Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

Elhanan Helpman, Harvard University, Tel Aviv University and CIAR
Torsten Persson, Institute for International Economic Studies and London School of Economics

A BEJEAP Advances article.

Abstract

We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.

Submitted: July 16, 2001 · Accepted: October 26, 2001 · Published: November 3, 2001

Originally published in Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Helpman, Elhanan and Persson, Torsten (2001) "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol1/iss1/art3

 
 
 
 

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