Hizballah:
A Primer
Lara Deeb
July 31, 2006
(Lara Deeb,
a cultural anthropologist, is assistant professor of women’s
studies at the University of California-Irvine. She is author
of An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi‘i
Lebanon.)
For
background on the national dialogue, see Reinoud Leenders, “How
UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform,” Middle
East Report Online, May 23, 2006.
For
background on Hizballah and Syria, see Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah
and Syria’s ‘Lebanese Card’,” Middle
East Report Online, September 14, 2004.
For
background on Hizballah and Iran, see Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, “Iran,
the Vatican of Shi‘ism?” Middle East
Report 233 (Winter 2004).
For
background on Hizballah and the US, see Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah
in the Firing Line,” Middle East Report Online,
April 23, 2003.
For
background on the 1996 Qana bombing, see Laurie King-Irani, “Petition
Charges Israel with War Crimes: The Case of the Qana Massacre
Survivors,” Middle East Report Online,
December 8, 1999.
For
additional reading, see Augustus Richard Norton, Hizballah
of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 2000); and
Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy:
Hizballah, ‘Terrorism’ and the Politics of
Perception,” Third World Quarterly 26/1 (2005). |
Hizballah,
the Lebanese Shi‘i movement whose militia is fighting the
Israeli army in south Lebanon, has been cast misleadingly in
much media coverage of the ongoing war. Much more than a militia,
the movement is also a political party that is a powerful actor
in Lebanese politics and a provider of important social services.
Not a creature of Iranian and Syrian sponsorship, Hizballah arose
to battle Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon from 1982-2000
and, more broadly, to advocate for Lebanon’s historically
disenfranchised Shi‘i Muslim community. While it has many
political opponents in Lebanon, Hizballah is very much of Lebanon
-- a fact that Israel’s military campaign is highlighting.
THE LEBANESE
SHI‘A AND THE LEBANESE STATE
In Lebanon,
the state-society relationship is “confessional” and
government power and positions are allocated on the basis of
religious background. There are 18 officially recognized ethno-confessional
communities in the country today. The original allocations, determined
in 1943 in an unwritten National Pact between Maronite Christians
and Sunni Muslims at the end of the French mandate, gave the
most power to a Maronite Christian president and a Sunni Muslim
prime minister, with the relatively powerless position of speaker
of Parliament going to a Shi‘i Muslim. Other government
positions and seats in Parliament were divided up using a 6:5
ratio of Christians to Muslims. These arrangements purportedly
followed the population ratios in the 1932 census, the last census
ever undertaken in the country.
This confessional
system was stagnant, failing to take into consideration demographic
changes. As the Shi‘i population grew at a rapid pace in
comparison to other groups, the inflexibility of the system exacerbated
Shi‘i under-representation in government. Meanwhile, sect
became a means of gaining access to state resources, as the government
shelled out money to establish sect-based welfare networks and
institutions like schools and hospitals. Because the Shi‘a
were under-represented in government, they could channel fewer
resources to their community, contributing to disproportionate
poverty among Shi‘i Lebanese. This effect was aggravated
by the fact that Shi‘i seats in Parliament were usually
filled by feudal landowners and other insulated elites.
Until the
1960s, most of the Shi‘i population in Lebanon lived in
rural areas, mainly in the south and in the Bekaa Valley, where
living conditions did not approach the standards of the rest
of the nation. Following a modernization program that established
road networks and introduced cash-crop policies in the countryside,
many Shi‘i Muslims migrated to Beirut, settling in a ring
of impoverished suburbs around the capital. The rapid urbanization
that came with incorporation into the capitalist world economy
further widened economic disparities within Lebanon.
ORIGINS
Initially,
this growing urban population of mostly Shi‘i poor in Lebanon
was not mobilized along sectarian lines. In the 1960s and early
1970s, they made up much of the rank and file of the Lebanese
Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. Later,
in the 1970s, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic cleric who had
studied in the Iraqi shrine city of Najaf, began to challenge
the leftist parties for the loyalty of Shi‘i youth. Al-Sadr
offered instead the “Movement of the Deprived,” dedicated
to attaining political rights for the dispossessed within the
Lebanese polity. A militia branch of this movement, Amal, was
founded at the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Alongside
al-Sadr, there were also other activist Lebanese Shi‘i
religious leaders, most of whom had also studied in Najaf, who
worked to establish grassroots social and religious networks
in the Shi‘i neighborhoods of Beirut. Among them were Sayyid
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, today one of the most respected “sources
of emulation” among Shi‘i Muslims in Lebanon and
beyond, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. A “source of emulation” (marja‘ al-taqlid)
is a religious scholar of such widely recognized erudition that
individual Shi‘i Muslims seek and follow his advice on
religious matters. Among the Shi‘a, the title of sayyid denotes
a claim of descent from Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.
Between 1978
and 1982 a number of events propelled the nascent Shi‘i
mobilization forward and further divorced it from the leftist
parties: two Israeli invasions of Lebanon, the unexplained disappearance
of Musa al-Sadr and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In 1978,
while on a visit to Libya, al-Sadr mysteriously vanished, and
his popularity surged thereafter. That same year, to push back
PLO fighters then based in Lebanon, Israel invaded the south,
displacing 250,000 people. The initial consequence of these two
events was Amal’s revitalization, as Amal militiamen fought
PLO guerrillas in south Lebanon. There were increasing Shi‘i
perceptions that the Lebanese left had failed, both in securing
greater rights for the poor and in protecting the south from
the fighting between the PLO and Israel. The following year,
the Islamic Revolution in Iran set a new sort of example for
Shi‘i Muslims around the world, and provided an alternative
worldview to Western liberal capitalism different from that espoused
by the left.
The final,
and doubtless the most important, ingredient in this cauldron
of events was the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June
1982. This time Israeli troops, aiming to expel the PLO from
Lebanon entirely, marched north and laid siege to West Beirut.
Tens of thousands of Lebanese were killed and injured during
the invasion, and another 450,000 people were displaced. Between
September 16-18, 1982, under the protection and direction of
the Israeli military and then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon, a Lebanese Phalangist militia unit entered the Sabra
and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut, and raped, killed and maimed
thousands of civilian refugees. Approximately one quarter of
those refugees were Shi‘i Lebanese who had fled the violence
in the south. The importance of the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon to the formation of Hizballah cannot be underestimated.
Following
the events of 1982, many prominent members of Amal left the party,
which had become increasingly involved in patronage politics
and detached from the larger struggles against poverty and Israeli
occupation. In these years, a number of small, armed groups of
young men organized under the banner of Islam emerged in the
south, the Bekaa Valley and the suburbs of Beirut. These groups
were dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation troops, and
also participated in the Lebanese civil war, which by this time
had engaged over 15 militias and armies. Initial military training
and equipment for the Shi‘i militias was provided by Iran.
Over time, these groups coalesced into Hizballah, though the
formal existence of the “Party of God” and its armed
wing, the Islamic Resistance, were not announced until February
16, 1985, in an “Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon
and the World.”
STRUCTURE
AND LEADERSHIP
Since 1985,
Hizballah has developed a complex internal structure. In the
1980s, a religious council of prominent leaders called the majlis
al-shura was formed. This seven-member council included branches
for various aspects of the group’s functioning, including
financial, judicial, social, political and military committees.
There were also local regional councils in Beirut, the Bekaa
and the south. Toward the end of the Lebanese civil war, as Hizballah
began to enter Lebanese state politics, two other decision-making
bodies were established, an executive council and a politburo.
Sayyid Muhammad
Husayn Fadlallah is often described as “the spiritual leader” of
Hizballah. Both Fadlallah and the party have always denied that
relationship, however, and in fact, for a time there was a rift
between them over the nature of the Shi‘i Islamic institution
of the marja‘iyya. The marja‘iyya refers
to the practice and institution of following or emulating a marja‘ al-taqlid.
Fadlallah believes that religious scholars should work through
multiple institutions, and should not affiliate with a single
political party or be involved in affairs of worldly government.
In these beliefs, he is close to traditional Shi‘i jurisprudence,
and distant from the concept of velayat-e faqih (rule
of the clerics) promulgated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of
Iran.
Hizballah
and its majlis al-shura officially follow Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as Supreme Leader of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, but individual supporters or party
members are free to choose which marja‘ to follow,
and many emulate Fadlallah instead. The point is that political
allegiance and religious emulation are two separate issues that
may or may not overlap for any single person.
Sayyid Hasan
Nasrallah is the current political leader of Hizballah. While
he is also a religious scholar, and also studied at Najaf, he
does not rank highly enough to be a marja‘ al-taqlid and
instead is a religious follower of Khamenei. Nasrallah became
Hizballah’s Secretary-General in 1992, after Israel assassinated
his predecessor, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, along with his
wife and 5 year-old son. Nasrallah is widely viewed in Lebanon
as a leader who “tells it like it is” -- even by
those who disagree with the party’s ideology and actions.
It was under his leadership that Hizballah committed itself to
working within the state and began participating in elections,
a decision that alienated some of the more revolution-oriented
clerics in the leadership.
HIZBALLAH
AND THE UNITED STATES
In the United
States, Hizballah is generally associated with the 1983 bombings
of the US embassy, the Marine barracks and the French-led multinational
force headquarters in Beirut. The second bombing led directly
to the US military’s departure from Lebanon. The movement
is also cited by the State Department in connection with the
kidnappings of Westerners in Lebanon and the hostage crisis that
led to the Iran-contra affair, the 1985 hijacking of a TWA flight
and bombings of the Israeli embassy and cultural center in Buenos
Aires in the early 1990s. These associations are the stated reasons
for the presence of Hizballah’s name on the State Department’s
list of terrorist organizations. In 2002, then Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage famously described Hizballah as the “A-Team
of terrorists,” possessing a “global reach,” and
suggested that “maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-Team.” Hizballah’s
involvement in these attacks remains a matter of contention,
however. Even if their involvement is accepted, it is both inaccurate
and unwise to dismiss Hizballah as “terrorists.”
There are
several major reasons for this. First, Hizballah’s military
activity has generally been committed to the goal of ending the
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Since the May 2000 Israeli
withdrawal, they have largely operated within tacit, but mutually
understood “rules of the game” for ongoing, low-level
border skirmishes with Israel that avoid civilian casualties.
In addition, Hizballah has grown and changed significantly since
its inception, and has developed into both a legitimate Lebanese
political party and an umbrella organization for myriad social
welfare institutions.
Another aspect
of the US listing of Hizballah on the terrorist list is related
to the group’s reputation as undertaking numerous “suicide
attacks” or “martyrdom operations.” In fact,
of the hundreds of military operations undertaken by the group
during the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon, only 12
involved the intentional death of a Hizballah fighter. At least
half of the “suicide attacks” against Israeli occupying
forces in Lebanon were carried out by members of secular and
leftist parties.
A third element
in the US insistence on labeling Hizballah a terrorist group
is related to the notion that Hizballah’s raison d’etre is
the destruction of Israel, or “occupied Palestine,” as
per the party’s rhetoric. This perspective is supported
by the 1985 Open Letter, which includes statements such as, “Israel’s
final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliteration
from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from
the talons of occupation.” One might question the feasibility
of such a project, particularly given the great asymmetry in
military might and destructive power that is now on display.
Hizballah's large-scale rocket barrages of July 2006 commenced
after the Israeli bombardment had begun (there was a smaller
diversionary rocket attack in the Galilee on the morning of July
12, just prior to the cross-border raid to capture Israeli soldiers).
Those barrages have thus far killed 19 civilians and damaged
numerous buildings -- nothing like the devastation and death
wrought by Israeli aircraft in Lebanon. There is
also reason to question Hizballah’s intent, despite
frequent repetition of the Open Letter rhetoric. Prior to May
2000, almost all of Hizballah’s military activity was focused
on freeing Lebanese territory of Israeli occupation. The cross-border
attacks from May 2000 to July 2006 were small operations with
tactical aims (Israel did not even respond militarily to all
of them).
Hizballah’s
founding document also says: “We recognize no treaty with
[Israel], no ceasefire and no peace agreements, whether separate
or consolidated.” This language was drafted at the time
when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had just given rise to the
Hizballah militia. Augustus R. Norton, author of several books
and articles on Hizballah, notes that, “While Hizballah’s
enmity for Israel is not to be dismissed, the simple fact is
that it has been tacitly negotiating with Israel for years.” Hizballah’s
indirect talks with Israel in 1996 and 2004 and their stated
willingness to arrange a prisoner exchange today all indicate
realism on the part of party leadership.
RESISTANCE,
POLITICS AND RULES OF THE GAME
In 1985, Israel
withdrew from most of Lebanon, but continued to occupy the southern
zone of the country, controlling approximately ten percent of
Lebanon using both Israeli soldiers and a proxy Lebanese militia,
the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance
took the lead, though there were other contingents, in fighting
that occupation. The party also worked to represent the interests
of the Shi‘a in Lebanese politics.
The Lebanese
civil war came to an end in 1990, after the signing of the Ta’if
Agreement in 1989. The Ta’if Agreement reasserted a variation
of the National Pact, allotting greater power to the prime minister
and increasing the number of Muslim seats in government. Yet
while the actual numerical strength of confessional groups in
Lebanon is sharply contested, conservative estimates note that
by the end of the civil war, Shi‘i Muslims made up at least
one third of the population, making them the largest confessional
community. Other estimates are much higher.
When the first
post-war elections were held in Lebanon in 1992, many of the
various militia groups (which had often grown out of political
parties) reverted to their political party status and participated.
Hizballah also chose to participate, declaring its intention
to work within the existing Lebanese political system, while
keeping its weapons to continue its guerrilla campaign against
the Israeli occupation in the south, as allowed by the Ta’if
accord. In that first election, the party won eight seats, giving
them the largest single bloc in the 128-member parliament, and
its allies won an additional four seats. From that point on,
Hizballah developed a reputation -- even among those who disagree
vehemently with their ideologies -- for being a “clean” and
capable political party on both the national and local levels.
This reputation is especially important in Lebanon, where government
corruption is assumed, clientelism is the norm and political
positions are often inherited. As a group, Lebanese parliamentarians
are the wealthiest legislature in the world.
While the
party’s parliamentary politics were generally respected,
levels of national support for the activities of the Islamic
Resistance in the south fluctuated over the years. Israeli attacks
on Lebanese civilians and infrastructure -- including the destruction
of power plants in Beirut in 1996, 1999 and 2000 -- generally
contributed to increases in national support for the Resistance.
This was especially true after Israel bombed a UN bunker where
civilians had taken refuge in Qana on April 18, 1996, killing
106 people.
The occupation
of south Lebanon was costly for Israel. Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak made withdrawal a campaign promise in 1999, and later
announced that it would take place by July 2000. A month and
a half before this deadline, after SLA desertions and the collapse
of potential talks with Syria, Barak ordered a chaotic withdrawal
from Lebanon, taking many by surprise. At 3 am on May 24, 2000,
the last Israeli soldier stepped off Lebanese soil and locked
the gate at the Fatima border crossing behind him. Many predicted
that lawlessness, sectarian violence and chaos would fill the
void left by the Israeli occupation forces and the SLA, which
rapidly collapsed in Israel’s wake. Those predictions proved
false as Hizballah maintained order in the border region.
Despite withdrawal,
a territorial dispute continues over a 15-square mile border
region called the Shebaa Farms that remains under Israeli occupation.
Lebanon and Syria assert that the mountainside is Lebanese land,
while Israel and the UN have declared it part of the Golan Heights
and, therefore, Syrian territory (though occupied by Israel).
Since 2000, Lebanon has also been awaiting the delivery from
Israel of the map for the locations of over 300,000 landmines
the Israeli army planted in south Lebanon. Unstated “rules
of the game,” building on an agreement not to target civilians
written after the Qana attack in 1996, have governed the Israeli-Lebanese
border dispute since 2000. Hizballah attacks on Israeli army
posts in the occupied Shebaa Farms, for example, would be answered
by limited Israeli shelling of Hizballah outposts and sonic booms
over Lebanon.
Both sides,
on occasion, have broken the “rules of the game,” though
UN observer reports of the numbers of border violations find
that Israel has violated the Blue Line between the countries
ten times more frequently than Hizballah has. Israeli forces
have kidnapped Lebanese shepherds and fishermen. Hizballah abducted
an Israeli businessman in Lebanon in October 2000, claiming that
he was a spy. In January 2004, through German mediators, Hizballah
and Israel concluded a deal whereby Israel released hundreds
of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the businessman
and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers. At the last minute,
Israeli officials defied the Supreme Court’s ruling and
refused to hand over the last three Lebanese prisoners, including
the longest-held detainee, Samir al-Qantar, who has been in jail
for 27 years for killing three Israelis after infiltrating the
border. At that time, Hizballah vowed to open new negotiations
at some point in the future.
HIZBALLAH’S
NATIONALISM
As noted,
Hizballah officially follows Khamenei as the party’s marja‘,
and has maintained a warm relationship with Iran dating to the
1980s, when Iran helped to train and arm the militia. Hizballah
consults with Iranian leaders, and receives an indeterminate
amount of economic aid. Iran has also continued military aid
to the Islamic Resistance, including some of the rockets in the
militia’s arsenal. This relationship does not, however,
mean that Iran dictates Hizballah’s policies or decision-making,
or can necessarily control the actions of the party. Meanwhile,
Iranian efforts to infuse the Lebanese Shi‘a with a pan-Shi‘i
identity centered on Iran have run up against the Arab identity
and increasing Lebanese nationalism of Hizballah itself.
A similar
conclusion can be reached about Syria, often viewed as so close
to Hizballah that the party’s militia is dubbed Syria’s “Lebanese
card” in its efforts to regain the Golan Heights from Israel.
While the party keeps good relations with the Syrian government,
Syria does not control or dictate Hizballah decisions or actions.
Party decisions are made independently, in accordance with Hizballah’s
view of Lebanon’s interests and the party’s own interests
within Lebanese politics. After the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005, and the subsequent
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah’s position was
often inaccurately described as “pro-Syrian.” In
fact, the party’s rhetoric was carefully chosen not to
oppose Syrian withdrawal, but to recast it as a withdrawal that
would not sever all ties with Lebanon, and that would take place
under an umbrella of “gratitude.”
There is no
doubt that Hizballah is a nationalist party. Its view of nationalism
differs from that of many Lebanese, especially from the Phoenician-origins
nationalism espoused by the Maronite Christian right, and from
the neo-liberal, US-backed nationalism of Hariri’s party.
Hizballah offers a nationalism that views Lebanon as an Arab
state that cannot distance itself from causes like the Palestine
question. Its political ideology maintains an Islamic outlook.
The 1985 Open Letter notes the party’s desire to establish
an Islamic state, but only through the will of the people. “We
don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force,” the
letter reads. The party’s decision to participate in elections
in 1992 underscored its commitment to working through the existing
structure of the Lebanese state, and also shifted the party’s
focus from a pan-Islamic resistance to Israel toward internal
Lebanese politics. Furthermore, since 1992, Hizballah leaders
have frequently acknowledged the contingencies of Lebanon’s
multi-confessional society and the importance of sectarian coexistence
and pluralism within the country. It should also be noted that
many of Hizballah’s constituents do not want to live in
an Islamic state; rather, they want the party to represent their
interests within a pluralist Lebanon.
The nationalist
outlook of the party has grown throughout Hizballah’s transition
from resistance militia to political party and more. After the
Syrian withdrawal, it became evident that the party would play
a larger role in the Lebanese government. Indeed, in the 2005
elections, Hizballah increased their parliamentary seats to 14,
in a voting bloc with other parties that took 35. Also in 2005,
for the first time, the party chose to participate in the cabinet,
and currently holds the Ministry of Energy.
Hizballah
does not regard its participation in government as contradicting
its maintenance of a non-state militia. In fact, the first item
on Hizballah’s 2005 electoral platform pledged to “safeguard
Lebanon’s independence and protect it from the Israeli
menace by safeguarding the Resistance, Hizballah’s military
wing and its weapons, in order to achieve total liberation of
Lebanese occupied land.” This stance places the party at
odds with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for
the “disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese
militias” in September 2004, and with those political forces
in Lebanon that seek to implement the resolution. Prior to the
July events, Nasrallah and other party leaders attended a series
of “national dialogue” meetings aimed at setting
the terms for Hizballah’s disarmament. The dialogue had
not come to any conclusions by the beginning of the current violence,
in part because of Hizballah’s insistence that its arms
were still needed to defend Lebanon.
But the party
has a social platform as well, and views itself as representing
not only Shi‘i Lebanese, but also the poor more generally.
The Amal militia formed by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr developed into
a political party as well, and has been Hizballah’s main
political rival among Shi‘i Lebanese, though they are now
working in tandem. The longtime speaker of Parliament, Nabih
Berri, Amal’s leader, is the intermediary between Hizballah
and diplomats inquiring about ceasefire terms and a prisoner
exchange. The party also plays the usual political game in Lebanon,
where candidates run on multi-confessional district slates rather
than as individuals, and it allies (however temporarily) with
politicians who do not back its program. In the 2005 parliamentary
contests, the Sunni on Hizballah’s slate in Sidon was Bahiyya
al-Hariri, sister of the assassinated ex-premier. Since the elections,
the strongest ally of the Shi‘i movement has been the former
general, Michel Aoun, the quintessentially “anti-Syrian” figure
in Lebanese politics. Aoun’s movement, along with Hizballah,
was an important component of enormous demonstrations on May
10 in Beirut against the government’s privatization plans,
which would cost jobs in Lebanon’s public sector.
SOCIAL WELFARE
Among the
consequences of the Lebanese civil war were economic stagnation,
government corruption and a widening gap between the ever shrinking
middle class and the ever expanding ranks of the poor. Shi‘i
areas of Beirut also had to cope with massive displacement from
the south and the Bekaa. In this economic climate, sectarian
clientelism became a necessary survival tool.
A Shi‘i
Muslim social welfare network developed in the 1970s and 1980s,
with key actors including al-Sadr, Fadlallah and Hizballah. Today,
Hizballah functions as an umbrella organization under which many
social welfare institutions are run. Some of these institutions
provide monthly support and supplemental nutritional, educational,
housing and health assistance for the poor; others focus on supporting
orphans; still others are devoted to reconstruction of war-damaged
areas. There are also Hizballah-affiliated schools, clinics and
low-cost hospitals, including a school for children with Down’s
syndrome.
These social
welfare institutions are located around Lebanon and serve the
local people regardless of sect, though they are concentrated
in the mainly Shi‘i Muslim areas of the country. They are
run almost entirely through volunteer labor, mostly that of women,
and much of their funding stems from individual donations, orphan
sponsorships and religious taxes. Shi‘i Muslims pay an
annual tithe called the khums, one fifth of the income
they do not need for their own family’s upkeep. Half of
this tithe is given to the care of the marja‘ they
recognize. Since 1995, when Khamenei appointed Nasrallah and
another Hizballah leader as his religious deputies in Lebanon,
the khums revenues of Lebanese Shi‘a who follow
Khamenei have gone directly into Hizballah’s coffers. These
Shi‘a also give their zakat, the alms required of
all Muslims able to pay, to Hizballah’s vast network of
social welfare institutions. Much of this financial support comes
from Lebanese Shi‘a living abroad.
WHO SUPPORTS
HIZBALLAH?
As one of
Israel’s stated goals in the current war is the “removal” of
Hizballah from the south, it is critical to note that the party
has a broad base of support throughout the south and the country
-- a base of support that is not necessarily dependent on sect.
Being born to a Shi‘i Muslim family, or even being a practicing
and pious Shi‘i Muslim, does not determine one’s
political affiliation.
Nor does one’s
socio-economic status. It is sometimes assumed that Hizballah
is using its social organizations to bribe supporters, or that
these organizations exist solely to prop up
“terrorist activities.” These views both betray a simplistic
view of the party. A more accurate reading would suggest that the
party’s popularity is based in part on its dedication to
the poor, but also on its political platforms and record in Lebanon,
its Islamist ideologies, and its resistance to Israeli occupation
and violations of Lebanese sovereignty.
Hizballah’s
popularity is based on a combination of ideology, resistance
and an approach to political-economic development. For some,
Hizballah’s ideologies are viewed as providing a viable
alternative to a US-supported government and its neo-liberal
economic project in Lebanon and as an active opposition to the
role of the US in the Middle East. Its constituents are not only
the poor, but increasingly come from the middle classes and include
many upwardly mobile, highly educated Lebanese. Many of its supporters
are Shi‘i Muslim, but there are also many Lebanese of other
religious backgrounds who support the party and/or the Islamic
Resistance.
“Hizballah
supporter” is itself a vague phrase. There are official
members of the party and/or the Islamic Resistance; there are
volunteers in party-affiliated social welfare organizations;
there are those who voted for the party in the last election;
there are those who support the Resistance in the current conflict,
whether or not they agree with its ideology. To claim ridding
south Lebanon of Hizballah as a goal risks aiming for the complete
depopulation of the south, tantamount to ethnic cleansing of
the area.
In terms of
the current conflict, while Lebanese public opinion seems to
be divided as to whether blame should be placed on Hizballah
or Israel for the devastation befalling the country, this division
does not necessarily fall along sectarian lines. More importantly,
there are many Lebanese who disagree with Hizballah’s Islamist
ideologies or political platforms, and who believe that their
July 12 operation was a mistake, but who are supportive of the
Islamic Resistance and view Israel as their enemy. These are
not mutually exclusive positions. One of the effects of the Israeli
attacks on selected areas of Beirut has been to widen the class
divides in the Lebanon, which may serve to further increase Hizballah’s
popularity among those who already felt alienated from Hariri-style
reconstruction and development.
THE CURRENT
VIOLENCE
On July 12,
2006, Hizballah fighters attacked an Israeli army convoy and
captured two soldiers. The party stated that they had captured
these soldiers for use as bargaining chips in indirect negotiations
for the release of the three Lebanese detained without due process
and in defiance of the Supreme Court in Israel. As noted, there
is precedent for such negotiations. The raid had been planned
for months, and the party made at least one earlier attempt to
capture soldiers. Nasrallah had stated earlier that 2006 would
be the year when negotiations would take place for the release
of the three remaining Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. In
a July 20 interview on al-Jazeera, he also stated that other
leaders in Lebanon were aware of his intention to order a capture
attempt, though not of the details of this particular operation.
After the
capture of the soldiers, Israel unleashed an aerial assault on
Lebanon’s cities and infrastructure on a scale unseen since
the 1982 invasion. This attack was accompanied by a naval blockade,
and more recently, a ground invasion. The ground invasion is
being strongly opposed by Hizballah fighters along with fighters
from other parties. Both the Lebanese Communist Party and Amal
have announced the deaths of fighters in battle. At least 516
Lebanese have been killed, mostly civilians; the Lebanese government’s
tally of the dead stands at 750 or more. A UN count says one
third of the dead are children. In several cases, villagers who
were warned by Israeli leaflets or automated telephone messages
to leave their homes were killed when their vehicles were targeted
shortly thereafter. On July 30, Israeli planes bombed a three-story
house being used as a shelter in Qana, killing at least 57 civilians
and reawakening memories of the 1996 Qana massacre. The Lebanese
government estimates that 2,000 people have been wounded since
July 12, while as many as 750,000 people have been displaced
from their homes. Hizballah has responded, since early on in
the Israeli bombing campaign, by firing hundreds of rockets into
Israel, killing 19 civilians thus far. An additional 33 Israeli
soldiers have been killed in combat.
In Lebanon,
entire villages in the south have been flattened, as have whole
neighborhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Runways and
fuel tanks at Beirut International Airport, roads, ports, power
plants, bridges, gas stations, TV transmitters, cell phone towers,
a dairy and other factories, and wheat silos have been targeted
and destroyed, as well as trucks carrying medical supplies, ambulances,
and minivans full of civilians. The UN is warning of a humanitarian
crisis, and has indicated that war crimes investigations are
in order for the targeting of civilians in both Lebanon and Israel.
Human Rights Watch has documented Israel’s use of artillery-fired
cluster munitions, which it believes “may violate the prohibition
on indiscriminate attacks contained in international humanitarian
law” because the “bomblets” spread widely and
often fail to explode on impact, in effect becoming land mines.
Eyewitnesses in Beirut report that the pattern of destruction
in hard-hit neighborhoods resembles that caused by thermobaric
weapons, or “vacuum bombs,” whose blast effects are
innately indiscriminate. Lebanese doctors receiving dead and
wounded have alleged that Israeli bombs contain white phosphorus,
a substance that, if used in offensive operations, is considered
an illegal chemical weapon.
Israel’s
initially stated goal of securing the release of the two captured
soldiers has faded from Israeli discourse and given way to two
additional stated goals: the disarmament or at least “degrading” of
Hizballah’s militia, as well as its removal from south
Lebanon. According to an article in the July 21 San Francisco
Chronicle, “a senior Israeli army officer” had
presented plans for an offensive with these goals to US and other
diplomats over a year before Hizballah’s capture of the
two soldiers. Though Israel is not in compliance with several
UN resolutions, the Israeli army appears to be attempting singlehandedly
-- though with US approval -- to implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1559.
It is unclear
how the aerial bombardment of infrastructure and the killing
of Lebanese civilians can lead to any of these goals, especially
as support for Hizballah and the Islamic Resistance appears to
be increasing. Outrage at Israel’s actions trumps ideological
disagreement with Hizballah for many Lebanese at this point,
and as such, it is likely that support for the party will continue
to grow.
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CORRECTION:
Due to an editor's error, the initial version of
this article misleadingly implied that Hizballah did not fire
any rockets at Israel in July 2006 prior to the Israeli bombardment
of Lebanon. In fact, there was a rocket attack in the Galilee
on the morning of July 12, prior to Hizballah's raid on the army
convoy and the current Israeli military campaign. We regret the
error.
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