Foreign Policy got hold of Mohamed ElBaradei ahead of his return to Egypt and is set to soon publish a long interview, focusing both on Iran and his tenure at the IAEA and his impending return to Egypt (third week of February, FP says.) I can't wait to read the full thing once it's available, and urge you to read the excerpt they put on online. For now I'll focus on the part of the interview which deals with Egypt's policy towards Gaza, where ElBaradei makes an interesting (if off-the-cuff) policy proposal:

FP: President Mubarak has been criticized harshly in Egypt and from outside, from some quarters, for his policy toward Gaza. Do you have any opinions on his policy toward Hamas?

ElBaradei: I don't really know the details about his relationship with Hamas. All I know about Gaza is that you have to distinguish between national security and humanitarian assistance. I would quote Chris Patten, the chancellor of Oxford University, who wrote that we are failing Gaza and that 1.5 million innocent civilians have been penalized because of the behavior of some of the Hamas members. To me this is not much different from what happened to Iraq before and after the war. You end up penalizing the innocent and the vulnerable -- the citizens. According to Patten, Gaza is only getting 31 of the "essential items" from the Israeli side, while they need thousands of items. They're not getting any construction materials. They received 41 truckloads of materials; the whole place is rubble.

The need to separate your politics from humanitarian needs and from protection of civilians is a principle that was established a hundred years ago with the Hague Convention and the Geneva Conventions. I feel that we are moving away from that in many ways. We talked about "crippling sanctions," for example. When you talk about "crippling sanctions," you have to understand that those who are being crippled are not the people in power -- it is the innocent civilians, the elderly, and the young. That is to me absolutely the wrong approach.

FP: Does that mean you would stop the construction of this underground wall that is currently being constructed between Egypt and Gaza?

ElBaradei: As I said, I don't really know the details, but if this [border area] has been used for smuggling, drugs, weapons, or extremists, then Egypt has the right to make sure it protects its security. But what Egypt can also do is use the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt to allow Gaza to have humanitarian assistance. For example, one idea I have is to create a free zone in the Egyptian part of Rafah [the border town]. I don't see why we can't have a free zone there where people from Gaza go and buy their own basic needs. So there is a difference between protecting national security, which no one questions, and providing humanitarian assistance.

I don't think it's entirely fair to say this is an ElBaradei policy platform, but it's certainly a very interesting suggestion and possible answer to the question of what kind of alternative policy Egypt could be pursuing towards Gaza — not the ideal policy, but rather a realistic policy considering the real security threat perception felt by Egypt (and not just the regime), the potential for radicalization Gaza represents, and regional constraints.

I'm not sure how literally ElBaradei is using the term free zone — i.e. whether he means a customs free zone, as Port Said was. If so the concept would run into the intricacies of the Oslo structure, most notably the Customs Union between Israel and the OPTs established under the Paris Protocol. This may seem like a technicality in light of the humanitarian crisis Gaza is facing, but it would certainly be a real concern to the Israelis and both Hamas and Fatah, with implications of separate economic systems for the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, peace-processors and officials of the concerned governments would have to do serious rethinking of the economic structure that currently exists in Israel/Palestine and that allows for the duty-free exports of Palestinians goods to Israel, which Palestinians rely upon to some extent. One could of course counter that Israel is not accepting Gazan exports for the moment, but it is a nonetheless an important shift in thinking.

There is another strategic implication for all concerned: such a plan would risk perpetuating the "three states for two peoples" direction the conflict is now taking, with Gaza becoming integrated into the Egyptian economy and the West Bank quite distinct from it. For Egypt, this is essentially what Israel would love to see: Gaza becoming Cairo's problem, not Tel Aviv's. It runs against the Egyptian argument thus far that Gaza is Israel's obligation under international law, and does not solve the concern about Hamas. 

Still, the argument could be made that Egypt could supply Gaza with the reconstruction material it needs, and perhaps act as an intermediary for Gaza's trade with the outside world (esp. the EU), without becoming economically implicated itself. There is certainly a good argument for a humanitarian opening of Rafah to grant Gazans access to the outside world, and allow goods in. It can be controlled in light of Egypt's concerns, and provide an alternative to tunnel smuggling. The devil will be in the details, though, and whether the PA and Israel (and even Hamas) would approve of such a plan, and what consequences there would be to going ahead with it even without, say, Israel's approval. 

Nonetheless, it's good to see ElBaradei not shying away from tackling this difficult issue. More Egyptians should be thinking about their country's responsibility in Rafah, and proposing serious and fully thought-out alternatives to the current policy. From what I've seen there's been much hand-wringing, but not many concrete proposals.

I had wanted to write something funny and incisive about Police Day, the annual event of pageantry and appreciation for your local cops celebrated in Egypt. But the above-mentioned cold has prevented me from doing so, and I even missed my favorite part of Police Day, the Nile Squad river rescue demonstration. If you are so privileged as to have a room or be a member of the gym at the Grand Hyatt Hotel, it offers the best view.

Don't despair, though, Jack Shenker has written a nice-guide on how to celebrate Police Day and Bikya Masr has a collection of their articles on the performance of Egypt's finest.

I still haven't entirely confirmed this (partly due to my near-comatose state), but President Mubarak in his Police Day speech several days ago is said to have made several important statements (about fundamentalism, among other things, and allusions to the Iranian threat.) Most interesting though is that Police Day is now an official national holiday — i.e. a bank holiday as they say in the UK (or has this always been the case? I can't remember). Is this a promotion of the police to the same status as Armed Forces Day? Compensation for the humiliation suffered by the police at the hands of the army last March? A sign of a great leveling between coppers and soldiers? Is Minister of Interior and supercop Habib al-Adly the next president? Hosni works in mysterious ways.

Anyway, all joking aside, whatever happens in Egypt over the next few years dealing with the declining quality of police work, rock-bottom trust for law enforcement and a routine practice of torture will be one of the most important challenges the country will face. Worth mulling over on this day.

A few days ago Hillary Clinton made a major speech about internet freedom. She said:

On their own, new technologies do not take sides in the struggle for freedom and progress, but the United States does. We stand for a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas. And we recognize that the world’s information infrastructure will become what we and others make of it. Now, this challenge may be new, but our responsibility to help ensure the free exchange of ideas goes back to the birth of our republic. The words of the First Amendment to our Constitution are carved in 50 tons of Tennessee marble on the front of this building. And every generation of Americans has worked to protect the values etched in that stone. 

One step towards that would be to fix the various impediments the US puts on accessing data, including from Middle Eastern countries. Take SourceForge, one of the most important repositories of open-source software in the world, where developers collaborate on building all sorts of tools, including the kind that might facilitate evading internet censorship. It turns out that since early this month it's been blocked in various countries including Iran, Syria, Sudan as well as other places upon which Washington has imposed sanctions. 

Arab Crunch has a post by Abdelrahman Iblidi, a Syrian programmer, criticizing the legislation that forces SourceForge to ban users from these countries and others (Cuba, North Korea.) Syrian developers have had similar problems before with Google Code and other US-hosted sites. This example of internet censorship is particularly grating because open-source technology has often provided solutions to go around internet censorship and protect user privacy, such as Tor. 

[I was alerted to this issue thanks to a tweet by one of the Egyptian blogosphere's leading open-source advocate, Alaa].

Not a great strategy to confront sectarianismWaleed Marzouk writes aptly in al-Masri al-Youm English about the discourse of denial of sectarian problems:

The 11 January edition of “Weghat nazar” (Point of view), a talk show on Al Masriya channel, was one of the more blatant demonstrations of the complete denial of sectarian strife in Egypt. In a segment that hosted Qena’s Christian governor, Magdy Ayoub, presenter Abdel Latif el-Minawy introduced his subject with a saccharine oration on the glories of Egypt that included a mention of 7000 years of culture by the Nile and a dismissal of sectarianism as a national issue. The governor was seen quickly biting his tongue, going through the mental gymnastics of trying to avoid the phrase "sectarian." Finally, Ayoub opted to say, "The killer was a criminal with no religious affiliation, who targeted places that could have had Muslims too."

El-Minawy went on to introduce his studio guests, journalist Saad Hagras and researcher Hani Labib, asking them to comment on the issue “not from a sectarian perspective, but the point of view of a regular civilian altercation." The guest speakers seemed to miss these instructions. Both responded with informed and level-headed comments.

Incidentally, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, a NGO that does excellent works on issues related to minority rights (among other things), released a report last week on the Naga Hammadi. It is extremely recommended reading. At the press conference for the report, researchers described the state of siege the town and surrounding village are under, intimidation of locals by security, the destruction of Coptic property by Muslims that took place because of false rumors being propagated, and more. One of their most salient criticisms of the handling of the situation by the security services was that more could have been done to prevent the killings of 6 January, and that investigations must look into the rumor-mongering and political backdrop of the sectarian tensions since last November.

In this week's Middle East International [subs], I wrote:

The official explanation, that the killings were in retaliation for the rape, is on the surface plausible, considering the prevalence of the practice of tar, or vendetta, in the region. But this version of events is questioned by local activists, who point out that the Christmas killings do not fit the pattern of a vendetta, particularly since the killers were not related to the rape victim and the targeted clerics were unconnected to the rape. Some subscribe to a conspiracy theory, according to which the killings may be part of a political ploy to intimidate Christians ahead of this autumn’s parliamentary elections.

At the centre of this conspiracy theory is one of Naga Hammadi’s MPs, Abdel Rahman el-Ghoul. Ghoul, a Muslim and with a fundamentalist reputation, is a member of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). He stood for election in 2000 (losing the seat), and again in 2005, when he won, despite the opposition of Bishop Kirollos. “In a place like Naga Hammadi,” explains Yousef Sidhoum, editor of Coptic weekly al-Watani, “when the bishop says he supports a candidate, every Christian will vote for him.” Bishop Kirollos, who has backed other Muslim candidates, has long opposed Ghoul, and relations between the two men are tense. After the attack, the bishop said that the gunmen “intended to assassinate me, and I know who is behind it.”

The prevalence of this theory points to a general dissatisfaction with the political handling of sectarian relations. Some denounce tokenism: for instance, the governor of the Qena region is a Copt, but is seen as relatively powerless and ineffective compared to other governors. His handling of the tensions since last November has been criticised, as has a perceived Muslim bias among police and security forces. “This is the game the regime plays,” says Sidhoum. “They address discrimination by appointing a token official. Christians in Qena remember his predecessor, a Muslim, much more favourably.”

The relationship between the MP, al-Ghoul, and the murderers deserves to be investigated — as well as treated with caution by those who want to immediately blame him for ordering the killing. Things are still very unclear. But al-Ghoul most definitely played a negative role in encouraging sectarian tensions in the region, and that deserves a closer look. Pretending that the killings were some random criminal act, as al-Ghoul has vociferously done in parliament, won't help.

From bendib.com

More moves to implement the 2008 Arab Information Ministers' Charter, which sought pan-Arab regulation for satellite TV programming:

RIYADH (AFP) – A proposal to create a pan-Arab television monitor is a "disturbing" move that could could lead to censorship of broadcasts critical of Arab governments, a media watchdog said on Saturday.

The Saudi-Egyptian proposal to establish a regional office to supervise satellite broadcasters is aimed directly at Qatar-based Al-Jazeera, the Palestinian Hamas group's Al-Aqsa TV and Hezbollah's Al-Manar channel, Paris-based Reporters Without Borders said.

"This proposal is disturbing, to say the least," the group said in a statement.

"The danger is that this super-police could be used to censor all TV stations that criticise the region?s governments. It could eventually be turned into a formidable weapon against freedom of information."

The proposal to create the "Office for Arab Satellite Television" is to be discussed when information ministers from Arab League countries meet in Cairo on January 24.

Reporters Without Borders said the proposal stems in part from a recent move by the US Congress to allow satellite owners to be branded "terrorist entities" if they allow broadcasts by television channels also branded as such.

OK, this is quite cool: an architect commissioned to create a new project in Sixth of October City outside of Cairo (which is currently mushrooming with competing shopping mall / residential / office projects) created the draft of the project in Second Life. The website for the project is here. 

In August of 2005 Trijicon was awarded a $660 million dollar, multi-year contract to provide up to 800,000 of its Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) to the U.S. Marine Corps. According to Trijicon, the ACOG is "designed to function in bright light, low light or no light conditions," and is "ideal for combat due to its high degree of discrimination, even among multiple moving targets." At the end of the scope's model number, you can read "JN8:12", which is a reference to the New Testament book of John, Chapter 8, Verse 12, which reads: "Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." (King James Version) (ABC News)The above image, from ABC News' The Blottler, may be considered bad enough on its own, but the fault is the manufacturer's, if we take the military's word that it was unaware of the markings. It's rather disappointing to see this from a military spokesman, though:

However, a spokesperson for CentCom, the U.S. military's overall command in Iraq and Afghanistan, said he did not understand why the issue was any different from U.S. money with religious inscriptions on it.

"The perfect parallel that I see," said Maj. John Redfield, spokesperson for CentCom, told ABC News, "is between the statement that's on the back of our dollar bills, which is 'In God We Trust,' and we haven't moved away from that."

Said Redfield, "Unless the equipment that's being used that has these inscriptions proved to be less than effective for soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and military folks using it, I wouldn't see why we would stop using that."

Well, one reason is that, with their overtones of Crusader rhetoric, it might be deemed offensive by these guys:

A U.S. Army sergeant allows an Iraqi police officer to look through the ACOG scope on his M-4 carbine assault rifle at a post in Hayy, Iraq. (defenseimagery.mil)Or that it will make perfect propaganda fodder for al-Qaeda. I can imagine the al-Sabah press release now, "infidel hordes equipped with Crusader weapons, purveyor of cultural decadence from Great Satan reports..."

The UK and New Zealand are asking Trijicon to remove the markings, after all.

Will the wanton cruelty never end?

The Gaza Valley (Wadi Ghaza) used to host a river with lush banks from Hebron to the Mediterranean. For the past many years it has been transferred into a trickle of sewage after Israeli authorities built a dam and cut the water flow.

Yesterday, the Israelis decided to open the dam, causing the banks of the trickling river to flood the homes of Gaza residents.

The BBC, silencing the perpetrator, turned the incident into an act of nature.

"On Monday seven people were killed in the region when heavy rains caused the worst flash floods seen in a decade."

Human Rights Group Al-Mezan described it differently, "For the second time in less than ten years the Israeli occupation forces have flooded Palestinian homes, fields and possessions of tens of families in the Gaza Strip."

No deaths means the English-speaking media is uninterested.

 

George Joffe, on Seif al-Qadhafi's comeback in Libya, in the ARB:

On October 6, 2009, Colonel Qadhafi, while attending a commemoration for the Union of Free Officers (the movement that planned and executed the 1969 revolution), called on Libyans to create a formal position for his 37 year old son so that he could properly serve them.  The next day, the Libyan Socialist Popular Leadership, a body that brings together heads of tribes and social institutions, proposed that he should become coordinator of its organizing committee, a position that made Saif al-Islam the second most powerful person in the Libyan hierarchy after his father.  His appointment was confirmed ten days later.

The significance of this appointment cannot be overstated.  It is, in effect, the formal endorsement of Colonel Qadhafi’s second son as his successor through a process of republican dynasticism, thus ending the speculation of recent years over how the succession process in Libya is to be managed.  Yet it is also a mechanism by which Saif al-Islam has been domesticated within the current Libyan political system, despite all his ambitions to reform it profoundly.  It remains to be seen how compromised his reform agenda might be in consequence.  It is also not clear whether Saif al-Islam has built up all the informal alliances within the power structure, the security forces, and the tribes that will be necessary if he is to preserve the freedom of action he will undoubtedly need to counter pressure from regime radicals (and possibly his brothers too) to displace him.

This reminds me of the leaks of letters between Seif's brother Muatassim and the US lobbying and PR firms that I blogged about in early September, and makes me wonder: were they leaked by Seif?

Daniel Pipes in praise of Geert Wilders, who in be tried for inciting hatred, in NRO:

Wilders is a charismatic, savvy, principled, and outspoken leader who has rapidly become the most dynamic political force in the Netherlands. While he opines on the full range of topics, Islam and Muslims constitute his signature issue. Overcoming the tendency of Dutch politicians to play it safe, he calls Muhammad a devil and demands that Muslims “tear out half of the Koran if they wish to stay in the Netherlands.” More broadly, he sees Islam itself as the problem, not just a virulent version of it called Islamism.

So how is he not an islamophobe, again?

One the things Pipes lists as a proof of Wilders' moderation is that:

Indicative of this moderation is Wilders’s long-standing affection for Israel that includes two years’ residence in the Jewish state, dozens of visits, and his advocating the transfer of the Dutch embassy to Jerusalem.

Bandar: in the brig?A few months ago I saw an Iranian report that claimed that Prince Bandar — known as "Bandar Bush" for his closeness to the Bush family — was under arrest after having tried to plot a coup. I was skeptical, and emailed a Saudi specialist about it, who dismissed it instantly. Bandar hasn't been seen much since he left the US after being replaced as ambassador, and is probably unhappy with King Abdullah's policies and the rise of Prince Nayef as the most likely successor to the throne. This much is known. The idea of a coup sounded pretty far-fetched.

Yesterday Hugh Miles wrote in the LRB blog that Saudi dissidents claim Bandar and four generals may be held in prison:

According to Saudi opposition sources, Bandar is now in Dhaban Prison, in north west Jeddah, a high security jail where terrorist suspects and political opposition figures are held. Bandar is said to be in a special wing where the other prisoners are four senior generals: one from the army, one from the royal guard, one from the national guard and one from internal security. Bandar’s lawyer in the US denies he is in prison and says he has been seen out and about recently, although he wouldn’t divulge when, where or even in which country.

The last official sighting of Bandar in public seems to have been on 10 December 2008, when he met the king in Jeddah. Since then he has missed a string of important events, and no one will say why. In September 2009, when his position as head of the Kingdom’s National Security Council was renewed for another four years, he didn’t appear in public to profess his allegiance to the king, as is customary. No official explanation was forthcoming. The same month, Bandar missed the Dallas Cowboys’ first home game against the New York Giants in their new stadium. Bandar has been a Cowboys fan since he flew as a fighter pilot instructor in Texas in the 1970s. He normally sits next to his friend Jerry Jones, the team’s owner. Then in October Bandar failed to show up as one of the official delegation accompanying King Abdullah on his landmark visit to Damascus, which ended the four-year estrangement between Saudi Arabia and Syria that began with the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.

But the most significant event Bandar missed was in December 2009 when his ill father, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, returned to the Kingdom after months convalescing in Morocco. As usual, the event was shown live on TV and Prince Sultan received many members of the Saudi royal family. Some senior figures – such as Princes Talal, Muteb and Abdulrahman – weren’t there for known reasons. But Bandar’s absence hasn’t been accounted for.

The lack of any official explanation of Bandar’s whereabouts is especially puzzling since he is supposed to head an important government agency. When he returned from Washington in 2005 after his 22-year stint as ambassador, his appointment as secretary-general of the newly formed National Security Council was meant to signal a return to the family fold and a higher domestic profile. In the months before his disappearance he travelled frequently to Moscow, both to negotiate arms deals and to try to persuade the Kremlin to halt its military co-operation with Iran. There’s been speculation that his activity in Russia could be connected to his disappearance: some blogs claim that Bandar’s supposed abortive coup was exposed by Russian intelligence.

That would be quite huge. Miles speculates that whatever the truth of the matter, Bandar's era of influence is over. This also means one of the major advocates of a strong relationship with the US is now absent, at a time when the next king of Saudi Arabia is likely to be Prince Nayef, who is less sanguine about Amreeka. And so, little by little, US dominion over the Middle East is being eroded.

Update on Thursday, January 21, 2010 at 10:39AM by Issandr El Amrani

The original post on the LRB blog has updated to say:

The blog has just received an anonymous email announcing that ‘Prince Bandar is at his home in Aspen Colorado, he has been there for about 3 weeks.’ Mystery solved then.

"Listen to the hand"

Those of you who monitor US democracy promotion efforts in Egypt — you know who you are — will have noticed that 2009 was eerily quiet in Washington when it came to that issue. Apart from the odd WaPo editorial taking the administration to task (as well as US Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey) for not uttering a word about the Egyptian regime's misdeeds, and analysts such as Carnegie's Michele Dunne, former Bush administration officials like Scott Carpenter (both Republicans incidentally) and organizations liked POMED fighting the fight to keep the issue alive at all, you never heard anything coming from the State Department or the White House. Until a few days ago, that is.

That's when Michael Posner, the newish US Assistant Secretary for Human Rights said the following:

The United States is "very concerned about the tragic events in Nagaa Hammadi," Posner told reporters in Cairo. "It's part of what we see as an atmosphere of intolerance."

On January 6, the eve of the Coptic Orthodox Christmas, three gunmen raked worshippers emerging from mass in Nagaa Hammadi with bullets, in the deadliest attack since 2000 when 20 Copts were killed in sectarian clashes.

Reconciliation efforts between Christians and Muslims alone are not enough, Posner said.

"There needs to be prosecution... there needs to be a break in the sense of impunity and there needs to be justice," he said.

Following the attack, residents of Nagaa Hammadi were furious at what they called government attempts to hush up Egypt's sectarian problem.

Three people were arrested and charged with premeditated murder after the attack which also saw one Muslim policeman killed.

But Posner said more information needed to come to light.

"Who was involved? Who may have ordered the killings?" he asked.

Copts, who account for nearly 10 percent of Egypt's population of 80 million, are the Middle East's largest Christian community but complain of routine harassment and systematic discrimination and marginalisation.

Posner was on his first visit to Egypt in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, as part of a tour that also took him to Jordan and Israel.

While he was openly critical of the human rights situation in Egypt, he insisted that democracy could not be imported.

"There are serious human rights problems in Egypt," Posner said, citing the emergency law, prison conditions, torture, abuse and religious freedom as issues of concern.

But "we know that in any society change occurs from within... In Egypt we take our lead from what Egyptians are saying or doing. It's an Egyptian discussion," said Posner who met ministers, officials, NGOs and activists during his visit.

A few days later, reacting to the arrest of bloggers and activists that had gone down to Naga Hamadi on solidarity with the victims of the recent attacks there, a State Dept. spokesman then said this:

"The United States is deeply concerned by today's arrests of individuals traveling to the Egyptian town of Naga Hammadi to express support for those tragically killed and injured during" the celebrations," said Mark Toner, acting State Department spokesman.

"According to publicly available evidence, those arrested included bloggers, democracy and religious freedom advocates," he added.

"We call on the government of Egypt to uphold the rights of all to peacefully express their political views and desires for universal freedoms and to ensure due process for those detained," Toner said.

The Naga Hammadi incident was a very serious and troubling event, and Posner raised some of the right questions about it (notably who ordered the hit on Bishop Kirollos, which will be the topic of a later post.) And the arrest of the bloggers was absurd and definitely worth condemning.

But let us stick to the context of US-Egypt relations, and ask: is this a turning point for the Obama administration, which chose Cairo for its (now increasingly irrelevant) speech and worked overtime (particularly Scobey) to repair the damage done to the bilateral relationship by the Bush administration? Or is it just a question of timing, since Posner happened to be on a regional tour?

Because while I might approve of the above statements, I am also moved to ask: where have you been all this time? Posner for instance was supposed to come to Cairo over a month ago; there are good grounds to believe he postponed his trip at the ambassador's insistence. There have been plenty of other occasions to voice concern, but instead these officials waited until after Congress finalized Egypt's aid package (including its incredible new endowment), the sale of a bunch of military hardware including shiny new F-16s and the construction of the new Rafah wall began. Not to mention that you had to wait for a WaPo editorial for any criticism to be made at all.

There is another problem. The Obama administration has said (or its proxies have explained) that it would rather deal with these issues in private than publicly, as the Bush administration did. The idea is that this is more productive. One might give them the benefit of a doubt, but after last month's boost on economic aid and the creation of the endowment, one really wonders if anything is being said behind closed doors at all. And whether the administration felt moved to speak out on an issue regarding Copts because the rights of Christian minorities has long been an important question for certain domestic constituencies.

I know many readers of this blog couldn't care less about US statements on human rights; crocodile tears, they'll say, due to the general support for the Mubarak regime. I'm conflicted about it myself. But we should remember that since we are talking about a clientelist relationship between Cairo and Washington, what is said officially does matter: it sets limits on what will be tolerated and can have a real impact on the ground. We saw that in 2004-2005. I would like to see more statements like this one, and fewer free carrots like the endowment. It's hard to separate these carrots from rewards for the disastrous blockade policy on Gaza — a policy both the US and Egypt should change. Right now, Egypt has gotten money and silence on human rights in exchange for enforcing a humanitarian in Gaza and playing along with a bogus peace process in which America can't even keep its own promises. It's a perverse equation.

So, Mr. Posner, well done on speaking out. We'd like to see more of that. But forgive us for our skepticism, we'll wait until we see change we can believe in.