D uring the cold war, we had the Soviet Union; today, we have Iran. At least, that’s the way it seems in many American political and intellectual circles, where Tehran’s foreign policy orientation is deemed to represent and be motivated by the antithesis of Western values. The worst intentions are often assumed and attributed to its leadership. This is most evident in the debate surrounding Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. President George W. Bush observed at one point that if Iran were to obtain not an actual nuclear weapon but simply the know-how to produce one, World War III would be triggered.

The Obama Administration has adopted a less alarmist tone and attempted to pursue a dialogue with Iran’s leaders. Yet it, too, has placed the "Iran question" at the top of its foreign policy agenda, a reflection of how Iran is viewed by American political elites and the public at large. Is it therefore any surprise that a recent Pew Research Center poll revealed that a clear majority of Americans would support a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities?

The cold war analogy is also relevant in another sense when discussing Iran–the exaggerated danger posed by a perceived arch enemy. In retrospect, we can now see that the Soviet Union was not the ominous and rising power the Reagan Administration and its supporters portrayed it to be. Rather than expanding, the USSR was economically contracting and faced a steady and steep decline during the 1980s. The threat posed by Iran today is similarly misrepresented, for four reasons. First, the percentage of GDP that Iran spends on its military is smaller than many of its neighbors; Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and Pakistan all spend more. Second, while Iran is a leading petroleum-exporting country, due to weak refining capacities it imports a significant proportion of its domestic gasoline consumption, making it vulnerable to external pressure and sanctions. Third, as a result of mismanagement, corruption, and sanctions, its economy is in shambles. Inflation hit 26 percent in February, unemployment is at record level, and, according to a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment, "real GDP growth has been declining every year since 2005/2006…falling to less than 1.5 percent in 2009-2010. Official data also show an all round decline in capital, labor, and total factor productivity, with some 20 percent of the population now below the national poverty line." And finally, with regard to Israel, the situation is not as black and white as often assumed.

The Islamic Republic remains home to the largest Jewish population in the Middle East after Israel (about 25,000). Claims by those such as Benny Morris that "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, wants to murder me, my family, and my people," are spurious. Ahmadinejad has many Jews in his own backyard that are within easy reach, yet zero evidence exists that they have been targeted for mass murder. Moreover, notwithstanding the repressive and authoritarian nature of the Iranian regime, it has consistently voted in favor of UN resolutions that endorse a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and it is on record as endorsing, via the Organization of Islamic Conference, the 2002 Arab League Peace Plan that similarly calls for the creation of two states along Israel’s 1967 border. Of course, we can debate the ultimate value of these expressions and their significance. But it is perhaps for these reasons that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak recently stated that "Iran does not constitute an existential threat against Israel." Former Prime Minister Tzipi Livni and the former head of the Mossad, Ephraim Halevy, have made similar comments in recent years.

While Ahmadinejad’s incendiary rhetoric is understandably a cause for concern, focusing exclusively on him and nuclear weapons inhibits a deeper understanding of contemporary Iran. On the ground level, there is a different reality. The future of Iran will be determined here, where a highly educated and politicized population is clamoring for change. An intellectual transformation of significant proportions, best described by Asef Bayat as "post-Islamism," has emerged in recent years. This transformation demands greater attention and recognition within the United States, in the policy community, and the public at large.

It is a transformation inextricable from Iran’s internal struggle for democracy. This struggle, embodied by the slain figure of Neda Agha Sultan and the rise of the Green Movement, became headline news in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election. The largely nonviolent street protests shook the Iranian regime to its core, creating elite rivalries at the top and a roiling discontent below. The Islamic Republic now faces a major crisis of legitimacy, unprecedented since the 1979 revolution, due in part to the widespread internal perception that the election was stolen and to the severe brutality of the postelection crackdown.

This is where Ali Mirsepassi’s Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change begins. Mirsepassi, who teaches sociology and Middle East Eastern Studies at New York University, reminds us that these protests were not merely a spontaneous outburst of public anger but rather are deeply rooted in modern Iranian history and "reveal the continuity of an Iranian tradition of appearing in ‘public’ and ‘shaming’ the authorities." He draws attention to a political tradition–largely unknown to many in the West–of peaceful mass mobilization that dates back to the nineteenth century. He notes that this tradition has long played a key role in Iran’s pursuit of representative and accountable government.