Afghanistan peace council inaugural session (AP)
Middle East Bulletin interview with Caroline Wadhams, director for South Asia Security Studies, Center for American Progress.
You recently returned from a NATO-led trip to Afghanistan. What were the key lessons learned from the trip?
There were a few key takeaways from the trip. First, I saw just how extensive our footprint is in Afghanistan, in terms of infrastructure, personnel, money, bases, equipment, etc. It was sobering to see how entangled we are in that country and how difficult it will be to extract ourselves over time.
Second, through my interviews with different NATO-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan government officials, I grew more skeptical about whether the strategy we are undertaking is achievable by 2014—the deadline for transfer—or even beyond. NATO-ISAF officials consistently stated that the inputs for the strategy are finally in place and that slow progress is being made. But the overall thrust of the strategy—to stabilize Afghanistan through the extension of central government authority from Kabul throughout the entire country—seemed unrealistic. I do not think the central government can be extended in our timeframe due to its lack of legitimacy and capacity, as well as a historical legacy in Afghanistan in which governance has been largely decentralized. Many local communities feel disconnected from Kabul and have shown resistance to the presence of government officials and police that have been appointed to govern there. And, to make matters worse, many government officials are corrupt and sometimes abusive, and people have no way of holding them accountable for their crimes. Though it was clear to me that U.S. and NATO troops are doing a tremendous job. They are doing exactly what they have been asked to do; the problem is they cannot transfer the security lead to the Afghan government.
Finally, NATO and the United States do not have an articulated political strategy. Nobody I spoke to could clearly articulate a response to important questions such as, “What do you want Karzai to do? How do you want Karzai to reform? If we recognize that state stability in Afghanistan depends on governance, what is our plan for ensuring that the government is sustainable and that it has larger, broader political support from the Afghan population?” We are trying to build the capacity of the government but we are not clear on how to address the lack of legitimacy and the government’s narrowing base of support. That appeared to be a huge gap in strategic thinking about Afghanistan.
While the war has been fought since 2002, this administration’s new strategy has only been in place for one year. As such, do you see room for improvement if the full strategy is given sufficient time to be carried out?
General Petraeus has actually said that the full resources for the strategy have only been in place for a couple of months. Even though we have not provided enough resources to Afghanistan for a long time, I am not optimistic that the strategy will work even with more time. There have been dynamics created during the past nine years that cannot be answered with more money and troops. There are flaws in the strategy that need to be addressed. For one, the military component—clearing insurgent areas and targeting insurgent commander and foot soldiers—dominates the strategy; the pieces that are essential to creating peace, such as the political and diplomatic elements, remain undeveloped. As I said earlier, there is no concrete strategy for reforming the government, and the current strategy does not have an aggressive enough diplomatic effort for reaching out to Afghanistan’s neighbors.
Another problem is that through international funding, whether it be our contracts or development assistance, we have empowered many former warlords and other unsavory actors who are despised by their communities. Some are associated with the government; some are only associated with the international community. Their abuses have also contributed to insurgent recruitment. NATO-ISAF has implemented new contracting guidance to address this, but we still have little idea of how to deal with the Frankensteins we have created and who we continue to rely on for protecting our military convoys and more.
In terms of a regional strategy, the Taliban continues to maintain safe havens in Pakistan. How have the Pakistani and Afghan governments worked together to solve this problem and other mutual problems between the countries?
There are a series of efforts underway to decrease the distrust and improve the cooperation between the two countries. The Tripartite Commission is one forum where senior NATO, Pakistani and Afghanistan officials share intelligence and discuss security challenges; the Commission has also created border coordination centers. There has also been an increase in the number of meetings between military and civilian officials from Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, there is a fundamental stumbling block that remains even with the closer collaboration between the governments. The Pakistanis continue to fear that the Afghan government is too closely aligned with India and want to ensure their influence in Afghanistan. Consequently, there is widespread agreement that the Pakistanis continue to support elements of the insurgency, particularly the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura of the Taliban, as potential hedges against a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan. With continued uncertainty about how long the international community will stay in Afghanistan, and increased speculation regarding a political deal with insurgents, the Pakistanis have little inclination to crack down or distance themselves from these insurgent groups in case they need to utilize them in a future scenario.
How does Pakistan view the Afghan government’s recent efforts to engage elements of the Taliban?
The Pakistanis ultimately want a deal between Karzai and the insurgency, especially the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura in the Taliban, where elements from these networks are integrated into the Afghan government. This would provide Pakistan greater assurance that its interests are represented in the Afghan government. Pakistan is very supportive of the Afghan government’s efforts to engage the insurgency, but Pakistan wants to ensure that it are involved in that process.
How has the U.S. government helped to improve relations and coordination between the Afghan and Pakistan governments?
The United States has undertaken a number of efforts such as the intelligence-sharing Tripartite Commission; bringing together the countries’ leaders in bilateral formats and regional conferences; and publicly encouraging closer relations between the countries. One of the Obama administration’s major initiatives is an expanded partnership with Pakistan to assist Pakistan in combating militant groups within its territory; to provide support to the civilian government and development priorities in Pakistan; and to broaden relationships between the United States and Pakistan beyond a military-to-military relationship. The United States hopes that one result of these efforts will be to shift Pakistan’s strategic calculations regarding Afghanistan, so that it no longer acts as a spoiler in Afghanistan. If the Pakistanis were to stop offering sanctuary and support to insurgents, as pushed for by U.S. officials, that would go a long way in improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
How has the United States helped improve governance in Afghanistan?
The United States has many different efforts underway. It helps build government capacity by embedding civilian and military personnel within the government to serve as mentors to government officials. We also target funding to specific ministries based on improved transparency and accountability of their funds. In addition, the Obama administration has placed a much greater priority on supporting governance at the local level, including through the District Development program and the Performance Based Governor’s Fund, and in funding rule of law programs. The United States has also exerted pressure on Karzai to implement anti-corruption reforms, with little success thus far.
While there is a lot being attempted, the difficulty remains that the approach is top-down, and President Karzai resists any erosion of his power. The current structure of governance is highly centralized; everything gets determined by Kabul. Karzai appoints positions at every level of government, down to the governor, mayor and district police chief. Local communities do not always support his choices, which creates resentment toward the officials he appoints.
In spring of 2010, you co-authored a report on Afghan governance. How does current governance compare with the situation in the spring?
There has not been a lot of progress in terms of governance. One of our major recommendations was that you needed to bolster checks and balances to counteract an excess of executive power. Another recommendation is that there needs to be more decentralization in terms of budget authority and planning and appointments in order to energize structures and leaders at the local level. We have seen very little progress since the spring. Some of President Karzai’s promises to deal with corruption issues and electoral reform, and to implement already approved decentralization legislation have not occurred. The government again finds itself embroiled in allegations of fraud and corruption as a result of the September parliamentary elections. It is a messy process that is damaging to the legitimacy of the government.
Are these issues that the U.S. administration can affect?
The United States should be using the leverage it does have to push political reforms more aggressively. I do not think we have prioritized a governance reform agenda sufficiently or been clear enough with President Karzai about what we expect. While it will be very difficult and Karzai will resist it, I do think that we should condition some of our assistance based on political reforms that we believe are essential for a more sustainable outcome. Demanding decentralization is a key component of this. I do not believe that we should continue with these military operations without government reforms; ISAF can clear and hold areas, but it ca not then transfer them, which is the ultimate goal.
What did you learn about NATO efforts to train Afghan security forces during your trip?
We got a number of briefings on this subject. ISAF is meeting all of its targets for the numbers of Afghan national police and army recruited and trained. The challenge is the quality of these recruits. There are also problems with high attrition rates, inability to recruit more senior-level figures and lack of literacy among the troops. Because the vast majority of enlisted men in the Afghan national security forces are not literate, ISAF has created literacy programs. One central challenge is that ISAF is having problems recruiting men from south and east Afghanistan, because of the government’s lack of legitimacy in those areas and for fear of reprisals by insurgents. ISAF is trying to recruit Pashtuns from those areas but it is having little success. As a result, the ethnic makeup of the security forces is relatively balanced among ethnic groups, but has few Pashtuns from the south and east. Ultimately, the training effort is vast—they are training about 20,000 people on any given day—which ISAF sees as the way to transfer control of security to the government.
What are other countries in the region doing to improve stability in Afghanistan and what more could they do?
There are a couple of clear spoilers including Pakistan, which offer safe havens to the insurgency as well as some support, though it’s hard to know the extent of it. Also, Iran seems to be playing both sides by supporting the Karzai government with bags of money, while also providing some support and equipment to insurgent groups to fight the U.S. and NATO troops.
There are more than 47 contributing countries to NATO, which are supporting the effort in terms of troop levels, trainers and money. Russia has been increasingly helpful to the United States. It has allowed NATO to transport lethal and nonlethal equipment through its territory. Recently, it provided some support for a counter-narcotics raid. There are a number of central Asian countries that are providing support to Karzai. India is also providing millions of dollars in development assistance to the government, which Pakistan sees as threatening to its interests.
There are many countries that want to see a stable Afghanistan, including Pakistan and Iran. The challenge is aligning everyone’s self-interests. Countries want a stable Afghanistan but on their terms. They do not want an Afghanistan that is perceived as being threatening or acting as a satellite for a rival country. You see that especially with Pakistan and India. While the Obama administration has done much more in its regional outreach, they can do more to bring these countries together. It is a long and difficult process but it needs to be a top priority in increasing stability in Afghanistan and the region.
