to have historical substance, and the people of this area do appear to be of mixed origin. However, what cannot be disputed is that the people within this area of Asia today call themselves ‘Kurd' and identify themselves with the particular area now called Kurdistan. Also, if a people feel themselves to be of a different race, nation or language group, one cannot claim that the cause of this group is not valid. In another word, what the Kurdish peoples identify should be respected.
The Current Perceptions of the Kurdish People In addition to its historic origins, it is clear that there is a necessity to consider the present circumstances of Kurdish identity. Current identity is closely related to the perceptions of the people and their views of a particular nation. However, it must be noted, as Bulloch and Harvey have argued that, much of the present population of Kurdistan would not call themselves Kurds, considering themselves to be Turks, Iranians or Arab."In South-eastern Kurdistan, around the Iranian town of Kermanshah, the local population has traditionally regarded itself as more Persian than Kurdish, and in language and religion it is indeed closer to the Persians than it is to, say, the Syrian Kurds of the Kurd Dagh."[32]
The area of ‘Kurdistan' historically known as Mesopotamia has been conquered by many nations and this has led to such a complex history that it is practically impossible to establish a true regional identity. As Bulloch and Harvey stated:"The racial mix became even more complex over subsequent centuries, as Turkish and Arab tribes pressed in on the Kurdish heartland. In early medieval times some ethnically Turkish tribes became Kurdified, while Kurdish tribes became Turkified. Kurds became vassals of Arab chieftains and vice versa, and Arab and Turkish words entered the vocabularies of the Kurdish dialects."[33]
The different perceptions and academic disciplines used by researchers seem to complicate the understanding of Kurdish ethnic origin and any current description of Kurdishness. Mutlu[34] suggested that the only reasonable way to identify anybody as Kurdish is through his or her mother and whether that person speaks Kurdish or any Kurdish dialect. However, as Winrow and Kirisci[35] noted, there are people who cannot speak the language but identify themselves as Kurdish. Even Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the seperatist terror group PKK, cannot speak Kurdish language though he championd Kurdish nationalism. For that reason, they defined a ‘Kurd' as, ‘Someone who considers him/herself to have a Kurdish ethnic identity, irrespective of whether Kurdish is the mother-tongue'[36] However, in the case of Turkey, this approach raises the question of who is a ‘Turk'. Winrow and Kirisci made a theoretical and also a pragmatic attempt to analyse this particular issue, examining the concept of ‘Turk' in terms of ethnic backgrounds and citizenship:
"Individuals may perceive that they have multiple identity. Which identity a person may choose to stress could be dependent on a particular context. And largely psychological ‘boundaries' between ethnic groups are not fixed. Different generations within a certain family could thus perceive themselves as either Kurdish or Turkish or they may feel that they belong to both identities. A Kurd could consider him/herself to be a member of specific tribe, hold a Kurdish ethnic identity and also feel him/herself to be a Turkish citizen... Therefore some like Hikmet Cetin (Ex Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister) would consider himself an ethnic Kurd of Turkish nationality (citizenship). He would regard himself as Turkish Kurd".[37]
Authors such as David McDowall[38] noted that some Kurdish tribes were probably Turks, some Arabs and some of them the successors of the early Mesopotamians who lived two thousand years ago in the region. Most of the researchers of this field seem to agree only upon the uncertainty of the origin of these people. The only practical answer is that the Kurdish people are all those who, as a consequence of the environment in which they live, feel a sense of Kurdish cultural identity, or describe themselves as Kurdish.
It is important for this study to take this approach in order to examine the links between this understanding of Kurdishness and that of the separatist Kurdist currents. It is difficult to define from the above analysis the Kurds as a distinctive nation within a subjective description of nation, such as race, ethnicity, religion and language. Decades-old tribal conflicts, clan-type social life, absence of common historical and cultural heritage, and geographical isolation in remote regions, hindered the emergence of a Kurdish sense of nationhood.[39] Despite all these difficulties in defining ‘Kurdish nation', during the second half of the 1960s the issue of Kurdish ethnicity was explored by the Kurdish and Turkish socialists. The socialist groups saw the problem from the perspective of socialist solidarity.[40] For them Kurdish and Turkish, all citizens of Turkey, were under the attack of ‘imperialist', ‘capitalist' forces, thus they had to co-operate against these enemies. During the 1970s the Kurdish ethnicity issue was exploited for political reasons by radical socialist and separatist groups. The studies used by these political groups were obviously partial, yet the state policies after the creation of the Republic had discouraged the research into the Kurdish identity because of concern about separatism. The Turkish state tended to claim that Kurds are a part of Turkish people, not a separate people.[41] Research and publications sponsored by external powers, most of them for their own political interests, has further complicated matters. The different views outlined above have bedevilled attempts to find a reasonable and objective conclusion to the matter. It is thus difficult to make a definitive comment about the real origins of the Kurds in this study. However, what can be said is that the more the state tried to avoid any research into the Kurdish issue[42], the more opposition groups, such as the PKK, exploited the issue. A Sociological and Cultural Descriptions of the Kurds
To understand the causes of Kurdish insurrections during the 20th century, and the subsequent emergence of the PKK (Partia Karkare Kurdistan), it is necessary to examine the religious, cultural, political and social background. The historical evidence suggests that Kurdish society was essentially tribal, originating from a semi-nomadic existence, which can still be seen in most Kurdish tribes to this day.[43] The Encylopedia Americana for instance describes the characteristics of the Kurds in 1950s:
"They are of mixed character, brave, freedom loving, hospitable, rather shy, and, to some extent, true to their word; on the other hand, are firmly devoted to bloody revenge and consider a robbery as honorable as an heroic act. They have great family love, the nomads wandering with their tents of black skins or the setytlersa living in low houses...."[44]
The tribal characteristic of Kurdish society may have changed, especially during the second half of the twentieth century, but it remains a cultural hallmark of the people. McDowall states that "loyalties, first to the immediate family, then to the tribe are as strong as any in the Arab world'.[45] It is suggested by historians, that unlike the Arabs, Kurdish tribal cohesion is based on a mix of blood ties and territorial loyalty.[46]
Another most important factor in Kurdish society has been religion, Islam. Alongside the tribal ties are strong religious loyalties, especially to the sheikhs, aghas, and to the local leaders of religious brotherhoods. Although the Kurds are known as a highly religious people, this characteristic is comparatively recent, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century, when two religious Muslim orders, the Qadiris and the Naqshbandis, began to spread rapidly throughout Kurdistan.[47] McDowall summarises this as:
To understand the causes of Kurdish insurrections during the 20th century, and the subsequent emergence of the PKK (Partia Karkare Kurdistan), it is necessary to examine the religious, cultural, political and social background. The historical evidence suggests that Kurdish society was essentially tribal, originating from a semi-nomadic existence, which can still be seen in most Kurdish tribes to this day.[43] The Encylopedia Americana for instance describes the characteristics of the Kurds in 1950s:
"They are of mixed character, brave, freedom loving, hospitable, rather shy, and, to some extent, true to their word; on the other hand, are firmly devoted to bloody revenge and consider a robbery as honorable as an heroic act. They have great family love, the nomads wandering with their tents of black skins or the setytlersa living in low houses...."[44]
The tribal characteristic of Kurdish society may have changed, especially during the second half of the twentieth century, but it remains a cultural hallmark of the people. McDowall states that "loyalties, first to the immediate family, then to the tribe are as strong as any in the Arab world'.[45] It is suggested by historians, that unlike the Arabs, Kurdish tribal cohesion is based on a mix of blood ties and territorial loyalty.[46]
Another most important factor in Kurdish society has been religion, Islam. Alongside the tribal ties are strong religious loyalties, especially to the sheikhs, aghas, and to the local leaders of religious brotherhoods. Although the Kurds are known as a highly religious people, this characteristic is comparatively recent, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century, when two religious Muslim orders, the Qadiris and the Naqshbandis, began to spread rapidly throughout Kurdistan.[47] McDowall summarises this as:
"Following the destruction of the emirates in the middle of the century, secular power became more localised and devolved on the tribal basis. In the absence of the mediation previously provided by the emirs, there was frequent disorder and conflict between the groups or tribes. The vacuum was filled by the growing number of religious sheikhs."[48]
This situation provided the sheikhs of the two religious orders with an opportunity, which far exceeded religious guidance, allowing them to enter the political sphere. An authority and security was established in the region, with the sheikhs frequently acting as intermediaries in inter-tribal conflicts and in disputes between the tribes and the government.[49] In this way these two religious orders were able to keep peace and harmony within society. The traditional feudal lords and the religious people perceived themselves as ‘Sunni Muslim subjects of a fundamentally Islamic empire and had no interest in an unpredictable Kurdish entity in which their own status may change for the worse'.[50] Despite some problems during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire Abdulhamid's policies prevented any uprising. In these years Islam played a vital role in uniting the Turkish and Kurdish people. Also, in the Independence War[51] the Kurdish resistant movement was actually an Islamic movement and aimed to save the Ottoman Empire but not to establish a secular state. However, with the Republic the picture was completely changed. It was Islam that assumed a major role in bringing Turks and Kurds together and the Republic was radically secular. Moreover, contrary to the Ottoman Empire, the new regime aimed to homogenise the land in order to protect the unity of the country.[52] For example İnönü, Atatürk's successor, argued in 1925 that they had to make Anatolia more homogeneous in order to sustain stability and security.[53] Thus after the secularisation of the new Republic the orders lost their serving authority in the region. Consequently there was a power vacuum, which was not filled as the central government of Ankara wished it to be. Authors such as Genckaya argued that:"It is obvious that the fundamental cultural difference between the Turks and Kurds living in Turkey is linguistic. Islam has become a unifying element for both the Turks and Kurds in Anatolia after the first Turkish tribes from Central Asia migrated in the late 10th century."[54]
So, it is argued that adoption of secularism and implementation of the ethnically based Turkish nationalism after the creation of the Republic did weaken the unifying elements between the two peoples. Indeed, one of the most famous Kurdish uprisings occurred in 1925 and the figurehead of this rebellion was Sheikh Said, who explained the reason for the uprising:"I have always thought of Islam that it would be the best suited system for our government to put it into effect and practice. I would never hesitate to declare this."[55]
The rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925 certainly attracted many supporters both in and outside of the region, and made a considerable impact, which led to an Islamic uprising against the modern reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Evidence also suggests that external political interests encouraged unrest in the area, caused primarily by the potential economic wealth in the region, from the oil fields of Kerkuk and Mosol.[56] Another reason put forward for this political instability was the vested interests of the local chieftains who considered they could assume greater power in its broadest sense, through the creation of an independent state of Kurdistan.[57] Indeed, Said's uprising may have shared a feature with all the previous Kurdish rebellions throughout history in that it was not so much a struggle for national independence but rather a rebellion of the chieftains against the reactionary interests of the central government, which they considered a direct threat to their position as feudal lords.
Kinnane[58] suggests that up to the twentieth century the tribal life of the Kurdish people helped them to resist the outside influences of cultural change that would have been imposed by any central authority within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman system of rule, however, had devolved political authority to the regions within the Empire, and thus was fundamentally different from that established in Turkey after 1923 (Kemalism), whereby society was controlled centrally.[59]
Historically, the Kurdish people displayed diverse political and cultural objectives. Even the Kurdish language contains different dialects which, it has been suggested, are a result of their multi-ethnic origins. Bruinessen[60] noted that the influence of the states, which form the area known as Kurdistan, has resulted in different educational systems in the individual countries that control the area. This influence is not only confined to education. The individual Kurdish populations of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Russia have also been subjected to the influence of the mass media, as well as having distinctive political cultures, and therefore have also influenced and probably led to the creation of today's different dialects.[61]
The people who identify themselves as being Kurdish speak different languages, which are not mutually intelligible. A well-respected writer on this subject, Andrews (1989), observed that language divides the Kurdish people. Those who reside within the Turkish border differ from those residing in the other main countries by their language and religion. According to Andrews, the majority of the Kurdish-Sunni people within Turkey speak a dialect of Kurmanji. A small percentage less than 10% speak dialects known as Zaza, Sorani, or Gurani.[62] Also approximately 30 % of the Turkish Kurds, known as the Alevi, who speak Kurmanji and Turkish and a great number of them also speak Zaza.[63]
The linguistic diversity of the Kurds can be categorised within the main dialect groups as follow: Kurmanji (spoken mainly in Turkey), Zaza, (spoken in Iraq), and Gurani which is the most common dialect in Iran.[64] As a result of these linguistic differences, the Kurdish tribes have been prevented from acting as one nation and from communicating with each other in one language. That is probably one of the reasons why it is difficult to make clear statements with reference to Kurdish issues, since one is not talking about one particular and unique people, but a combination of tribes each of which has different perceptions and demands.
To summarise, after the creation of the new Republic in 1923, some Kurdish groups seemed to object to the implementation of new political ideas. At the beginning whilst under the influence of religious traditions, some Kurdish groups fought against the secularisation of the state. However, with the introduction of the multiparty system since the 1950 elections and also as the result of more pluralistic and open political styles since 1950, many Kurds took advantage of these developments and made their voices heard in the parliament in Ankara, as well as participating in different aspects of the social and political development within the country.[65] Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1970s, some Kurdish students, who had migrated to the larger cities of western Turkey, developed a different approach to Kurdish issues under the influence of communism. The political ideas of Marx at this time were seen as the way forward by these students. The political sentiments of a society founded on communism, however, were contrary to the interests of the feudal rulers or tribal leaders and traditionalists so even, amongst the people seeking insurrection, aspirations were diverse. The Marxist group held the view that the feudal rulers put their own interests before those of the people. This view was strongly supported by Marxist Kurds, some of whom later formed the PKK.[66]
The Demography of the Kurds When one considers the geography of the area known as Kurdistan, it is worth noting that since the thirteenth century and throughout the Ottoman period to the present day, the term ‘Kurdistan' has not been based on any historical political entity. That is to say, Kurdistan is a geographical term referring to a place where large numbers of Kurds are found. The Minority Rights Group drew two conclusions from this in their 1989 report on the issue. The first view was that is that no map of Kurdistan can be drawn without contention, and for this reason the demographic map they produced was not a political statement, but a statement of where large numbers of Kurds were found.[67] The report also found that although the population was not exclusively Kurdish, in this imaginary map, the dominant culture was Kurdish. After examination of these variables, McDowall defined the geography of Kurdistan as the mountainous area where Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet, an area where Kurdish settlement can be traced back for centuries. He describes this area as:"Consisting of extremely rugged mountains of the Zagros range, running in ridges north-west to south-east. In the west these mountains give way to rolling hills, thence to the Mesopotamian plain. To the north the mountains slowly turn to a steppe-like plateau and the highlands of what used to be known as Armenian Anatolia."[68]
The actual population of the Kurds has long been a subject of controversy between scholars. The overall population is estimated at between 15 and 30 millions throughout the world. This broad estimate derives from the difficulty of defining who is a Kurd. In addition, there has been no census based on ethnic root of the Kurdish population during the period of Ottoman rule or the period of the Turkish Republic. Consequently, estimates of the size of population of the Kurds have been the result of scholarly guesswork rather than based on accurate statistics. Assimilation and the political conflicts made the situation more complex. For instance in Iraq many Turkmen have been considered as Arab or Kurdish in order to show their number lower. Andrews made a comparison between the figures produced by various researchers on the Turkish Kurd population.[69] Their findings were as follows: 1,480,246 (the 1935 census in Turkey); Kinnane[70]: 2,500,000; Area Research Handbook for 1970 census: 1,500,000; Edmonds (1971): 3,200,000; Burinessen's[71]: 7,500,000 taking account of the 1975 census in Turkey; and finally Andrews[72] estimated the population of the Kurds in Turkey in 1982 as 3,800,000 people. These population figures are all estimates and do not reflect actual numbers. Some authors, such as Bruinessen[73] and Ignatif[74] argued that the official estimates of persons of Kurdish origin within the sovereign state of Turkey have always been kept small, in order to reinforce the fact that politically they are a small group. In this context, it is relevant to take into account the research of Robins[75], which is relatively highly regarded by other contemporary researchers. According to Robins, the population range extends from the official figure of 7.1 per cent of the population, to 24 per cent according to Kurdish sources. It seems reasonable to assume that the real figure in somewhere between these extremes, at 17 to 18 per cent of the population of Turkey, which was around 60 million for the 1990s. This would indicate a Kurdish population figure of between 10 and 11 million.[76] Furthermore, the situation in Turkey is different from neighbouring countries, which also have a Kurdish population within their own borders. Well over half of the Kurdish population reside within the heartland of Turkey mainly as result of industrialisation and, consequently, they have been absorbed within the general population, whereas in other countries the majority of the Kurdish population occupy their own designated areas.[77] For instance the number of Kurds in Istanbul is higher than any other city in the world, including Arbil, Solayminayah (Iraq). Interestingly, in spite of the population, the seperatist movements are significanytly weak in Istanbul than the historically Kurdish regions.Kurdish Diaspora
When exploring the Kurdish demography the Kurdish diaspora should not be ignored. Though it is a relatively new phenomenon, the Kurds who live in the West have become an important actor in the Kurdish politics. Most of the Turkish Kurds in the West consider himself/herself ‘one from Turkey' or just a ‘Turk'. As a matter most of them had gone to these countries as a ‘guest workers'. However in the 1980s the PKK tried to create a Kurdish community in Europe, which can feed the PKK activities. Thus the PKK encouraged the Kurdish tribes to immigrate the European countries and the organisation provided all the legal and financial support for the illegal Kurdish migrants. By doing this the PKK was exporting its potential supporters to the West since it understood that a Kurdish nationalism could not be created in Anatolia as the PKK wanted. Now there are strong PKK lobbies and Kurdish groups in many European capitals, including Paris, London and Berlin.[78]Arguments Behind the Kurdish Uprisings in History This section seeks to examine and understand the causes of the various Kurdish rebellions that have occurred, how the public supported them and how the authorities responded. The instigators of most of these rebellions were either religious or tribal leaders. It is worth studying incidences of insurrection during the Ottoman Empire, in order to make comparisons with the rebellions that have occurred since the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
Nineteenth century uprisings seem to have been intended to extract various concessions from central government and were not seeking the establishment of a ‘Kurdish' independent state. Initially, the rationale behind these uprisings was the need for feudal tribal rulers to maintain their own authority. To accomplish this, the tribal lords needed to gain popular support without appearing to be seeking autonomous power or independence on an ethnic basis.[79] Amongst the dozens of rebellions in the nineteenth century, the uprising of 1880 led by Sheikh Ubeydullah stand out from the others because its motives included demands for the Kurdish people on an ethnic and national basis. Bulloch and Harvey quote the relevant parts of Ubeydullah's letter to the British consul at Bashkal as follows:
"The Kurdish nation is a nation apart. Its religion is different from that of others, also its laws and custom. The chiefs of Kurdistan, whether they be Turkish or Persian subjects, and the people of Kurdistan, whether Muslim or Christian, are all united and agreed that things cannot proceed as they are with the two governments. It is imperative that the European governments should do something, once they understand the situation... We want to take matters into our own hands. We can no longer put up with the oppression."[80]
Although this letter can be considered the first clear statement of modern Kurdish nationalism, it also referred to Kurdish identity and a unification of tribes and tribal leaders in the creation of a Kurdish state. Sheikh Ubeydullah described Kurds and Kurdish culture quite differently from the picture usually given by historians, especially in relation to religious comments. Ubeydullah described Kurdish society as Muslim and Christian whereas almost all the Kurds were in fact Muslim. Since western interests were mostly concerned with the Christian minorities in these states, this kind of approach may have been designed to secure European support for Ubeydullah's struggle against the Ottomans. Indeed, their plea received an immediate response for Sheikh Ubeydullah, because the English vice-consul to the Van Province provided weapons and ammunition, which was said to have arrived under the cover of famine relief.[81] The letter also put forward a nationalistic view, which did not necessarily represent the views of the Kurdish people. It is generally accepted amongst scholars that nationalism is an essentially modern development, and it is a recent phenomenon for the Kurdish people. A British political officer, serving in Eastern Turkey immediately following the First World War, who had an interest in seeing the Kurds unite against Turkey, observed that:"As a race they are not a political entity. They are a collection of tribes without cohesion, and showing little desire for cohesion. They prefer to live in their mountain fastness and pay homage to whatever government may be in power, as long as it exercises little more then nominal authority."[82]
Another issue relates to the consequences of the rebellion and its impact on the policy of Sultan Abdulhamid II. During and after the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion, Sultan Abdulhamid II introduced a government policy incorporating the teachings of Islam which became known as ‘Pan-Islamism'. With this policy the Sultan was hoping to secure a united empire and, as a considerable majority of the population were members of the Muslim religion, he considered that by extolling the virtues of Islam throughout the empire, this would have a unifying effect. During his time in power (33 years, from 1876 to 1909) this policy proved so effective that despite the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, the nation remained unified, and from it emerged a new and strong Ottoman nationalism, united by the Muslim faith. It was this policy of unification and the case for nationalism that ultimately defeated the rebellion of Sheikh Ubeydullah, who was unable to secure sufficient Kurdish support. The policies of the Sultan were so effective in creating a nationalistic spirit, which prevailed after his death in 1909, that by the commencement of the First World War in 1914 the Ottoman Empire was able to provide a unified army, incorporating many different people from throughout the Empire, amongst them many Kurds. These were known as the Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments and gave the Sultan total support, fighting alongside other Muslims from the Ottoman Empire.[83]
The establishment of the Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments has been the subject of considerable research by historians. The establishment of these regiments began in 1891 and by 1895 the number of regiments had risen to fifty-six. This supports the view that a large spectrum of Kurdish society, including the tribal and religious leaders, supported the Sultan and enthusiastically embraced the creation of these Hamidiye Regiments.[84] This solidarity with the Sultan was not readily apparent throughout the Empire, especially in regions where the dominant religion, Islam, was not so popular. This was particularly evident in the areas now known as Greece, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Serbia, which all revolted against the rule of the Sultan during this period. There is no firm evidence that the Kurds revolted for nationalist reasons in 1880, apart from the letter of Sheikh Ubeydullah to the British Consulate of Van Province. This could mean that the sense of being Kurdish was not the primary reason for revolt. Rather the rebellion by the Kurds may have been a reaction to the imposition of taxes, by the central government, and other such measures, which the feudal and religious chiefs perceived as attacks on their authority.[85] This view is strengthened when one recognises the fact that the Kurds sided with the Turkish government during the First World War and in its aftermath.
During the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan pursued an active policy of integration. Positions of governmental responsibility were given to members of the Kurdish community whose forebears and families had been in conflict with the Empire in the 1880s. For example, Bahri Bey, whose father, Bedir Khan was the one of the rebellion chieftains, was appointed aide-de-camp to the Sultan himself.[86] The descendants of Abdurrahman Pasha Baban obtained senior posts in the administration and the university in Istanbul. Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, Ubeydullah's son, became President of the Ottoman Senate in 1908 and was later appointed as President of the Council of State. The gates of the Imperial Palace were kept wide open for the exiled Kurdish leaders. Simple clan chieftains and notables also benefited from the Imperial magnanimity, receiving honours and titles to land.[87]
The objective was obviously to incorporate respected and important Kurdish dignitaries within the Ottoman establishment, legitimising the rule of central government, thereby reducing the political power of the local tribal chiefs and religious clerics. One of the main instruments of liberal democracy which demands that all parties contribute in power sharing and the decision- making process, and that no group is a permanent loser.[88] It is very difficult to suggest that the Ottomans were aware of the liberal democracy, as we understand today, however, what could be argued is that during the last period of the Ottomans (1890 to 1914), the Kurdish issue or Eastern problem was addressed while maintaining the rule of central government. This was achieved through some of the principles of liberal democracy, rather than through the absolute power of the Sultan. This policy seemed effective by resolving the differences between the central authority and the Kurdish community of the Empire. In fact there were no major rebellions throughout the last part of the nineteenth century, and relative peace was maintained up to 1925.
Kurdish Political Ideologies During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries It was not until the political uncertainty in the early part of the twentieth century that Kurdish discontent once again became an important matter of concern. This was influenced by changes that were taking place in the central government. Monarchical rule was being challenged by young educated upper class citizens known as the Young Turks. The first Kurdish organisation emerged in the period following the Young Turks' seizure of power in 1908.[89] Those who actively took part in the establishment of this Kurdish Association were called Taali ve Terakki Kurdistan (Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan). The principal activists of this group were all working in high posts in the Ottoman administration. The most notable of these were Emir Ali Bedir Khan Bey, General Sheriff Pasha, and Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, Ubeydullah's son, who was President of the Ottoman Senate. The intellectual and ideological framework of this organisation was set out mainly by Said-i Nursi, better known as Bediuzzaman, and Ismail Hakki Babanzade.[90]
The political thought of these two leaders, and in particular that of Bediuzzaman, have been a source of inspiration to Kurds ever since. To fully appreciate the position in the nineteenth century it is necessary to understand the tensions that were responsible for the conflict against the rule of the Sultan. The existing world order at the end of the nineteenth century was changing, it was a time when political ideas internationally were being exchanged, power structures were being challenged, new nations were growing in importance and the rule of the Empire was starting to decline. This change originated in the Christian-dominated west, but the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire was not immune from these experiences.[91] The wealthy upper-classes travelled abroad extensively, particularly to France, where the political ideals of democracy were still evolving. Discussions about the national status of Turkey amongst Muslim intellectuals started during the later stages of the ninetieth century and intensified in the twentieth century.[92] The political ideology of Sultan Abdulhamid II Pan-Islamism created an environment, which fostered the theories of a nation state amongst the Christian people of the Ottoman Empire. As Piscatori puts it: ‘Ironically, the rise of Pan-Islamic sentiments helped to establish the credentials of particularised nationalism' particularly within the Christian inheritance of the Empire.[93]
Although it is accepted that nationalism within the Ottoman territories was inspired by western influences, many researchers argue that the ideas of the nation state and nationalism were interpreted differently by Muslim intellectuals. As far as the Muslim population of the Empire was concerned the nationalism was that of millet system - based on religion and common culture rather than ethnic origin - that covers all Muslim inhabitants of the state, regardless of their ethnic origin. This view generally accepted the need to create an internationally-recognised, national identity, within the Muslim religion.[94]
The Ottoman State shaped its political policy in response to the different minorities who were themselves influenced by nationalism. The Christian minority were the first to rebel in search of its independence and they were followed by Arab nationalist movements, which created a kind of ethnic phobia within the Ottoman Empire. These ethnic groups were perceived as betraying the ideals and unity of the Ottomans with the help of western countries and this fear was inherited by the new Republic of Turkey and shaped its policy in response to dissident voices.[95] This period witnessed - in terms of ethnic nationalism or nation building theories - conflicting views of western nationalism, Pan-Islamism and the Turkish nationalism of the Young-Turks.
Said-i Nursi a prominent Kurdish intellectual and a military man was involved in many political and social organisations, such as the Association for the Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan, and the Kurdish Educational Publication Society. His ideas were rooted in Pan-Islamism, particularly rejection of interventions by the outside world into the Kurdish problem, opposing the western style nationalism and also opposing interpretations of western nationalism devised by the Young Turks as a Turkish nationalism. In contrast to the notion of the nation-state in the Islamic world, or pan-Islamism, in the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries, Said-i Nursi and his contemporary, Jamel al-Din al-Afgani, proposed a different view of the subject. They argued that religious unity must be given priority ahead of political unification. Nursi's understanding of the nation and nationalism needs to be clarified. In his many writings he distinguishes a nation by religion, such as the Christian nation or the Muslim nation.[96] According to Nursi, every nation can be proud of its ethnic origin, but this pride must not become an obsession which drives aggressive behaviour. He referred particularly to the Germans as an example of what he perceives to be negative nationalism.[97] One of the most distinctive parts of his argument was that he described nationalism as existing at two levels, one ethnic, the other cultural. According to Nursi, the nature and attitudes of the people in Europe are different from those of Asia, and therefore it was wrong to copy another nation-state by interpreting their nationalism in the same way. While ethnic nationalism played a part in the unity of communities, it should only be one of the ingredients of success. When referring to the concept of cultural nationalism, he stated that religion was the most important factor. Ethnic values might help to identify a nation but it was religion that was the unifying factor, the Muslim religion being an integral part of the everyday life of the Kurdish population.[98]
It can clearly be seen in the writings of Said-i Nursi why he opposed the western-style nationalism of the Young Turks. In contrast to ethnic nationalism, he defended the Pan-Islamism policy and cultural nationalism. However, Nursi also believed in values such as public participation in the decision-making process, and he valued freedom of speech and publication, which he thought could be adopted from attitudes in the west. Nursi saw the Kurdish problem as an entirely internal matter, and believed that the solution should be found in Istanbul rather than in London, Paris or Berlin. In his opinion there was no doubt that foreign governments were using the issue for their own ends rather than to benefit the Kurds. This idea was shared by almost all the conservative and traditionalist Kurdish intellectuals up to the present time.[99]
Another important indication of the Kurdish desire to create a independent Kurdish state came after the First World War. Following the defeat in the First World War, the Treaty of Sevres signed between the Ottomans and the Allies Forces on 10 August 1920 gave some kind of autonomy to the minority groups of the Ottoman nation. It recognised the rights of ethnic minorities, at the suggestion of President Wilson of the USA. The Treaty of Sevres made a clear declaration on the Kurdish issue in section III, Articles 62-64:
It was not until the political uncertainty in the early part of the twentieth century that Kurdish discontent once again became an important matter of concern. This was influenced by changes that were taking place in the central government. Monarchical rule was being challenged by young educated upper class citizens known as the Young Turks. The first Kurdish organisation emerged in the period following the Young Turks' seizure of power in 1908.[89] Those who actively took part in the establishment of this Kurdish Association were called Taali ve Terakki Kurdistan (Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan). The principal activists of this group were all working in high posts in the Ottoman administration. The most notable of these were Emir Ali Bedir Khan Bey, General Sheriff Pasha, and Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, Ubeydullah's son, who was President of the Ottoman Senate. The intellectual and ideological framework of this organisation was set out mainly by Said-i Nursi, better known as Bediuzzaman, and Ismail Hakki Babanzade.[90]
The political thought of these two leaders, and in particular that of Bediuzzaman, have been a source of inspiration to Kurds ever since. To fully appreciate the position in the nineteenth century it is necessary to understand the tensions that were responsible for the conflict against the rule of the Sultan. The existing world order at the end of the nineteenth century was changing, it was a time when political ideas internationally were being exchanged, power structures were being challenged, new nations were growing in importance and the rule of the Empire was starting to decline. This change originated in the Christian-dominated west, but the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire was not immune from these experiences.[91] The wealthy upper-classes travelled abroad extensively, particularly to France, where the political ideals of democracy were still evolving. Discussions about the national status of Turkey amongst Muslim intellectuals started during the later stages of the ninetieth century and intensified in the twentieth century.[92] The political ideology of Sultan Abdulhamid II Pan-Islamism created an environment, which fostered the theories of a nation state amongst the Christian people of the Ottoman Empire. As Piscatori puts it: ‘Ironically, the rise of Pan-Islamic sentiments helped to establish the credentials of particularised nationalism' particularly within the Christian inheritance of the Empire.[93]
Although it is accepted that nationalism within the Ottoman territories was inspired by western influences, many researchers argue that the ideas of the nation state and nationalism were interpreted differently by Muslim intellectuals. As far as the Muslim population of the Empire was concerned the nationalism was that of millet system - based on religion and common culture rather than ethnic origin - that covers all Muslim inhabitants of the state, regardless of their ethnic origin. This view generally accepted the need to create an internationally-recognised, national identity, within the Muslim religion.[94]
The Ottoman State shaped its political policy in response to the different minorities who were themselves influenced by nationalism. The Christian minority were the first to rebel in search of its independence and they were followed by Arab nationalist movements, which created a kind of ethnic phobia within the Ottoman Empire. These ethnic groups were perceived as betraying the ideals and unity of the Ottomans with the help of western countries and this fear was inherited by the new Republic of Turkey and shaped its policy in response to dissident voices.[95] This period witnessed - in terms of ethnic nationalism or nation building theories - conflicting views of western nationalism, Pan-Islamism and the Turkish nationalism of the Young-Turks.
Said-i Nursi a prominent Kurdish intellectual and a military man was involved in many political and social organisations, such as the Association for the Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan, and the Kurdish Educational Publication Society. His ideas were rooted in Pan-Islamism, particularly rejection of interventions by the outside world into the Kurdish problem, opposing the western style nationalism and also opposing interpretations of western nationalism devised by the Young Turks as a Turkish nationalism. In contrast to the notion of the nation-state in the Islamic world, or pan-Islamism, in the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries, Said-i Nursi and his contemporary, Jamel al-Din al-Afgani, proposed a different view of the subject. They argued that religious unity must be given priority ahead of political unification. Nursi's understanding of the nation and nationalism needs to be clarified. In his many writings he distinguishes a nation by religion, such as the Christian nation or the Muslim nation.[96] According to Nursi, every nation can be proud of its ethnic origin, but this pride must not become an obsession which drives aggressive behaviour. He referred particularly to the Germans as an example of what he perceives to be negative nationalism.[97] One of the most distinctive parts of his argument was that he described nationalism as existing at two levels, one ethnic, the other cultural. According to Nursi, the nature and attitudes of the people in Europe are different from those of Asia, and therefore it was wrong to copy another nation-state by interpreting their nationalism in the same way. While ethnic nationalism played a part in the unity of communities, it should only be one of the ingredients of success. When referring to the concept of cultural nationalism, he stated that religion was the most important factor. Ethnic values might help to identify a nation but it was religion that was the unifying factor, the Muslim religion being an integral part of the everyday life of the Kurdish population.[98]
It can clearly be seen in the writings of Said-i Nursi why he opposed the western-style nationalism of the Young Turks. In contrast to ethnic nationalism, he defended the Pan-Islamism policy and cultural nationalism. However, Nursi also believed in values such as public participation in the decision-making process, and he valued freedom of speech and publication, which he thought could be adopted from attitudes in the west. Nursi saw the Kurdish problem as an entirely internal matter, and believed that the solution should be found in Istanbul rather than in London, Paris or Berlin. In his opinion there was no doubt that foreign governments were using the issue for their own ends rather than to benefit the Kurds. This idea was shared by almost all the conservative and traditionalist Kurdish intellectuals up to the present time.[99]
Another important indication of the Kurdish desire to create a independent Kurdish state came after the First World War. Following the defeat in the First World War, the Treaty of Sevres signed between the Ottomans and the Allies Forces on 10 August 1920 gave some kind of autonomy to the minority groups of the Ottoman nation. It recognised the rights of ethnic minorities, at the suggestion of President Wilson of the USA. The Treaty of Sevres made a clear declaration on the Kurdish issue in section III, Articles 62-64:
"If within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty the Kurdish people within the areas defined in Art. 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that the majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey . . . Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. ... If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurdish inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet".[100]
"If within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty the Kurdish people within the areas defined in Art. 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that the majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey . . . Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. ... If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurdish inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet".[100]
For the nationalist Kurds, the Treaty of Sevres was the closest point they ever came to achieving a Kurdish state.[101] However, leading members of the Kurds, the sheikhs, chieftains and intellectuals did not appear interested in the offer made by the Allies. Most notably one of the two figureheads of this society, Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, and Said-i Nursi, dismissed the proposal as unwanted foreign meddling into the affairs of Islamic nations. Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, the leading member of almost every Kurdish organisation and head of the Organisation for the Liberation of Kurdistan, objected to the Treaty from a different viewpoint, regarding it as a dishonourable treaty: ‘To desert the Turks in their hour of need and to deal them a fatal blow by proclaiming the independence of Kurdistan would be an unworthy and dishonourable act in consideration of the long friendship between the two nations'.[102] As a solution, it was suggested that rights be given to the Kurds within the framework of a parliamentary system, which would cement co-operation between Turks and Kurds in Anatolia.[103] This idea gained support amongst the Kurdish community, who had fought loyally with the Turkish army, and were opposed to the Treaty of Sevres, which they saw as mechanism by which the Allies would set up a new Republic against the wishes of Turkey. As a result of this approach, Qadyr, proposed an option, which granted the Kurdish people possible autonomy under the Turkish state.[104] Nursi, on the other hand, perceived the matter as not only right for the Kurds, but also good for developing harmony and co-operation between Kurds and Turks and influencing the decision-making mechanisms of the new Republic of Turkey. He also advocated the importance of education, hoping that better-educated people would be an asset when problems might eventually have to be resolved by mutual tolerance and consensus reached by compromise and negotiations.[105] For that reason, Nursi backed the creation of a university known as Medreset-uz-Zehra situated in the middle of eastern Turkey in the province of Van.[106] Intellectuals such as Nursi assumed that by improving education for the people, future generations would be better equipped to solve the country's problems without foreign involvement. After the creation of the Republic the principles of Kemalism were put into practice. Of the six main dimensions of Kemalism, the Kurds seemed to reject two of the principles. The first one was the new interpretation of nationalism, which identified the phenomenon of nationalism as being rooted in ethnic origins rather than in religious ones. The second was the secularisation principle. It is argued that, one of the unifying factors between Turks and Kurds is Islam and secularisation of the new Republic damaged this tie.[107] In addition, as noted earlier, the most significant Kurdish rebellion during the new Republican era demonstrated clear opposition to the secular nature of the Republic and also the new implementation of ethnic nationalism. Between 1925 and 1950 there were dozens of public uprisings, particularly in the Kurdish regions, which slowly transformed the public perception of nationalism and the idea of the nation state. This new ideological concept was discussed in a publication of the Turkish Clubs (Türk Ocaklari) in 1946, where cultural and religious values and feelings of historical togetherness were emphasised as being of more importance than the ethnic origin of the race. The opportunity to put into practice this theoretical approach - cultural nationalism - came about during the multi-party elections of the 1950s, when the authoritarian regime was replaced with a more liberal system.[108] More recently, Kurdish thinking seemed to develop in two distinct ways. On the one side, the traditionalists and conservatives looked for wider participation in politics. In contrast, the Kurdish left wing, which came to Turkish political life late in 1960 and developed in the 1970s, preferred a policy of confrontation with the system, and in the end, some of these groups rejected all ties with the existing system.[109] The Kurdish left owed its development mainly to socio-economic changes and, with the emergence of a secular and populist conception of the Kurds, gained some ground from the earlier aristocratic and religious groups. In contrast, another characteristic of the 1950s was the wish of the Kurdish population to participate in the Turkish National Assembly. They appeared to be enacting Nursi's desire of complete involvement and participation in all aspects of political life, from that of a school teacher to ministers of state. Barkey and Fuller summarised this era as: "Heralded by the success of the Democrat Party at the polls in 1950, the coming of multiparty politics to Turkey somewhat eased the pressure Kurds had experienced during Kemal and his successor's rule, they promised both to ease some of the ‘cultural restrictions in the east' and also reduced the more ‘secularist' policies of the state."[110]
"Heralded by the success of the Democrat Party at the polls in 1950, the coming of multiparty politics to Turkey somewhat eased the pressure Kurds had experienced during Kemal and his successor's rule, they promised both to ease some of the ‘cultural restrictions in the east' and also reduced the more ‘secularist' policies of the state."[110]
As a result of these promises, the Democrat Decade[111] was notable for the freedom of expression that allowed all, including the Kurds, to express their complaints. Another characteristic of this decade was the emergence of the commercial bourgeoisie in Turkey, including some of Kurdish descent who in later years became influential in Turkish politics. The return to democracy in 1961 with a liberal constitution and the growth of a multi-party system, allowed the development and emergence of Kurdish and Turkish alongside one another. The decades of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed growing differences between the traditionalist, conservative, business communities of the Kurds and the socialist activists.[112] Kurdish socialism initially grew as part of the broader Turkish socialist movements. However, during the 1970s, a split developed between Turkish socialism and Kurdish socialism which lead to the formation of the Partia Karkare Kurdistan, or the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK). This development was mainly a result of the Turkish left's rejection of the nationalistic tendencies of Kurdish socialists. The PKK made its first appearance in 1974, and later in the same decade turned against the traditional authority of the religious and tribal leaders and towards the Turkish revolutionary groups, adopting the practices of violence and terror.[113]
Conclusion This study has established a number of points. First, it is difficult to ascertain the origins of the Kurds. They do, however, share a similar cultural and religious heritage to that of the Turks, the only major difference being one of language. There are a considerable number of people living in Turkey who identify themselves in a multiple ethnic sense as being of Kurdish descent while having Turkish citizenship, describing themselves as both Turk and Kurd. Ethnically based nationalism in the Kurdish community appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon. It has developed only in the last thirty years, and mainly fostered by the socialist movements. The earlier uprisings were not ethnically based as has been seen in Ubeydullah and Sheikh Said cases. Some, Kurds identify themselves as purely Kurdish in an ethnic sense, although as a whole this group accounts for a relatively small percentage of the Kurdish community.
Originally the Kurds occupied the mountainous areas of eastern Turkey, western Iran and northern Iraq. However, with the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of Turkey, a majority of the Kurds living in Turkey migrated to the more industrialised parts of the country, notably Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Adana and Ankara. Consequently, Kurds living in Turkey are no longer located in one particular region, and this, with inter-racial marriages between Kurds and Turks, have weakened ethnic nationalism, whilst at the same time giving rise to divisions within Kurdish communities. Kinzer demonstrated this clearly by contrasting the attitudes of a Kurd living in Istanbul called Cemal, and a Kurd called Baran who lived in Van, a city in eastern Turkey, a thousand miles a way from Istanbul:
This study has established a number of points. First, it is difficult to ascertain the origins of the Kurds. They do, however, share a similar cultural and religious heritage to that of the Turks, the only major difference being one of language. There are a considerable number of people living in Turkey who identify themselves in a multiple ethnic sense as being of Kurdish descent while having Turkish citizenship, describing themselves as both Turk and Kurd. Ethnically based nationalism in the Kurdish community appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon. It has developed only in the last thirty years, and mainly fostered by the socialist movements. The earlier uprisings were not ethnically based as has been seen in Ubeydullah and Sheikh Said cases. Some, Kurds identify themselves as purely Kurdish in an ethnic sense, although as a whole this group accounts for a relatively small percentage of the Kurdish community.
Originally the Kurds occupied the mountainous areas of eastern Turkey, western Iran and northern Iraq. However, with the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of Turkey, a majority of the Kurds living in Turkey migrated to the more industrialised parts of the country, notably Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Adana and Ankara. Consequently, Kurds living in Turkey are no longer located in one particular region, and this, with inter-racial marriages between Kurds and Turks, have weakened ethnic nationalism, whilst at the same time giving rise to divisions within Kurdish communities. Kinzer demonstrated this clearly by contrasting the attitudes of a Kurd living in Istanbul called Cemal, and a Kurd called Baran who lived in Van, a city in eastern Turkey, a thousand miles a way from Istanbul:
"I am a Kurd, but what differences does that make?' asked Cemal as he sat behind a glass full of gold bracelets and earrings. ‘I am Turkish. I love Turkey. Never once have I had a problem because I happen to have Kurdish blood. Everyone is equal in this country."[114]
"I am a Kurd, but what differences does that make?' asked Cemal as he sat behind a glass full of gold bracelets and earrings. ‘I am Turkish. I love Turkey. Never once have I had a problem because I happen to have Kurdish blood. Everyone is equal in this country."[114]
Baran's thoughts were very different: "My identity as a Kurd is the most precious thing I have", he said.[115] These two quotations illustrate the differences between the attitudes of Kurds to their ethnic heritage. Although rebellions were instigated by the sheikhs, such as Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880 and Sheikh Said in 1925, as well as the tribal leaders, there is a strong argument that the reasons for the rebellions were rooted in economic or religious demands, or in keeping the status and interests of a particular tribe or leader, rather than seeking an unified Kurdish nationalism. It can be said that the nature of Kurdish rebellions up to the twentieth century were primarily tribal. These revolts mainly led by chieftains and sheikhs and their ultimate aims were more local power and protection of their traditional rural and tribal lifestyle against the central government. This tradition continued in the twentieth century against modernisation and secularisation policies of the new Republic. This view was shared by large number of authors, most notably by, Mumcu[116], Bruinessen[117], and Olson.[118]
The rise of nationalism in the world, at the end of the nineteenth century, and the political debate on pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and nationalism, had an effect on Kurdish attitudes towards central government, and may have been the embryo of the Kurdish national identity to some extent. Nevertheless some influential scholars rejected the western style of ethnic nationalism, having a different conception of nationalism, which they called millet, a nationalism based on civic culture and religion.
In brief, the Kurdish people did not claim an independent nation-state in western style. Yet, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the elite of the newly established Republic of Turkey aimed for a secular, western style homogenised nation-state, which inevitably dismissed the Kurdish demands. With the emergence of a multiparty system in the 1950s the Kurdish community involved themselves in political activities, and many Kurds achieved high political office during this period and participated in the decision-making processes. During these years the cultural and political integration of the Kurdish people gained some momentum. However, with the military coup of 1960, relations between the citizens and the ruling class crumbled again and this affected relations between the Kurdish people and the central government. In these years, political polarisation occurred among the Kurds as it had in Turkey in general. In the 1960s socialism became a more influential political force within Turkish politics. The socialist movement was divided into Turkish and Kurdish socialism. The Kurdish socialism exploited the differences between two societies and blamed the government for everything that went wrong. In contrast to traditional and conservative Kurds, who proposed wider participation in politics using the normal channels of democracy Kurdish socialists wanted to break ties with the existing system and opposed any involvement in Turkish politics. As a result, a more radical approach was taken by a splinter Kurdish socialist group, which led to the formation of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The socialist guerrilla movement evolved to a separatist movement and the PKK resorted to an armed struggle against the Turkish state and against other Kurdish groups who participated in political affairs.
Baran's thoughts were very different: "My identity as a Kurd is the most precious thing I have", he said.[115] These two quotations illustrate the differences between the attitudes of Kurds to their ethnic heritage. Although rebellions were instigated by the sheikhs, such as Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880 and Sheikh Said in 1925, as well as the tribal leaders, there is a strong argument that the reasons for the rebellions were rooted in economic or religious demands, or in keeping the status and interests of a particular tribe or leader, rather than seeking an unified Kurdish nationalism. It can be said that the nature of Kurdish rebellions up to the twentieth century were primarily tribal. These revolts mainly led by chieftains and sheikhs and their ultimate aims were more local power and protection of their traditional rural and tribal lifestyle against the central government. This tradition continued in the twentieth century against modernisation and secularisation policies of the new Republic. This view was shared by large number of authors, most notably by, Mumcu[116], Bruinessen[117], and Olson.[118]
The rise of nationalism in the world, at the end of the nineteenth century, and the political debate on pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and nationalism, had an effect on Kurdish attitudes towards central government, and may have been the embryo of the Kurdish national identity to some extent. Nevertheless some influential scholars rejected the western style of ethnic nationalism, having a different conception of nationalism, which they called millet, a nationalism based on civic culture and religion.
In brief, the Kurdish people did not claim an independent nation-state in western style. Yet, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the elite of the newly established Republic of Turkey aimed for a secular, western style homogenised nation-state, which inevitably dismissed the Kurdish demands. With the emergence of a multiparty system in the 1950s the Kurdish community involved themselves in political activities, and many Kurds achieved high political office during this period and participated in the decision-making processes. During these years the cultural and political integration of the Kurdish people gained some momentum. However, with the military coup of 1960, relations between the citizens and the ruling class crumbled again and this affected relations between the Kurdish people and the central government. In these years, political polarisation occurred among the Kurds as it had in Turkey in general. In the 1960s socialism became a more influential political force within Turkish politics. The socialist movement was divided into Turkish and Kurdish socialism. The Kurdish socialism exploited the differences between two societies and blamed the government for everything that went wrong. In contrast to traditional and conservative Kurds, who proposed wider participation in politics using the normal channels of democracy Kurdish socialists wanted to break ties with the existing system and opposed any involvement in Turkish politics. As a result, a more radical approach was taken by a splinter Kurdish socialist group, which led to the formation of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The socialist guerrilla movement evolved to a separatist movement and the PKK resorted to an armed struggle against the Turkish state and against other Kurdish groups who participated in political affairs.
* Sedat Laciner, Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Turkey. Ihsan Bal, Turkish national Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey.
[1] For the Eastern Question see: Mathew Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1972); John A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1917); Marian Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the End of the Otoman Empire, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984); Alan Palmer, Decline and Fall of the Otoman Empire, (London: 1992).
[2] Kendal, (1980) Kurdistan in Turkey, in G. Chailand, People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1980), p. 19.
[3] Johon and Harwey, ‘No Friends But Mountains: The Tragic History of Kurds' , Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, 1993, No. 4, p. 55. [6] D. McDowall, The Kurds: A Nation Denied, (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1992); D. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996). [7] Çay, Her....; Z. Yıldız, Kürt Gerçeği (Kurdish Reality), (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1992); P. A. Andrews (ed.), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, (Weisbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp. 152-171. [10] O. F. Gençkaya, ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics: An Overview', Islamic World Report, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1996, pp. 94-101. [11] Mehrdad R. Izady, A Concise Handbook The Kurds, (Washington and London: 1992), pp. 166-182. [12] For more examples see: Izady, A Concise...., pp. 166-182. [13] According to Seferoğlu and Türközü the word ‘star' is originally Persian and the Kurds adopted this word from the Persians. They claim most of the common and similar wors in Kurdish and English were borrowed from Persian, nd this cannot prove the similarty between Kurdisha and the European languages: Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu and Halil Kemal Türközü, 101 Soruda Türkler'in Kürt Boyu (Turks' Kurdish Branch in 101 Questions), (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1982). [14] Selahaddin Mihotuli, Arya Uygarlıklarından Kürtlere (From the Aria Civilastions to the Kurds), (Istanbul: Koray Yayınları, 1992); Ekrem Cemil Paşa, Kürdistan Kısa Tarihi (The Short History of Kurdistan), (Istanbul: Doz, 1998); Tori, Kürtlerin İlkçağ Tarihi ve Kültürü (Ancient History of the Kurds), (Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, 1997), pp. 185-189. Also see Sedat Laciner, ‘MED-TV'nin Etki ve İslevleri' (MED-TV's Impacts and Functions), Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 3, No: 27, July 2002, p. 120; Sedat Laciner, ‘Bolucu Televizyon Yayinciligi ve Uluslararasi Baglantilari: MED-TV Ornek Olayi: 1994-1999' (The Separatist Television Broadcasting and Its International Connections: MED-TV Case-Study: 1994-1999), Avrasya Dosyasi, Vol. 8, Summer 2002, No. 2, pp. 329-371; Sedat Laciner, ‘Ayrilikci Televizyon Yayinciliginda Dis Destek ve Nedenleri' (The Foreign Support in Separatist Broadcasting and Its Reasons), Avrasya Dosyasi, Vol. 8, Winter 2002, No: 4, pp. 227-252. [15] Paşa, Kürdistan..., p. 17. [18] A. Aydın, Kürtler, PKK ve Abdullah Öcalan (Kurds, PKK and Abdullah Ocalan), (Ankara: 1992). [19] B. Kodaman, Sultan II. Abdülhamit'in Doğu Anadolu Politikası (The Eastern Policy of the Sultan Abdulhamid II), (Ankara: Ankara University Printinghouse, 1987). [20] Also see: Seferoğlu and Türközü, 101 Soruda...; Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu, Anadolu'nun İlk Türk Sakinleri: Kürtler (The First Turkish Inhabitants of Anatolia: The Kurds), (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1982); [22] A.M. Çay, Her Yönüyle Kürt Dosyası, ( The Kurdish File from Every Aspects), (Istanbul: Boğaziçi, 1993), pp. 53-59. [23] Çay, Her..., pp. 64-95. [24] Aydın, Kürtler..., p. 27. [26] Yıldız, Kürt..., pp. 27-29. [27] Yıldız, Kürt..., pp. 27-32. [28] The original tezt is as follow: "Men Kürt-el-kan Alp-Urungu Altunluğ Keşiğim Bantım Belde, Elim Tokuz Kırk Yaşım". Ali Tayyar Önder, Türkiye'nin Etnik Yapısı, Halkımızın Kökenleri ve Gerçekler (Turkey's Ethnic Structure, Our People's Roots and the Truth), (Ankara: Zirve Ofset, 1999), p. 97. [29] For more examples and details see Önder, Türkiye'nin..., p. 91; M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, Kürtlerin Türklüğü (Kurds' Turkishness), (Istanbul: Hamle, 1995), pp. 86-98; Seferoğlu and Türközü, 100 Soruda..., pp. 23-24. [30] Önder, Türkiye'nin..., p. 98; Seferoğlu and Türközü, 101 Soruda..., pp. 10-11. [31] Winrow and Kirişçi, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, (London: Portland Frank Cass, 1997). [32] J. Bulloch and M. Harvey, No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 52. [33] Bulloch and Harvey, No Friends..., p. 58. [34] S. Mutlu, ‘The Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces', New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 12, Spring 1995. [35] Winrow and Kirisci, The Kurdish.... [36] Winrow and Kirisci, The Kurdish...., p. 121. [37] Winrow and Kirisci, The Kurdish...., p. 121. [38] D. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); D. McDowall, The Kurds, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1996). [39] H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller, ‘Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities', Middle East Journal, 51, Winter 1997, pp. 57-79. [40] For this period see: Ihsan Bal and Sedat Laciner, ‘The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democrcay, 1960-80', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 90-115. [41] V. B. M. Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh, and State, (London: Zed Books, 1992); V. B. M. Bruinessen, Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems, in Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Sperl, Stefan (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992). [42] L. Yalcin-Heckmann, ‘Kurdish Tribal Organisation and Local Political Processes', in Finkel, A. and Sirman, N. (eds.), Turkish State, Turkish Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1990). [43] Winrow and Kirisci, The Kurdish...; Kodaman, Sultan II..... [44] The Encyclopedia Americana, (New York, 1952), Vol. XVI, p. 558. [45] D. McDowall, The Kurds, (London: MRG, 1989), p. 8. [46] McDowall, The Kurds. [47] Kodaman, Sultan II...., pp. 67-75. [48] D. McDowall, ‘The Kurdish Question: A History of Review', in Kreyenbroek and Sperl (ed.), (1992) The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 15. [49] Bruinessen, Agha...; Yalcin-Heckmann, ‘Kurdish...'. [50] McDowall, ‘The Kurdish...', p. 17. [51] For the Turkish Independence War see: Ali Kazancigil and ergun Ozbudun (eds.), Ataturk, the Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst&Company, 1997); Laciner, Ideological..., pp. 50-74; Serafettin Turan, Turk Devrim Tarihi (History of Turkish Revolution), 2th Book, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1992); Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement, (London: SAGE, 1975). [52] For the details see Laciner, Ideological..., Chapter II and III. [53] Bilal Şimşir, İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de ‘Kürt Sorunu', 1924-1938 (The ‘Kurdish Problem' in Turkey in British Documents, 1924-1938), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 58. [54] O. F. Gençkaya, ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics: An Overview', Islamic World Report, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1996, pp. 94-101, p. 94. [55] Sheikh Said, cited in Uğur Mumcu, Kürt - İslam Ayaklanması (Kurdish - Islamic Uprising), (İstanbul: Tekin, 1992), p. 124. [56] Sedat Laçiner, The Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD thesis, King's College, University of London, 2000. Also see: Yaşar Kalafat, Bir Ayaklanmanın Anatomisi, Şeyh Sait (An Anatomy of an Uprising), (Ankara: Asam, 2003); Kemal Melek, ‘Türk İngiliz İlişkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri (The Musul Oil in Turkish - British Relations, 1890-1926) in Toktamış Ateş and others, Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar (The Problems in Turkish Foreign Policy), (İstanbul: Der yayınları, 1989), pp. 38-39. [57] Mumcu, Kürt...; Kodaman, Sultan II.... [58] D. Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan, (Oxford: University Press, 1964). [59] Kinnane, The Kurds... [60] Bruinessen, Agha.... [61] Bruinessen, Agha..., p. 35. [62] P. A. Andrews (ed.), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp. 152-175. [63] Andrews, Ethnic..., p. 162. [64] Bruinessen, Agha..., p. 35. Also about the Kurdish language and the diversity see: The Encylopedia of Islam, Vol. 2, pp. 189-194; Seyfi Cengiz, Dış Kaynaklarda Kırmanclar, Kızılbaşlar ve Zazalar (The Kırmachs, Kızılbashs and Zazas in the Foreign Sources), (London: Desmala Sure Press, 1995); C. J. Edmonds, ‘Some Developments in the Use of Latin Characters for the Writing of Kurdish', Journal of the Royal Asiastic Society, (London: 1933); D. N. MacKenzie, ‘The Origins of Kurdish', Transactions of the Philological Society, (London: 1961); J. G. Taylor, ‘Journal of a Tour in Armenia, Kurdistan and Upper Mesopotamia with Notes of Research in Deyrsim Dagh', Journal of the RoyalGeographical Society, Vol. 38, 1866, pp. 281-361; Basile Nikitine, ‘Kurdish Stories from My Collection', Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies, IV, 1926-1928; V. Minorsky, ‘The Guran', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XI, 1943-1946; ‘Zazaca, Kurmançca (Kürtçe) ve Farsça Arasındaki Farklar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (An Evaluation on the Differences between Persian, Zaza, Kurmanch -Kurdish- Languages), Asmeno Bewayir, No. 13, May 1998; Michael Chyet, Standardizing the Modern Journalistic Language in Kurdish, paper presented in MESA, 1996; Seyfi Cengiz, Dersim ve Dersimli (Dersim and People from Dersim), (London: Desmale Sure Yayınları, 1995). [65] Barkey and Fuller 1997, Turkey's...,; Fact Book on Turkey: Kurds and PKK Terrorism, (Ankara: 1996, TDF); Fact Book on Turkey: Kurds and PKK Terrorism - II, (Ankara: 1997, TDF). [66] Fact Book on Turkey: Kurds and PKK Terrorism, (Ankara: 1996, TDF); S. Dilmaç, Terrörizm Sorunu ve Türkiye (The Problem of Terrorism and Turkey), (Ankara: EGM, 1997). [67] D. McDowall, The Kurds, (London: MRG, 1989). [68] McDowall, The Kurds, p. 5. [70] Kinnane, The Kurds.... [71] V. B. M. Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems', in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992). [73] Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish...'. [74] Michael Ignatieef, Blood & Blonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, (Toronto: Viking, 1993). [75] P. Robins, ‘The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and Kurdish Issue', International Affairs, 69, October 1993, pp. 657-632. [76] Robins, ‘The Overlord...', p. 661. [77] Robins, ‘The Overlord...', p. 661. For instance İstanbul has become the biggest ‘Kurdish city' in the world after the influx from the Eastern part of Turkey. It must be noted that the city has no ethnic or separatist problem. [78] Laciner, ‘MED-TV'nin...', pp. 119-123. [79] Kendal, ‘Kurdistan in Turkey', içinde G. Chailand, People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, (London: Zed Press, 1980), p. 25. [80] Bulloch and Harvey, No Friends..., p. 75. [81] Kendal, ‘Kurdistan...', p. 31. [82] Hay in P. G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl (ed.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 50. [83] Bulloch and Harvey, No Friends..., p. 223. [84] Kodoman, Sultan II...., pp. 34-50. [85] S. A. Arvasi, Doğu Anadolu Gerçeği (The Eastern Anatolia Reality), (Ankara: Özge, 1986). [86] H. Bozarslan, ‘Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Turkey', in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 95-114. [87] O. Aytepe, ‘Yeni Belgeler Işığında, Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti', Tarih ve Toplum, June 1998, 174, pp. 13-15. [88] Bal, Prevention of...., Chapter One. [89] Kendal, ‘Kurdistan...'. [90] Aytepe, ‘Yeni...', pp. 9-15. [91] For the details see Bal, Prevention..., Chapter III. [92] J. P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-State, (Cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1991). [93] Piscatori, Islam..., p. 77. [94] Piscatori, Islam..., p. 76. [95] Laçiner, Evolution of... [96] Said Nursi, Mektubat (The Letters), (Ankara: Sözler Yayınevi, 1978), p. 330. [97] Nursi, Mektubat, p. 331. [98] Nursi, Mektubat, pp. 330-335. [100] I. C. Vanly, ‘The Kurds in Syria and Iraq', in Kreyenbrook and Sperl, The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 144. [101] Kendal, ‘Kurdistan...', pp. 40-41. [102] Kendal, ‘Kurdistan...', p. 40. [103] McDowall, The Kurds..., pp. 16-18. [104] Aytepe, ‘Yeni...', pp. 9-16. [105] A. Salih, Kürt Tarihi, Kürtler ve Demokrasi (The Kurdish History, Kurds and Democracy), (Istanbul: 1993). [106] Said Nursi, Sözler (Speeches), (Ankara: Sözler Yayınevi, 1987), pp. 195-197. [107] O. F. Gençkaya, ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics', in Wiberg and Bussittil Kalleja (ed.), Research for Peace in the Mediterranean Region, (Malta: Mireva Publication, 1994). [108] K. H. Karpat, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977). [109] Aytepe, ‘Yeni...', pp. 9-16. [110] Barkey and Fuller, Turkey's...., p. 18. [111] For the details of the DP era also see: Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve Ideolojisi (The DP, History and Ideology), (Ankara: SBF, 1970); Huseyin Bagci, Demokrat Parti Donemi Dis Politikasi (Foreign Policy of the DP Period), (Ankara: Imge, 1990); Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiement in Democracy, 1950-1975, (London: C. Hurst, 1977). [112] I. P. Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992). [113] I. G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992), (Istanbul: Turkish daily News Publication, 1992). [114] S. Kinzer, ‘Kurds Fashion, Two Identities in a Fearful Turkey', New York Times, 27 July 1997. [115] Kinzer, ‘Kurds...'. [116] Uğur Mumcu, Kürt - İslam Ayaklanması (The Rebellion of Kurdish Muslims), (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992). [117] V. B. M. Bruinessen, ‘Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: The Worker's Party of Kurdistan', Middle East Report, July-August 1988. [118] R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); R. Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and Middle East, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
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