The Center for American Progress (CAP) hosted a discussion titled “The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship” on Wednesday. Brian Katulis, senior fellow at CAP, moderated a panel composed of Steven Cook, senior fellow of Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Michael Werz, senior fellow at CAP. As part of the larger discussion of Turkey-U.S. relations, the panelists addressed the development of democracy in Turkey.
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On Wednesday, Dr. Nora Fisher Onar, professor of Politics and International Relations at Bahcesehir Unverisity in Istanbul and visiting research fellow at Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies, spoke on differing schools of thought within Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
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In an article for the Boston Review, Jan-Werner Muller of Princeton University details the history of the Christian democratic movement and asks whether “the historical analogy between Christian and potential Muslim democracy…perhaps suggest[s] promising alternatives to the authoritarian rule that dominates the Middle East.” He asserts that “institutional structures are what matters, not political ideas or programs” – as such, he concludes that “calls for liberalizing Islam and arcane disputes about the Qur’an’s compatibility with democracy are largely beside the point. Programmatic moderation, if it happens at all, will be a result of democratic political practice, not its precondition.” In the case of Christian Democracy, Muller writes, leaders drew in voters by basing their platforms on a particular body of thought, while simultaneously “reassuring nonbelievers that those of faith had accepted pluralism.” By delicately balancing various principles, Christian Democrats made themselves appealing to both Christians and non-Christians. Whether this is possible for Islamist politicians, Muller writes, remains unclear. He points out that “the political mobilization of believers does not necessarily result in a one-to-one translation of private religious identities into public political identities,” and that identities are reconstructed in pluralist arenas where compromise is key. Thus, he concludes, “blanket condemnations of Islam as incompatible with Democracy overlook the fact that religious doctrines do not strictly determine politics.”
In a new, detailed piece at Tehran Bureau, Muhammad Sahimi explains the history of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s troubles with the clerical establishment, and what, if anything, his recent trip to the holy city of Qom accomplished. “Unlike his predecessor as Supreme Leader — Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — Khamenei has never had his own independent base of popular support.” The process through which Khamenei rose to the position of Supreme Leader was heavily influenced by Hashemi Rafsanjani, who thought Khamenei was “weak in religious credentials and therefore pliable.” The recent trip to Qom was an effort to “have the most senior grand ayatollahs and ayatollahs greet him as he entered the holy city, where about 30 Marjas taghlid currently reside. It became quickly clear, however, that aside from Khamenei’s reactionary supporters…no credible cleric would agree to that.”
Sahimi calls into question reports that Khamenei was able to achieve the main goals of the trip: to officially become a Marja taghlid, or figure of emulation, and to be named the Marja-e omoom, the foremost of the Marja. He said that it does not matter how various “daily hardline mouthpieces” and “other reactionary websites” refer to Khamenei. “The great aspect of Shiism is that it is the people who decide whom they want to follow, whom they want to emulate, whom they consider a true and pious Marja,” he says.
Al Masry Al Youm reports today that the Muslim Brotherhood is urging the High Elections Commission to uphold a court order allowing the campaign slogan “Islam is the Solution.” In The Brotherhood’s Opinion, a weekly post by the group, the Brotherhood criticizes the regime’s arrests of group members and calls on the government to treat all candidates fairly. Saad al-Katatni, a Brotherhood spokesman, also asserts that the High Elections Commission “must take a neutral stance as it is not an affiliate of the NDP.”
Muslim Brotherhood sources also say that the group will focus on social justice issues in its campaign platform during the upcoming parliamentary elections. The specific election program – which outlines strategies to tackle unemployment, the uneven distribution of wealth in Egypt, women’s issues, Coptic relations, and other social and political challenges – will be released in the coming weeks.
The New America Foundation (NAF) held an event today marking the release of Hooman Majd’s new book, “The Ayatollahs’ Democracy: An Iranian Challenge.” Majd was introduced by Steve Clemons, Senior Fellow and Director of the American Strategy Program at NAF.
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Writing at Tehran Bureau, Mea Cyrusreports that the Supreme Leader of Iran is making his first trip to the holy city of Qom since the controversial re-election of President Ahmadinejad. Cyrus says that the trip is notable due to the participation of some clerics in the Green Movement, including Mehdi Karroubi, and the recent steps taken by the regime to silence criticism from clerical quarters. “Khamenei is going to Qom for several important reasons, among them to show his authority and intimidate those clerics, both grand and junior, who dare to oppose him and his puppet president publicly or privately.” Cyrus points to the recent shut down of senior cleric’s websites and the centralization of control of religious endowments as areas where Khamenei is applying pressure. Cyrus also mentions the recent news that Azad University is being taken over by the government concluding, “[m]aking this announcement right before his trip to Qom is a calculated step, a warning to other clerics and a move to isolate Rafsanjani and his followers, clerical and nonclerical alike.”
On Monday, October 4th, The George Washington University hosted a panel entitled “Do Jordan’s Elections Matter?” The event was moderated by Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington. The panelists were Curtis Ryan, Associate Professor of Political Science at Appalachian State University, Anne Mariel Peters, Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, and Jillian Schwedler, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts, Amherst. The speakers were asked to discuss Jordan’s upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 9th. In a few opening remarks, Mark Lynch pointed out that much of the discussion about democracy in the Middle East has been “telescoped” on Egypt. Amidst hopes for reform in Jordan, however, it seems important to ask whether these elections will bring change. What role will Islamist groups play, and what election reforms have been made? More broadly, do the elections matter at all?
The full event notes are below - otherwise, find the PDF here.
An event was held today at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace celebrating the release of the book “Between Religion and Politics”, coauthored by Amr Hamzawy and Nathan Brown. Marwan Muasher acted as the moderator for the event, where the authors explained the process they utilized in the researching of the book and explored, in depth, the case studies of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
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Marlin Dick, a freelance journalist based in Lebanon, profiled the evolving nature of Hezbollah in a piece for The Middle East Report Online on Monday. He asserts that, among other successes, the group’s partial reconstruction of some of Beirut’s southern suburbs after the July 2006 War demonstrates that “the party remains ahead in the governance game compared to the woeful Lebanese state,” which remains fragmented and weak. Dick suggests that the party’s domestic reputation has only been improving in recent years, especially in areas where law and order are kept by the party, not the state. Dick describes Hezbollah’s social service provision to its Shiite base as “large-scale and usually efficient,” and adds that its reconstruction projects have been run with considerable professionalism. In contrast, Dick writes, the government has been widely accused of fund mismanagement, corruption, and overall incompetence. Although the party’s performance “has not been spotless in the eyes of its base,” its leaders have cultivated a “domestic political aura of seriousness and anti-corruption” and have engaged in domestic political debates about how to conduct elections, reform, and privatization among other issues.
Dick concludes: “For now, the party is benefiting from its expanded civil, political and state responsibilities [and] has managed to run its ministries without becoming tarred with accusations of corruption and squandering of resources.” He dismisses accusations that the party’s Islamist inclinations threaten the “Lebanese state and political order.”
On Monday, September 13th, POMED hosted an event entitled “Is Turkey Becoming Less Democratic?” The event was moderated by Bill Schneider, Distinguished Senior Fellow and Resident Scholar at Third Way and the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. The discussion featured three panelists: Gonul Tol, Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; Daniel Brumberg, Director of the Muslim World Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace; and W. Robert Pearson, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and President of the International Research and Exchanges Board.
POMED’s full notes continue below or read them as a pdf.
Today at the National Press Club, a press conference was held to discuss the Mubarak government’s prominent role in the upcoming negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Hosted by The Coalition of Egyptian Organizations and the Egyptian Association for Change-USA and moderated by Tarek Khalil, the event featured a panel of Egyptian activists.
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Heather Ferguson, a Stanford University fellow, and Ty McCormick, an intern at the American University in Cairo, argue in the Huffington Post today that the Obama administration has “respectfully declined” to press for political reform in Egypt. In their view, “this policy reflects a sincere belief on the part of the Obama administration that Islamists cannot be democrats.” Ferguson and McCormick criticize the view that Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood might eliminate democratic processes and institutions if elected to office. This type of thinking, they reason, stems from the notion that Islamists are a monolith and have one particular, rigid view of democracy and the role of religion in public life. The authors suggest that the Obama administration has, in effect, “declar[ed] the incompatibility of Islam and democracy,” thereby ignoring the possibilities for elasticity and synthesis in that relationship. Ferguson and McCormick assert that “the U.S. should seize the opportunity presented by ElBaradei [and] attempt to engage positively with his diverse group of followers,” so as to enhance the credibility of Washington’s rhetorical support of democracy in the region.
An editorial in The Nationalcontends that despite consternation in Turkey’s secular circles, the AKP-backed constitutional referendum scheduled for September 12th is a needed step forward: “Although internal bickering has cast the referendum as a power struggle between Islamists and secularists, the fact of the matter is that Turkey’s constitution has long been in need of reform.” The piece continues, “…if Turkey wishes to position itself as a truly democratic power, particularly as it keeps its eye on EU membership, such reforms are an inevitable step in its maturity as a flourishing nation state.”
Meanwhile, writing at RFE/RL Abbas Djavadisuggests that regardless of the results of the referendum, the real challenge facing both secular and Islamic politicians will be forging political compromise over the next year: “Undoubtedly, the 1980 constitution needs to be amended. It no longer suits the stronger, more democratic Turkey of the 21st century. But can the politically deadlocked country move in this direction without resorting to violence or illegal measures? If it cannot find a process of compromise and consensus, much of the progress of recent years could be in danger.”
Writing at Comment is Free, Brian Whitaker discusses the Quilliam Foundation’s claim that “violent and nonviolent Islamists broadly share the same ideology and disagree only on tactics.” According to the Quilliam Strategic Briefing Paper, “Preventing Terrorism: where next for Britain?, “Although some Islamist groups have accepted aspects of democracy, political pluralism and the concept of universal human rights, few — if any — Islamist groups have accepted all of these principles either fully or simultaneously.” The paper goes on to say that Islamism constitutes a threat to secular democracy and “tolerant society,” adding that Islamist ideology promotes an “anti-democratic, fascist state” comparable to racial apartheid.
Presenting a different analysis, Whitaker argues that the key issue is not Islamist violence, but the fact that Islamists “believe in the ’sovereignty of God,’” which “conflicts with democratic ideas about the sovereignty of the people.” According to Whitaker, the underlying problem is “an anti-libertarian assumption that linking the state with religion is both legitimate and necessary. Not only that, but religion claims the right, at least in some circumstances, to override the will of the people.” Whitaker attributes the increasing popularity of Islamist groups in the world to Western support of undemocratic regimes, adding that “the lack of scope for political and religious debate means that their basic ideology often remains unchallenged in the public discourse.” However, responding to Whitaker, Inayat Bounglawalapoints to Turkey as model for reconciliation between Islamic values and democracy. In his assessment, he writes that “across the Islamic world, polls have repeatedly found widespread support in favour of the implementation of both democracy and Islamic values.”
Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, argues in a new policy briefing that the U.S. must reassess its policy toward moderate Islamist groups in the Middle East, or potentially see a trend of radicalization emerge. According to Hamid, major Islamist parties– in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), which operate within countries that are key U.S. allies and leading recipients of U.S. aid –find themselves in “a state of crisis” as they face both increased repression from the current regimes and internal party divisions. Under these circumstances, he points out, moderate groups are reconsidering their positions on a number of issues, including participation in and validation of crucial upcoming national elections in both countries. To support these groups and prevent the rise of more radical elements in their place, Hamid says that the Obama administration should take two important steps. First, it should “publicly affirm the right of all opposition actors, including Islamists, to participate in upcoming elections,” and back up this affirmation with “a consistent American policy of opposing not just the arrests of secular activists but Islamist ones as well.” Second, the administration must “empower U.S. embassies to begin substantive engagement with Islamist groups.” In Hamid’s estimation, though “the Obama administration has emphasized its belief in engaging a diverse range of actors,” thus far “it has failed to reach out to many of the largest, most influential groups in the region”– a situation that must be remedied.
Majid Mohammadi argues at Gozaar that the Green Movement in Iran has “reshaped the Iranian political factions” inside and outside of the country. Noting two different tendencies both inside and outside of Iran, Mohammadi writes, “One section of the movement pursues its goals within the framework of the existing regime and its constitution, while the other does not believe the regime is capable of reform and aims to overthrow the regime through a series of non-violent actions.” Mohammadi says that those in favor of working within the current system– Islamists –and those against it– secularists –are debating the vision of an Iranian republic vs. an Islamic republic. Describing the secularists as “revolutionary in substance,” Mohammadi explains that they “want regime change.” On the other hand, Mohammadi points out that Islamists do not hold the Islamic Republic responsible for the “misery of the Iranian people,” but rather hold “Khamenei’s regime to be a deviation from the original idea of the Islamic republic.”
Writing in the National Review, Barbara Lernerargues that the current ruling political party in Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP,is indeed Islamist and that “a ‘moderate Islamist party’ is a Western fantasy, a contradiction in terms, concocted by people who are blind to the fundamental differences between Islam and Christianity.”Assessing Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, Lerner argues that Turks “are now just part of the Middle Eastern mob,” adding that the party pretends to believe in freedom, democracy, and equality while in reality the government consists of “closed-minded, hate-spouting xenophobes and anti-Semites.” Comparing the current Turkish government to the Ottoman empire, Lerner says, “Ottoman emperors were the opposite of the narrow, hate-filled ideologues who govern the Arab and Persian states and, alas, Turkey today,” adding that the regime is “anti-western, anti-Christian, or anti-Jewish.” Lerner expresses four concerns: one, that the Turkish secular military has failed in its duties due to its fear of jeopardizing Turkish membership in the EU; two, that the AKP has infiltrated all secular institutions with its Islamist followers in order to consolidate its power; three that anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment amongst Turks is growing; and four, that the West has failed to hold the AKP accountable for its “extreme hostility to our legitimate and vital security interests.”
In another analysis of political developments in Turkey, Soner Cagapatay writes in Newsweek that “Turkey is heading toward a European model, but it is neither modern nor liberal.” Instead, he argues that Turkey is moving towards the East European model of the 1940’s, “when communist parties took power in democratic elections, only to subvert democracy and veil their nations behind the Iron Curtain.” Cagapatay equates communism with Islamism, saying, “both movements, rooted in an illiberal ideology, see democracy as a means to an end and espouse a Manichaean, us vs. them mentality.” He moves on to propose that the AKP will continue to support Islamist leaders in the region and “trample on free media, gender equality, and democratic safeguards such as an independent judiciary” in its own country. However, like Lerner, Cagapatay is hopeful that Kemal Kiliçdaroglu of the secular Republican People’s Party may gain public support, which Cagtaptay argues can only be achieved through “grassroots politics.” He adds that “the West must stand with democracy by ensuring free and fair elections and maintaining a level political playing field.”
The Hudson Institute’s Current Trends in Islamic Ideology recently published an interesting piece discussing the dual relationship between the clerical establishment and the theocratic government in Iran. In the piece, Mehdi Khalaji describes the aftermath of last year’s elections as a time when the government significantly discredited the clerical establishment, while the clergy largely “remained silent against the regime’s attacks.” Tracing the extant tension between the clergy and the government back to the Safavid era, he explains that Ayatollah Khomeini’s presentation of velayat-e-faqhi, Islamic jurisprudence, integrated the two factions. However, according to Khalaji, “the history of Iran since the Islamic revolution has shown that Khomeini’s vision has largely failed, and that the Shiite clerical establishment has not fully incorporated itself into the state apparatus.” Khalaji also argues that many in the Shi’a clerical establishment have shown strong resistance against a modern republic and have instead supported monarchies as a protector of “the immunity of Islam.” There have also always been Shi’a clerics who have rejected Khomeini’s theory of and Islamic republic, including Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, who advocated against the politicization of the Shi’a clerical community.
Khalaji argues that the theocratic government in Iran has increasingly confiscated much of the clerical establishment’s independence and gained control of its institutions. The Iranian regime has used “instruments to punish anti-regime tendencies” and has given incentives to “pro-regime behavior,” Khalaji explains, adding that the interest amongst clerics to preserve their standing in society has led to their passivity in responding to the “regime’s oppressive violence” since last year’s presidential elections. However, this does not entail that the clerics are in favor of Khomeini’s idea of a Supreme Leader, he explains. While this may be true, Khalaji expresses his concern that no Shi’a cleric in Iran has introduced an “alternative to the theory of the rule of the jurist.” With that said, Khalaji believes that many are looking to Iraq as a new form and idea of a Shi’a state.
Al-Masry Al-Youm reported today that the Muslim brotherhood has decided to promote the NAC’s reform platform on its website and is calling for Egyptian political actors to sign presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei’s petition for seven reforms, including repealing the emergency law, amending the Constitution to allow multi-party presidential elections, ensuring judicial supervision of elections, and ending election fraud. According to Hossam Tamam, an expert on political Islam and former editor at IslamOnline, the Brotherhood’s decision indicates not a sincere backing of ElBaradei’s campaign, but an attempt to use the NAC to gain greater negotiating power against the Mubarak government in the upcoming elections. “By supporting ElBaradei, the Muslim Brotherhood can put pressure on the regime and force it to reach a compromise with them, eventually granting them a certain quota of parliamentary seats,” he says. Meanwhile, Hassan Nafae, the NAC coordinator, rejected this analysis and called such interpretations “destructive.”
