The International Criminal Court is currently looking into Kenya’s 2007-08 post-election violence that left more than 1,000 people dead. The Court has not yet formally identified any key suspects, although former higher education minister William Ruto is believed to be under investigation. The following article originally appeared in The Star.
Some estimates point to the figure of about 1.5 million Kenyan shilling for such an enterprise. So personally footing the bill for a return trip for an entourage of at least four people to The Hague—with accommodation and meals thrown in—is something outside the fathomable paygrade of the ordinary mwananchi (citizen); about 50 percent of whom we are informed live below the poverty line.
But William Ruto is not an ordinary mwananchi: the former minister for Agriculture and Higher Education belongs to the higher echelons of Kenya’s political food chain and today galvanizes huge support among the Kalenjin community. However, last week’s trip by Ruto and at least three associates to the International Criminal Court's headquarters still does not represent some petty cash expenditure and there must have been clear strategic reasons for it; particularly given that he could as well have requested to meet with Louis Moreno Ocampo’s associates in Nairobi.
So what gives? Of course, the first line offered was that he had gone to The Hague to set the record straight around his alleged role in Kenya’s post-election violence. Ruto and his team have sought to impugn the integrity of the witnesses who have reportedly accused him of being involved in post-election violence. His lawyer Katwa Kigen, in a Sunday Nation op-ed, wrote: “At least seven of the so-called witnesses are people of questionable integrity with some having not only done time in jail but also subject of investigations by security agents.”
This was reinforced by his statement accusing those alleging that he was involved in post-election violence of having been hired and coached to bear false witness against him. Ruto particularly singled out Hassan Omar Hassan of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights: “He looked for them, paid them and promised them good life in big cities around the world... Hassan should tell the country his participation in coaching political mercenaries allied to political parties.” Curiously, how Ruto and his team know so much about the witnesses who supposedly bore false witness about him remains a mystery. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights was quick to repudiate Ruto’s statement asking for concrete evidence from Ruto of any wrongdoing on Hassan Omar’s part. Ruto has also pooh-poohed the Waki Report on post-election violence claiming he did not appear before the Waki Commission as it had stated.
However, it is doubtful that Ruto and his team would need to travel to The Hague at such considerable expense to make these allegations. So to the next reason offered for The Hague visit. This was that Ruto was asking the Court to indict President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga for their alleged role in Kenya’s post-election violence. Katwa Kigen was quoted: “It is the general feeling and mood of the country that those with the highest responsibility be held to account for the loss of life and property... In that regard the investigations should start with the President and the Prime Minister as people fought because of them... before moving down the ladder to those who played various roles.” Again, would Ruto have traveled to The Hague at such personal cost to make such a demand? Those who know Court's prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo will tell you that not to waste waste your saliva offering “advice” about how he will conduct his cases.
The third reason proffered for The Hague visit was that Ruto may have gone to plea-bargain: to offer “insider” information in exchange for a deal with the prosecution so that he is charged with some lesser offences. Some alleged minutes of the Orange Democratic Movement pentagon that have been circulating on email are offered as evidence that at least one strand of post-election violence was organized by the highest organ of the party. The ODM hierarchy led by Prime Minister Raila Odinga has categorically denied that such minutes exist by pointing out there was no such meeting. Two problems here: the veracity of the alleged minutes is highly questionable—the timing as well as the way they are being circulated punctures their credibility. Secondly, in a plea-bargain Ruto would have to accept some culpability even if at a lower level than those he accuses of being behind the post-election violence. This, it is submitted, hardly conforms to his political character profile.
The most intriguing explanation for The Hague visit by Ruto and his team is based on a worst-case-scenario analysis. In this scenario, he would be indicted and what would remain would be how to get to The Hague. There are two choices here: either through a warrant of arrest or through a summons to appear. The opprobrium of an arrest warrant is something that must frequently cross the mind and weigh heavily on those who have cause—reasonable or unreasonable—to fear that they are in the crosshairs of the Court. There is the public humiliation of being manacled and bundled helplessly into the custody of the Scheveningen detention facility. The alternative is to ensure that the Court is convinced that they do not need an arrest warrant to enforce attendance at the court since one will voluntarily appear there.
Now that would be something one could spend a seven-figure sum of money to establish. It is made even more enticing by the fact that through this option, there is a probability of getting bail. “Once the suspects co-operate, they will enjoy full liberties until the cases are concluded. Those liberties include continuing with their political agenda for 2012, 2017, and 2022 General Elections,” wrote Party of National Unity spokesman Moses Kuria this Tuesday in the Star.
This possibility has already occurred in the Court's case against two Darfur rebel leaders Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (Banda) and Saleh Modahmmed Jerbo Jamus (Jerbo). In this case, the Court has accused Banda and Jerbo of having led an attack on September 29, 2007, on the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) stationed in North Darfur, Sudan. The two are accused of three counts of war crimes under Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute: violence to life, in the form of murder, whether committed or attempted, within the meaning of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Statute; and pillaging, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute.
Arrest warrants were originally sought for the two but on February 23, 2009, the prosecutor submitted a request stating that the issuance of summonses to appear would be sufficient to ensure Banda and Jerbo's appearance because they had expressed willingness to appear before the Court. This application was granted with some conditions imposed. It would indicate a willingness by the Court to accommodate suspects who cooperate.
Now is that not something to break the bank for?
