Dear Friends,

The American people have voted, and Barack Obama will be the next president of the United States.  So what does that mean for U.S. support for democracy in the Middle East?

I think there’s reason to hope - or rather several reasons - that Obama could be an extraordinary supporter of democracy, particularly in the Middle East.  But there are also reasons to be concerned that if this community does not consistently highlight the importance of democratic development to the achievement of U.S. goals and interests in the Middle East, it could slip from the agenda.

First, the good stuff.  An Obama administration will make clear from the outset: democracy cannot be imposed by force, it can only be supported through peaceful means.  I think - I hope - Obama will likewise make clear that U.S. policy will not abandon support for human rights and democratic reform in the Middle East during his presidency.

Second, I think an Obama administration will get started immediately doing what’s most important - working to restore U.S. credibility on human rights and democracy by closing Guantanamo, and ending definitively extraordinary rendition, torture, and indefinite detention without trial.  Moreover, an Obama administration would work to rebuild our working relationships with allies through multilateral institutions and new international initiatives.  Both of these are crucial.

Third, Obama prides himself on being a good listener, and I think there’s a good chance that early in his presidency he and his advisors would embark on a listening tour of the Middle East, to talk with government and civil society leaders.  Going to the region to listen, and not just to bring, or dictate, solutions, would express powerfully a resolve to partner with the people and governments of the Middle East in support of human development.

Fourth, Obama has personal skills - born of his experience as a community organizer - that could serve him very well as a supporter of democracy and human rights.   He can speak directly to young people in the region - leveraging his persona of hope and change.  He can make an argument, persuade, engage in constructive diplomacy in a way that other presidents have not been able to do.  And he seems to have an inherent faith in the capacity of people, if properly supported and motivated, to drive change from the bottom-up - a necessary complement to top-down reforms.  Finally, it seems possible that just hinting at that capacity to speak directly to the people in powerful ways, could shift the terms of discussion about political reforms

Fifth, an Obama administration would likely work to strengthen the civilian tools necessary to support democratic activists.  Obama has stated a desire to double foreign assistance over time.  Included in that, he would ask Congress for a “Rapid Response Fund” to support countries in the wake of democratic breakthroughs.  His administration has promised to expand the size of the USAID and State Department Foreign Services, and to elevate the role of USAID to enhance its independence and strength.  Finally, Obama has said he would appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor to develop integrated country strategies for supporting democracy and development.

But of course, these qualities speak to an Obama administration’s generic strong starting place if it were to try to support democracy in the Middle East.  The above says little of its priorities, and here is where some have voiced concerns.

First, Obama is the leader of a Democratic party that has to some extent soured on support for democracy - particularly in the Middle East.  In reaction to President Bush’s failed freedom agenda, arguments have been raised that the next administration should focus on anything but democracy in the Middle East: economic issues and poverty reduction instead of political reforms and democracy; the strengthening of government institutions over support for free and fair elections that hold governments accountable; and in Asia, Africa, or Latin America instead of the Middle East.  Nonetheless, it seems more likely that an Obama administration would try to broaden the freedom agenda - to include human security, economic development, justice and rule of law, alongside democratic development - rather than jettison that agenda altogether.

Second, in a year of crises, the administration will be forced to focus its diplomacy on dealing with Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the peace process, and the global financial crisis. Each of these challenges requires the help of our allied governments in the Middle East.  The perception is that it could be difficult to navigate these challenges while simultaneously leveraging diplomacy in support of basic rights - the right to organize and speak freely, the rights to a free media and an independent judiciary.  The question here is whether the Obama administration will enunciate an interest in partnering with regional governments alone, or whether instead it voices an interest in partnering with the region’s people in their pursuit of human development.

Third, there are concerns that an Obama administration could drastically reform important institutions, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), or in the context of a tight budget, cut their funding in favor of other goals.  Such cuts are certainly possible - and they would send dangerous signals to the region’s ruling establishments. But rather than cuts, I expect reform.  MCC may be multilateralized, with new donors added and its governance reformed, in an effort to improve its effectiveness.  MEPI may be restructured, and perhaps moved out of the State Department’s Bureau of Near East Affairs, which could undermine certain advantages that it now enjoys, but would at least continue our existing funding relationships with local democracy activists in the region.

So what does this all mean? Early on, I think we will see a coalition of two blocks of administration officials: one group that favors dropping democracy far down the agenda totem pole, and a second that strongly supports democracy and human rights, but wishes to approach the topic patiently out of the conviction that the U.S. must first restore its credibility on the subject.  From that coalition, we will likely see a patient approach - beginning by working to restore US credibility on human rights, going to the region to listen and not just to dictate, and renewing a conversation with European allies about shared interests in human development.

Nonetheless, a few indicators will help us discern whether such an approach will serve as a prudent foundation for future activism or as a substitution for it.  First, when Obama travels to the region, does he meet with only government officials or also civil society leaders?  Second, in his speeches, does he speak directly to the region’s people, or only about them - does he highlight the importance of a partnership between Americans and Middle Easterners, or only between our respective governments?  In the realm of assistance, will the Obama administration build up its tools for flexibly getting aid to the democracy activists that drive change, or will it neglect those tools?  And will it instruct diplomats to highlight the importance of basic rights and freedoms, or neglect these issues in public statements and private conversations with autocratic allies in the region?

As a former community organizer, Obama knows that change won’t come simply from the top-down - it has to be driven by people from the bottom up.  By his early actions, we will get a sense of whether he chooses to act on that knowledge, supporting and inspiring change, or tries - like many presidents before him - to evade the difficult but nonetheless vital issue of democratic reform in the Middle East.

Best,

Andrew

Andrew Albertson
Executive Director
Project on Middle East Democracy
andrew.albertson@pomed.org
(202) 422-6804

POMED Updates

Now that the American people have chosen our next President, POMED looks forward to supporting the transition process to the new Obama administration, which will be a focus for us over the next few months.  At the same time, the past month has been a busy time for POMED, with several exciting events and developments.

POMED Welcomes Two New Members to Our Board of Advisors

We are honored and excited to announce the addition of two new members to our Advisory Board: Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Interntaional Center for Scholars, and Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Their expertise and guidance will be tremendously valuable as POMED continues to grow.

See the full list of our Advisory Board here.

Public Event on Religion and State

On October 6, POMED and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hosted a panel discussion titled “Religion and State: A Middle East, U.S., and EU ‘Trialogue.’” The event featured Geneive Abdo of the Century Foundation, Ibrahim Houdaiby of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, former Congressman Bob Edgar of Common Cause, and Dietmar Nietan of the German Social Democratic Party, moderated by POMED’s Executive Director, Andrew Albertson. 

Geneive Abdo addressed the permanent tension in Islamic societies between the authority of the state and that of the religious clerisy. Ibrahim Houdaiby noted that all three major monotheisms share basic human values that should govern societies, and argued that a society governed by absolute secularism loses certain human values that only a religious framework can provide. Dietmar Nietan noted that all European nations share the difficulty of integrating their Muslim populations. He stressed the need for dialogue with religious groups and noted such engagement has proven historically successful. Bob Edgar asserted a strong belief in the separation of church and state, but not in the separation of people of faith from government institutions.

More detailed notes of the panel discussion are available on POMED’s website. 

Book Event with James Traub at Georgetown

On October 20, POMED and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies hosted James Traub, contributing writer at the New York Times Magazine, and Michele Dunne, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to discuss Traub’s new book, The Freedom Agenda: Why America Must Spread Democracy (Just Not the Way George Bush Did). The event was moderated by POMED’s Director of Dialogue Programs, David DeBartolo.

Traub lamented the Bush Administration’s contamination of democracy promotion by linking it indelibly with the Iraq war, and called for continuing support for Middle East reformers and for recognizing the legitimacy of the region’s moderate Islamist parties. Michele Dunne said that although U.S. credibility has suffered, support for democracy is still very high in the Middle East.

More detail on the event is available here.

POMED Hosts Egyptian Blogger Nora Younis

On October 17, POMED hosted a small discussion event for prominent Egyptian blogger and human rights activist Nora Younis with several local Washington-based bloggers to discuss  her experiences, the challenges faced by bloggers, activists, and journalists in Egypt, and her perspective on recent political developments.  For more detail on the discussion, see the descriptions on POMED’s blog or at Partnership for a Secure America’s Across the Aisle blog.  On October 20, POMED also co-sponsored a Capitol Hill briefing with Human Rights First for Nora to discuss these issues with Congressional staffers.

The Challenges of Democracy and Secularism in Turkey

By Nick Danforth, POMED Research Associate

In July, Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) narrowly escaped being banned by the country’s Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was a “focus of anti-secular activities.” In the frenzy surrounding this closure case, many observers were moved to write of Turkey’s choice between secularism and democracy. But as long as these two values are seen as contradictory, Turkey is likely to remain neither fully democratic nor fully secular. Now, with this summer’s crisis past, it is time to ask how democracy and secularism have come to appear so incompatible in Turkey, and how this misperception can be corrected. 

Crucially, the value enshrined in one of the unamendable articles of the Turkish constitution is not “secularism” but Laiklik, a cognate of the French Laïcité. In Turkey this is not understood as the separation of religion and state, but rather, the subordination of religion to the state.  In Turkey, mosques are government funded, imams legally required to be government trained, and Friday sermons subject to review by the Ministry of Religion. Symbols of personal religiosity, like headscarves, are not allowed in government buildings and Turkey’s Prime Minister was banned from politics in the 1990s for inappropriately invoking religion in a speech. In this context, when AKP politicians are quoted as calling for “redefining secularism” they are not necessarily demanding theocracy, but rather chafing against intrusive restrictions that would shock Americans from across the political spectrum.

That said, the fears which motivate Turkey’s “secularists” should not be dismissed lightly. While President Gül’s wife’s headscarf was the subject of much debate, her age at the time of their marriage - 15 - was seldom mentioned. Gül was 30. Both Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül rose to prominence - Erdogan as mayor of Istanbul and Gül as Foreign Minister - in the 1990s as part of a party that denounced the EU as a Zionist conspiracy, and called for the creation of an explicitly Islamic court system.

Turkey’s secularists worry that because of what they see as the extreme and growing religiosity of Turkish society, a more open, American approach to secularism would not work in their society. That the Refah party could come to power in the 1990s (albeit as part of a coalition, with only 21 Percent of the vote) helped fuel a profound suspicion of the Turkish electorate that every AKP victory exacerbates. The fear is that if the AKP secretly does want to impose Sharia, voters might not necessarily want to stop them, or be willing to stand up for the rights of women or religious minorities. Seeing women in black chadors in the center of Istanbul or reading about honor killings in the city’s outskirts cements the belief that drastic steps are needed to maintain a social order where women are permitted to hold jobs, show their hair, and speak to men in public.

Unfortunately, these fears have led the AKP’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), to adopt a heavy-handed and confrontational approach, which has in turn further galvanized support for the AKP.  When the AKP won 47 percent of the vote in July of 2007, it appeared to demonstrate voters’ anger over the CHP’s semi-democratic efforts to block Abdullah Gül’s election to the presidency. Many in the AKP similarly believe that if their party had been closed in July, its successor would have won an even more resounding victory in the country’s next election. When, last spring, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allow women to wear headscarves in universities, the CHP appealed to the constitutional court, which ruled the amendment itself unconstitutional because it contradicted an unamendable constitutional principle. The AKP’s support for the amendment was also used as evidence against it in the closure case.

There is reason to believe, though, that events may conspire to break this vicious cycle. The AKP was elected in 2002 in part based on the belief that its religious orientation would keep it immune from the corruption that bedeviled Turkish politics in the 1990s. It was then re-elected in 2007 in large part because of its successful management of the economy. Now that the AKP is facing well-publicized corruption charges and the Turkish economy appears unlikely to escape the global crisis unscathed, there is reason to believe the electoral tide may turn against it. This may in turn diminish the fears driving the secular opposition and enable a more successful CHP to take a more moderate approach to issues of religious freedom. At the same time President Gül will have the chance to appoint several new judges to the constitutional court during his term, creating a court that would have a more liberal interpretation of secularism. 

As the United States ushers in a new administration and reestablishes its foreign policy priorities, it is essential that the U.S. express unequivocal support for Turkish democracy. It must also make clear, though, that this support comes not at the expense of secularism, as some in Turkey fear. Rather, it is with faith that the Turkish people, when given the choice, will vote for the continuation of secularism. The U.S. should make clear its belief, for example, that liberalizing the definition of secularism, by allowing headscarves in universities, is not the first step towards oppressive theocracy in Turkey, but rather the first step towards a democracy where its citizens enjoy the same freedom of religion that we in America cherish. In this, U.S. support for democracy is a vote of confidence in the maturity of Turkish society and in the ultimate success of the long process of modernization and reform that has defined the Turkish Republic.