Obvious challenges to free and fair elections included the regime’s undemocratic restriction of competition that is sanctioned by the constitutional and legal electoral framework, and the ruling party’s thorough influence over the electoral process via its grip on state institutions and close bonds with the presidency.

Also acknowledged as problems were the numerous security and organizational obstacles facing opposition parties and movements in order to field their candidates and communicate with citizens and the limited local oversight of elections and absence of international monitoring.

However, these discussions addressed only a sliver of the election-based difficulties Egypt currently faces. Although the elite-perpetuated absence of electoral fairness and transparency is undoubtedly important, other less-discussed shortcomings have surfaced within the current electoral race. 

First, few weeks before elections, none of Egypt’s main political parties participating in elections, nor the Muslim Brotherhood have announced their electoral programs. NDP and opposition leaders continued to voice generalized positions on social, political and economic issues.

These weak electoral programs, partly a product of the single-vote electoral system in place, display characteristics typical of political environments with restricted competition.  For example, the ruling party did not use its program to defend the outcome of the policies adopted since the last parliamentary elections or to showcase intended changes. On the other hand, the opposition did not dare to objectively criticize the regime’s policies or put forth detailed alternative policies.

These hollow party programs allowed candidates to vainly echo their parties’ slogans (such as “citizens come first” and “Islam is the solution”) without grounding them in the issues that affect average Egyptians. They also rendered the electoral race a competition of individuals with well-financed campaigns, for example members of the business elite, union representatives, representatives of highly influential families and groups in rural areas, and candidates from state and security institutions.  With the exception of the last category, these candidates are fielded by both the NDP and opposition parties alike; however, all parties failed to account for the contradictions in interests between these various groups. 

Secondly, Egyptian voters lacked sufficient knowledge of mechanisms political parties use to choose their candidates. The Wafd Party released little information to supporters regarding its General Assembly’s decision by a narrow margin to participate in elections and the party’s subsequent selection of candidates.  Transparency was also absent from the Muslim Brotherhood’s procedures―while the Brotherhood’s Guidance Office announced that a sweeping majority (98 percent) of the party voted in favor of electoral participation, some public figures from the Brotherhood have since contradicted these figures, claiming that only around 50 percent supported it.

The NDP’s mechanisms to choose candidates may appear transparent and fair. Candidates are chosen in a complicated, three-phase process: first, electoral primaries are held, whereby active NDP members (2.5 million) choose candidates. During a second phase, the results of primaries are added to the results of opinion polls conducted by the party, a rare trend among parties holding primaries. In the third and final phase, the names of candidates are referred to NDP leaders for their final decision. Transparency unquestionably encourages NDP members to run (this year, the number of NDP candidates in primaries neared 4,000).

However, this competition within the NDP, if examined closely, reflects only ceremonially transparency. In reality, it is the party’s leadership that eventually chooses candidates, with only partial consideration of the results of primaries or opinion polls. Similar to the procedures it followed during the 1980s and 1990s, the NDP aims to ensure that key individuals and representatives of powerful interest groups are selected. 

Thirdly, Law No. 18 of 2007 (amending Law No. 73 of 1956) grants full authority to oversee all aspects of the electoral process to the Higher Electoral Commission (which is chaired by the President of the Cairo Court of Appeal and includes the President of the Alexandria Court of Appeal, a deputy of the Court of Cassation, a vice-president of the State Council, and 7 other members (3 former members of judicial bodies and four public figures, all chosen by the People’s Council and the Shura Council).  Its tasks include updating and publishing voter lists, registering candidates, determining the date of the campaign launch, monitoring campaign expenses, ensuring candidates do not use religious or discriminatory slogans, state institutions, or places of worship, ensuring the neutrality of media coverage, and granting licenses for observers.

Though the prerogatives of the Commission are numerous on paper, in practice it encounters several obstacles beyond the NDP’s use of power to influence the outcome of the electoral process. For example, in a clear violation of the Commission’s decision that the electoral campaign would start in the middle of the month, electoral banners and posters have spread throughout Egypt’s streets following candidates’ registration. Candidates from the NDP, the Wafd, and the Muslim Brotherhood have disregarded and publically criticized the HEC’s decision that every candidate should spend no more than 200,000 Egyptian pounds on the campaign.

The Muslim Brotherhood has undoubtedly made the most controversial move to belittle the Commission’s decisions. With its admitted determination to use the slogan “Islam is the solution” in its campaign, the Brotherhood is blatantly violating the law prohibiting the use of religious slogans in elections, the law establishing the Higher Electoral Commission, and other laws regarding the exercise of political rights.  The Brotherhood also chooses to ignore Article 5 of the Constitution prohibiting any religious-based political activity. Such a trend stirs legitimate doubt regarding the Brotherhood’s level of respect for the constitutional and legal framework intended to regulate Egypt’s political life.  If―as these actions suggest―the Brotherhood reluctantly accepts this framework for the sake of participation while attempting to strategically undermine its components, Egyptian politics as a whole and the Brotherhood in particular risk descending into an even more weakened state of democracy.

Amr Hamzawy is research director and senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut.