EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgia’s Rose Revolution: Momentum and Consolidation

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIA’S ROSE REVOLUTION: MOMENTUM AND CONSOLIDATION
Eric A. Miller 11/22/04

Georgia’s Rose Revolution has succeeded in making positive changes in the country’s economic and political direction, said panelists at a recent roundtable, convened to evaluate developments in Tbilisi over the past year. But, the panelists indicated, consolidating the gains already made will provide fresh challenges. President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration must concentrate on strengthening institutions, rather that relying on the force of individual will, some suggested.

The Rose Revolution – a popular protest over a rigged parliamentary election that cascaded into a political uprising -- forced former Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to resign on November 23, 2003. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A November 18 roundtable – titled Georgia’s Rose Revolution: One Year and Beyond, and co-sponsored by the Washington, DC-based Georgia Forum and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University – evaluated the successes and shortcomings of Saakashvili’s effort to transform the country from a failed state into a Western-style market democracy.

Panelists generally agreed that Saakashvili’s aggressive campaign against high-level governmental corruption, waged since January, stands out among the year’s many accomplishments. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "Rampant corruption under Shevardnadze was crippling for Georgian development," noted one of the panelists, Lincoln Mitchell, the former Director of the National Democratic Institute’s Tbilisi office. "But Saakashvili’s actions have increased public confidence and hope in the government."

Georgian citizens have seen immediate improvements in their day-to-day lives, panelists suggested, citing a significant decrease in police corruption. "Nearly 13,000 police officers, those commonly found on the streets of Tbilisi ready to shake down Georgian motorists, have been fired," said Ambassador David Smith, a US member of the International Security Advisory Board for Georgia. "Their replacements are well-trained, salaries have been increased, and extortion and bribery has dipped significantly."

The successful and relatively peaceful reintegration of the renegade region of Ajaria marked another shining moment for Saakashvili’s administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The benefits of forcing former regional strongman Aslan Abashidze from power were multifaceted. The reestablishment of Tbilisi’s authority in Batumi marked an encouraging first-step in efforts to promote Georgia’s territorial reintegration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On an economic level, Abashidze’s departure closed a major conduit for smuggling that had hampered development efforts. But perhaps the most important issue, according to Revaz Adamia, Georgia’s ambassador to the United Nations, was the psychological impact of Ajaria: "It showed that major problems could be solved. It gave hope to the Georgian people," Adamia said.

Panelists cited the reorganization of Georgia’s defense establishment – something overshadowed by other developments -- as another important Rose Revolution success story. Under Saakashvili’s watch, the US-sponsored Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) ended successfully and now, in addition to US trainers, Georgians are training other Georgians. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The Ministry of Defense also was placed under civilian control, and the defense budget was nearly doubled to 119 million lari (roughly 45 million US dollars). At the same time, the National Security Council cut over half of its personnel, and authority over the Interior Ministry’s military roughly 8,000-strong force was transferred to the Defense Ministry.

The civil-society implications of the termination of the Interior Ministry’s influence over the country’s armed forces are profound, Smith indicated. "Democracies do not have internal armies."

A year ago, the military totaled roughly 22,000 troops. Today, the number is about 15,000. The incorporation of the Interior Ministry troops into the regular army will slow the streamlining process, but Defense Ministry officials say they are committed to reducing the overall force to 14,600. "They will do this by absorbing some into the new force, retraining others, and where appropriate dismissing others," Smith said. Officials in Saakashvili’s administration express hope that in making the Defense Ministry more efficient, the government can boost the military’s effectiveness in promoting national security goals.

While initial developments are encouraging, the Rose Revolution’s ability to meet its goals are far from assured, the panelists said, adding that Saakashvili’s administration faces some difficult decisions in the coming months and years. Given Georgia’s lack of well-developed institutions, the choices made by Saakashvili stand to have an especially powerful influence over the country’s near-term development.

Perhaps the thorniest issue that Saakashvili will wrestle with for the foreseeable future concerns Georgia’s territorial integrity. Saakashvili appears determined to restore Tbilisi’s control over its two separatist-minded regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Panelists agreed that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain crucial in years to come. Georgian government attempts over the summer to replicate the Ajaria experience in South Ossetia failed, putting the two sides on the brink of a full-blown armed confrontation. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The Tbilisi-Tskhinvali tension has, in turn, stoked confrontation between Georgia and Russia. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "It is clear that Georgia needs Western help to solve these frozen conflicts, and they also deserve our help," said Cory Welt, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Through Georgia’s participation in international peacekeeping initiatives in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq, Saakashvili has sought to encourage Western support for Tbilisi’s territorial reintegration agenda. In addition, Georgia has moderated its reintegration concept by placing greater emphasis on minority rights. In Welt’s words, Tbilisi now seeks to forge a "civic identity and not an ethnic one" for the country.

Whether such moves will succeed in securing strong Western backing remains an open question. Panelists noted that the Bush administration appears reluctant to confront Russia openly at this time because, as Smith put it, Washington’s "national security plate is pretty full." However, he pointed out that several times in the past year, the [Bush] administration "has sent strong signals to Moscow" on Georgia’s behalf. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Ultimately, as Welt said, unless the United States gets more involved, the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts are unlikely to be resolved. "It is simply too difficult for Georgia to negotiate directly with Russia, especially with their ongoing support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Welt said.

In the purely domestic realm, there are aspects of the anti-corruption campaign that are cause for concern. Panelists acknowledged that while the government’s actions have enhanced the public perception of the government, the moves to punish corrupt officials have at times skirted the rule of law. In Tbilisi, non-governmental activists have complained that some anti-corruption prosecutions have been politically motivated, designed to cripple and intimidate Saakashvili’s political enemies. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, some panelists pointed out that curbing the corrupt practices of middle- and lower-level bureaucrats will be a painstaking process, possibly testing the public’s patience.

As for the country’s broader economic performance, it is too early to judge the Saakashvili administration’s performance, the panelists indicated. "The real economic question for Georgia is how it manages the assets and the liabilities inherited from the previous regime," said Ross Harrison, Executive Vice President of Tapco International and Treasurer of the America-Georgia Business Council.

"The results over the past year are unclear," Harrison stated. A vibrant business community is blossoming and foreign direct investment is growing, but Harrison noted that the Georgian government has yet to set forth a clear economic strategy that leverages Georgian assets, like its strategic position in the East-West energy corridor and its once attractive tourism industry.

Saakashvili has yet to develop a medium-to-long-term economic plan that could help guide his administration in confronting the challenges ahead. "The government has focused on its short-term populist appeal and not on developing a long-term strategic outlook," Harrison said. In the future the pace of Georgia’s economic development will be determined by the "balance between popular expectations and a more comprehensive economic strategy."

In examining the country’s near-term political prospects, panelists emphasized a need for the Saakashvili administration to develop institutions. At present, the lack of a developed system of checks and balances, along with a shortage of qualified personnel to staff the three branches of government, leave Georgia in a precarious position. One individual, the president, wields an inordinate amount of influence – something that can compound the consequences of policy mistakes. Some panelists suggested that any attempt to further concentrate power in the hands of the president would be counter-productive in meeting the Rose Revolution’s aims.

"Democracies represent more than just their elections, but also a sense of ownership, of political accountability, of a legal and legitimate process," Mitchell said. "Democracies are about institutions and not individuals."

Saakashvili will have to sacrifice individual authority in order to allow Georgian democracy to flourish, Smith suggested. "Greater parliamentary oversight of the executive branch will be crucial to cement Georgia’s democratic transition."

Editor’s Note: Eric A. Miller, Ph.D., is an Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia, and Research Associate at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, Washington, DC.

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