Project on Middle East Democracy

May 2009 Newsletter



 

Project on Middle East Democracy

May 2009 Newsletter

 

 

 

From the POMED Wire

 

Left Waiting at the Door

Four Egyptian youth groups-the Democratic Front Party Youth, the Ghad Party Youth, the April 6 Youth Movement and the Cairo Liberal Forum-have released a statement criticizing the Egyptian ruling party and the conduct of President Obama’s upcoming speech in Cairo…
 
Obama in Egypt: Realism at What Cost?

In this past weekend’s New York Times, James Traub writes about the ideological tightrope President Obama must walk in his upcoming speech to the Muslim world in Cairo on Thursday…

Groups Lobby President Ahead of Speech
The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) released an open letter to “President Obama and the Muslim World” today which offers a “Muslim perspective on what governments, leaders and individuals can do to improve the prospects for international peace and prosperity…”

 

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Dear Friends,

This week, the president heads to Cairo to deliver one of the most important foreign policy addresses of his young presidency. This long anticipated speech to the Muslim world will answer any number of questions about the Obama administration’s perspective on and priorities in the Middle East - including the extent to which democracy and human rights will be supported or neglected.

So far, the signals from the Obama Administration on this important question have been mixed. On the one hand, many noted Secretary Clinton’s damaging remarks in China, dismissing the importance of raising human rights in her official meetings - remarks that were no doubt read in Tunis and Cairo, as well as in Beijing. We learned also that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), which this year celebrates the 35th anniversary of their important Congressionally-mandated annual reports on human rights, will be kicked out of State’s main building and moved into the Red Cross building across the street. Then came the news that Congress, apparently prompted by the US embassy in Cairo, would cut by 60% our aid for democracy activists and other governance-related goals in Egypt - a country whose symbolic importance for U.S. policy in the region is underscored by the president’s trip this week and which may be headed into a difficult two years as the country prepares for President Mubarak’s succession, whether by democratic or undemocratic means. Meanwhile, we still have no Assistant Secretary for DRL and no USAID administrator. By this account, what should be a rebuilding year has instead become a year in which U.S. tools for supporting democracy have been dismantled, dismissed, or allowed to deteriorate - a full-gear backlash against Bush.

On the other hand, there has been some good news.  The administration’s budget numbers - just released last Wednesday - include levels of support for democracy and governance in the region that exceed those of the previous administration. Funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was kept steady in the 2009 omnibus appropriations package passed by Congress in March while funds for the the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) were maintained but decreased; the president’s latest budget proposal for 2010 includes requests for significant funding increases for both. In other words, there is some indication that the Obama administration is doing precisely what they suggested they would: continuing to support democracy but talking about it less. Of course, it may also be questioned whether a strategy of democracy assistance de-coupled from clear public statements is likely to be effective.

The mixed signals continued last week. On Wednesday, Secretary Clinton told reporters that she raised the issue of democracy and human rights in her meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. On Thursday Clinton took a photo op and brief meeting with Freedom House’s New Generation Fellows - precisely the kind of Egyptian democracy activists the current budget proposal suggests we stop supporting. With the activists as a backdrop, Clinton told the cameras that democracy and human rights “is a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy.” She also suggested that it would be included as one of four key lines of discussion with Egyptian officials in a proposed strategic dialogue with Egypt, of the kind the U.S. now conducts with both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

More troubling, however, was the Secretary’s pointed contention that in contrast to spending on “economic opportunity” in Egypt, the U.S. has spent “many billions of dollars over the last yearspromoting NGOs, promoting democracy, good governance, rule of law.” Economic opportunity deserved greater emphasis, she said, “because out of economic opportunity comes confidence, comes a recognition that people can chart their own future.” These two points - that the U.S. spends untold billions on our aid relationships with democracy activists and that economic opportunity is likely to independently promote democratization in a repressive state like Egypt - are both patently false and rather awful starting points for our relationship with the Egyptian government and people at the outset of the Obama administration.

But all that is now behind us. President Obama’s upcoming visit and speech will set the stage for at least the next few years of U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim (and especially Egyptian) audiences. Three issues matter - 1) What he says, 2) What he does, and 3) What he announces.

Most of the attention in the run-up to the speech has focused on the president’s rhetorical ability. Touted as a “Philadelphia speech on US-Islamic world relations,” in reference to the president’s major address on race during the campaign, the speech is widely expected to be broad, thoughtful, and well-executed. The U.S. sorely needs a “reset” with Muslims and Muslim-majority countries. And although a single speech can only do so much, it is worth noting that since Zogby and other polling firms began tracking such data, no U.S. president has ever enjoyed levels of public support in Arab and Muslim countries on the scale that President Obama now does. People are far from won over, professor Shibley Telhami told a Washington audience recently, but they are interested - perhaps cautiously optimistic. There is an opportunity to build on that opening, but to do so President Obama’s language will need to resonate not with the diplomatic goals of Arab governments but with popular demands, including internationally-oriented demands for respect, independence, and attention to grievances but also domestically-focused demands for basic liberal and democratic rights, rule of law and justice reforms, better economic management, and less corruption.

Beyond the speech, however, is the question of how Obama will spend the rest of his time in Cairo. No doubt he will have an audience with Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak. President Mubarak has been a valuable ally of the United States in several ways, including with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in intelligence-sharing for counterterrorism, and through its stable, pacific relations with Israel. However, the president’s official schedule cannot stop there. President Obama should also meet with representatives of independent civil society groups. Since the main purpose of his visit is to speak directly to people in the broader Arab and Muslim world, it would be particularly awkward if Obama neglected to meet face to face with any actual Arabs and Muslims while in Egypt, beyond his official hosts. So far, however, the White House has given no indication civic activists will be invited to do anything more than attend President Obama’s speech.

Finally, what will he announce? As of last week, the White House continued to debate what if anything President Obama might announce while in Cairo - whether new policies or new aid initiatives. With so much of the focus on the visit and the president himself, there may be little need for anything more. However, the broad message of the trip - an American desire for a strong, direct relationship with the Arab and Muslim world - could be supplemented by a new initiative that amplified or somehow institutionalized that sentiment.

POMED has been actively involved in these debates, from our January paper offering suggestions for “What Should Obama Say to the Middle East?” to our more recent report on ways for the U.S. to further integrate the reform agenda into our broader bilateral relationship with Egypt. In meetings on Capitol Hill and with executive branch officials, we have argued the importance of clearly enunciating U.S. support for human rights and democracy in the Middle East; following that rhetoric up with substantive efforts to encourage political reform in Egypt; and strengthening U.S. tools for aiding democratic reform and civic activists. And with your help, we will continue to do so after Thursday’s speech.

As always, I want to thank this community for your support of our work, and also to encourage you to send us your feedback on how we can do better.

All the best,
Andrew


Andrew Albertson
Executive Director
Project on Middle East Democracy
andrew.albertson@pomed.org
(202) 422-6804

 

 

POMED Updates

 

Egypt Report and Event

On May 20, POMED released a new report, “Looking Forward: An Integrated Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt,” by Greg Aftandilian.  The paper offers concrete recommendations for how to integrate political reform as a key issue in the U.S. relationship with Egypt.

As Obama prepares for his visit to Cairo, the report is a must-read for anyone concerned about getting that relationship right.

Our roll-out event on Capitol Hill featured warm reviews from Ambassador Ned Walker, Tom Malinoski of Human Rights Watch, and Neil Hicks of Human Rights First.

Since the report’s release, Greg and POMED’s Director of Advocacy Steve McInerney have briefed administration officials on its recommendations.

Multilateralism Conference

From May 20-22, POMED co-sponsored with the Heinrich Boll Foundation an intensive workshop discussion on the need for greater multilateral cooperation toward political reform in the Middle East. The workshop was attended by an outstanding group of 15 under-40 leaders from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. It was hosted by Georgetown University’s Center for Democracy and Civil Society.

The discussion culminated in a public event on Friday, May 22, at which several of the participants shared their views.

This was the first of two planned workshops on the topic. At this workshop, the participants discussed the shared reform goals that multilateral cooperation might support. In a second workshop in September, hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center, participants will return to discuss the multilateral mechanisms by which that agenda might be advanced.

Letter to President Obama

POMED’s letter to President Obama, drafted together with the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), continues to gain support and attention.  More than 1500 policy experts, scholars, and activists have now signed the letter, urging President Obama to make support for democracy and human rights in the Middle East a priority.  The letter stresses the need for a more consistent and credible policy that focuses on supporting gradual, indigenous democratic reform.

Since the letter’s release, POMED and the letter’s coordinating committee have discussed the letter with key officials at the State Department. We will continue to seek meetings with executive branch officials and members of Congress.

You can add your voice to this message to President Obama by signing the letter here.

Upcoming Events

Happy Hour

On the eve of President Obama’s speech, we’ve got a great happy hour planned to bring together young professionals who care about the Middle East. Please join us for drinks, food, hookah, and a fantastic time.

Where: Gazuza Patio (1629 Connecticut Ave NW # 4 Washington, DC 20009)
When: Wed., June 3, 6-8pm
RSVP to: happyhour@pomed.org

 

After the Cairo Address

On Thursday afternoon, following the Cairo address, POMED will co-sponsor an event with the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy.  The event will look at what President Obama says and what that tells us about the priority his administration will give to human rights and democracy in the Middle East.

Please join us only hours after Thursday’s address is delivered in Cairo for a discussion with leading American and Arab experts to examine the speech and what it may signal about the Obama administration’s approach to the region. 

 

Geneive Abdo
The Century Foundation

Richard Eisendorf
Freedom House

Fouad Makhzoumi
National Dialogue Party of Lebanon

Will Marshall
Progressive Policy Institute

Ahmad Moussalli
American University of Beirut

Moderated by Radwan A. Masmoudi, CSID

 

Thursday, June 4, 2009

2:00 - 3:30 pm

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 601

Washington DC, 20036

 

Please RSVP to:  rsvp1@islam-democracy.org

May Legislative Roundup


May was another busy month on Capitol Hill.  Congress had aimed to pass a final version of the Fiscal Year 2009 supplemental appropriations bill before adjourning for the weeklong Memorial Day recess, but was unable to do so.  The Senate passed an amended version of the House bill just before adjourning, but a conference committee will work on a unified version of the bill this week.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration submitted to Congress the details of its budget request for Fiscal Year 2010, which will form the basis for the FY2010 appropriations process this summer.  Overall, the request increases funding to support democracy and goverance in the region, with a particular emphasis on funding to support rule of lawand human rights, which saw funding more than doubled.  POMED will soon have a number of reports analyzing the budget request and the following the appropriations process this summer.

Foreign Affairs Funding and Authorization

On May 12, Rep. David Obey (D-WI) introduced H.R.2346, the emergency appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2009.  On May 14, the House approved the bill, which provides nearly $97 billion in funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through September 30 of this year.  It also includes additional foreign assistance to several states in the region, including Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.  The bill passed in a vote of 368-60, with 51 Democrats in opposition over concerns that the administration is escalating the war in Afghanistan without a clear exit strategy.  Sen. Daniel Inouye initially introduced a Senate version, S.1054, before acting on the House version H.R.2346, which was amended before being passed in the Senate in an 86-3 vote.  In addition to emergency appropriations for U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the bill would also make appropriations through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts for a number of other Middle East states.  There are a number of differences between the versions of this bill passed by the House and the Senate: the House version provides $50 million in economic aid to Egypt while the Senate version has none, the Senate version includes $15  million in economic aid for Yemen while the House version has none, and the Senate version contains higher levels of supplemental assistance for Jordan and Lebanon.

On May 13, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced S.1033, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and on May 14,  Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Howard Berman (D-CA) introduced legislation, H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011.  This, being the first re-authorization bill since 2002, aims to improve U.S. foreign policy efforts, especially in the areas of diplomacy and development. Among other things, the bill authorizes the hiring of 1500 additional Foreign Service Officers and the creation of a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps within the Foreign Service, ensures that the U.S. will meet its financial commitments to the UN, establishes the Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation to expand the number of U.S. students studying overseas, supports the administration’s plan to double the size of the Peace Corps, and authorizes a plan to use short-term volunteers to respond to humanitarian and development needs worldwide.  On May 20, the bill was considered and amended by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be reported as amended by voice vote.

Afghanistan

On May 21, S.Con.Res.19, a concurrent resolution which expresses the sense of Congress that the Shiite Personal Status Law in Afghanistan violates the fundamental human rights of women and calls for the laws repeal, was passed in the Senate by a Unanimous Consent. The resolution was sponsored by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) on the Senate side and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) on the House side.

On May 14, Rep. James McGovern (D-MA) introduced H.R.2404, a bill requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress by the end of 2009 a report outlining the United States exit strategy for United States military forces in Afghanistan participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Development Assistance to Pakistan

On May 22, H.R.1886, sponsored by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), a bill which authorizes democratic, economic, and social development assistance to Pakistan, was reported as amended by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bill, also known as the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009 would authorize President Obama to provide to Pakistan funding for military training, to bolster the rule of law, economic development, good governance, health care and educational programs. The bill also prohibits assistance if the Pakistani government is not dismantling their nuclear program or taking appropriate steps to combat terrorism.
 
Public Diplomacy

On May 7, S.Res.49, sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a bill which would express the sense of the Senate regarding the importance of public diplomacy, was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. The bill cites the negative view of the United States abroad and Freedom House’s figure that 123 countries have a press classified as “Not Free” as reasons for a reexamination of the public diplomacy platform strategy of the United States. Specifically, the bill recommends establishing American cultural centers “in societies in which freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or local investment in education [are] minimal.”

Anti-Americanism in the Press

On May 6, H.R.2278, sponsored by Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), a bill which would direct the President to provide Congress with a report on anti-American incitement to violence in the Middle East, was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bill cites al-Manar, al-Aqsa, and al-Zawra television stations as ones which “broadcast incitement to violence against the United States and…aid Foreign Terrorist Organizations in the key functions of recruitment, fundraising and propaganda.” The bill would designate such providers ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists” and consider punitive measures against them.

Iran Sanctions

On Monday (5/18), S.1065, a bill which would authorize State and local governments to direct divesture from, and prevent investment in, companies with investments of $20,000,0000 or more in Iran’s energy sector, was introduced and referred to the Senate committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. The bill is sponsored by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS).

 

 

Lebanon’s Elections: The End of the Breathing Room
 
By David Mikhail, POMED Research Associate

Last year’s brief unrest between the majority March 14 coalition and Hizbullah’s March 8 coalition ultimately ended in an agreement in Doha.  The United States and the United Nations expressed their jubilation at the end of violence, and Lebanon’s mantra of “No Victor, No Vanquished” was, once again, applied. Yet those who understood the workings of the Lebanese political machine did not share in the optimism. The potential of Doha never came from the immediate concessions it entailed, which were in any case fragile and reversible.  Rather, it was found in the all-important “breathing room,” a period of peace between last June and the parliamentary elections this summer where the parties could negotiate towards a stable future.  The problem, however, is that this breathing room produced little in the way of real change.  As the nation enters these elections on June 7th, the reality is that the bygone forces of destabilization are very much in play.

Hizbullah-Militant and Moderated

An explicit provision of the Doha Agreement called for the eventual disarmament of Hizbullah. Not only has this not happened, but Hizbullah has ostensibly taken on a new boldness. The group admitted to smuggling arms into Gaza for Hamas and was implicated by the Egyptian government in an effort to plot attacks in that country.

But if Hizbullah is using its activities outside of Lebanon to maintain its resistance bona fides, it has seemingly done the opposite in country. Hizbullah’s contributions to last year’s Gaza conflict were largely rhetorical - presumably to avoid losing political capital by dragging Lebanon into another war with Israel by opening up a second front from the North. This balancing act allowed the group to stretch the sympathy it received from their 2006 war with Israel. For now, Hizbullah achieved what most Western powers feared: gaining political capital without sacrificing their weapons to do it.

From a practical standpoint, the weapons issue has all but shut down national reconciliation efforts that have been ongoing throughout the year. That Hizbullah has shown no willingness to budge on the issue has served as the quintessential non-starter.

Little in the Way of Reform

The most encouraging aspect of Doha came with the creation of smaller electoral districts, departing from the larger district scheme that was endorsed by Syria. But this is more or less where electoral reform ended. Effective campaign finance regulations, and more importantly, measures to reverse the nation’s long-used practice of vote-buying have been non-existent. Hundreds of millions of dollars are expected to flow into Lebanon to buy votes for the upcoming races.

The most ambitious proposal of the Boutros Commission, and therefore the most glaring objection, was the shift to proportional representation. Under this plan, 51 of the 128 seats would be subject to proportional representation, which would translate into increased power for smaller political factions as well as Lebanese Shiites, who make up the largest plurality in the country. Efforts by President Michel Sleiman and Prime Minister Siniora to re-introduce the issue have done little to forward the cause. The enduring power of the Lebanese confessional system and the lack of any real political will to change it are in full display.

Beyond the sectarianism, the confessional system has given added power to Shia and Sunni militants. While Hizbullah has been able to rely on moderate Shiites, March 14 has looked to the support of Sunni Islamists to maintain political control.
 
What Violence Awaits

It’s widely acknowledged that, with the likely closeness of the races, the outcome will be decided by Christian voters. As calls for Christian reconciliation persist, March 8 member and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and March 14 member and Free Patriot Movement leader Michel Aoun have targeted Christian voters. Any effort at reconciliation, however, has been undermined by violence between opposing factions. Most notably, this led to the deaths of Pierre Ishak, a supporter of March 14, and Youssef Franjieh, one of the heads of the Marada Movement, a Christian party backing March 8.

The prospect of violence has not lessened outside of the Christian realm either. Last year, after Hizbullah was widely seen as the “winner” in Doha, Sunni Islamists waged a violent campaign against Alawite Shiites in the North. The new catalyst for Sunni Islamist resentment could be the tribunal to try the perpetrators of the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The tribunal already released the only suspects it had detained so far. If successful convictions are not achieved, and if the implication of Hizbullah in the assassination grows stronger, the Sunni-based Future Movement, the largest member of March 14, and Future Movement leaders Saad Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, will lose credibility. Sunni Islamists, meanwhile, may take their frustrations to the streets.
 
Beyond the Races

March 8 demanded and ultimately received cabinet veto power last year. Just one no-vote from the opposition would block any measure. In a context with little to no independent civil society and a scant history of cross-party collaboration, and with nothing to improve the situation inside the Doha breathing room, this veto power will likely produce more legislative deadlock regardless of who wins on June 7th.

Whatever progress occurs from here on out, the reality is that the year that March 14 and March 8 had to take steps towards real reconciliation went largely untapped. Only the future will determine whether this omission was the stuff of true political tragedy.