People have been emigrating from the area that is now Lebanon for well over a century. It is currently estimated that there are between 11 and 13 million people from Lebanon or of Lebanese descent in the worldwide Lebanese diaspora. Such numbers easily surpass the small number of Lebanese that actually live in Lebanon today – around 3.7 million.

With such a large population of Lebanese living outside of their home country, one would anticipate that finding evidence of a cohesive Lebanese identity or Lebanese diaspora would be relatively easy. However, this has certainly not been the case. The Lebanese are often a fractured and splintered people harboring many different ideals of a Lebanese imagined community as well as various views of the future and past of the state of Lebanon and its people.

The evolving nature of a Lebanese identity, as well as the fractured nature of the Lebanese people (both in the diaspora and in the home country), makes it very difficult to discuss the Lebanese diaspora in unified or universal terms. In addition, the different experience of Lebanese in diverse countries, as well as the differing experiences of those of various religious sects adds to the intangible nature of the Lebanese diaspora.

The Lebanese, having first begun emigrating around 130 years ago, are not the pure, traditional version of a diaspora. They assuredly do not meet all of the various requirements that William Safran claims to be the test of a true diaspora. While the Lebanese are dispersed from an “original center,” maintain a memory or myth of their original homeland, are in many cases committed to an ideal for their homeland (however, this agenda varies tremendously among differing sects), and are finally identified in relation to their homeland (Saffran, 1991), they often lack various other qualities that are necessary to fit Safran’s traditional definition at different points in the diaspora’s history. At different points in the diaspora’s history certain Lebanese groups may or may not wish to return to the homeland or certain groups may or may not have been accepted by their host countries. Therefore, when speaking of the Lebanese diaspora, one cannot define it statically. Some communities or groups within the diaspora may meet some of the requirements at one time and others at another time.

While defining a diaspora in certain concrete or static terms may offer more problems than it does clarity or resolution, there yet exists an idea of the term “diaspora” in public and academic discourse. Our class has chosen to define it as “a transnational ‘imagined community’ of dispersed people who consider themselves to share a common bond or identity despite historical movement and the resulting differences among them.” Therefore, how do the Lebanese qualify as a diaspora, despite lacking some of Safran’s qualities at different periods of their story?

In the definition above, a diaspora is a group of people who “imagine” themselves to be a certain way, therefore the Lebanese of the diaspora have created for themselves, an “imagined community,” (Anderson, 1983) as being a vision of their community that the group possesses – a widely accepted ideal or myth. The idea of an original homeland and culture is central to the Lebanese imagined community or identity, and it is this central identity that allows the Lebanese to be bound together as a worldwide diaspora. Despite sectarian or family/clan alliances that represent the primary part of an individual’s identity, there is yet that sense of an original homeland and culture that brings together two strangers for a brief interlude in a St. Paul or Sao Paulo grocery store. There exists an underlying recognition of shared homeland, food, music, etc that binds the Lebanese throughout the world at a very distinct, however vulnerable level.

Therefore, for many in the diaspora, the idea of being Lebanese, at least at a universal level (encompassing all the various sects), is largely bound to the nation-state ideal (a geographical place of origin). Despite the tensions and conflicts that have surrounded the drawing of Lebanon’s borders and the sectarian clashes that this has produced, people yet recognize that those who live within those borders are, in fact, Lebanese. Whether Muslim, Christian, or Druze, there still exists a basic recognition of a national and shared identity among the people.

However, a rather large disclaimer must be introduced. Despite this universal recognition of what constitutes a “Lebanese,” people of differing sectarian orientations have wished for different visions of a Lebanese people and a Lebanese state. Therefore, while the nation-state ideal allows one to talk about the Lebanese diaspora in broad or universal terms, the Lebanese (both in Lebanon and in the diaspora) have organized themselves predominantly on community/village and sectarian levels.

Thus, it is true that a shared Lebanese national identity is neither the central, nor the traditional means of identification for most Lebanese. In fact, the identity of many Lebanese in the homeland and in host countries has experienced an evolution of sorts in the last hundred-plus years. A unified Lebanese identity has always been secondary to the identification produced by family, village, and sect. However, I will argue that sectarian versus national Lebanese tendencies for identification have risen and fallen with the political movements and rhythms of the home country (generally transported to the diaspora communities via village internationalization, communication, and new immigrants). Also, while identification is often produced from homeland sentiments, it is shaped and refined by the group’s context within the host country. Therefore, the essential question is how has a Lebanese national versus parochial identity evolved throughout recent history and how has that been transported to and reinforced in the diaspora communities?

Back

B. Lebanese Identity?

The term “libanization” or “lebanonization” came into vogue during the final stages of the Lebanese civil war (Harris, 1997, p. 1). This word, many scholars speculated, would soon replace the term balkanization for epitomizing a fractured and disintegrated state and its people, but with a resurgence of Balkan tensions the term libanization was soon discarded in public discourse.

Although libanization did not take hold as a universal term, its idea does suggest the extent to which Lebanon and its people are fractured. However, although scholars can certainly point to the splintered nature of the Lebanese people today following the long and bloody civil war, what of the Lebanese identity a century ago, even before the current state of Lebanon came into existence?

It is quite certain today that the Lebanese in the diaspora harbor tensions and prejudices amongst each other, but did those individuals emigrating fifty or a hundred years ago harbor some of these same tensions at the expense of a unified Lebanese identity? And if so, have these tensions shaped the way in which the Lebanese diaspora imagines itself and the state of Lebanon?

I would argue that many of the tensions that exist today in Lebanon and within the Lebanese diaspora, denying the existence of a cohesive Lebanese identity, also existed a century ago, although assuredly not with the same intensity or politicization. After all, the civil war was not the cause of today’s tensions, but is instead a culmination of the sectarian tensions (and interconnected class tensions) that had existed for decades and even centuries before.

Although I will argue that a certain degree of tension existed among the Lebanese for quite some time, it is yet very evident that these sentiments have undergone an evolution or transformation in the last century. These sentiments have allowed for a vulnerable Lebanese identity to take root in the home country as well as in the diaspora communities. This identity is based on a loose and intangible pride of the homeland that is a result of Lebanon’s independence, prosperity, and Arab ancestry.

For a short time following independence and preceding the civil war, the Lebanese people were able to harbor some form of a cohesive Lebanese and Arab secular national identity. However, this Lebanese identity was yet subordinate to sectarian, village, and family identities. This hierarchy of identity was generally transferred and reinforced by emigrating Lebanese to the diaspora communities in the host countries.

To the extent that a Lebanese identity did exist for Lebanese in Lebanon as well as in the diaspora, this Lebanese national identity meant different things to different people during distinct periods in Lebanon’s history. For many Christians in the period prior to independence, a Lebanese national identity was a product of Lebanese Christian nationalism (mostly Maronite based) and, therefore, they felt that Lebanon should exist as a primarily Christian state in the vast Middle Eastern sea of Islam. For many Muslims, Lebanon as a Christian state was an aberration. Even if many believed that Lebanon should be a separate entity from Syria, Muslims (and some Christians involved in the early Arab movement) generally wished for an Arab state. In addition, there has been a push by some Muslims recently for Lebanon to exist as an Islamic state, a threat to many Christians.

The Lebanese were perhaps able to form a fragile Lebanese national identity during the years surrounding the Arab-Israeli war. The decades following Lebanese independence through the early years of the civil war saw the acceptance of an Arab-Lebanese identity that was secular in orientation and was able to unite the Lebanese in the diaspora through various Arab secular and cultural organizations. These organizations were generally non-political (at least as far as home country politics were concerned), and generally concerned with the integration and success of Lebanese and other Arabs in the host countries. The situation of most Lebanese in the host countries (which was generally Christian, successful, and well-accepted) also allowed for the acceptance of a unified Lebanese identity (to an extent).

However, the long-standing conflicting ideologies of Christian and Arab nationalism (and the religious Islamic trends of today) as well as the identity issues they represent for the Lebanese people have currently been resurrected in the Lebanese diaspora. Lebanese identity during the civil war discarded most aspects of a unified Lebanese nationalism in favor of stronger sectarian and family ties in Lebanon and the diaspora.

However, since the civil war, the Lebanese identity and imagined community has been more difficult to pinpoint. There does appear to be a trend among Lebanese Christians to discard some of their intra-sectarian conflicts in favor of a broader Middle East Christian identity (assuming this is non-political in nature). In addition, among Lebanese Muslims, the role of Islam is becoming more predominant as those in the diaspora gravitate toward other Muslims of Middle Eastern descent. This does not seem all that unnatural or intriguing in light of the Lebanese peoples’ history of evolving identity. However, it becomes interesting when understood in the context of other current trends.

Since the war, the foreign occupation of Lebanon has been an explosive topic in Lebanese discourse. Occupied by both Israel and Syria at the end of the war, Lebanese from all sects and orientations were intent on becoming free from occupation (which would seem to be an indication that Lebanese nationalism still exists on some level). With only Syria left occupying the country today, it is not surprising that Christians are upset by this. After all, their ideal of a Christian state has been overridden by an Islamic states’ occupation.

However, most Muslims are also upset by the occupation. Therefore, the issue of Syrian occupation has the opportunity to become a unifying factor, bringing many sects under the unifying Lebanese national identity once again (to an extent of course). However, is this the case? Although it would appear to be a unifying force due to the number of websites and organizations that are dedicated to this topic, to a large extent it is only the leaders that have been able to come together. The issue has not yet reinstated the umbrella of a Lebanese national identity among the general population of differing sects.

Back

C. Argument

Having briefly identified some of the issues regarding a cohesive Lebanese identity or imagined community in the diaspora, I will argue that the Lebanese identity has been constantly evolving over the last century. This evolution has largely stemmed from issues and conflicts arising in the homeland. Therefore, while homeland politics have produced the identity of the diaspora, it is the situation of the different Lebanese groups in the context of different host countries that has shaped and refined their imagined communities.

Therefore, it is necessary to detail in the following pages the history of Lebanon’s national development as it relates to identity in the home country and in the diaspora. Also, a discussion of Lebanese groups in the context of their host countries is essential, including host country politics and sentiments, as well as the cultural and financial capital possessed by the diaspora communities.

To allow for simplification, I will divide the paper into three different sections that relate to different phases of homeland developments and emigration. In each section, I will identify homeland developments as they relate to Lebanese identity as well as detail the factors affecting emigration, including macro, meso, and micro factors (Castles and Miller, 1998). Macro factors affecting emigration include the world political economy, inter-state relations, policies of nation states, etc. Meso factors include the migration industry (middlemen). Finally, Micro factors affecting emigration include social networks, as well as cultural and financial capital. Also, each section will involve a discussion of Lebanese communities and situations in different host countries, including how the identity(s) and orientations of the homeland have been transferred to the diaspora and how host country dynamics have shaped these identities. This will include a discussion of how cultural (education, job and language skills, similar culture or religion) and financial (wealth) capital has affected these dynamics.

When focusing on places of immigration and conditions within the host countries, particular attention will be given to the situations of the Lebanese diaspora in the United States and Brazil (as one grouping, modeling a laissez faire immigration approach) as well as Australia and Canada (another group, modeling a current multicultural immigration approach). When looking at the Lebanese diaspora in these countries, the one constant will be the situation in the United States. Due to logistical circumstances, I will discuss both Brazil and the United States in the first period, both Canada (and the United States in the second period, and both Australia and the United States in the last period.

The first period I will discuss will include the time before and through Lebanese independence in 1943. This will involve the rise of Christian nationalism in its pursuit of a Christian Lebanese state as well as the development of an Arab nationalism in the early 20^th century that greatly impacted the identity of the Lebanese in Lebanon as well as those in the diaspora. Christians identified together (especially the Maronites) in order to push through their vision of a Christina state in the Middle East. At the same time, many Muslims in Lebanon came together to resist the idea of a Christian state. The Arab nationalist movement presented Muslims with the alternative of an Arab state.

Secondly, I will discuss the period from independence to the Lebanese civil war, which saw Beirut and the rest of Lebanon prosper economically and culturally. This time period saw the development of a sense of Arab pride in the state of Lebanon. However, at the same time, the internal demographic shifts that Lebanon began to experience in the decades preceding the civil war would mark the beginning of the end of any fragile sense of Lebanese identity that was fostered from the prosperity experienced by Beirut and its Arab secular orientation. During this time in the diaspora one can see evidence of more Lebanese-Arab cultural associations and organizations that were supported by all Lebanese, regardless of sectarian identity.

Finally, the third phase of history in Lebanon’s national development encompasses the war years through the present time. This period witnesses the disintegration of any delicate Lebanese identity that was fostered in the decades prior to the war. The renewed sense of tension among differing religious sects cultivated by the war found its way to the diaspora communities around the world.

Christians began to feel a renewed sense of threat to their status as premiers of a Christian state. As Christian numbers in Lebanon began to dwindle, and they began to feel the threat and isolation of losing their position in Lebanon, the evolution of Lebanese identity began to enter its latest stage. Christians, fearful of losing their numbers and superiority, began to find a sense of solidarity with other Christians of Middle Eastern descent. Perhaps more importantly, however, the social attitudes of the host countries created (for the Christians) a need to differentiate themselves from Muslims. Muslims, hopeful of finally realizing their dream of Lebanon as an Arab state (or even an Islamic state for some) and feeling tension toward the Lebanese Christians after the war, began to seek friendships and identification with other Muslim-Arabs from differing Middle Eastern countries. In addition, during this period, Islam began to gain prominence in the lives of many Muslims, forcing them to defend and identify with their religion in the face of western discrimination.

Back

II. Pre - Lebanese Independence

A. In the Homeland

As will become apparent, the driving force behind the establishment of the modern state of Lebanon was the ideological orientation of the Maronites of Lebanon. It was their Christian nationalistic orientation and western connections that caused the boundaries of the current state of Lebanon to be carved out of greater Syria following World War I. When Lebanon received its independence from the French in 1943, the Christian nationalistic orientation also played a very large role in the construction of a national government. Therefore, from the late 1800s through the period of independence, the idea of Lebanon as a Christian state was the driving force of a Lebanese identity and imagined community. In the diaspora as well, a sense of being “Lebanese” or “Syrian-Lebanese” was a largely Christian phenomenon, due largely to the fact that most emigrants during this time were Christian.

Although the area of Mt. Lebanon did not become officially autonomous until the late 1800s, a sense of that autonomy and separate identity came into existence centuries before. In 1620, the Druze feudal chief, Fakhir, al-Din, established a semi-autonomous area under Ottoman rule. Therefore, Lebanon as a distinct entity has existed for quite some time, predating European intervention (Harris, 1997, p. 61).

During Ottoman times, the area of Mt. Lebanon served as a haven for non-Muslims in what was becoming a sea of Islam. From this time, Lebanon existed as an idea of more central importance to the Druze (religious group in Lebanon, very solitary by nature) and Christians of the region (Harris, 1997, p. 62). The sense of precariousness that resulted from being non-Muslim minorities in the region would create (for Maronites especially) the drive to realize a Christian state and area of power in this threatened atmosphere. This sense of instability would largely contribute to the drive of the Christian nationalist movement of the early to mid 1900s.

Although the Druze of Mt. Lebanon had demographic and military superiority for centuries, the Christians (especially Maronites), began gaining demographic prominence leading up to independence. Despite growing Christian numbers, the Druze yet maintained more feudal and military superiority over the Christians.

In fact, there was a great amount of fighting between the Christians and the Druze of the area. Clark Knowlton writes about how these massacres and western penetration into the area fueled future emigration (1992). It was the large massacres of Christians in the time period between 1840 and 1860 that invited greater western attention and sympathy towards Mt. Lebanon’s Christians. Ibrahim Pasha had invaded the area in 1831, halting much of the bloodshed. However, when he left in 1841, massacres of Christians by Druze began anew (Knowlton, 1992, p. 268).

Western missionaries had been coming to Mt. Lebanon since 1829. After the massacres of Christians by Druze in the mid-1800s, the missionaries began writing back to Europe and the United States, detailing what they perceived to be the horrible plight of Mt. Lebanon’s Christians at the hands of both the Druze and Muslims. When hearing of this, western press began visiting the area to write stories of the massacres that would appear in the western newspapers. These stories generated a large amount of sympathy in the west (Knowlton, 1992, p. 286-287).

After reading the stories of the Levant, many westerners became interested in visiting the area. Mt. Lebanon’s Christians catered to the needs of the western visitors and began developing economic and social connections with Europe and the United States (Knowlton, 1992, p. 287). The Maronites already had a loose connection to Rome because of their religion, but these new economic ties led to some of the first waves of emigration from Mt. Lebanon in the late 1800s.

In addition to the western attention that the missionaries had brought to Mt. Lebanon and its Christians, these missionaries also brought with them western education, establishing a network of schools that greatly benefited the Christian population of Mt. Lebanon. Although the Christians of the area were largely peasants, the western education they received from the missionaries allowed them to evolve into the intellectual and also economic elite of Lebanon in the 1900s (Knowlton, 1992, p.286). It should also be noted that the Sunni Muslims of Mt. Lebanon also benefited from the western education and used it to gain an economic and intellectual hold in Lebanon during the 1900s as well.

With western intervention in the Mt. Lebanon area (especially French) in the 1860s, came the establishment of the mutasarrifiyya or the “Little Lebanon.” The European powers insisted on Mt. Lebanon becoming an internationally recognized semi-autonomous area after witnessing the massacres of the Christians of the area. The Ottomans had recognized that it would be best for its rule to be accepted by the Maronites of the area. If not, the Maronites could cause problems for the Ottomans with western countries (Harris, 1997, p. 36).

Although the Christians now had their semi-autonomous area of the mutasarrifiyya, many Christian leaders recognized a problem. Many Christians were emigrating from the area due to economic problems and the connections they had made with western nations (Knowlton, 1992, p.287). The mutasarrifiyya was, in fact, geopolitically unstable. Due to the way in which the boundaries were drawn, Little Lebanon did not include Beirut (the economic center of the region) or the Biqa’ Valley (a large agricultural area) (Harris, 1997, p. 37). Therefore, the mutasarrifiyya was not able to economically sustain itself. After a large period of starvation during World War I, this became even more evident for Christian leaders.

During the years of the mutasarrifiyya, there began to be contrasting ideas about the fate of Lebanon. Some people felt that Lebanon should exist as a distinct and separate entity from other Arab and Muslim countries while others felt that Lebanon should stay a part of greater Syrian. So began the rise of Lebanon’s Christian nationalist movement in the face of Arab nationalist aspirations of a single Arab Syrian state.

“It is the Maronite fears and ambitions that supplied the connecting thread

in the historical progress from Mt. Lebanon as a de facto autonomy through

Little Lebanon to Greater Lebanon.”

-Harris (1997, pp. 62)

With the fall of the Ottomans after World War I, the Maronites of Mt. Lebanon would have a chance to make their move for a Christian state. After World War I, the French attained a League of Nations mandate for the area to guide it towards independence. The Maronites were able to distinctly influence the French unlike the other sects of the area due to various factors.

Firstly, they had economic and cultural links to the west through Beirut and with the tourism industry. In addition, there had already been large numbers of Christians (especially Maronites) emigrating to Europe and the Middle East since the late 1800s. These people were able to establish themselves and gain the direct ear of the French. Finally, they had a distinct cultural interchange with the French due to their religion and the educational opportunities that western missionaries had afforded them. In fact, the Maronite Patriarch discussed the idea of Greater Lebanon with French officials in 1918 and 1919 (Harris, 1997, p. 39).

Having been influenced by the suggestions and aspirations of the Lebanese Maronites, the French supported the idea of expanding the geographic area of Little Lebanon to make it an economically viable state in the future. Therefore, in 1920, the French established Greater Lebanon, carving it out of greater Syria.

Greater Lebanon, its borders having been expanded, now included Beirut, Tripoli, the Litani River and the agricultural Biqa’ Valley. With the incorporation of these areas, Lebanon was able to successfully sustain itself economically (Harris, 1997, p. 42). In the next few decades, Lebanon would come to be known as the Paris of the Middle East, and Beirut became the banking and the financial center of the larger Levant area.

The expansion of Lebanon and its Maronite driving force had been a large goal of the Christian nationalist movement at the time. By successfully achieving their goal of an enlarged Lebanon, the Christians of the area began to establish their preeminence in the state that would last up to the civil war. Their drive to create the enlarged area of Lebanon contributed greatly to the sense of Lebanese identification as being Christian. The Lebanese imagined community at this time was largely a Christian entity and creation. The Lebanese in the diaspora, mostly Christian at this time (over 90%) (Truzzi, 1997, p. 6), were also aware of this sense of the Lebanese as a Christian imagined community.

However, although Christian preeminence and the Christian Lebanese imagined community would thrive for the next few decades, the redrawing of Lebanon’s borders created demographic changes in the area as well as dissention among different groups within the redrawn borders.

When Lebanon consisted of the mutasarrifiyya, the Christian population was over 75%. However, after the borders were redrawn, the Christian population totaled only slightly over half, at 51% (Harris, 1997, p. 81). With the expansion of the area, also came the incorporation of areas that were largely Muslim (especially Shi’i). There had been debate within the Christian nationalist leadership about the consequences of this move. However, the chance for economic and financial sustenance was the fundamental objective and surpassed the worry about demographic problems.

During this period, the rise of Christian nationalism, as I mentioned before, was largely due to a feeling of threat and sense of insecurity in a largely Muslim area. Even today, many Christians ask themselves, “Why can’t they (Muslims) just leave us this tiny country for us Christians?”

However, at the same time that Christian nationalism was reaching many of its goals, there existed great unrest in the Muslim and Arab nationalist ranks. Many Muslims were afraid of French interference as well as being ruled by Christians. However, the French and Christians were able to quiet many Muslims’ (especially Sunni) fears by supporting a pluralist arrangement in the political system. Therefore, the Sunni leadership soon realized that it had a voice in Lebanon’s affairs (Harris, 1997, p. 41). In addition, many Sunnis would benefit from the economic prosperity of Lebanon, creating a sense of acquiescence. While the Sunnis integrated into the system, the Shi’is, although poor, felt that there was hope for a better future due to the pluralist arrangement of the government (Harris, 1997, p. 41). Therefore, resistance to the idea of Greater Lebanon soon faded.

While the constitution of Lebanon was written in 1926, the state of Lebanon did not actually receive its independence from the French until 1943. At this time the National Pact (unwritten) was forged. It was based upon the 1932 census figures that indicated a 51% majority of Christians. The Shi’is represented 20% of the population, the Druze were 5% of the population and the Sunnis were about 24% of the population (Harris, 1997, p. 81). The permanent organization of the government until after the civil war was based upon these figures. Therefore, it was established that the Christians would hold a majority of seats in the parliament (6 to 5 ratio in favor of the Christians). The president would also always be a Christian. A Sunni would have the prime minister position, and a Shi’I would always have the chair of parliament position. Therefore, the 1943 unwritten National Pact established the Christians as the dominant sect in Lebanon.

For many Christian Lebanese, they had realized their dream of a prosperous Christian state in the Middle East, driven by the Christian nationalist movement that was so powerful due to its western connections.

Back

B. Emigration Pre-1943

Emigration from the area of Lebanon during this period largely began in the 1880s. During this time, thousands of people from the Mt. Lebanon area emigrated, the majority (over 90%) being Christian. To this day, over 50% of those in the Lebanese diaspora are Christian due to this large period of Christian emigration.

It is difficult to attain accurate numbers of emigrants during this period because up until 1920, emigrants arrived in their host countries with Ottoman passports and were classified as Turks. Others were classified as Syrians until the 1926 constitution or independence in 1943. However, it is widely accepted that the majority of the Syrians arriving during this time period (up to 90%) came from the Mt. Lebanon area (Lesser, 1996, p. 52).

During Ottoman times, from the 1880s through World War I (very little emigration during the war due to feasibility problems) people from Mt. Lebanon emigrated for various reasons. Firstly, they were able to feasibly emigrate because they had begun to make connections with the west through economic and cultural linkages via Beirut. When the western missionaries had come to the area, followed by western tourists, the Christians of Mt. Lebanon benefited from both the education and cultural interchange (Knowlton, 1992, p. 287).

However, their reasons for emigrating were various. Many listed their reason for emigration as persecution. The massacres of the previous decades by the Druze, as well as the discrimination they faced as minorities in the Middle East provided the incentive needed to make the voyage to Europe and the Americas. The Ottomans, in the early 1990s, due to their war in the Balkans, enacted conscription in the Mt. Lebanon area and many young men fled to avoid this as well (Knowlton, 1992, p. 286-287).

In addition, under Ottoman rule, Christians were mainly peasants and suffered from poverty and economic decay, as well as a low social position. Therefore, most during this period emigrated in order to make enough money in their host countries to be able to create a better life in the Mt. Lebanon area. Most early emigrants, in fact, did not intend to remain in their host countries for long (Truzzi, 1997, p. 3).

Once the first emigrants arrived in their various host countries and sent back large sums of money to their families, many others were encouraged to follow. Christian missionaries in the late 1800s reported that “immigration fever” was sweeping over the region (Knowlton, 1992, p. 289). The area began to see more and more ticket agents talking about life in the Americas. They held meetings, describing the wonderful situation in the United States and South America and informed people of how to make the trip (Knowlton, 1992, p. 288). At this time, most Lebanese had a very vague idea about “America,” unaware of its vastness. It was not the place of destination that was important so much as just leaving. Many were vulnerable to unethical ticket agents that would say they would end up one place when they would be sent to another. However, once people began to establish themselves in their respective host countries, they were able to send for family members and describe the exact means of getting to a desired place.

Back

C. Host Countries: United States and Brazil

In this first period of Lebanese emigration, the main destinations were the United States and South American countries like Brazil and Argentina. Australia and Canada, while receiving some Lebanese emigrants, did not receive the large amounts that both the United States and Brazil did. Therefore, in this section I will focus on the situation for Lebanese immigrants in the United States and Brazil. The size of the Lebanese immigrants populations to Canada and Australia during this time period were much less significant. In addition, the situation of immigrants in these countries largely mirrored what was occurring in Brazil and the United States (they were largely Christian, generally successful and became well-adjusted to their host countries).

In the late 1800s, immigration to both Brazil and the United States was occurring in large amounts. Although accurate numbers for this entire period do not exist, there are estimates that from 1890 to 1914, over 60,000 immigrated to Brazil while during that same time period over 86,000 immigrated to the United States (Truzzi, 1996, p. 13).

At the time, Brazil was encouraging immigrants to fill certain areas of its labor economy. Brazil needed farmers to settle in the south and develop the land, workers to replace the freed slaves on its farms, as well as industrial workers in its beginning phases of industrialization. However, the Lebanese immigrants did not fit into any of these categories, immigrating primarily to urban areas like Sao Paulo and uninterested in factory work (Knowlton, 1992, p. 290). Therefore, Brazil did not encourage the Lebanese (classified as Turks or Syrians at the time) to immigrate. However, the Lebanese came to Brazil in large numbers despite this lack of encouragement.

These first Lebanese immigrants, after arriving in Brazil, generally became peddlers of hawkers. They gravitated toward this work for two reasons. Firstly, most of the immigrants were unskilled, and peddling was a means of work that didn’t require skilled labor. Secondly, it was a way to get “quick returns.” Most wanted to make money fast and return to Lebanon to a better life there (Truzzi, 1996, p. 3). Peddling, however, requiring language skills, helped the Lebanese immigrants develop the Portuguese language, which would help with assimilation.

Despite the widespread use of peddling in the Lebanese immigrant community as a means of work, by the 1920s peddling was in decline among Lebanese. This was due to the fact that more and more women were emigrating and the Lebanese began making Brazil their permanent home (Truzzi, 1996, p. 9). By the 1920s, Jeffrey Lesser estimates that there were about 130,000 Arabs in Sao Paulo and Santos, 20,000 in Para, 15,000 in Rio de Janeiro, as well as many more in other large cities (Lesser, 1996, p. 52).

In Brazil, many Lebanese immigrants went from peddling to retail trading, wholesaling, and manufacturing, largely in the textile industry. As Oswaldo Truzzi, notes, the Lebanese immigrants were in the right place at the right time to create a stable and profitable niche for themselves in the textile industry (Truzzi, 1996). This was possible because the Lebanese were the first predominantly urban immigrant group in Brazil (they had immigrated after many other groups that had gone to more rural areas). At the time of their arrival, Brazil was beginning to industrialize – the perfect time to sweep in and occupy the textile niche (Truzzi, 1996, p. 21). In fact, Truzzi writes that by 1940, 50% of the capital invested in Sao Paulo’s textile industry was Lebanese (1996, p. 11).

The success of these early Lebanese immigrants in the Brazilian textile market allowed them upward social and economic mobility in Brazil. Many of the second and third generations were able to use this economic success as a jumping off point for professional careers. Many went to universities and became professionals in medicine and law. This in turn, allowed for their access into Brazilian politics. Today, in fact, Lebanese are actually overrepresented in Brazilian politics because of the economic and social niche that allowed for their success in the country (Truzzi, 1996, p. 12-13).

In Brazil, although their economic and social success during the early period of emigration was astounding, their prominent position created more attention (much negative) for the Lebanese immigrants. In Brazil, unlike in the United States, Lebanese immigrants were more obvious because they constituted a larger proportion of the total immigrants population (they were the 7^th largest group) and they were heavily concentrated in the textile niche. Although they experienced some discrimination, it did not seriously hinder their upward mobility (Truzzi, 1996, p. 14-15). This perhaps led to the Lebanese in Brazil creating more of a cohesive identity. Jeffrey Lesser points out that the Lebanese in Brazil consciously created an Arab-Brazilian identity. He states that, “Leading members of the Arab-Brazilian community frequently espoused the intersection of Arab and Brazilian culture by re-defining ethnic differences within a Brazilian national identity, claiming that Arabs were more ‘Brazilian’ than most Brazilians” (Lesser, 1996, p. 47).

The Lebanese in Brazil formed this Arab-Brazilian or Lebanese-Brazilian identity to try to define their status, wanting to be both Brazilian and Lebanese. For Brazilians, the Lebanese were hard to identify (this was a problem in other countries as well). They were neither white, nor black, nor yellow, and they were largely Christian (Lesser, 1996, p. 46). However, the Lebanese preferred to be considered “white” and consciously distanced themselves from anyone appearing to be “non-white” (Truzzi, 1996, p. 16). They also largely resisted their early classification as “turcos” (Lesser, 1996, pp. 48).

Finally, the Lebanese in Brazil were able to retain a sense of cohesiveness and connection to their “Lebanese” identity due to their connections with the home country. In Brazil, during the period of 1908-1936, there was a very large (46%) remigration rate out of Brazil. These connections to the home villages remained vital to their sense of identity. In fact, entire villages in Lebanon would be able to speak Portuguese due to the connections, migrations, and remigrations with Brazil (Lesser, 1996, p. 54).

These connections with the home country, as well as the large influence of the Arabic press in Brazil (Lesser, 1996, p. 56) allowed the Lebanese in Brazil to retain their Lebanese identity. And, because at the time Lebanon was experiencing its Christian nationalist movement, this Christian Lebanese orientation was transferred to those in the diaspora through the direct connections with new immigrants and the Arabic press. In this way, the Lebanese Christian identity was able to flourish and evolve away from the homeland through the generations. Most of this period’s emigrants left before the establishment of the state of Lebanon, yet retained a sense of Lebanese (often hyphenated with Syrian) identity after the state was formed.

Although those in the diaspora were affected by Lebanese Christian nationalistic politics, they do not appear to have tried to influence the politics of the homeland themselves. While many felt a connection with the Christian nationalistic movement because they identified as Christians (in opposition or in contrast to Muslims) and they identified by place of origin (Mt. Lebanon), they did not feel the need to influence politics in Lebanon. Many were simply more concerned with integrating successfully into their host countries. Also, most early immigrants were uneducated, illiterate, and uninterested in homeland politics.

In the United States, the early Lebanese immigrants’ story was very similar to that in Brazil. As in Brazil, the early Lebanese immigrants (also over 90% Christian) began arriving in the late 1800s. After arrival, most began working as peddlers in order to make quick money to bring home (Suleiman, 1992, p. 190). However, as immigration became more of a permanent phenomenon, the Lebanese in the United States began moving into other trades. The Lebanese used peddling as a way to save up enough money to begin their own businesses (Ahdab-Yehia, 1980, p. 142).

However, unlike in Brazil, the Lebanese in the United States did not create a niche in one particular industry, but instead began their own businesses in many different types of industry. They were actually very gifted at the middleman professions, and this early generation of immigrants became largely economically successful. As in other countries, those that were able to successfully establish themselves served as middlemen for other immigrants, helping them find jobs and housing as they arrived (Ahdab-Yehia, 1980, p. 141).

The second and third generations, like those in Brazil, entered the professional enterprises and became very successful, also soon entering politics in the host country. As this integration into the host culture occurred, aspects of their cultural identity declined. Although for many it was important to keep the Arabic language alive in the household, in most cases they were fighting a losing battle (Ahdab-Yehia, 1980, p. 144-145).

Unlike Brazil, the ethnic communities of Lebanese immigrants in the United States had a much more difficult time remaining cohesive. In the United States, the Lebanese were not as visible as in Brazil. Although one of the first Arab immigrant groups to arrive in the United States, the Lebanese were only a very small percentage of the overall immigrant population (Truzzi, 1996, 14). Also, because they were not concentrated into one certain economic sector, they also did not garner as much attention as did those in Brazil. In fact, when the Lebanese entered politics in the United States, they tended to enter as Americans, and did not exploit an Arab ethnic voting bloc (Suleiman, 1992). World War I also temporarily cut off many of the immigrants from their connections back home, enhancing the need to assimilate. In addition, many felt the sense of patriotism when America entered World War I, and at this time, many began to feel greater attachment to the United States than to their homeland (Suleiman, 1992, p. 193).

“Though many of them did not realize it or did not wish to admit it,

they became Americans! The United States was not their real home and

Lebanon/Syria became the home of their dreams, the place to idolize, to

praise unstintingly and to long to return to some day, even if only to be buried there.”

-Suleiman (1992, pp. 193)

Although this first period of Lebanese immigration to the United States demonstrates an extensive period of assimilation, resulting in the loss of much of their ethnic identification, it was not all lost. The maintenance of their religious institutions as well as a certain threat to their identity kept them from completely becoming American until the second phase of emigration (which would reinstate their sense of Lebanese identity to a greater extent).

As is expected, the main concern of many Lebanese immigrants in the United States was the maintenance of their religion and family loyalty. Churches were built in ethnic communities as soon as there were enough people to support the project. In Detroit, the first Maronite church was constructed in 1916. The Maronites finally attained an American Diocese in Detroit in 1972 (Ahdab-Yehia, 1980, p. 142-143).

For the smaller Muslim communities, maintenance of their religion was also extremely important, although much more difficult. The first mosques in the United States were founded by Lebanese Muslims; the very first one having been built in Detroit in 1919 (Aswad, 1992, p. 170). Finding halal meat and maintaining the other aspects of the Islamic religion helped keep the Lebanese Muslim communities together during this first emigration period.

However, sectarian tensions existed between the Lebanese Christian and Muslim immigrants even during this first phase of emigration. No unifying umbrella organizations existed at the time. Firstly, this is due to the fact that Lebanon was not yet a state at the time. In addition, they had brought the tensions that existed in Lebanon with them to the United States. Finally, it was simply a matter of cultural capital – the fact that the Maronites and Orthodox Lebanese shared their religion with the host country allowed for an easier time. Muslims also had a more difficult time because they began arriving about 15-20 years after the first Christian Lebanese immigrants and, therefore, did not establish their social networks until later (Aswad, 1992, p. 170). In Detroit, although the Christians and Muslims lived in relatively close proximity to one another, they kept their distance as much as possible. Many worked for the auto plants in the area. However, the Muslims worked predominately for Ford while the Christians worked for Chrysler (Aswad, 1992, p. 172).

Having discussed the role that religious institutions and sectarian tensions played in fragilely maintaining a sense of ethnic identity (although almost completely sectarian based), it is also important to understand the role that discrimination played in the maintenance of identity.

Having already touched on the fact that Muslims had a difficult time due to their different religious beliefs, it is important to also discuss factors that affected all Lebanese immigrants – citizenship requirements. The identity crisis that citizenship requirements created for Lebanese immigrants would begin to establish the sense of Arab and unified Lebanese identity that would grow in the following decades.

The United States, in the early 1900s, began enacting more restrictive immigration policies as a result of the increasing negative public sentiment against immigrants. While those that arrived before the restrictive citizenship laws were enacted were allowed American citizenship, the Lebanese who arrived during this time were denied citizenship on the basis of skin color. This represented a problem for the Lebanese, who had never thought of themselves as “yellow” or Asians. They (especially the Christians) had considered themselves more European-oriented and white and were distraught that others did not realize this (Gualtieri, 2001).

The Lebanese community came together because of this issue and brought some important cases to higher appellate courts, arguing that this Syrian (at the time classified as such) man was denied citizenship unfairly – he was white. In 1914, the courts decided a case brought by George Dow (had been denied citizenship). The court ruled that Syrians were really Arabs, the purest form of the Semitic race, and were therefore white (Gualtieri, 2001). While the community largely dropped the issue of Arabness after the case was decided in their favor, it would provide foundation for a broader Lebanese –Arab identity to surface at home and in the diaspora following independence.

Back

III. Independence to the Civil War

A. In the Homeland

During the period from independence to the beginning of the civil war, Lebanon was generally known as the “Paris of the Middle East.” Its economic and financial prosperity masked the brewing sectarian and class issues, superficially making it the West’s model for a pluralistic state. Internationally, Lebanon was regarded as the ideal state – able to work out its sectarian differences and profiting at the same time.

During this formative period, Lebanon and its different sects came together on an external level, its national ideology evolving from one of Christian nationalism to that of Arab nationalism. During this time, it was important to take the secular and Arab political orientation. Christians, happy with being the intellectual and business elite of the state, were willing to temporarily ignore their previous Christian nationalistic stance, discarding their belief in the Phoenician myth (the Christians being originally Phoenicians, setting themselves distinctly apart from Muslims and other Arabs). The Sunnis were also greatly prospering and happy to form an Arab national identity throughout the state. Although this masked the demographic shifts as well as the class and sectarian tensions that would lead to the civil war, many were happy to accept this new imagined community.

Back

B. Emigration: Post 1943- Civil War

During this time period, emigration from Lebanon was significant and steady. According to Boutros Labaki, for the period from 1945 to 1960, emigration was steady at around 3000 leaving per year (1992, p. 605). However, these arrivals differed significantly from the early arrivals of the first period of emigration. While the first waves of emigrants were generally poor and illiterate, this new phase if emigrants largely consisted of students and professionals (Suleiman, 1992, p. 194).

More Muslims did begin to arrive at this time, but the emigrants yet remained largely Christian. However, regardless of their sect or religious identity, these immigrants were generally educated and very secular in orientation. Most thought of themselves as Arab nationalists. They strongly identified as Arabs and were viewed as being very politically sophisticated (Suleiman, 1992, p. 194).

Back

C. Host Countries: United States and Canada

Because of this steady stream of new emigrants, who brought with them strong Arab identification and feeling of unity with other Lebanese, the immigrants communities of different host countries was largely affected. Through these new immigrants and the political ideals they brought with them, the Lebanese identity and imagined communities in the diaspora evolved along with that of the home country. To explain this further, I will focus on the Lebanese diaspora communities of this period mainly in the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada. During this period, Lebanese emigrants did go to Brazil and Australia, but little has been documented about their experiences in Brazil since the early period. Also, I will briefly detail their situation in Australia during this time period in the next section.

Firstly, in the United States, as was discussed in the previous section, the Lebanese population was largely assimilated and had lost a large amount of its ethnic identity, aside from food, music, and religious beliefs. As Michael Suleiman points out, with the arrival of new Lebanese Arab-oriented immigrants to the United States, younger generations of the first immigrant wave were revitalized and wanted to search for their ethnic roots. The secular nature of the new immigrants was very appealing to these American-born Lebanese, and this was able to bind together the two different communities of earlier and latter emigrants (Suleiman, 1992, p. 194).

In addition, during these decades, the Arab nationalist movement of Egypt’s Nasser was coming into conflict with the west. Due to very one-sided media coverage of the conflicts between Israel and the Arabs, the Lebanese in the United States (as well as other Arab immigrant groups) were faced with discrimination. The negative stereotyping of Arabs by the western media led to discrimination. Simply having an Arab background led to charges of anti-Semitism. Ralph Nader was subject to such charges simply because he was of Lebanese ancestry (Suleiman, 1992, p. 196). Had the Lebanese of the United States even wanted to identify themselves as something different, it would have been an uphill battle due to the public’s and to the media’s perception that they were Arabs.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war served to greatly solidify the new Arab identity of the Lebanese community in the United States. Many were shocked at the blatant one-sided reporting of American media regarding the Middle East (Suleiman, 1992, p. 196). In fact, as Suleiman points out, it was in 1967 that the first national, non-sectarian organization was founded – the Association of Arab-American University Graduates. The goal of this group was to educate Americans about Arabs. Many other organizations were to follow, including the National Association of Arab-Americans created in 1972, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee created in 1980, and the Arab-American Institute in 1985 (Suleiman, 1992, p. 196).

Barbara Aswad also notes the increase of Arab nationalism surrounding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in the Lebanese communities in Detroit. She notes the increased volume of Nasser signs and the various rallies that were held in support of the movement (attended by Christians and Muslims) (Aswad, 1992, p. 175).

Canada, like the United States, saw a steady stream of new Lebanese immigrants during the decades following World War II until the civil war. A small Lebanese immigrant community had already established itself before the war years (1975 to 1990) in a few urban areas. From 1911 to 1950, any increase in the Lebanese population was largely a result of natural birth rates. However, after 1950, immigration from Lebanon greatly increased. By 1971, there were an estimated 50-60,000 people of Arab origin in Canada, roughly half thought to be Lebanese. The heavy influx of Lebanese immigrants from 1965-1975 was largely a result of Canada’s new liberal immigration policies (Abu-Laban, 1992, p. 229-233).

Like those immigrating to the United States, those coming to Canada during this period were largely educated and from the professional classes. This largely resulted in the same evolution of identity that was occurring in the United States. A branch of the World Lebanese Cultural Union was established in Canada in 1963. As a non-sectarian and non-political organization, its goals were to build bridges between the Lebanese at home and abroad (Abu-Laban, 1992, p. 236).

The Canadian government also supported ethnic newspapers. Those developed by the early immigrants had failed to survive, but there was a new effort in the 1960s and 1970s to develop widely-circulating papers and newsletters. These papers would provide connections between Lebanese and Canadians, detail Arab culture and identity, as well as discuss the ideas of multiculturalism and human rights. These institutionalized promotions were there to provide links to the homeland and ethnic identity, but also encourage adaptation to Canada (Abu-Laban, 1992, p. 237). Connecting organizations and newspapers like these helped to transfer the evolving Lebanese national Arab identity from home to those living abroad.

The Canadian government, due to its multicultural policy was eager to push and encourage more umbrella organizations that encompassed different Lebanese communities. During this period, ties and connections were formed among leaders of different Lebanese groups, allowing for a unified Lebanese and Lebanese-Canadian identity to take root. However, with the beginning of the civil war, most of these ties were cut, despite the Canadian government’s eagerness for more unified Lebanese representation.

Back

IV. The Civil War To the Present

A. In the Homeland

In 1975, Lebanon once again became a divided and fragmented state with the beginning of its 15-year civil war. The civil war was a result of sectarian and class tensions that had been brewing for the last few decades. As I mentioned earlier, Lebanon’s system of representation was based upon the 1932 census, which placed the Christians as the dominant sect. Therefore, the Christians held the highest governmental positions as well as the majority of the seats in parliament. In addition, the Christians and the Sunnis dominated the economic and financial sectors of society.

However, a large demographic shift took place in the decades preceding the civil war. As Beirut reigned supreme in the region as a Christian-dominated economic center, the largely rural and poor Shi’I Muslims of the south and the Biqa’ Valley began moving to the city (Harris, 1997, p. 42). The beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict increased this internal migration when Israel began bombing the south of Lebanon. As more and more Muslims moved from the rural peripheries to Beirut, the dynamics of the capital city shifted. The Shi’is began to have better educational opportunities, but were not experiencing the same upward shift in their finances (Harris, 1997, p. 66). The income gaps among the Lebanese people were astounding. In 1961, only 4% of Lebanese took one third of the national income while 50% of the population took only 18% of the national income (Harris, 1997, p. 64).

As this became more evident to the Lebanese people, and it was obvious that these issues were not going to be resolved, tensions reached their breaking point. The war began after a bus-bombing incident in the spring of 1975 and began to be played out along very sectarian lines. The Lebanese people quickly collapsed back into their old sectarian and community identifications.

The first phase of the war was fought along almost strictly sectarian divisions. However, the second phase (1982-1988) actually briefly united most of the Lebanese in gloom due to the complete economic deterioration of the country. However, this only led to the more severe and fragmented divisions of the last years of the war (Harris, 1997, p. 67). During this last phase of the war, the fighting became both inter and intra-sectarian, bringing the war to nearly every city and village in the state when before it had been largely concentrated in Beirut (Davie, 1992, p. 631).

Therefore, the war provided new incentive for the Lebanese to leave their homeland in larger numbers that ever before. Those living in Beirut often fled for fear that they would lose their lives. Many families left simply to protect their children from being drawn into one of the various militias. For others, the financial implications of the war were too much. For people used to living in a relatively progressive and comfortable state, lack of basic utilities like water and electricity pushed them to leave.

At the end of the civil war, Lebanon found itself in social and economic ruin. Its large banking system and profitable tourism industry were destroyed, basic utilities had to be painstakingly restored, and the country found itself occupied by both Syria and Israel. While it is true that Israel has since left Lebanon, Syria apparently has no intention of leaving, justifying its occupation by suggesting that Lebanon would only spiral down into war again if Syria were to leave.

Corruption is also rampant, according to many Lebanese both in the country and in the diaspora. It ranges from the very top governmental levels to everyday life at the universities and city offices. In addition, the income gaps that were present at the beginning of the war have only widened as a result of the war. In 1992, only 450 people held 55% of the assets in the banking system (Harris, 1997, p. 64). Therefore, emigration in post-war Lebanon is largely a result of difficult living conditions (good jobs that can pay for one’s basic expenses are very difficult to find (even if one has a degree), disgust at the amount of corruption within the system, and the illegitimacy of a government under the thumb of Syria.

Back

B. Emigration: Civil War to Present

It is estimated that around 990,000 Lebanese left their home country between 1975 and 1989, up to 40% of Lebanon’s population (Labaki, 1992, p. 609). Those emigrating largely went to the states that have received past immigrants from Lebanon. Because there were few foreign embassies in Lebanon during and even after the war, Cyprus became a “stepping stone” for many Lebanese who wished to flee the country (Davie, 1992). A large Lebanese community was established in Cyprus to help others with housing, papers, etc. The community in Cyprus served the fleeing Lebanese as a a network of middlemen, a meso factor in the immigration process.

In addition to the large numbers of Lebanese immigrating during and since the civil war, Boutros Labaki notes that there are some distinct new trends in this new emigration period. Firstly, there is a trend from professional emigration towards heavier family reunion emigration. Secondly, there is a trend away form mainly Christian emigration to multi-sectarian emigration. Finally, there is also a trend towards the diversification of the economic and financial status of new Lebanese emigrants (Labaki, 1992, p. 621). These trends will help explain the evolution of Lebanese identity that is taking place in both the more laissez-faire host state of the United States, as well as in the multicultural state of Australia, the two host countries I will describe in this section.

Back

C. Host Countries: United States and Australia

I will first describe the situation of the Lebanese in the United States before moving on to the situation in Australia. It is important to note that although the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States was often opposed to deporting Lebanese immigrants during the war years, there were no special policies in place to aid those emigrating to the United States or to help them once they arrived – that was largely left to the established community groups already present.

Based upon estimates, there are over 2 million people from Lebanon or of Lebanese ancestry living in the United States today. However, in order to understand the immigrant population of today, it is important to know the number of Lebanese-born immigrants currently in the country. According to the United States Census Bureau, in 1990, there were over 86,000 first-generation Lebanese immigrants in the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1999). The Center for Immigration Studies offers the number of first-generation immigrants in the United States as over 83,000 in 2000 (Camarota, 2002). However, in addition, there were an estimated 20,000 illegal Lebanese immigrants in the United States as of 1996 (Camarota, 2002).

The Center for Immigration Studies also offers some very significant statistics for the socio-economic characteristics of first-generation Lebanese immigration in the United States as of 2000. Nearly 58% of these first generation immigrants are United States citizens, nearly 50% have a college or graduate degree, and the average annual income of $50,000 is well over the national average. In addition, the percentage of Lebanese immigrants that are self-employed is over 21%, double the national average, and the number of Lebanese immigrants who are home-owners is 71%, also slightly above the national average (Camarota, 2002).

When taking these statistics alone, one might think that the Lebanese emigrating today to the United States are adapting just as easily as did their predecessors in earlier generations. However, after looking at poverty and welfare statistics for this same immigrant group one can’t be so sure. Once again, using the statistics of the Center for Immigration Studies, there are over 25% of new Lebanese immigrants living in poverty and over 20% are making use of major welfare programs. These are noticeably above the national averages, which are 10.5% and 15%, respectively (Camarota, 2002).

When taken next to the annual income and education statistics, this new data appears to be very confusing. While a 1989 survey conducted by Michael Suleiman found that the vast majority of Lebanese immigrants in the United States are yet Christian and financially successful (1992), the new multi-sectarian trends of the war years and today are changing this daily. As Boutros Labaki suggested, the new immigrants of today are not only more Muslim in religious orientation, but are also no longer financially secure (1992, p. 621). The civil war caused enormous amounts of economic deterioration in the country, and this new phase of emigration has reflected the economic hardships of Lebanon. The cultural (education, language, skills, similar religion) and financial capital that was being brought with the emigrants prior to the war is largely disappearing in this new wave. Therefore, it is much more difficult for these immigrants lacking both cultural and financial capital to find the economic success and social mobility that prior generations had found.

However, these new immigrants are not only bringing evidence of Lebanon’s economic troubles to the diaspora, but are also serving as one of many conduits for the renewed sectarian tensions within the Lebanese community. The issues that came to light with the civil war have been speedily transferred to those living in the diaspora. While it was true that even prior to the war years the Lebanese in the United States (as elsewhere) organized themselves along community and sectarian lines often through their churches, there had been an effort to come together through certain umbrella organizations that were largely non-sectarian and non-political. These included organization like the World Lebanese Cultural Union, as well as smaller cultural organizations organized in a particular city or university like the Chicago Lebanese Club.

Current trends since the war have found the Lebanese clinging more fervently to their sectarian and religious institutions. With the growth of the Islamic movement in the Middle East (and Lebanon), one finds religion becoming much more important to immigrants (Aswad, 1992). With the west’s (especially the United States’) anti-Islamic attitude, reinforced by the media, one sees evidence of Lebanese Christians defining themselves more ardently as Christians (in opposition to Islamic beliefs) while Muslims have rallied together to defend their religious beliefs in the face of discrimination. Also, particularly after September 11, 2001, it is interesting to see that Lebanese Christians are more likely to wear large cross necklaces to demonstrate their identity as Christians, not wanting to be associated with other Muslim Arabs (since the word Muslims and Arab seems to be used interchangeably in the United States).

While Christians are defining themselves by what they are not – Muslims, therefore creating a larger gap between themselves and other Lebanese, Muslims are becoming more committed to defining themselves with their religion. The days of Arab secularism appear to now be a thing of the past. As Barbara Aswad indicates, people who before discussed secular nationalism are now discussing religion. In fact, Aswad sees evidence for more divisions within the Lebanese community in the United States than she sees in Lebanon (1992). This may be due to the fact that the Lebanese in the United States have to define themselves in the context of anti-Arab and anti-Islamic sentiment that it not present in Lebanon.

“Yvonne Haddad, speaking on Islam, once commented that the

grandparents fought for independence, their children for nationalism

and socialism, and their grandchildren for Islam.”

- Aswad (1992, pp. 177)

Aswad also sees greater differences within generations that are American born, as the younger American generations are becoming heavily influenced by the imams. Until the 1960s, notes Aswad, most Muslim Lebanese struggled to assimilate into American culture, choosing to adopt western over Islamic dress. However, with the influence of the imams, younger generations are dressing more conservatively where their mothers might have worn skirts (Aswad, 1992, p. 177).

Aswad, in her study of the Lebanese Dearborn community, has also seen evidence of more inter and intra-sectarian factionalism during and since the war. Whereas there had previously been communication among the leaders of different Lebanese religious sects, during the war all such ties were quickly cut. In addition, Aswad saw evidence of tensions among Lebanese of the same sect because of the war that were drawn along different militia lines, supporting different political factions within Lebanon (Aswad, 1992).

In Australia, despite its multicultural policy that for a time strove to unite the Lebanese under an umbrella of national identity, the situation is largely similar to that in the United States. In Australia, there is an estimated 400,000 people that are either Lebanese born or are of Lebanese descent. Australia’s Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs reports the latest census figures for Lebanese-born people in Australia as being over 70,000 (2002).

Although Lebanese have been immigrating to Australia for well over 100 years, the numbers have not been as significant as those in the Americas, and their situation in Australia did not warrant extra detail since it largely mirrored that of Lebanese immigrants to both the United States and Brazil. Like those in the U.S. and Brazil, they were largely Christian, began primarily as peddlers, opened their own businesses, and largely assimilated successfully into Australian culture, some becoming major figures in the food and clothing industries.

However, according to Australian government statistics, it appears that the new Lebanese immigrants to Australia are encountering more difficulty, especially economically. The government reports that the Lebanese-born population is less skilled than the average Australian, lacking educational qualifications, and there exists a much higher percentage of unemployment among the Lebanese community (Dept. of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 2002).

In the decades following Australian independence up until the 1970s, a “White Australia” policy largely survived, limiting the numbers of Lebanese that were allowed into the country as well as limiting citizenship. However, the policy of multiculturalism was gradually introduced in the 1970s and exists yet today, prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race and culture (Humphrey, 1998, p. 6).

The first waves of Lebanese immigrants to Australia had maintained some of their Lebanese identity as they prospered in Australia despite struggling with the White Australia policy and were able to influence the Australian government to ease restrictions on Lebanese immigrants during the civil war years. Although special consideration was given to Lebanese immigrants during this time (over 20,000 were allowed into the country in a very short period), the established Lebanese communities were unable to cause the Australian government to give the new Lebanese immigrants refugee status (Humphrey, 1998).

Therefore, the new Lebanese immigrants, largely poor and lacking in cultural capital, often relied on the existing social networks that had been established by the Lebanese-Australian communities decades before. The Lebanese Christians often had more support when they arrived due to the larger numbers of Christians already in Australia and the depth of institutional support they provided. The newer Muslim immigrants have much more difficulty when arriving in Australia.

It is important to note, as Michael Humphrey does, that the “social significance of being Lebanese” has changed in Australia over the history of Lebanese migration (1998, p. 24) as it has for Lebanese around the world. When the Lebanese first arrived over 100 years ago, they were a very small and unnoticed group. In the face of discrimination, often being classified as non-white, the mostly Christian Lebanese consciously decided to assimilate, identifying themselves as European rather than Asian. However, today the Lebanese immigrants are much more conspicuous to the average Australian. They, as a largely urban immigrant group, are often marginalized and suffer from long-term unemployment (Humphrey, 1998).

The civil war and the changing emigration trends it caused for the Lebanese also changed the composition of the Lebanese communities in Australia – more Muslim. It wasn’t until this time that the Lebanese in Australia became known as a “problem community” to Australians (Humphrey, 1998, p. 29). Almost half of the Lebanese-born population came to Australia since 1975 (Humphrey, 1992, p. 445), becoming very obvious to the Australian population. These new immigrants lacked the cultural capital due to their different religion, lack of education (at least by Australian standards), and lack of transferable job skills. The Australian government was also unhappy that these new Lebanese arrivals were bringing their sectarian conflicts from Lebanon and playing them out in Australia.

The established Lebanese Christian communities have become very upset about the bad press that the new Lebanese arrivals are creating for all Lebanese in Australia. They, in turn, have tried to distance themselves from the newly arriving immigrants, making a statement about what is a “good” and “bad” Lebanese immigrant (Humphrey, 1992, p.445). Therefore, by defining themselves in contrast to the new and largely Muslim immigrants population, they are denying the existence of a unified Lebanese identity.

Ghassan Hage also acknowledges the gap between the older Christian generation of immigrants and the newer Muslim generation after interviewing a Lebanese Christian Australian who had torn the scarf off a Muslim woman. He writes that her action came from, “the belief that her own Christianity was convertible into more governmental Australianness than the Islam of the other Australian whose religion has no value whatsoever as far as governmental belonging is concerned. Her Christianity made her more White” (1998, p. 60). Often feeling that they had struggled for generations to be accepted as Australians and “white,” many in the Lebanese Christian community blame current racism against Lebanese and other Arabs on new Muslim Lebanese immigrants who “have ruined our reputation in this country” (Hage, 1998, p. 60).

The Lebanese of Australia, like those in the United States, are defining presently themselves by difference. Michael Humphrey argues that it is the difference encouraged (as pluralistic and important) by the Australian multicultural policy that creates a hierarchical classification for immigrants (1992). For the Lebanese, this hierarchical classification is happening within their group, not among other immigrant groups.

This was particularly evident in 1981, when the Australian Lebanese Committee and the World Lebanese Cultural Union celebrated the hundred-year anniversary of the first Lebanese immigrant arriving in Australia. This event was largely attended by the older generation immigrants (largely Christian, especially Maronite) and was largely seen as only celebrating the presence of the old generation Christian Lebanese, offering this as the only significant representation for the current Lebanese community in Australia (Humphrey, 1992, p. 448-449). This was considered by many as a political move by the Christians to demonstrate their preeminence.

Even before the civil war reinstated old sectarian tensions among the Lebanese immigrants in Australia, the Australian government had a particularly difficult time establishing unified umbrella organizations. What Michael Suleiman writes about early immigrants in the United States I believe was generally true everywhere; “the pattern was to call for unity of all ‘Syrians’ and then attack the opposition as the instigators of hatred and disunity” (Suleiman, 1992, p. 192). In Australia, when efforts were made to find universal representation for Lebanese on a national level, as with the Lebanese Settlement Council, it often resulted in power plays by the Maronites or other groups to dominate the organization, forcing a sense of illegitimacy on the organization.

“If the Lebanese did not have a single voice in Lebanon, how could they

have one in Australia? In multicultural Australia ethnic representation is a

matter of claims which are based on self-identification, not official state

certification.”

- Humphrey (1992, pp. 41)

As previously stated, the new Lebanese immigrants did not bring or posses the cultural capital that older generations had. They were largely unskilled, non-professionals (at least by Australian standards). Michael Humphrey views this latest phase of immigration as resulting in the “proletarianisation” of the recent Lebanese immigrants, which reinforces their sectarian loyalties (1998, p. 47).

The older Maronite communities have much larger incomes than do the more recent Muslim immigrant communities. Because of the urban nature of these new immigrants and their reliance on family and sectarian organization for support, their Lebanese identity has evolved largely in contrast to Christian immigrants. Humphrey believes that the multicultural policy of the state only serves to reinforce these differences and states that, “In Australia Lebanese Muslim immigrants were a displaced proletariat where reliance on family and community was a strategy of urban subsistence. Recreating community was the social basis of organization and identity in a multicultural urban space” (1998, p. 153).

The Australian government, frustrated at not being able to establish a tangible, centralized, and legitimate Lebanese entity, has resorted to the tangible and “bureaucratized” religious organizations of different Lebanese sects in order to institute its multicultural policy among the Lebanese (Humphrey, 1998, p.156). However, this only serves to solidify the differences already existing among the Lebanese. Therefore, Australia’s multicultural policy may actually be working against the unification of the Lebanese identity in Australia.

Back

D. A Unified Lebanese Identity?

Having already established that the latest phase of Lebanese identity has resulted in its increased fragmentation due to the civil war and the social attitudes of the host countries, forcing the Lebanese to define themselves in terms of difference, I feel that I must briefly explain the role that the current Syrian occupation of Lebanon is playing in the evolution of a Lebanese identity. The Syrian occupation, something greatly disliked by most Lebanese, regardless of sect or political orientation, has the ability to bring about some form of a vulnerable unified Lebanese identity. This of course, relates to the old proverb that the Middle East seems to live by – the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The current proliferation of organizations, websites, and chat rooms that are dedicated to eradicating the Syrian presence would seem to indicate that the Lebanese are organizing themselves around this issue, despite sectarian differences. However, as Baha Abu-Laban suggests in her discussion of the Lebanese in Montreal, there is no reason to believe that the “recent reduction in social distance at the leadership level in Montreal has filtered down to the popular level” (1992, p. 241). I believe this to be true with regard to the Syrian occupation as well. Although it has generated much discussion on the internet, when looking closer, there does not appear to be any real connection between the different groups and organizations suggesting action against Syria.

In fact, it appears that many of the leaders from different organizations recognize this as a large obstacle to productive action. The Free Lebanon movement based out of Australia featured an essay written by Pierre Rafoul, calling for the Lebanese of the diaspora to unite so that they can rid Lebanon of its occupiers (Rafoul, 2002). Many other websites, with their own motivating essays, are encouraging the same thing of their followers. However, it is questionable as to whether it is actually reaching and motivating the diaspora.

Another problem when observing these movements over the web, is that for an outsider, it is incredibly difficult to ascertain the origins of a particular organization. A website may claim to be non-sectarian, but yet largely supported by Maronites. Finally, many of the essays on the web, which are designed to unite the Lebanese community against Syrian occupation can be traced back to General Michel Aoun (the exiled Christian general of the Lebanese Army, ideologically orientated towards a secular and unoccupied Lebanon) and his followers. Therefore, how many of these sights are sponsored by Aoun and his followers? Without knowing for sure, it is very difficult to understand the power that the issue of Syrian occupation may potentially have to unite the fragmented Lebanese of the world.

As discussed above, the issue of Syrian occupation has not currently been able to unify the Lebanese population at home or abroad (except superficially at leadership levels). This lack of unification, as demonstrated by the Syrian issue, is one important reason for why the Lebanese of the diaspora have not been able to influence the politics of the home state, even though they have largely been affected by home state politics. However, there have been those in the diaspora who have tried. One current example is the support that the leaders of the Lebanese diaspora are giving to the Syrian Accountability Act that is presently before the United States Congress. This act condemns Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, supporting a free and independent Lebanon. If the bill were to pass and Syria did not withdraw, the United States would scale back trade with Damascus. However, the bill also condemns Syria’s support of terrorism, which is most likely why it has gotten so far in congress.

Although the bill is evidence of some effort on the part of the diaspora to influence home country politics, there have been very few other efforts on the part of the Lebanese diaspora to do much else. This is due to a variety of factors, the first being lack of unification, as previously discussed. The Lebanese of the diaspora are currently fragmented and fractured, mirroring the situation in the homeland. Although there are groups in the diaspora (many offshoots of political parties or militias in Lebanon), they are able to accomplish very little. They are unable to unify with other Lebanese groups to create the amount of support needed for significant change. Also, there is a large amount of infighting that takes place within the differing Lebanese organizations in the diaspora. Even among the different Phalangist groups (Christian militia) active in the diaspora, there is a significant amount of disagreement, resulting in the splintering of the groups. The large amount of essays calling for unification of the Lebanese around the world is evidence of this.

In addition to lack of unification, there are reasons for the lack of influence by the diaspora in Lebanese homeland politics. Firstly, in many cases, Lebanese immigrants (especially recent ones) are disgusted with politics, corruption, and infighting, and therefore have no desire to become involved in it once having left Lebanon. One recent Christian Lebanese immigrant in Minnesota, when asked why he wasn’t interested in Lebanese politics, responded by saying, “I sold my country a long time ago.” He represented the feelings of many recent immigrants who were “sick to death” of Lebanese politics. On a related note, many Lebanese immigrants, disgusted with Syrian occupation and corruption, are loath to become embroiled in Syrian politics and corruption.

Finally, the demographics of the diaspora affect the group’s willingness to get involved in homeland politics. The earlier and primarily Christian generations of immigrants are often assimilated into their host countries, having no real interest in their homeland aside from cultural traditions, religion, and summer vacations. Also, the newer and more diverse Muslim Lebanese immigrants have directed most of their activism towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, working for Palestinian rights rather than trying to influence the politics of their homeland. Because the Israeli-Palestinian issue has been such a large part of Lebanese politics in the past, perhaps this is not that surprising that Lebanese Muslims should be very interested in Palestinian issues.

Back

V. Conclusion

The identity and imagined communities of the Lebanese diaspora over the last century have undergone large transformations due to the influence of homeland issues and sentiments, as well as the societal context of their host countries. The Lebanese have remained connected in their own diasporic niches to other Lebanese niches around the world (and to the homeland) through new immigrants, familial connections, and through larger cultural organizations. However, the most important means of communication is via family. Many Lebanese have siblings, parents, cousins, and former neighbors living in many different countries around the world. Due to the importance placed upon family by the Lebanese culture, these connections have allowed many Lebanese in the diaspora to remain connected to their culture and homeland.

Therefore, the connections produced by family and new immigrants to the home country and other Lebanese groups around the world have allowed for the transferal of homeland politics and identification to those residing in diasporic communities. Thus, as has been described in the pages above, the sentiments and events of the homeland play an important role in shaping the imagined communities of the Lebanese in the diaspora. These imagined communities are then refined and redefined in the context of the host country.

Those in different host countries during the earliest period of emigration were able to experience the Christian nationalistic sentiments of the new Lebanese state. Although having left before the independent state of Lebanon was officially formed, many were able to view themselves as “Lebanese” because of ties to their place of geographic origin and its people.

Those in the diaspora during the second period of emigration were able to transform the Lebanese imagined community to something more nationally unified and secular with the arrival of new immigrants from Lebanon. Also, the policies of host states, whether multicultural or not added to this identification. In the United States, one-sided media coverage of the Middle East spurred many to grasp onto the Arab nationalist movement. Also, in the multicultural state of Canada, the government actively promoted organizations that would unify its Lebanese communities.

The third period of emigration discussed in the paper illustrates the collapse of a unified Lebanese imagined community due to the influence of the civil war and the sectarian tensions it fueled. Also, the social politics of differentiation encountered by the Lebanese of the diaspora in their respective host countries also exacerbated the transformation of identity and imagined community into something much more sectarian and family based, as is obvious in both the United States and Australia.

Finally, the future of the Lebanese diaspora’s imagined community is difficult to guess. The issue of Syrian occupation of the homeland could perhaps provide the means for nationally unifying the Lebanese diaspora once again. However, there is little evidence at present that this is taking place due to lack of unification among the different Lebanese groups of the diaspora.

Back